At last weeks hearing a SASC member asked the Secretary of Defense something along the lines of “what are we doing to institutionalize our COIN capabilities?” While that is an important question, I think the bigger question is “what steps are we taking to foster and institutionalize innovation and adaptation?”

I bring this up based on several recent observations from ongoing efforts to adapt. Culturally we are still resigned to a “one sized fits all” approach – favoring organizational final solutions to challenges that require consideration of conditions and objectives. We still want “final” closure, the kind that is out of step with the nature of war, and our role in it.

Bob Killebrew pointed out recently on the SWJ (see Transition in Iraq) that we must consider JAN 2011 and the need for a vehicle to further both US and GoI policy objectives beyond the “I” commands (MNC-I, MNSC-I, IAG). His though was to start looking at the requirements for a robust ODC (Office of Defense Command) or possibly a MAAG (Military Advisory and Assistance Group). He understands that such an effort is not something you just magic out of thin air, or existing commands if you want to get it right and set it (and your policy objectives) up for success. It takes time. This is how you ensure that when somebody says “lunch is served”, you are ready to eat.

How do we as an institution support this? At the ground level, e.g. ‘pointy” end of the spear level, Joe and Jane (up to COL Joe and COL Jane) are adapting and innovating every day. They have to. However, do we as an institution understand what they are doing? Do we understand the significance it has on the force? How are we capturing it? What have we done on the institution side that supports it? While the goal may be to cut out the adhockery, what have we done to support that goal?

Going back to Bob’s observation – what are we doing right now to support it? What resources could we apply or redirect to answer the questions of what this particular ODC / MAAG should be capable of doing given the conditions and objectives? What type of people will it require? What authorities will it need? Given that this is a much broader issue than just a MNC-I (or even a CENTCOM) issue, what can JFCOM (or maybe OSD since this is also about DoS) do to support it? How does the DoD Dir on IW support this and other issues of institutional adaptation?

While Bob’s example is a good one because it highlights what should be a politically visible issue, there are others along this line less visible at the service levels that need to be considered as well. Too often we proceed along the same line of operation, missing our institutional decision points because we were ignorant of the requirements facing others, did not understand the relevance, did not know about parallel efforts that could be leveraged, did not talk, succumbed to the not invented here disease, were unwilling to accept risk (or did not understand the risks), did not have a sense of urgency because it did not or would not effect us, or we were too busy worrying about being efficient vs. being effective.

While I thought the SASC member’s question to the SEC DEF was pretty good, he missed his responsibility some. He really needs to be looking further out, thinking about our institutional ability to adapt to conditions and objectives that we may not have considered, or may prefer not to think about. If we can get that right, the other parts will take care of themselves. We have to get over ourselves, and break the “one size fits all” paradigm.

Best, Rob