COIN & The Media (catch all)

[Cavguy]

The Israeli-Palestinian context was chosen for two reasons. First, as a proxy case for thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan, the case study approach freed up participant discussion and encouraged out of the box reflections and learning. Second, the Israeli experience has certain significant parallels with current operations in Iraq, although it also has significant differences. (See page 13 of the unabridged study). The importance of the report is really in the take-aways regarding current operations.

I absolutely love the paper. Great Work! The observations below are very useful.

Never assume you are on the moral high ground, and that you therefore don’t need to message. (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

An intervening armed state tends to be seen as “Goliath,” while non-state actors that resist are often cast as “David.” (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

Targeting insurgent leaders won’t stop the resistance and the resulting informational effects may fuel further radicalization. (Tactics versus strategy)

Direct action against a threat may create positive informational effects with home audiences, but negative informational effects in the COIN theatre. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

When a campaign’s strategic narrative contradicts the observed realities of your soldiers on the ground, it can hollow out the army’s morale. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

Eliminating insurgents won’t stop the resistance or the terror tactics. (Tactics versus strategy)

When it comes to rumors of war-fighting gone wrong, the first stories onto the wire stick. Even if these stories prove to be exaggerated or false, the damage to your reputation, and moral legitimacy, is hard to erase. (Information sequel: perceptions of moral authority)

Humanitarian action undertaken to limit civilian casualties should be documented and communicated before, during and after action. (Informational sequel and prequel: perceptions of legitimacy; preempting and dispelling rumors)

Even if you don’t trust certain media, engage them. Restricting media gives an informational advantage to your adversary. (Information management: perceptions of legitimacy)

Western democracies have low tolerance for the moral ambiguities of kinetic action. This is especially so when, in the heat of battle, mistakes or civilian casualties occur. Kinetic action that violates the law of war creates informational effects that decrease domestic and Western support. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy)

Political messages that target domestic audiences can spillover to other audiences, and create detrimental informational effects in the COIN theater. (Informational effects: GIE and challenge of different audiences)

Cohesive all-of-government coordination can yield synchronization of the message, but not necessarily the effects. (Informational effects: Perceptions of legitimacy/perception management)

Information Operations need to keep going, even after the physical action is over. (Information sequel: perception management)

Read the whole thing!