Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Cavguy]

Need to know if anyone can cite a post-1945 insurgency against a democracy that won, as defined by achieving all goals. (separation or overthrow) Political settlements are a different set.

I'm considering my grad thesis on Democracies and Insurgencies. Specifically, in the RAND insurgency dataset of 89 insurgencies 1945-2006, I found no examples of a democracy (defined by government enduring the insurgency, not the government of external supporters) losing an insurgency, as defined by the insurgents attaining all of their objectives (overthrow or secession). Of 20 democratic insurgencies in the database, 10 beat the insurgent, 5 are ongoing, and 5 reached some sort of political accord between sides.

I have some subjective coding questions, but the results hold true even when I "play" with the inclusion of certain cases not in the RAND set. (i.e. Russia 1999 (Chechnya II) is not considered a democracy, but in 1994 is)

Other casual observations include:

* last longer on average (AVG 17 yrs vs. 11)
* less likely to settle politically than the mean for all governments in the dataset
* results seem to hold true regardless of GDP, external support (either side), external sanctuary, political freedom, and even military competence
* Average insurgency size is less than half the mean of all insurgencies
* Nearly all post-cold war democratic insurgencies are separatist in nature, not aiming for regime change.

My overall research will involve why democracies are more resistant to insurgencies. Sort of a "Democratic Insurgency" theory.

Possible hypothesis include:

For reference, the 1945-2006 Democratic insurgencies, by outcome: (note, "Lose" means insurgent loss, included is start date of insurgency, and length of insurgency)

Philippines (MNLF) Lose 1971 25
Argentina Lose 1968 11
Peru Lose 1981 11
Philippines HUK Lose 1946 9
Uruguay Lose 1963 10
Lebanon Lose 1958 1
Uganda (ADF) Lose 1986 14
Northern Ireland Lose 1969 30
Philippines (MILF) Lose 1977 29
Turkey (PKK) Lose 1984 15
Philippines (NPA) Ongoing 1969 37
India Northeast Ongoing 1975 31
Nigeria (Niger Delta) Ongoing 1991 15
Sri Lanka Ongoing 1976 30
South Thailand Ongoing 2004 2
Senegal Political 1980 22
Chechnya I Political 1994 2
East Timor Political 1975 25
Georgia/Abkhazia Political 1992 2
Papua New Guinea Political 1988 10

Input appreciated about the viability of this topic or holes in the thesis before I go to far. Also any literature pertaining to this topic appreciated.

[Schmedlap]

Fishel's post from another thread came to mind...

the theoretical position he noted was stated by Ted Robert Gurr in his 1970 classic, Why Men Rebel. It may be summarized as follows:
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

With that in mind, I would guess (and this is a pure guess - not even an "eduated" one) that most democracies tend to experience less drastic social upheavals than other forms of government. Using the theory above, less drastic upheaval means less intense insurgency (if any). The weaker insurgency gets defeated.

Another uneducated guess: in a democracy, change is less likely to take the form of armed upheaval because a democracy, in theory, gives everyone at least some voice or the perception that they have a voice and they are less likely to lash out. Hitler comes to mind. He didn't wage an insurgency. He got elected.

Third thought: an insurgency can gain legitimacy by demonizing a king or oligarchy. Who does it demonize in a democracy? The people? That doesn't sound like much of a rallying cry. "We suck - let's overthrow ourselves!"

[jmm99]

put Algeria ? Part of France - not part of French Union colonial structure - which was a democracy. Easy enough to explain it away since the democratic standards applied to Paris did not apply to Algiers, etc., etc. But, the result was secession.

PS: the topic seems OK - and, in the examples, the term "quasi-democracy" would fit many (IMO); thus, slanting the playing field in favor of insurgency "winning". Maybe there are two questions:

1. Why are there insurgencies in democracies ? E.g., Why the War of Northern Agression ?

2. Why are those insurgencies unsuccessful, etc. ?

[Starbuck]

Does the money play a role? I was reading something from Fareed Zakaria the other day regarding liberal democracies, and he stated that they tend to occur (and become stable) when the per capita income exceeds a certain point. If that's the cases, then people feel less likely to wage war against the government if they have money, property and thus, something to lose.

A democracy also gives the violent minority a voice in the government, a chance to elect people to advance their agenda, whereas non-democratic nations do not. Exceptions should be made in cases like Israel, where a minority group is not represented in the government, and experiences a very low standard of living, and thus, we might not call it a "true" democracy.

Furthermore, I would expect that most democracies would be more likely to reach a political settlement in the face of a protracted conflict, as democracies tend to not settle for protracted wars. Or am I just looking at this from a Western American point of view (Phillipines, Eastern Europe, etc).

[Cavguy]

Does the money play a role? I was reading something from Fareed Zakaria the other day regarding liberal democracies, and he stated that they tend to occur (and become stable) when the per capita income exceeds a certain point. If that's the cases, then people feel less likely to wage war against the government if they have money, property and thus, something to lose.

Starbuck - welcome to the board. Please introduce yourself here. Like the BSG handle.

My first thought was that it involved money, but the "democratic insurgencies" span the gamut from extremely poor to rich on a relatively even bell curve - take the UK/Northern Ireland example. For example Uruguay and Senegal are on there, hardly economic powerhouses then or now.

A democracy also gives the violent minority a voice in the government, a chance to elect people to advance their agenda, whereas non-democratic nations do not. Exceptions should be made in cases like Israel, where a minority group is not represented in the government, and experiences a very low standard of living, and thus, we might not call it a "true" democracy.

The RAND set calls this an anocracy, which accounts for Israel, South Africa, and the French (Algeria) case. Rule by minority or small majority (often democratic), but without universal suffrage for a significant portion of the electorate.

Furthermore, I would expect that most democracies would be more likely to reach a political settlement in the face of a protracted conflict, as democracies tend to not settle for protracted wars. Or am I just looking at this from a Western American point of view (Phillipines, Eastern Europe, etc).

I would have thought so too, but when compared to the mean of political settlements across all insurgencies, democracies actually settle LESS! I think democratic insurgencies involve issues or ideologies less willing to compromise.

There are some dataset coding issues, but none of my quibbles has changed the overall observation significantly.

[Cavguy]

put Algeria ? Part of France - not part of French Union colonial structure - which was a democracy. Easy enough to explain it away since the democratic standards applied to Paris did not apply to Algiers, etc., etc. But, the result was secession.

PS: the topic seems OK - and, in the examples, the term "quasi-democracy" would fit many (IMO); thus, slanting the playing field in favor of insurgency "winning". Maybe there are two questions:

1. Why are there insurgencies in democracies ? E.g., Why the War of Northern Agression ?

2. Why are those insurgencies unsuccessful, etc. ?

Algeria was considered an Anocracy by RAND- rule by minority, since the (democratic) French denied suffrage to the Algerian population.

I replied to a PM on the civil war question - as I have read various definitions I have concluded that not all civil wars are insurgencies - mainly because the pol-sci definition of civil war requires "organized military units" among other things, which not all insurgencies (even some successful ones) have.

[Bob's World]

put Algeria ? Part of France - not part of French Union colonial structure - which was a democracy. Easy enough to explain it away since the democratic standards applied to Paris did not apply to Algiers, etc., etc. But, the result was secession.

PS: the topic seems OK - and, in the examples, the term "quasi-democracy" would fit many (IMO); thus, slanting the playing field in favor of insurgency "winning". Maybe there are two questions:

1. Why are there insurgencies in democracies ? E.g., Why the War of Northern Agression ?

2. Why are those insurgencies unsuccessful, etc. ?

I see insurgency as the course of last resort of a populace to effect change of governance. In a country with no or few legitimate means to effect change, the popualce as a whole both loses hope sooner that change will not occur in due course, and gets to "last resort" sooner as a result.

So why do you still get situations like the American Civil War? Two factors are important. All legal means had been exhausted and we were at a stalemate; two, the issued divided the populace in clear geographic sides. If the issue would have been more like gun control or abortion, that is difused accross the populace in no neat, geographic segments, it is unlikely to result in insurgency. Just suck it up and keep voting.

Look at Tailand. Not a US brand democracy, but there is an ongoing islamic insurgency even though Muslims are less than 5% of the populace. Geographically though, that 5% is a compressed majority down on the Malaysian border. Similar in the Philippines.

2. Why are they not successful? As far back as Sun Tzu military leaders have know that an enemy with no recourse but to fight will fight harder and longer than one who knows that they can either escape, or if forced to surrender, will face a fate better than death. Same concept probably applies here. If a democratic populace is finally pushed to fight, like the South, once that fight appears hopeless they are probably much more inclined to accept a compromise than a popualce that knows that once committed to the fight they must either prevail or die. It was a matter of honor that drove them to fight, and given the option of an honorable surrender, they were willing to take it.

To me this all seems like common-sense, but as that isn't as common as one might hope, this may make a worthwhile paper. My only real reservation is that I am really against all of the "Democracy" rhetoric that has permeated the U.S. message, strategy, and activities of late. I far prefer self-determination and popular sovereignty.

To me, Democracy is a lot like sex. Its great if everyone involved wants it, but if forced upon you it is rape. To carry that analogy probably one step too far: If the Uncle Sam would improve his message and delivery, he'd probably find a lot more willing takers...

[Cavguy]

Fishel's post from another thread came to mind...


With that in mind, I would guess (and this is a pure guess - not even an "eduated" one) that most democracies tend to experience less drastic social upheavals than other forms of government. Using the theory above, less drastic upheaval means less intense insurgency (if any). The weaker insurgency gets defeated.

Interesting, must think on this.

Another uneducated guess: in a democracy, change is less likely to take the form of armed upheaval because a democracy, in theory, gives everyone at least some voice or the perception that they have a voice and they are less likely to lash out. Hitler comes to mind. He didn't wage an insurgency. He got elected.

I think this explains why democratic insurgencies seldom hit "tipping points" where they gain mass support - most of the electorate feels they have a means to resolve political grievance. Those who are "democratic insurgents" are mostly irreconcilable to the existence or shape of the government in some form and thus see no hope in the democratic process. Ethno-sectarian secession comes to mind.

Third thought: an insurgency can gain legitimacy by demonizing a king or oligarchy. Who does it demonize in a democracy? The people? That doesn't sound like much of a rallying cry. "We suck - let's overthrow ourselves!"

Agreed.

[William F. Owen]

Third thought: an insurgency can gain legitimacy by demonizing a king or oligarchy. Who does it demonize in a democracy? The people? That doesn't sound like much of a rallying cry. "We suck - let's overthrow ourselves!"

You may want to look at the Insurgency in southern Thailand, were to my mind the "Insurgents" - and it is by no means clear who they are - never say anything against the Thai King - because should they, things would get very brutal, very quickly.

[William F. Owen]

Cav,

Merely some suggestions, but I would also suggest you look at the role physical land and territory in your thesis.

The IRA was aiming at a unified Ireland.
The PFLP and PLO wanted land and territory - still do.
The South Thailand Insurgency wants the states with a Muslim majority to be part of Malaysia, or secede from Thailand, in some form.

Insurgencies are generally about the control of terrain. I might add that pure terrorist groups on the other hand, generally aims at a change of policy, rather than terrain, but that needs to be held to rigour.

[Cavguy]

Cav,

Merely some suggestions, but I would also suggest you look at the role physical land and territory in your thesis.

The IRA was aiming at a unified Ireland.
The PFLP and PLO wanted land and territory - still do.
The South Thailand Insurgency wants the states with a Muslim majority to be part of Malaysia, or secede from Thailand, in some form.

Insurgencies are generally about the control of terrain. I might add that pure terrorist groups on the other hand, generally aims at a change of policy, rather than terrain, but that needs to be held to rigour.

I have found the same so far - most post-cold war "insurgencies" seek separatism of some form - not regime change or overthrow.

The definitions are imprecise and have overlap between political terror, civil war, and insurgency, which makes the inclusion/exclusion of certain cases somewhat subjective - my key is not to introduce bias by excluding a case which potentially undercuts the theory and can reasonably be called and insurgency.

I have other quibble issues across the dataset, but the inclusion of my quibbles doesn't change the empirical observation. (For example, including Chechnya II, Iraq, or Afghanistan as an insurgency against a democracy doesn't change that democracies don't outright lose (yet))

[William F. Owen]

The definitions are imprecise and have overlap between political terror, civil war, and insurgency, which makes the inclusion/exclusion of certain cases somewhat subjective - my key is not to introduce bias by excluding a case which potentially undercuts the theory and can reasonably be called and insurgency.

May I offer,"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."

[Eden]

As I look over your database (and I am by no means an expert on many of these insurgencies) it occurs to me that insurgencies in a democracy results when a particular group feels that it is vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority. In other words, there is no overt mechanism (such as our bill of rights and judicial review) that protects minority political/cultural/economic rights that they consider vital to their security or to their identity - usually both.

I also note that in most of the cases the democracy in question is not one with a long democratic tradition. Therefore minorities are less trusting that, in the long term, the democratic values of the majority will serve to resolve their grievances.

Finally, in most of the cases, the insurgents occupy a geographically distinct part of the country - that is, they have a coherent (usually defensible) base from which to operate, as opposed to being a faction 'immersed' in the majority.

All this means that an insurgency within a democracy will normally be able to force the government to a political settlement acceptable to both sides more easily than one fighting against a totalitarian state. In the former case, achieving overt safeguards against the tyranny of the majority (autonomy, voting rights, guaranteed representation, etc) will be acceptable substitutes for "total victory" in the eyes of the insurgents, and will be seen by the government as acceptable concessions within the framework of a democratic state. Especially when the alternative is continuing a debilitating, costly insurgency. In the latter case - insurgencies against totalitarian states - the stakes are far higher and the capacity for compromise far lower, making it easier to sustain the will of both sides to continue the fight.

Thus I would question whether I would characterize a political settlement as a loss for the insurgents - it merely allows them to continue the struggle through other means.

[50Bravo]

Fishel's post from another thread came to mind...


With that in mind, I would guess (and this is a pure guess - not even an "eduated" one) that most democracies tend to experience less drastic social upheavals than other forms of government. Using the theory above, less drastic upheaval means less intense insurgency (if any). The weaker insurgency gets defeated.

Another uneducated guess: in a democracy, change is less likely to take the form of armed upheaval because a democracy, in theory, gives everyone at least some voice or the perception that they have a voice and they are less likely to lash out. Hitler comes to mind. He didn't wage an insurgency. He got elected.

Is the corollary that, in a democracy, insurrection is more likely if a large enough part of the polity perceives that they have no voice, that the situation is out of control? i would also suggest that Hitler did wage an insurgency, there was plenty of violence and intrigue. Saying that his deal wasn't an insurgency is, I believe inaccurate. The elections were a side show, the game was over well before then. Another example would be Hamas. They were "elected" yet who believes that there was no violence or coersion. w

Third thought: an insurgency can gain legitimacy by demonizing a king or oligarchy. Who does it demonize in a democracy? The people? That doesn't sound like much of a rallying cry. "We suck - let's overthrow ourselves!"

But you could say (as many do) our representation sucks, lets remove them. It seems that there is a lot of that going around these days. Cavguy you may have a foam rubber pinata here..

[Schmedlap]

This is somewhat of a rambling post, but I'm pressing "submit reply" anyway.

To answer the question, another question may be worth pondering. Why have some countries not converted to democracy?

I was re-reading Bernard Lewis’ piece in the latest Foreign Affairs (March/April 2009) and I thought his description of the models of Arab governance was interesting. Starting on page 86, he writes “most Arab regimes belong to one of two categories: those that depend on the people’s loyalty and those that depend on their obedience. Loyalty may be ethnic, tribal, regional, or some combination of these… The regimes that depend on obedience are European-style dictatorships that use techniques of control and enforcement derived from the fascist and communist models. These regimes have little or no claim to the loyalty of their people and depend for survival on diversion and repression: directing the anger of their people toward some external enemy.”

The recent order has been the loyalty regimes like Morocco and Saudi Arabia or the obedience regimes like Egypt or Syria (I presume). But, he goes on to point out that these two models “are becoming less effective; there are groups, increasing in number and importance, that seek a new form of government based not primarily on loyalty, and still less on repression, but on consent and participation. These groups are still small and, of necessity, quiet, but the fact that they have appeared at all is a remarkable development.”

A trend for the future may be a move away from the either-or choice of loyalty versus obedience toward a third option of consent (democratic-like models). Lebanon, he states, “is one country in the entire region with a significant experience of democratic political life. It has suffered not for its faults but for its merits – the freedom and openness that others have exploited with devastating effect.”

This, to me, seems to suggest a first-mover disadvantage within the Arab world. The creation of a government modeled on consent necessarily creates a situation in which there is also freedom to openly oppose the government without fear of suppression or social chastisement, creating a situation amenable to not just political disagreement, but is also like sending an invitation to Hezbollah or al-Qaeda to come set up a recruiting center or a jihadist FOB (see Lebanon and Iraq).

Who wants to be first to open up if it means you trade your tyranny, which for whatever its sins at least ensured stability and security, only to get in return Hezbollah or the latest “al-Qaeda in (insert region)” franchise? This creates a paradox in which the only way to ensure your consent model of government is to rely upon the very secret police and oppressive arm of the government that you were hoping to get rid of. And what if they finally purge the foreign fighter? Can they be expected to just disband, as their rank and file smoothly transition into the private sector? Not likely.

Iraq seems to be the best hope for the region in transitioning to the consent model. But is OIF a blueprint for success? Operation Syrian Freedom doesn’t sound good. Operation West Bank Freedom? Sounds like an industrial meat grinder, wrapped in flypaper. How about sanctions against the bad regimes and foreign aid for the goods ones? How’s that working out for us?

Democracy may simply be a manifestation of a country's social evolution to a point where it is more resistant to the elements of a successful insurgency (rather than having any special tools to combat them after the fact). That the insurgencies were unsuccessful may be due to their failure to achieve certain decisive tasks, rather than the democracy's success in responding to the insurgencies. Democracy may be more akin to a preventive vaccination than to a post-diagnosis dose of antibiotics. But in some countries, like in the Mideast, it is like a flu vaccine - the vaccine brings risk in the early stages.

[AmericanPride]

Schmedlap,

I'm not convinced by Lewis' argument. While accurate to some degree, it has no precision. The 'people', 'loyalty' and 'obedience' are too broad to be of any use (which goes along with another criticism I have of the concept of the 'mass base', but that's for later). All governments use a mix of loyalty and obedience (and even some consent) to maintain influence over different elements of the population. The problem isnt that these states are dependent on "loyalty" or "obedience" but that they are generally weak institutionally (with the exception of the security forces), and liberalizaiton, democraticization, and modernization create significant instability because the state is the prime mover. The elites that govern therefore assume all of the risk. And in the last 100 years, how many states have successfully been pushed into modernity? Anyone other than Stalin's USSR?

Who wants to be first to open up if it means you trade your tyranny, which for whatever its sins at least ensured stability and security, only to get in return Hezbollah or the latest “al-Qaeda in (insert region)” franchise?

That's not really an accurate definition of the problem. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood offer consent-based alternatives to the Western-backed "obedience" regimes. And because the states are weak institutionally, these groups have significant influence when filling the capabilities gaps (social welfare, etc).

Iraq seems to be the best hope for the region in transitioning to the consent model.

I disagree. Iraq (and Syria) had republican forms of government in their recent history. Both failed to be sustained because of factionalism and instability, resulting in the establishment of a one-party state (Egypt is not remarkably dissimilar). What has changed in Iraq that will prevent future factionalism? Will Iraq require an enduring US presence to maintain stability?

I'd argue that Syria is in the best position to modernize (and eventually democratize), if it can make peace with Israel. Peace will allow Syria to integrate into the international community, draw in wealth that will enable modernization, and allow it to address some of its social and economic problems that currently prevent modernization and the subsequent liberalization.

Why have some countries not converted to democracy?

Because the risk of failure is too costly and the cost of success is too high.

[Schmedlap]

Thanks for taking the time for a lengthy reply. I was beginning to fear that I rambled on for nothing.

While accurate to some degree, it has no precision. The 'people', 'loyalty' and 'obedience' are too broad to be of any use...

I don't think so. I think there is an important distinction between a government that has a ruling family in a country where kinship lines are respected versus a government that has a repressive bureaucracy of ideologically driven nutbars from all walks of life. The former would never work in Iran and the latter would never work in Saudi Arabia, imo.

The problem isnt that these states are dependent on "loyalty" or "obedience" but that they are generally weak institutionally (with the exception of the security forces), and liberalizaiton, democraticization, and modernization create significant instability because the state is the prime mover.

I don't think he was articulating "the problem" so much as "the situation." But, I agree with the second half of your sentence. Good point.

Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood offer consent-based alternatives to the Western-backed "obedience" regimes. And because the states are weak institutionally, these groups have significant influence when filling the capabilities gaps (social welfare, etc).

I think there is an awful lot of fear mixed in there that is more significant than the consent. I think the consent is just feigned in public by many who privately live in fear. But, regardless of my disagreement on that point, I think your second sentence is correct.

What has changed in Iraq that will prevent future factionalism?

Prevent? Nothing. Significantly reduce the odds? I think you answered that when you responded to my question of, "Why have some countries not converted to democracy?" You responded...

Because the risk of failure is too costly and the cost of success is too high.

Exactly. So what changed in Iraq, you ask? The injection of US troops changed the situation in Iraq to reduce the risk of failure (primarily that of ethnosectarian factionalism) and to shift the cost of success to the American taxpayer.

The Bernard Lewis piece requires a subscription, so I'm not sure if you were able to read the full thing. I suspect that his full essay is more convincing than my brief summary - don't take my word for it. Many have gone astray by relying too heavily upon me.

[50Bravo]

The short answer is, no, I can't think of one.

As to suitability for your Thesis, the information you provide seems to me, possibly correlated but not necessarily causal. If the data are not or cannot be demonstrated to be causal then you are in for a long walk in the sun.

It is difficult for me to fit those governments into one box called Democracy, as many of them are at odds with what you and I might think of as a democracy... so you got that definitional thing.(Maybe the "spectrum" of democratic characteristics might have some impact on the term of the insurgency?)

I would be leery of making the commitment to this topic until I had found some relationship that looks causal. The tough part about a Thesis (IMHO) is picking a subject that you can run with and use that yet allows a narrow enough focus to allow a clear and succinct examination of your hypothesis. This is what you need for a clean product.

I think that to make this work, you'll need to tunnel deeper and discover something that might (or might not) be demonstrable as a causal factor. If it was my assignment and I could not identify that prospective relationship, I'd shift targets.

[Schmedlap]

I'm considering my grad thesis on Democracies and Insurgencies. Specifically, in the RAND insurgency dataset of 89 insurgencies 1945-2006, I found no examples of a democracy (defined by government enduring the insurgency, not the government of external supporters) losing an insurgency, as defined by the insurgents attaining all of their objectives (overthrow or secession).

This thought just popped into my mind today.

Perhaps democratic systems condition the populace to wage its battles at the battle box rather than in the streets by...
1. providing a mechanism for grievances (throw the bums out)
2. providing the belief that something as drastic and risky as overthrow/secession is unnecessary
3. creating a climate where discourse and airing out grievances publicly is encouraged, preventing the need to go underground. Removing the need to go underground ensures that grievances are not only aired - which gives some therapeutic effect, but also invites rebuttal, which deters others from joining and helps to prevent the aggrieved from becoming too removed from reality.

In other words, provide an alternative, raise the risk-reward ratio, and counterattack while the threat is emerging, rather than after it arrives.

This might also be a "chicken or the egg" case. Democracy is more than just casting ballots. The process must be fair, the choices must be real, the debate must be unrestrained, and there must be no fear involved. Otherwise, it is only a democracy in name, not in substance. How many countries achieve that highly sophisticated state of social order and stability? Once a country achieves that, it seems that the society should also be smart enough to figure out how to sort out its differences before they devolve into fisticuffs, tomfoolery, assassinations, and urban sniping.

Likewise for the bad guys. If they have somehow arrived at the conclusion that things are so bad/backwards/intolerable that armed action is the only solution, then they are probably hopelessly disenfranchised. Why? There are always a few outcasts in society. But when enough of them exist to form a viable counter-movement, then that means that something is wrong.

This may lead back to one of the conclusions that many of us so often find ourselves revisiting: the way to defeat an insurgency is to prevent it.

[Ken White]

This may lead back to one of the conclusions that many of us so often find ourselves revisiting: the way to defeat an insurgency is to prevent it.

I came to that conclusion in 1962. Nothing I've done, heard, read or seen since has given me any reason to change my mind...