Undergraduate Student, Help w/Counterinsurgency Debate

[Schmedlap]

Regarding transferability of skills...
I think it depends on the echelon. The intangible value of continuous combat operations for years is immeasurable at the levels where they occur: largely battalion and below. I also think the staff planning and coordination, while different from HIC, is likewise invaluable. Just the experience of continually working together in a real-world environment is immeasurably value. I think one can make a case that we're not too competent in terms of Corps-level conventional operations of the type of sweeping across the Fulda Gap and generally agree with COL Gentile's assessment of that. But I think we're hands-down exponentially more lethal at battalion and below.

I think of it this way:
Imagine conglomerate A. It sees a bunch of companies that manufacture scunion. The conglomerate buys them all, so as to achieve a scunion monopoly. In order to do so, the conglomerate must coordinate the activities of the companies, but their internal processes are largely okay as is.

Now imagine conglomerate B. It, too, seeks a scunion monopoly. Conglomerate B has a knack for quickly coordinating activities of subordinate companies. Unfortunately, conglomerate B purchases a bunch of companies that manufacture drip pans and chock blocks. Conglomerate B cannot leverage its organizational (or C2) capabililities until those subordinate companies revamp their internal processes.

I would say conglomerate A has the advantage.

[Ken White]

for relevance and materiality, here...
Is there a difference (quantitative or qualitative) between, say, Life Support in two situations (one CONV; one COIN) ? Is the difference due (in whole or in part) to one being COIN, the other CONV ? If so, the difference is relevant. Whether it is material (important enough to be concerned about) is a matter of judgment (quantitative or qualitative).

Yes; Yes (in the former there is stasis, in the latter there is mobility -- difference between barracks with a/c or tents and sleeping in the mud). Relevant to what???

If the other factors you mention obscure the picture ("due to what" or "how much is due to what" cannot be determined), relevance and materiality cannot be determined. That's the best I can "do" on this topic.

Uh. Okay. Ummm -- what's the topic???

If -- and that's a big if; you have been less than clear -- the topic is whether a COIN trained force can be switched to HIC more easily than a force trained for HIC can adapt to COIN operations, I'd say the most recent example is comparing the COIN-centric Israeli force that went into Lebanon in 2006 and got smacked with a hybrid (not even HIC; hybrid) buzz saw with the HIC trained Israeli force that went into Gaza last month and did rather well in an urban hybrid situation.

As to the logistics bit, not my thing. Any clarification on that will require someone with that knowledge and that isn't me. You want to discuss training and / or operations from individual fighter to Fire Team or individual Tank to Corps level, I can do that with some knowledge but my knowledge of high end log issues is non-existent.

[jmm99]

The immediate topic was an example using relevance and materiality - which is what I understood your question to be. To me, relevance and materiality are different. If fact A affects fact B in some way, then the two facts are mutually relevant. The next step is to determine materiality - how much does fact A affect fact B (is the relationship important - how much weight should be given).

Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories:

1. Combat

2. HQ-Admin

3. Logistics

4. Life Support

Niel's post #35, Wilf's, COL Gentile's and Schmedlap's ##39-41 all give me some insight into the questions of relevance and materiality applied to categories 1-4. Also, Niel's link to the Armor COIN issue did the same.

Those posts (and yours) primarily address 1. Combat issues in shifting between counter-insurgency and conventional operations, and vice versa.

My question is whether categories 2-4 also have to be taken into account and whether they are material factors in determining an appropriate force structure for counter-insurgency, on one hand, and conventional, on the other.

Perhaps, one force structure can be appropriate for both[*]. I don't know, which is why I raised the question.

[*] Using a Split T, rather than a single wing unbalanced right or left.

[Cavguy]

Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories:

1. Combat

2. HQ-Admin

3. Logistics

4. Life Support

I'd argue that our logistics are better prepared than they have ever been - from a combat survival standpoint. Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas. OIF/OEF has forced CSS guys to train for combat and take it seriously, and have done well adapting.

As far as establishing mobile refuel/rearm sites, field logisical functions, and supporting all classes of supply, they're probably in a skill deficit because so much has been contracted out.

[Ken White]

The immediate topic was an example using relevance and materiality - which is what I understood your question to be. To me, relevance and materiality are different. If fact A affects fact B in some way, then the two facts are mutually relevant. The next step is to determine materiality - how much does fact A affect fact B (is the relationship important - how much weight should be given).

I understood that, what was not understood was to what the relevance and materiality were to pertain.

Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories...My question is whether categories 2-4 also have to be taken into account and whether they are material factors in determining an appropriate force structure for counter-insurgency, on one hand, and conventional, on the other.

My answer is yes, they do have to be taken into account. If for no other reason the mobility of HIC versus the static locations usual in COIN but there are many other factors -- and all are or will be very much situation dependent. I'll also point out that one could provide alternative categorization to those four -- Combat and combat support would perhaps the simplest example.

Perhaps, one force structure can be appropriate for both. I don't know, which is why I raised the question.

Military force structure is always a compromise effort -- and like any compromise, it is rarely as effective as a purpose designed structure. In the case of the US Army, it strongly biased toward HIC which means in a COIN effort, ad hoc arrangements are necessary. Due to the stasis, that's easily done (if annoying to have to do...). OTOH, a force designed for COIN could not adjust to HIC without considerable changes -- there would be few Tanks, for example.

The down side from a realistic perspective is that a force optimized (to an extent if not fully) for HIC will have a predilection for HIC-like action regardless of the scenario. That can be deterred by strong leadership and good training.

The flip side is that a force optimized for COIN will not have an inclination toward aggressive and rapid forward movement in spite of casualties. Units used to holding Memorial Services for every man killed will have to shift to seeing dozens killed and no time for services; Investigators of every death will no longer have a job...

Shifting gears upward can be done -- it just isn't as easy as down shifting.

[jmm99]

Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas.

you led me to this in the Armor COIN issue (just before your article) - p.24 (footnotes omitted below), Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations, by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps:

Unfortunately, the first unit to face this defense was a logistics company from Fort Bliss, Texas. The 507th Maintenance Company was part of an mpressive U.S. Army supply line, and its primary mission was to provide maintenance, supplies, and support to a patriot missile battery that would advance north toward Baghdad with the 3d Infantry Division. The 507th’s company commander entered the Army as a dental assistant and eventually worked his way into commanding mechanics, cooks, computer technicians, and clerks who lacked basic military fighting skills. He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.
....
The 507th missed that turn, drove straight through downtown An Nasiriyah, and was ambushed with a “torrent of fire.” Eleven members of the 507th would eventually perish as a result of combat actions that morning. Seven others would become Operation Iraqi Freedom’s first prisoners of war (POWs).

Thus, a tragedy and a tough way to learn a lesson.

[Schmedlap]

He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.

Safety first! Can't trust Soldiers with weapons, you know. And you surely can't trust their NCOs to train them on how to use them. Great example of the pre-9/11 Army mentality, at it's finest. Give that Safety Officer an ARCOM.

<sarcasm>Oh, how I long for the days when we cherished safety and fear of our weapons over combat effectiveness and ruthless lethality.</sarcasm>

[Ken White]

Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas.

The incident happened because the necessary combat skills; known as a requirement since Korea ADDED:{When the Chinese routinely infiltrated our lines and attacked CSS element in the Corps Zones -- and occasionally far deeper.}, reinforced in Viet Nam and needed by all soldiers, were not adequately covered in training for Lynch, her leaders or her Commanders -- all of whom erred mostly because they were poorly trained -- over an obvious period of many years. That includes the 1990-2001 period when the Army knew it was likely to be deployed to stability ops but did nothing to prepare for it. The situation has improved, slightly, today but we still are turning out only partly trained Soldiers.

That incident happened partly because the Army wanted to save money and 'not train anyone for skills they may not require' ADDED: {and the practice of deferring f/ CSS MOS Tng in the Svc Schools most or all the the combat skills as 'Tasks to be trained in unit' -- which don't or did not bother.} Perhaps the money saved went to to buy a SP Artillery system and a new ScoutHelicopter... Oops, that didn't work out. Either time on the chopper...

I'll also say -- as I have before, that anyone since Korea who thinks life is going to be totally linear in the combat zone is not thinking clearly. ADDED:{While our training did head that way, our doctrine has not said that.} Too much flexibility is afforded all our potential opponents. They can buy NVG and laser pointers just as well -- cheaper, even, then we can. They're also likely to be more innovative and flexible than we can be...

[jmm99]

Richard E. Killblane, Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security, CSI OP13, which is here, tells the story of how the Army developed its doctrine for convoy protection during the Indian Wars up to WWI; lost it during WWI and WWII (linear battlefields, etc.); regained it to some extent during Korea; and then re-developed it in Vietnam.

The bulk of the article deals with Vietnam and US adaptations to face the challenges of Highway 19 - where French Mobile Group 100 was wiped out in 1954 (the opening scene of We Were Soldiers). Those lessons were in turn lost after Vietnam. An interesting article - especially for those of us who have played with re-building cars and trucks (some neat custom vehicles in the photos).

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