Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Bob's World]

No. More ignorance. The insurgents were severely tromped and almost totally ineffective before the last US troops left in 1973. The North Viet Namese Army won it in 1975 -- with a conventional invasion, not an insurgency..

Ken,

You've raised this point at least a couple of times that I am aware of, and while you are factually accurate, the grand design of Maoist Insurgency is to culminate in a conventional force that seals the deal. So to say that the insurgency did not win is not really fair, they simply followed the full program to its logical conclusion, moving up and down between phases I and II, attempting III prematurely and backing down to II again, and finally, as you state, in 1975 being able to pull off the phase III conclusion.

I am quite confident that if that attack had been defeated, things would have simmered down in phase II for a while until they felt the conditions were right to try a phase III operation again.

Which goes to the point of insurgency: So long as the underlying conditions that gave rise to the insurgency exist, you can suppress it, but you can not stomp it out. The government must ultimately answer to its populace; either at the end of a bayonet, or by simply doing their job and addressing the legitimate concerns and grievances (or getting out of the way and allowing a governance that will do so) before it comes to that.

[Ken White]

You've raised this point at least a couple of times that I am aware of, and while you are factually accurate, the grand design of Maoist Insurgency is to culminate in a conventional force that seals the deal. So to say that the insurgency did not win is not really fair, they simply followed the full program to its logical conclusion, moving up and down between phases I and II, attempting III prematurely and backing down to II again, and finally, as you state, in 1975 being able to pull off the phase III conclusion.

And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.

I am quite confident that if that attack had been defeated, things would have simmered down in phase II for a while until they felt the conditions were right to try a phase III operation again.

Probably true.

Which goes to the point of insurgency: So long as the underlying conditions that gave rise to the insurgency exist, you can suppress it, but you can not stomp it out. The government must ultimately answer to its populace; either at the end of a bayonet, or by simply doing their job and addressing the legitimate concerns and grievances (or getting out of the way and allowing a governance that will do so) before it comes to that.

Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.

I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.

So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

[reed11b]

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency? What about where ideological or political differences are the drive behind armed resistance, such as the religious conflicts in the ME, or the Chechan revolt?
What about the Kurdish attempts to build there own homeland, this fights across multiple nation borders and would they still fight eben if they were financialy well off? I feel that they would if some one sold them on the concept of greater Kurdistan effectivly.
Reed

[Cavguy]

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency? What about where ideological or political differences are the drive behind armed resistance, such as the religious conflicts in the ME, or the Chechan revolt?
What about the Kurdish attempts to build there own homeland, this fights across multiple nation borders and would they still fight eben if they were financialy well off? I feel that they would if some one sold them on the concept of greater Kurdistan effectivly.
Reed

I think the definitions my above post (USG and DoD) answers your question.

There is no "hard" standard for categorization. Some subjectivity is involved.

[Ken White]

Is this considered nessecary to be defined as an insurgency?

Bob's World whose position my response that you quoted was directed to; to me; or to Cav Guy whose thread this is?

In any event CavGuy answered and did it well IMO. As for the position Bob's World states, he didn't restrict it to economic or social matters so the religious difference or just an ideological difference as well as ethnic and other differences are covered by his conditional requirement.

I believe that all those things you mention and more in the two Viet Nams in the early 60s were roughly in balance with slightly better industry and more efficient government with less corruption in the North but better economic, religious and ethnic / individual freedom conditions in the South. It was IMO better than a draw with a fair edge to the South, thus my response to him.

[ipopescu]

Cavguy,

One of the weeks of my graduate seminar in international security here at Duke deals with the performance of democracies in wars in general. This question is larger than your specific topic, but I'm thinking you might find it useful to look over some of these readings (unless you've done so already) to get an idea of how the literature on this issue evolved and where it is right now.

Håvard Hegre, et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” APSR 95/1 (March 2001): 33-48.
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, 2002).
David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” APSR 86/1 (March 1992): 24- 37.
Michael C. Desch, “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” IS 27/2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.
Responses to Desch by Choi, Lake, and Reiter and Stam; and Desch’s reply, IS 28/1 (Summer 2003): 142-94.
Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” IS (forthcoming; Blackboard).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (MIT, 2003).
Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94,” APSR 95/3 (September 2001): 633-47.
Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, 2003).

Recommended Critiques:
Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look,” JCR 48/4 (August 2004): 525-46.
Risa Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay,” IS 28/2 (Fall 2003): 149-91.

I personally find your topic highly interesting. Do you have any particular case-studies in mind as well?

[Ron Humphrey]

Forgive me for the way this may sound but doesn't it seem like the actual justification's or reasons we find for unrest in general let alone insurgency, wars and the like are formed into some sort of massive jumble through our efforts to explain it rather than just see them for what they are?

Mankind is.

Mankind thinks- (sometimes)

A family is the base unit of our communal existence, within it constructs we find order through determination to follow whatever path seems consistant with survival and perhaps even more importantly further development. Call it what you will; self-determination, self-actualization, self-development, Whats in it for me, etc.

Each individual seeks to find success(for lack of a better word) through their interactions with others in context with the environment within which they find themselves and what their experiences have shown them to be at least plausible. That said the structure for leadership doesn't really seem to vary so much as many seem to believe.

Parents fill the role of providing guidance and direction for the family, that is until such time as the children feel that their (needs, wants, desires, just deserts) are not being met to their satisfaction and they choose to strike off on their own. Societal norms generally seem to follow this same basic premise. So IMHO do many if not all major forms of governance.

Dictatorial - I follow you because I have no other choice, but at least I'm alive( Let the latter part come into question and I revolt regardless of my chances for success

Ideological- Generally Same as above except its not that I have too but that I choose to ascribe to said philosophy and as such follow you

Theocratic- I follow you because my faith teaches that I must follow the direction of those who have or are being directed to lead me
( This works until, as with the family unit I feel that my needs be they spiritual or otherwise are not being met with what I believe my faith requires of my leaders.

Democratic- The family chooses its leader through whatever form its comfortable with and follows them. Society chooses it leaders and as such chooses to follow with the addendum that should you not get them what they want they can choose somebody else. Let it get to where they feel like you might take that choice away and they'll revolt.


Long and short many in this life just want to be left alone but are still a part of whatever process takes place within their environments. If things become notably out of sorts they will and do come out of their corners.

Dictatorships have a really hard time dealing with that awakened giant due to the fact their survival was enabled through that groups silence

Theocracies have the choice of adjusting their overall presentation in order to facilitate a settling of tension's. They just have a tendency of refusing to do so due to "principles" or the fact that they really didn't believe so much as they used that belief to enhance their stature.

Democracies can and do more often than not get changes sufficient to calm the heaviest part of the uprisings and when they don't wars happen. Since most still want at least a semblance of democracy the more common action is to compromise and address the grievances one way or another.

Rant complete


OH well Good luck with the paper Niel

[Entropy]

The scholarly question becomes - why are democratic governments less likely to fall to insurgencies? The point of this thread was to see if any of the experts lurking or present here could demonstrate selection bias - cases I ignored which may discredit the empirical observation I am preparing to write the thesis on - a qualitative and quantitative examination of why this may be so. At this point, I don't know if it is luck, economics, governmental inclusion, military competence, etc. The point is that I don't have a conclusion, just an empirical observation and some data points.

I understand and agree with your justifications for limiting the scope to post-1945, but that is a relatively short period of time considering the breadth of history. Still, it looks like you have enough examples to make a case. Sounds like a good topic to me.

Your real challenge looks to be finding the causalities behind the correlation you've found.

Because I was YG 97 and exited my BCT as a MAJ they wouldn't give me advanced civil schooling because I was too senior, hence night classes for me.

Wow, that's too bad.

[AmericanPride]

Ron,

In Post #40, you describe a number of different classes of governemnt and how that may impact the distribution of power and the propensity for internal violence. I will suggest here a similar argument: that liberal/revolutionary/revisionist states face less problems with internal violence than do conservative/reactionary/traditionalist states because the factions within the former can more easily redefine/reshape/modify ideologies, institutions, and policies as the circumstances dictate. I would further argue that most liberal/revolutionary/revisionist states eventually become conservative/reactionary/traditionalist as the 'dust settles' so-to-speak, and power becomes more formal and institutionalized.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,

One of the weeks of my graduate seminar in international security here at Duke deals with the performance of democracies in wars in general. This question is larger than your specific topic, but I'm thinking you might find it useful to look over some of these readings (unless you've done so already) to get an idea of how the literature on this issue evolved and where it is right now.

Håvard Hegre, et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” APSR 95/1 (March 2001): 33-48.
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, 2002).
David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” APSR 86/1 (March 1992): 24- 37.
Michael C. Desch, “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” IS 27/2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.
Responses to Desch by Choi, Lake, and Reiter and Stam; and Desch’s reply, IS 28/1 (Summer 2003): 142-94.
Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” IS (forthcoming; Blackboard).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (MIT, 2003).
Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94,” APSR 95/3 (September 2001): 633-47.
Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, 2003).

Recommended Critiques:
Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look,” JCR 48/4 (August 2004): 525-46.
Risa Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay,” IS 28/2 (Fall 2003): 149-91.

I personally find your topic highly interesting. Do you have any particular case-studies in mind as well?

Thanks. I had a similar IR class last semester covering all the major theories - balance of power, power transition, etc, and we spent time ad nauseum debating the effects of democracy. Some of the works above were in the course readings.

While working on another research paper on the effects of external support/sanctuary on insurgency I stumbled on the "Democratic Insurgency", and my advisor thinks it would make a worthwhile investigation.

===

My alternate topic would have been to compare cases where nations have defeated insurgents with external sanctuary and contrasted the principles employed with "classical" COIN (i.e. Galula et.al) and see if there were differences - and also whether FM 3-24 holds up to it. One critique of our major COIN "success" case studies is that they lack real sanctuary and generally had little external support - Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, El Salvador. Obvious implications for Afghanistan. Figured I would save that for a potential MMAS.

[Bob's World]

And by that time well over 90 plus percent of the original insurgents were dead. I'm aware of Mao's Phases -- even more aware of Giap's (who was about twice as smart as Mao) plan.Probably true.Not really true with respect to Viet Nam -- most of the populace just wanted to be left alone. Some insurgencies are started and run by very dedicated folks who take the semblance of a problem, elevate it to a casus belli and go for broke.

I usually object to comparisons of Malaya and Viet Nam because the efforts were so very different -- but they do have one thing in common; in both cases an outside power (China in the first case, North Viet Nam in the second) took some social ills and raised them to start insurrections. Both were effectively stopped by a combination of good COIN tactics (very belatedly in VN) and political fixes. The big difference was that China was in no position to elevate to Phase III.

So yeah, it was a three phase effort -- but the insurgents didn't win they were mostly Southerners who did not necessarily want to hew to Ho. Another nation's fighters did win -- and the North had manipulated the VC almost as badly as they did the US.

The insurgency in VN, BTW, does not meet your definition of bad underlying conditions; the South was in better shape than the North on that score in the early 60s an people in both nations knew that.

Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.


This goes to a key aspect of my Populace-Centric theory. (Not controlling the populace, as in Kilcullen's population-centric tactics applied in Iraq; but in focusing on the needs, desires, perspectives and will of the populace as one engages through their government. To seek to meet our own interests in ways that are not counter to the interests of the populace; and to be, where necessary, an enabler of better relations between a populace and its governance and not a wedge to the same.)

We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.

I'd hate to see us make the same (similar) mistake in Afghanistan / Pakistan where a historic populace is also in revolt and we are preparing to commit tremendous energy once again to enforce a border created by white men thousands of miles away that cuts through the heart of the Pashtu homeland to reinforce states that reflect Western interests more than the interests of the Populaces they encompass.

When we learn from history, it is important that we take away the right lessons. Just me, but to me the main lesson is that the west can no longer simply expect eastern populaces to accept what we lay out for them, but that we can still achieve our vital interests in these areas by changing our approach to one of reinforcing the will of the populaces of these regions as prioritized over any vestiges of western governmental constructs imposed over the years, or ideas of how we currently want them to behave.

Surely we can be smart enough to find a way to support divided historic populaces around the world without having to destroy the states they reside within. Surely we can be smart enough to support troubled states without having to destroy the historic populaces that are divided by their borders.

My vote is for fighting smarter, not harder. We need a surge of strategic thinking, not a surge of hard young riflemen like my son. As long as we think we are there to "defeat" some threat as opposed to enable a stronger relationship between a populace and its governance we will fail. As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.

This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.

(Ok, this is way longer, and went down a path I did not fully intend when I started typing 20 minutes ago, but sometimes you just have to go with the flow. Ken, clearly this is not all aimed at you. I just think you mischaracterize the true Vietnamese populace, but I also understand you have valid reasons for your positions. You earned them, and I have the highest respect for that.)

[John T. Fishel]

Take a bit closer look at El Salvador. One of the major problems there was the existence of sanctuaries - the so-called "blosones" - of disputed territory along the Salvadoran/Honduran border allegedly administered by the UN. That was where the FMLN took R&R and massed their supplies from Nicaragua and points beyond.

Much of the discussion here hinges on different definitions of democracy. Suggest you pick one that corresponds well to your Rand dataset and just stick with it.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

As long as people seriously think that a Clausewitzian model of warfare based on study of the Napoleonic wars between states applies directly to this type of conflict we will fail.

Clausewtiz did not base his understanding of war purely on his experiences of fighting against Napoleonic armies. Clausewitz observations on the nature of war is applicable to any form of armed conflict.

This is people business. Understand people first; second understand what actions over the years have manifested in the conditions of conflict that exist. Next, sit down and figure out new ways to meet your national interests in that region that are designed not to reinforce the failed system, but to enable a new system that has a chance to work.

Well that's exactly what Clausewitz says, except he wrote On WAR, and you are drifting off into National Policy and Strategy, of which WAR is a subset of skills and capabilities.

Warfare is a tool, and a pretty dam good one, when applied to right problem.

[Bob's World]

Clausewtiz did not base his understanding of war purely on his experiences of fighting against Napoleonic armies. Clausewitz observations on the nature of war is applicable to any form of armed conflict.



Well that's exactly what Clausewitz says, except he wrote On WAR, and you are drifting off into National Policy and Strategy, of which WAR is a subset of skills and capabilities.

Warfare is a tool, and a pretty dam good one, when applied to right problem.

Good points, but said another way, one might ask: "Is all violence "warfare"? or "If a state opts to respond to violence by waging warfare against the perpetrators of that violence does that make it warfare"?

Or, as WILF suggests, perhaps is it really a much larger issue that touches National Policy and Strategy?

I believe that many see this the way WILF does and I recognize that it is the majority position, so by a purely democratic or mathmatic analysis, it must be right.

I challenge that status quo thinking though, believing that an insurgency is most often better "neutralized" through addressing root causes than "defeated" by waging war against one's own populace as if it were a foreign state.

When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to protect interests they have there, they tend to want to keep the current government in place so work to not only do so, but also to help put down the rebellion. Right or Wrong is not the metric, preserving access to the national interest is.

When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to create interests they desire there, they tend to want to dispose of the government in place, so work to do so and to also lend aid to the rebellion in its efforts. Right or Wrong is not the metric here either, gaining access to the national interest is.

These actions of National Policy and Strategy revolving around these popular revolts make up the family of operations we call "Insurgency" and "Counterinsurgency" and "Foreign Internal Defense" and "Unconventional Warfare." But is it warfare in the true Clauswitzian sense? Perhaps. My point is that it is worth considering through both lights to have the best perspective. The concept of "Irregular Warfare" is based on the perspective that all of these activites are indeed war. But consider the source, IW came from the military, so naturally they see it that way.

Another way is to look at all of these violent internal struggles as all part of man's natural reaction to dealing with problems that can't be resolved peacefully, the appliation of violence. But that does not make it necessarily "war."

[William F. Owen]

I challenge that status quo thinking though, believing that an insurgency is most often better "neutralized" through addressing root causes than "defeated" by waging war against one's own populace as if it were a foreign state.

I'm not sure you are actually challenging a position I in particular hold. Insurgency is the use of "military means" - organised violence for a "political purpose."

The problem is that the root cause is often impossible to address without defeating the insurgents first. What is more, as in Sierra Leone, the stated cause, (democracy) was not actually the source of the violence (resources).

Sure, addressing the roots of conflict, often avoid/delay conflict. One you are fighting though, it's best to win. Peace is nice. It's not a requirement.

[Bob's World]

I'm not sure you are actually challenging a position I in particular hold. Insurgency is the use of "military means" - organised violence for a "political purpose."

The problem is that the root cause is often impossible to address without defeating the insurgents first. What is more, as in Sierra Leone, the stated cause, (democracy) was not actually the source of the violence (resources).

Sure, addressing the roots of conflict, often avoid/delay conflict. One you are fighting though, it's best to win. Peace is nice. It's not a requirement.

I will have to join Mr. Webster (": a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency"), the U.S. DOD and NATO("An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.), and a host of others in disagreeing with your definition of insurgency. In fact, an insurgent, not having a military, can not likely employ "military means." He employs violence. He employs terror, but only in phase III as in Vietnam or China (sorry Ken) does he employ "military means" Certainly the counterinsurgent, possessing a military is free to, and often does, "employ military means" in responding to such violent popular uprisings.

I also take the position that defeating a symptom, (the insurgent), is the delaying action, as new insurgents will always emerge so long as the underlying conditions exist. Addressing the concerns of the populace is the enduring solution. Again, we will remain 180 degrees out on this point, and I am comfortable with that.

Example: The defeat of the MNLF in the 70's is cited as a "victory," yet here they are still fighting the government of the Philippines as the underlying conditions were never addressed.

Any "victory" in an insurgency built primarily on the slain bodies of the rebelling populace has merely buried the coals to burst into flames again in due time. The history of man is replete with examples of this fact.

[Ken White]

Bob's World said

...now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency.

I do not agree with that statement, not what I said. However, that is closer to reality than the rest of your admittedly correct in idealistic terms argument. Reality differed. As you said:

We ignored the will of the Vietnamese populace writ-large by first reinstating the French occupation, and then by enforcing the artificial border through the heart of their homeland as part of our Cold War hedge against the Soviets.

And the rest as they say is history -- in the Case of Viet Nam, history with many myths embedded and the normal case of people believing what they want to believe.

Steve Blair has it right IMO.

To get back on the thread, Bob's World later said:

I challenge that status quo thinking though, believing that an insurgency is most often better "neutralized" through addressing root causes than "defeated" by waging war against one's own populace as if it were a foreign state.

When a foreign country intervenes in such an internal conflict to protect interests they have there, they tend to want to keep the current government in place so work to not only do so, but also to help put down the rebellion. Right or Wrong is not the metric, preserving access to the national interest is.

I agree and that tracks with what I believe CavGuy is trying to show. I'd only offer two cautions for him as to what happened in several of his examples and for the consideration of all as policy issues:

Be very sure you truly understand what are the root causes. As the digression on Viet Nam shows, opinions can vary and affect the outcome...

On the second quoted point, I believe such 'keeping' should be determined based on the host nation's national interest, not the intervenor's as generally occurs.

[Steve Blair]

Ok Ken, now I have to comment on your supporting argument that N.Vietnam was an outside power that instigated and manipulated and sustained a S. Vietnam insurgency. This is whole idea of a "North" and "South" Vietnam is just another aspect of the Western Colonial influence imposed on one populace. Vietnam had enjoyed some 900 years of independence from China prior to being subjected to about 100 years of French occupation and colonization. Upon successfully defeating that occupation the country was artificially divided into North and South states for purely Western political purposes. Did China and Russia support the Vietnamese movement to liberate themselves from this Western influence? Absolutely. Was North Vietnam somehow an "outside power" because a group of white men thousands of miles away drew a line on a map? Hardly.

Not that this has anything to do with Neil's topic, but....

I have to agree with Ken on this one. There were any number of cultural differences (some major, some minor) between the population in the north and that in the south, as well as the (often ignored) central Vietnam subset (the region around Hue). I would actually characterize the idea of a "unified Vietnamese populace" as another Western fiction that doesn't square well with the reality on the ground. If you dig into any of the literature of the period as well as VC narratives, you'll find that many of them resented the influence of the "foreigners" from the north (ranging from their views on social/moral issues to their harsh accents and different way of doing business - and the dislike was often returned by the cadres from the north who considered their southern counterparts lazy and morally 'loose'). Much of this had to do with the way the Vietnamese people expanded their own influence within the region, but to say that they were the same people because they are ethnically identical (or close to identical) is to ignore the impact that cultural development has on a national or regional identity.

And now back to the thread's topic. I would also agree that it's best to limit this study to the period after 1945, even though I'm personally much more interested in earlier insurgencies. When time and number of available sources are two major considerations, the post-1945 period is hard to beat.