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Thread: Undergraduate Student, Help w/Counterinsurgency Debate

  1. #21
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Throughout history, they’ve gotten into big conventional fights and are renowned for how well they do in them. It is easier to switch from COIN warfare to conventional than vice-versa.
    That is an outright lie! Sorry to put it so strongly, but who ever wrote that is talking utter garbage. It is absolutely not true, and entirely false. -what is more the British Army has proved this wrong over 100 years. The British Armies that did COIN from 45-95 where all Hi-intensity, nuclear war focussed forces! - FACT.

    A lot of COIN concerns the Restriction of Force. If you don't have the levels of force to restrict, then you are lost.

    Good armies can do both. This COIN-v-Conventional is utter BS. This is what is so dangerous about the COIN avant-garde, who seem to want to force the choice.

    It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN that it takes to turn a COIN force to conventional.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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  2. #22
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Totally true in my observation...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    ...Good armies can do both. This COIN-v-Conventional is utter BS. This is what is so dangerous about the COIN avant-garde, who seem to want to force the choice.

    It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN that it takes to turn a COIN force to conventional.
    One just needs to concentrate on the basics and get them thoroughly inculcated. Then it all becomes relatively simple; it's not nearly as complex as some seem to assume.

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    Default This is more a question, from the peanut gallery ...

    than an assertion of fact.

    What I glean, from such as Nagl's and Krepinevich's books, is that COIN operations require a smaller logistics tail than conventional operations. This seems intuitively logical (e.g., helicopters, tanks and arty are maintenance and support-intensive).

    If this be true (Wilf, Ken and everyone else ?), logistics would be another reason why shifting from COIN to conventional would be more difficult - and, perhaps, impossible in a limited timeframe for that shift.

    PS - FV, you now know that there are some rough edges here; but Wilf does call them as he sees them.

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    Default Good on ya

    I'm very glad you won your debate.
    Another example of transition to big war from small war and back again: The Indian fighting army of 1861 found its officers leading huge armies against each other in the Civil War. After 1865, they went back to fighting Indians...

    Everybody who says we have to do both is spot on. There are, of course, zealots on both sides of the debate but the reality is much more subtle. Gian Gentile is a particularly effective advocate of the conventional side but one who does not reject COIN. He thinks we need to focus more on big wars. OK, I don't agree, but he has a point ... The problem with his postition, as I see it, is that if he wins the argument, small wars issues will - as they always have in the past - be shoved onto the back burner and we will have to learn how to fight them all over again (as if we had never seen them before).

    Please stay in the conversation, you have much to contribute.

    Cheers

    JohnT

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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    What I glean, from such as Nagl's and Krepinevich's books, is that COIN operations require a smaller logistics tail than conventional operations. This seems intuitively logical (e.g., helicopters, tanks and arty are maintenance and support-intensive).
    That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies. It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Post Just MHO but from everything I've seen

    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies. It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.{Emphasis Ron}
    That actually seems to be the case. Of course haven't seen studies to back it up yet. Sure somebody is getting paid to look at it
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  7. #27
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Schmedlap and Ron Humphrey are correct IMO.

    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies...
    Exactly.

    That is true on all counts. The logistics of bullets, beans and repair are mind boggling -- but the system is designed to cope with that and does it well. When all the Class X items (Aid supplies and civilian construction materials for example) are introduced, it does not cope well -- witness all the projects in Iraq that were terribly slow in starting and even slower in being completed. The contracting system is a big part of the problem; in a major war it can be ignored, in the small wars of peace it will not be. Schmedlap ends:
    ...It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.
    I'm no Loggy but from watching it over the years, my perception is that he's quite correct.

    An additional consideration is that in a COIN environment, too many people have too much time on their hands to worry about odds and ends and the little nice to have things which they then ask for * -- in a conventional war, such luxury is not available. There would be no barrack huts with A/C and flat screen TVs would not be a consideration; the PXs would be rudimentary if they were even around (Heaven knows what out Cl VI transport bill is...).

    A COIN operation presents strange and unusual demands on the system; conventional war just places heavy but fairly consistent and constant demands on it. Most people engaged in the fight do not have time to worry about the exotic -- or troop comfort; just surviving becomes the issue.

    The shift from one type to another should not be traumatic (except for supplies enroute if the shift is during an ongoing operation. Could be disconcerting to receive a pallet of coca-Cola instead of one 7.62 linked...) or really even troublesome. All the war fighting stuff gets shipped to COIN ops, just in far smaller quantities. So it would be a matter of less troop comfort and aid material while sending more war materiel. We can ramp up pretty well, we prove that over and over. The biggest problem would be getting the right combat service support unit mix in the right place in a timely fashion, I think...

    As an aside, my perception is that Nagl and Krepinevich get several things wrong on several levels -- or skew things to make their points -- either way, neither they nor I are logistically qualified to state categorically which is likely to place the most heavy demand and, more importantly, I get to again point out that the ol' METT-TC intrudes on the answers (plural).

    * That is not to denigrate anyone or anything so save the flames; MRAPS, Ballistic glasses, Camelbacks or PEQ2s and such like for everyone are great and I'm all for them. Most of that stuff is desirable, no question. If I were to go off to war again, I'd like to have much of it. However, whether most of it is necessary for combat is an entirely different matter.

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    That makes me wonder how much of the current tooth-to-tail ratio is driven by circumstance and attitude. I asked a professor of mine one time about his thoughts on T3R and he shrugged and said that a heavy logistical tail is the price of industrialized war. I'm not entirely convinced, given that there are ways to improve efficiency while increasing effectiveness (although I recognize that in many cases they are inverse.)

    In 1917 the AEF deployed to France with almost 80% of its personnel in Combat Arms roles. 90 years later that favorable ratio has been inverted; only 25% of the total personnel are in Combat Arms units. That is including some contractors. (Search for an article called "The Other End of The Spear.")

    The Power Surety Task Force undertook a project to insulate tents. Where they used this approach they were able to save 83% of the fuel that had previously been consumed for space cooling. In the future they will continue to switch from large air conditioners to smaller air conditioners, and they hope to make greater use geothermal heat pumps.

    The end result is fewer convoys, fewer support troops, decreased force protection requirements, fewer ambushes, fewer road accidents, fewer expenditures, etc. The cost is minimal and the return on investment is almost as good as stealing.

    So while the natural tendency might be towards more permanence and greater resource use, there are ways to have what you want (an air conditioned tent) without the baggage that comes along with it.

    ETA: In 2001, 70% of the supplies that the Army carried by weight was fuel. I am unsure of more modern statistics in OIF/OEF, especially considering that much of the fuel is carried by contractors.
    Last edited by SethB; 01-31-2009 at 10:21 PM.

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    Default OK, got this ....

    It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt [changing "turn" to "adapt"] a COIN force to conventional.
    which seems to be something of a current "common doctrine" over the last few posts - which sums operational adaptation.

    So, are we at the point where something like this is the postulate ?

    It takes more added logistics to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt a COIN force to conventional.
    This (if it be true) seems a practical counterpoint to the first proposition.

    Is there any literature on the comparative logistical aspects of CONV > COIN & COIN > CONV ?

    PS: Agree that Nagl and Krepinevich have written briefs, but so did Summers. My solution, as with all briefs (except my own ), is not to swallow everything I read.

    "The Other End of The Spear" is linked here.

    An interesting bit of trivia - the other end of the spear was originally a useful combat tool - so sayeth this.

    Seems I recall someone saying that our non-combat forces should be better trained & retrained in combat skills. Perhaps, a figment of my imagination.

  10. #30
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default First, a question.

    Who made this statement you quoted:

    It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt [changing "turn" to "adapt"] a COIN force to conventional.
    ???

  11. #31
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question The one form of reasoning I'm not sure I've ever been able to swallow whole

    It is commonplace that it is asserted forces trained to fight conventionally can be re-trained to fight COIN easier than the other way around.

    While I see the reasoning behind the argument it still sticks in my craw a little.

    Soldiers- taught to fight //then soldiers taught how to fight what they fight.

    If I were an enemy I think I'd be a lot more reluctant to fight someone if they're really good at fighting the close fight. In that case I have to worry about them in large formations but even if I managed to convince myself I could take out every bit of their heavier weaponry I would still have to be worried about how well my forces could handle them on the ground.

    Doesn't seem to ring quite so true if you reverse it.
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    Default Ken, re: quote - Wilf in post #21,...

    which was quoted by you in post # 22. No claim made that you agreed with the quote - I thought it summed its position well.

    After looking through "The Other End of The Spear", it focuses on three categories of components that would have to be compared in a switch from CONV to COIN, and vice versa: Combat, HQ-Admin, Logistics-Life Support (he often separates these last two, which would make 4 categories).

  13. #33
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Pair a phrases...

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    which was quoted by you in post # 22. No claim made that you agreed with the quote - I thought it summed its position well.
    Oh, I agreed with Wilf's statement; Your quote with no attribution and a change OTOH modifies that statement into something I do not agree with. Not just semantic but a good military force can 'adapt' down (recall I strongly disagree that COIN is the 'graduate level of war'). The reverse is NOT true -- a COIN trained force has an attitudinal disconnect and will get clobbered in a big fight. They will need to be trained; thus 'turned' and cannot just adapt -- well they could and some have but it will hurt.

    The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

    Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.

    Much as I hate sports metaphors, the COIN effort is a really good High School or Junior College team; the conventional fighter is the Pro Team -- pick your sport. The Pro can play in the other Leagues or levels but the reverse is not true -- ordinarily not without some embarrassment or injury. All the Pro has to do to gear down is not be too rough...

    Your other quote from above:
    It takes more added logistics to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt a COIN force to conventional.
    Not a log person; my perception is that it's not so much more as it is different.
    This (if it be true) seems a practical counterpoint to the first proposition.
    Perhaps. To me we're mixing Persimmons and Breadfruit. Training is the key to the first item; a focus shift and a purchase shift seem key to the second. Both can be problematic though the training issue will generally be the more prone to consume time. In any event, both are very much situationally dependent and I'd recommend not trying to postulate any hard and fast rules for either item.
    Is there any literature on the comparative logistical aspects of CONV > COIN & COIN > CONV ?
    I'm sure there probably is but would not begin to know where to look. Perhaps someone with a Log background may know.
    After looking through "The Other End of The Spear", it focuses on three categories of components that would have to be compared in a switch from CONV to COIN, and vice versa: Combat, HQ-Admin, Logistics-Life Support (he often separates these last two, which would make 4 categories).
    Huh? I'm sorry, I'm uncertain what you mean here. Why would we want to compare them? I read The Other End of the Spear some time ago and left it wondering why it was written. Sorry, I am just not a fan of the numerate approach -- I have seen too many military people seduced by the 'clarity' a metrics and matrices offer only to flail and fail when that effort failed.

    Yes, all four (separation of log and life support is logical) of those categories differ in a (or any) COIN / Conventional comparison -- but they'll also likely differ significantly in some cases in comparing any two COIN theaters (Viet Nam / Afghanistan / Iraq / Philippines...) or two conventional Wars (WW I or WW II / Korea) or even small operations (Dominican Republic / Grenada / Panama). They all differ considerably in all parameters we've discussed.

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    Default I get your point ...

    from Ken
    The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

    Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.
    If I get it (from above), "adapt" is a more limited adjustment - "turn" is taking off on a new bearing. Agree that, for most people, "thou shalt kill" is a harder nut for them to swallow than returning from that state to "thou shalt not kill". To me, all of that (what you say above) is adaptation down to Willie and Joe.

    Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.

    As to the other three categories, "Why would we want to compare them?". Because they are possible variables - whether they turn out to be relevant and material is another issue, which can be answered only if you look.
    Last edited by jmm99; 02-01-2009 at 04:42 AM.

  15. #35
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.
    I would argue that there is no loss of "killer instinct" from performing COIN missions based off of my personal experiences and observations.

    My unit in OIF 1 spent a year in an area of virtually no contact in SE Baghdad. On April 4, 2004, the Sadr uprising began, and overnight formerly peaceful Shia areas became free-fire zones. My Armor BN (and many others) were thrown into instant high intensity urban combat. For an overview of what happened in Sadr City that day, you can read Martha Radditz's account here. The company commander's account of the assault into Sadr City and my BN CDR's account of the following two months in Najaf are in the ARMOR COIN issue. (Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain by Captain John C. Moore & Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White)

    The men instantly "flipped switches". No retraining on the "killer instinct" was needed. It doesn't take much of a switch to shoot back at those shooting at you.

    Same observation over 15 months in the second tour. I have never seen anyone need retraining on "killer instinct" in today's military. The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

    Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
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  16. #36
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thou shalt not kill has no bearing, most people are at least mildly amoral

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    If I get it (from above), "adapt" is a more limited adjustment - "turn" is taking off on a new bearing. Agree that, for most people, "thou shalt kill" is a harder nut for them to swallow than returning from that state to "thou shalt not kill". To me, all of that (what you say above) is adaptation down to Willie and Joe.
    Well, those in most armies, anyway. That issue is skill and reaction time. The real issue, whether you call it adaptation or retraining and reorienting is the time factor. One can shiftdown pretty quickly; shifting upward takes a little more experience, time or training, not just a philosophical shift in the leadership echelons approach to problems but a refocusing of the entire unit into less often or never used skills....
    Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.
    Of you're being judgmental -- else you wouldn't insist on adapting as opposed to turning. That's fine, call it what you wish and as for the 'killer instinct,' compare any period of months or years in Iraq with a like period from WW II, Korea or even Viet Nam which was half COIN. It's really an ROE acculturation problem.

    Adapting from ROE that insists upon a ten digit grid for minimum collateral damage and be careful what or who you shoot to HIC ROE where collateral damage is far less an issue, a six digit grid will be the norm because no one has the time to work for constant tens and a maneuvering Army will not have all the electronic aids available today because the log system won't provide 'em in adequate quantity due to the cost, loss and replacement volumes which no one in either theater today has had to cope with. In that HIC environment, the issue is not be careful how and at whom you shoot but finding people in the wrong clothes at which to shoot. Once you see 'em, IF you do, you're encouraged to shoot them, no probable cause required, front, back -- immaterial.

    CavGuy is right that these kids today can flip the switch psychologically -- that's because they were trained initially for HIC and their leaders geared them down for COIN; in that case, rapid shifting is possible as I said. I have pointed out several times that 1MarDiv did that in Korea and the Airborne Brigades did it early on in Viet Nam -- it is the purely COIN trained crowd who will have the 'adaptation' deficiency.

    Again, the Pro can play in any League, the less experienced (or trained) will not be able to shift up without work -- and time.
    As to the other three categories, "Why would we want to compare them?". Because they are possible variables - whether they turn out to be relevant and material is another issue, which can be answered only if you look.
    They aren't possible variables, they are certain variables; what's important is that they will differ from each other as well as type to type and within types from one episode to another for many reasons.

    Relevant or material to what, may I ask? I might be more helpful if I had a clue what you're trying to do.

  17. #37
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default People who need people...

    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    ...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".
    My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap...

    There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.

    Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.
    Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.
    True, I'm sure. HIC kids can shift the gears with just a little push. Good leaders enable that.

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    Default You stated some parameters,

    for relevance and materiality, here

    from Ken
    Yes, all four (separation of log and life support is logical) of those categories differ in a (or any) COIN / Conventional comparison -- but they'll also likely differ significantly in some cases in comparing any two COIN theaters (Viet Nam / Afghanistan / Iraq / Philippines...) or two conventional Wars (WW I or WW II / Korea) or even small operations (Dominican Republic / Grenada / Panama). They all differ considerably in all parameters we've discussed.
    Is there a difference (quantitative or qualitative) between, say, Life Support in two situations (one CONV; one COIN) ? Is the difference due (in whole or in part) to one being COIN, the other CONV ? If so, the difference is relevant. Whether it is material (important enough to be concerned about) is a matter of judgment (quantitative or qualitative).

    If the other factors you mention obscure the picture ("due to what" or "how much is due to what" cannot be determined), relevance and materiality cannot be determined. That's the best I can "do" on this topic.

  19. #39
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Fundamentals

    What the COIN avant garde miss, is that it is quite easy to train for COIN. 90% of what is needed goes on at the platoon and company level, so needs little training resources and not that much time.

    Compare that with wanting to rehearse a formation level opposed, nocturnal river crossing, or a Battle Group passage of lines under NBC conditions.... and yes, logistics is a huge factor.

    What the Lebanon in 2006 showed, was what Korea and Vietnam already had proven, was that your enemy doesn't need to have Motor Rifle Regiments to cause you to have to conduct pretty intensive combat operations - look at Fallujah!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by John T. Fishel View Post
    ...Gian Gentile is a particularly effective advocate of the conventional side but one who does not reject COIN. He thinks we need to focus more on big wars. OK, I don't agree, but he has a point ... The problem with his postition, as I see it, is that if he wins the argument, small wars issues will - as they always have in the past - be shoved onto the back burner and we will have to learn how to fight them all over again (as if we had never seen them before)...
    Lots of good discussion here, as usual on SWJ blog. I especially agreed with some of the comments made by Ken and Wilf on the need to have an army that is well trained in the basics of combat skills.

    I disagree with Niel when he states that the killer instinct is there in coin and readily transferable to HIC. Yes this might be the case for combat platoons or companies like Niel's and where it was at and the level of kinetic fighting involved. But "killer instinct" is a complex and layered thing in a large fighting army. That is to say, the way a corps commander displays his "killer instinct" in HIC is through many extended combat functions like command and control, operational level logistics that are vulnerable to attack, and to use WILF's example of a night river crossing into the teeth of a well-laid defense. In this sense it is wrongheaded to think that our army over the last seven years can just pick up from Iraq and Astan and do a corps level movement to contact into the teeth of an enemy who fights and stands sort of like Hiz did in 2006.

    To John T: Boy I certainly hope and pray that that is not what happens, that in maintaining our focus on the higher end of fighting we had better not ditch the hard lessons won on coin over the past seven years. To be clear, that would be a huge mistake and I really just don’t see it happening. John, I think that fear is hyped to a good degree by folks who called for a focus on coin in the 80s and 90s after Vietnam but were shoved to the sidelines. I think at some point we should let the past go, so to speak, and not be controlled by fears of what happened before will necessarily raise its head again. In short there is no conventional bogeymen waiting in the wings to bring the army back to 1985, build more M1 tanks, recall Don Holder to active duty to write a revised version of airland battle. That bogeyman is simply not there, nor is he me.

    gian
    Last edited by Gian P Gentile; 02-01-2009 at 02:56 PM.

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