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    Default The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation

    New from RAND:

    Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation
    COIN and other stability operations are central to the current operational environment and are likely to remain so in the future. These operations demand a unique focus on shaping indigenous audiences. Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population. Creating a unified message is key in this regard, as the words and deeds of coalition forces must be synchronized to the greatest extent possible. U.S. force actions help set conditions for establishing credibility and fostering positive attitudes among the indigenous population, which, in turn, enable effective and persuasive communication. We have identified commercial marketing practices that can assist the U.S. military in its COIN shaping endeavors. We have also drawn on the insights of U.S. military personnel and past operational experiences....

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    Default Info Effects in COIN & Stability Ops

    Shifting Fire: Information Effects in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations
    The “Information Operations and Winning the Peace” workshop, held at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, was a collaboration between the War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) and the Advanced Network Research Group, University of Cambridge (UK). It brought together, over a three-day period (29 November to 1 December), an audience of some 60 leaders and practitioners representing the military, national security, intelligence and interagency communities, as well as academia. It included representatives from the U.S., UK and Canada. The venue was CSL’s Collins Hall and the workshop structure consisted of introductory expert briefings followed by small group discussions. Three case studies drawn from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served as the “driver” for small group work. These case studies examined aspects of the second Intifada phase of that conflict (circa 2002) and looked at the realities and challenges of managing “information effects” in a counterinsurgency at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The case studies provided a jumping off point for discussion of the issues and challenges facing U.S. and coalition militaries in adapting to the complexities of the “long war.” The workshop was an unclassified event, and the Israeli-Palestinian case studies allowed participants to engage issues without prejudice or risk to on-going operations.....

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    Interesting choice of scenarios - not one I would have chosen. Israel/Palestine is not really a case of COIN as there is no real struggle for control over population loyalty or security.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Interesting choice of scenarios - not one I would have chosen. Israel/Palestine is not really a case of COIN as there is no real struggle for control over population loyalty or security.
    You're right - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not an example of pure COIN. But neither is the situation in Iraq, and each of those two is as different from the other as they are from classic counterinsurgency. However, there are certainly applicable lessons to be learned.

    Clive Jones, who wrote an excellent piece on Israeli intelligence failings in Lebanon which also holds lessons for Iraq, wrote this other article related to the scenarios above which also makes for an interesting read:

    One Size Fits All: Israel, Intelligence, and the Al-Aqsa Intifada

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    Default Purpose of Using the Second Intifada Case Study

    The Israeli-Palestinian context was chosen for two reasons. First, as a proxy case for thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan, the case study approach freed up participant discussion and encouraged out of the box reflections and learning. Second, the Israeli experience has certain significant parallels with current operations in Iraq, although it also has significant differences. (See page 13 of the unabridged study). The importance of the report is really in the take-aways regarding current operations.

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    Quote Originally Posted by murphyd View Post
    The Israeli-Palestinian context was chosen for two reasons. First, as a proxy case for thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan, the case study approach freed up participant discussion and encouraged out of the box reflections and learning. Second, the Israeli experience has certain significant parallels with current operations in Iraq, although it also has significant differences. (See page 13 of the unabridged study). The importance of the report is really in the take-aways regarding current operations.
    I absolutely love the paper. Great Work! The observations below are very useful.

    Never assume you are on the moral high ground, and that you therefore don’t need to message. (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

    An intervening armed state tends to be seen as “Goliath,” while non-state actors that resist are often cast as “David.” (Perceptions of moral authority/legitimacy)

    Targeting insurgent leaders won’t stop the resistance and the resulting informational effects may fuel further radicalization. (Tactics versus strategy)

    Direct action against a threat may create positive informational effects with home audiences, but negative informational effects in the COIN theatre. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

    When a campaign’s strategic narrative contradicts the observed realities of your soldiers on the ground, it can hollow out the army’s morale. (Informational effects: challenge of different audiences)

    Eliminating insurgents won’t stop the resistance or the terror tactics. (Tactics versus strategy)

    When it comes to rumors of war-fighting gone wrong, the first stories onto the wire stick. Even if these stories prove to be exaggerated or false, the damage to your reputation, and moral legitimacy, is hard to erase. (Information sequel: perceptions of moral authority)

    Humanitarian action undertaken to limit civilian casualties should be documented and communicated before, during and after action. (Informational sequel and prequel: perceptions of legitimacy; preempting and dispelling rumors)

    Even if you don’t trust certain media, engage them. Restricting media gives an informational advantage to your adversary. (Information management: perceptions of legitimacy)

    Western democracies have low tolerance for the moral ambiguities of kinetic action. This is especially so when, in the heat of battle, mistakes or civilian casualties occur. Kinetic action that violates the law of war creates informational effects that decrease domestic and Western support. (Informational effects: perceptions of legitimacy)

    Political messages that target domestic audiences can spillover to other audiences, and create detrimental informational effects in the COIN theater. (Informational effects: GIE and challenge of different audiences)

    Cohesive all-of-government coordination can yield synchronization of the message, but not necessarily the effects. (Informational effects: Perceptions of legitimacy/perception management)

    Information Operations need to keep going, even after the physical action is over. (Information sequel: perception management)
    Read the whole thing!
    Last edited by Cavguy; 08-31-2007 at 08:02 PM.
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    Default Developing Media in Stabilization & Reconstruction Ops

    USIP, 15 Oct 07: Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
    Summary and Recommendations

    • In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. Post-conflict civilian populations are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by mass media as tensions run high and the possibility of violent relapse remains strong. Many civilians harbor deep skepticism and mistrust of the media, being accustomed to platforms that are controlled either by the state or by political groups looking to further their political agendas.

    • An effective media strategy can mitigate postwar tensions by elevating moderate voices and dampening extremist ones. It can create peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved without resort to violence. The creation of a robust media culture will also allow citizens to begin holding their government accountable for its actions and ensuring its commitment to democracy.

    • Efforts to develop local media institutions should be undertaken separately from attempts to develop strategic communications. In an increasing number of non-permissive environments (i.e., environments where security is not fully established), the distinction between these two endeavors is blurred because of a mistaken assumption among some players that both activities share the same purpose and goal.

    • A poorly developed media strategy can be detrimental in a war-ravaged country still rife with violence. A hastily conceived plan may reinforce divisions between warring parties or create a weak media sector that is vulnerable to exploitation by warlords, political patrons, and spoilers. Media development efforts also fail when the public does not trust them to establish a credible source of information.

    • Ideally, given the media’s capacity to shape war-torn countries, interveners should apply a coherent strategy in the pursuit of media development. Unfortunately, no such strategy yet exists and thus interveners have little guidance as to what tools and methods work best in the development of media institutions. In fact, media development is still conducted on an ad hoc basis from conflict to conflict.

    • This report seeks to fill this strategic gap. More particularly, it recommends that interveners take the following series of steps as they generate a strategy for media development in post-conflict zones.
    Complete 20 page paper at the link.

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    Default COIN & The Media (catch all)

    I’m a lurker on this board who’s a student of the media. In addition to viewing all the usual COIN topics, I spend much of my time reading comments about the media’s actions. The tone seems to me to be generally critical of the media’s performance.

    While I can think of good arguments both for and against this assessment, I’m intrigued at how the media, especially our own Western media, seems to be treated differently than other players in the COIN fight. Many who are adept at co-opting former enemy fighters into their COIN strategy are quick to malign, insult or disparage media organizations who, like it or not, will be the ones telling the story to the local populace or those back home.

    The media is clearly a part of COIN strategy at higher levels, but for some reason this view does not seem to have trickled down to lower levels to the extent that other COIN strategies have. I’ve heard many soldiers in Iraq tell reporters that they don’t like the media in general or the reporter’s paper in particular. I’ve never heard soldiers tell Iraqis that they just don’t like that person’s neighborhood, party or sect – even if they might feel that way privately. I think you can see this on these very boards: Many complaints about the media, very few complaints about the local populace or their organizations. This seems counterproductive.

    My gut feeling is that many view the media as somehow outside the COIN fight instead of an integral part of it. Ironically, it seems many find it easier to conceptualize Arab and Afghan media as part of COIN than Western media. My guess is that this is because we already view the Arab and Afghan populations as the target of our efforts, while we view Western media as unfaithful allies. I’d argue that COIN efforts must target both local media to undermine the insurgency and domestic media to build support for the counter-insurgency.

    I’m not saying much of the reaction against the media isn’t justified. I just don’t think leaders and soldiers are as pragmatic in their attitude toward the media as they are with other aspects of COIN.

    This is not to say that media shouldn’t be held accountable when they screw up. Yet the top-to-bottom focus should be on relationship-building efforts the same as with any other part of COIN. Even commanders who lose a soldier to an IED don’t stop community development altogether, although they may berate the local council. If they can work with complicit locals in that environment, it should be easy to set aside suspicions and work with media organizations.

    So I’m curious, whether you think I’m completely off base. Is the media, particularly Western media, an accepted part of the COIN at all levels or is it seen as an opponent in an us-versus-them conflict?

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    Default Will sleep first

    If I post on pure emotion I will not stay with the good graces of the SWJ. I will sleep on it, then answer with a level head.

    Additionally please go here link and introduce yourself
    Last edited by ODB; 02-01-2009 at 06:45 AM.
    ODB

    Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:

    Why did you not clear your corner?

    Because we are on a base and it is secure.

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    Cow,

    Read this article by LTG William Caldwell, CG of Fort Leavenworth and former MNF-I spokesman and the discussion on the board here. I'm happy to say my initial reservations have all been well addressed. He's been requiring all officers and organizations at Fort Leavenworth to regularly engage with the media - traditional and non-traditional.. In fact, it's a CGSC graduation requirement.

    My opinion, we have to engage with the media to win, and accept that some of the time we won't get the reporting we want - the benefits of engagement usually outweigh the costs.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Also look at this newsletter from CALL--put together by yours truly from JRTC.

    Media is the Battlefield


    And its follow on

    Media relations

    That has an article by LTG Caldwell

    Best

    Tom

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    ODB, those are exactly the emotions I’m interested in exploring.

    I’m a reporter, so I admittedly come at this from a different perspective. But I have a hard time understanding why soldiers get so angry at the media when they deal so calmly with so many other situations that, to my mind, are much worse than even the most unfair news story.

    For example, I’d been with a unit for a few weeks when an IED killed a soldier. The soldiers went door to door asking neighbors near the blast if they’d seen or heard anything. Each said they were inside at the time, even though it was a beautiful day. I was amazed by how calmly and professionally the soldiers handled the situation even though residents clearly knew more than they were saying. A platoon sergeant later confided that he was seething inside, but he never gave any hint of that to the Iraqis. The mindset was, “Mission first.”

    That pragmatism isn’t always there with the news media, though. I’ve had countless soldiers tell me when I show up for an embed that, “I’ve just got to warn you, I don’t like the media. It’s nothing personal, but I had a bad experience one time and I can’t stand journalists.”

    Even if that bad experience was unjustified, this strikes me as a very unpragmatic approach in an organization that prides itself on pragmatism. And chances are, the soldier has had many other bad experiences in other arenas that he or she doesn’t allow to affect the mission. What about the media gets under soldiers’ skin?

    Cavguy, great article and discussion. I see that on the ground. Leaders in many units have a required number of “leader engagements” in which they must talk to the media (although I can also see arguments that that might be swinging the pendulum in the other direction). In general, I think the leaders generally have it down pretty well.

    But where most junior soldiers have a very good understanding of the soft approach that COIN requires (limit damage, build relationships, etc.), I haven’t found that to be the case in regards to the media. Tom Odom expressed this very well in the discussion you reference:

    We have been pushing the idea that the media is much like terrain; it is part of the battlefield and you have to adapt to it. No one I know likes humping a ruck through mountains. But most of us don't waste our time disliking the mountains. Instead we change loads or find another way to go. The same line of reasoning applies to the media.
    And like I said earlier, I think soldiers conceptually view the Arabic and Western media differently. As a westerner myself, I can be just as guilty of this misconception (ie. IO is something the military does to them, while PAO is something the military does for me).

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cow Cookie View Post
    ...So I’m curious, whether you think I’m completely off base. Is the media, particularly Western media, an accepted part of the COIN at all levels or is it seen as an opponent in an us-versus-them conflict?
    Of course the media is a part of COIN but there has to be a balance. The US Military is not allowed to "lie" to the media, I'll be gosh-darned if I know what law prevents this, but Public Affairs officers are loathe to even stretch the truth. Their overriding concern is always to be perceived as truth-tellers. When Information Operations operators and planners work with PA folks there used to be a lot of animosity and mistrust, but this appears to no longer be the case. As a matter of fact in Afghanistan it is codified that they work together and on almost all staffs there is cooperation.

    But, there are two primary parts of Information Operations that make it difficult for PA and IO to work together, sometimes to the detriment of PA. Psychological Operations and Military Deception. The perception that PSYOP lies, while thy usually emphasize facts supporting their point, implies to some in the media that working with PSYOP means you might be not telling the truth (a misperception). Military Deception, by its very nature, either hides the truth in plain sight or absolutely obscures our true intentions, this could be perceived as outright lying. Thus there is a perception that anyone working in IO may or may not be telling the truth. This has also seemed to lead a misperception by some media members that the military is always 'not telling the truth'.

    Another problem is that bad news sells. I can walk the media through countless shows of positive progress but the story that will sell deals with tragedy, corruption, illegal activities or another sort of a negative story. I've seen media folks not paying attention at demonstrations and slip away to find a "Joe Tentpeg" and ask their story, hoping to find a scoop. I can't fault them for this, not personally, but professionally it hurts.

    Another problem is presenting the story. Dead babies worked great in Lebanon in 2006, showing the Israelis to be brutal, cruel, heartless - terrific negative press. The 2008/2009 Israeli-Hamas war saw Israel controlling media access to the battlespace and maximizing a myriad of media to portray their story, but the media was hobbled and spoon fed some stories.

    How does this relate to COIN? Embedded media works, but it has inherent risk. Press releases are boring, press conferences are useful because it is more human, but empowering the press allows them to roam and see the truth for themselves. Issuing a list of 'must sees' to the media is an idea that occasionally works, but generating interest outside what appears to be official channels will draw media reporting - and this is a true challenge.

    Cultural sensitivity is another really important issue. The military is beginning to understand that cultural differences create problems and is aggressively solving the problem when it occurs. But the media has the same problems, especially if they are foreigners... highlighting the difference between two very disparate cultures shows how well the situation is being addressed when successes do occur.

    This is all difficult but must be done...
    Joel
    Alexandria, VA

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    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
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    Default Media comments

    Cow Cookie:

    Take a look at my posting last year [2008] pushing for revived Voice of America programing as per the 0/11 Commission Formal Recommendations, to counter Arab media negative to us, in particular al Jazeera.

    As an older hand who used to work wargamming as a Chief of same for old USREDCOM, which then became USSOCOM (I was a reservist at the Assistant Chief of Staff level in both outfits, a weekend warrior, not an active duty type) civil affairs and psychological warfare was then, at least, one of our greatest weak spots.

    Since 9/11 however, I thought we had changed over to the imbeded media people with all our units and forces in the field in Iraq and perhaps Afghanistan.

    Did you overlook imbedded media in your comments?

    Did you think about inclusing of Voice of America in the overall media umbrella efforts in your comments?

    Youger, educated Pakistanis, Pukhtuns, and Iraqis do listen to and watch TV broadcasts from and by VOA current tense and many comment on their native websites that they like the programming, particuarly the Western music on air for them to enjoy.

    Low key sideline comments by me for your reply or reaction.

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    Default This may fit here?

    A story in The Daily Telegraph (UK) on UK-sponsored adverts in Pakistan, to show the West is not the enemy: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-Pakistan.html

    The Guardian (UK) slightly more detailed report: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009...ising-campaign

    Might fit in a Pakistani thread, but this one is about media and COIN.

    davidbfpo
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-10-2009 at 12:20 PM. Reason: Add second link.

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    Default Afghan war on UK TV

    Currently there are two UK TV series on Afghanistan; a popular "hardman" with the British troops, two episodes so far and he is respectful of the Taliban's fighting skills, with 1m viewers: one review article http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/t...ghanistan.html and to the programme http://sky1.sky.com/ross-kemp-2

    To come, I think next week, is a fly-on-the-wall documentary on the medics who serve, mainly reservists.

    Maybe some unintended effects, dispite "minders" and spin doctors. Ross Kemp's comment for example on the lack of helicopters will be noted widely.

    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by George L. Singleton View Post
    Did you think about inclusing of Voice of America in the overall media umbrella efforts in your comments?

    Youger, educated Pakistanis, Pukhtuns, and Iraqis do listen to and watch TV broadcasts from and by VOA current tense and many comment on their native websites that they like the programming, particuarly the Western music on air for them to enjoy.
    However, for quite a while, "we" insisted on promoting objectives other than (& often counter to) our COIN objectives. This have included such things as the diss. of radio media with female broadcasters & singers in heavily Pashtun areas. The BIG picture is often too clouded by our political & social agenda.

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    Default John Nagl on COIN and Media

    Folks,

    Some may be interested in this Q&A with John Nagl I've just posted. The basic theme is whether counterinsurgency is even possible given:

    a) media-driven society
    b) counterinsurgencies take a long time
    c) counterinsurgencies are very messy

    Nagl says yes. URL is:

    http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=370

    Here's a quote:

    The fact that a think-tank had to publish a statement on war aims seven years into a war is not a ringing endorsement of strategic communications policy to date, but it does not prove that the American people are unwilling to bear the burdens of counterinsurgency campaigns if they are explained as honestly and completely as possible.
    While I agree with him on strategic communication, I'm not sure we are willing to bear the burdens. Of course, this is just based on discussions with average Americans...i.e. my friends.

    Happy to discuss. I imagine this question has come up before.

    Tristan

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    Default Tristan, the "definitive" work

    on Ameirican willingness to bear the burden of war has been done by Peter Feaver of Duke. Although it was written pre-9/11 the Iraq war data seems to bear him out. Sorry, don't have the cite but you should be able to find it pretty easily.

    Cheers

    JohnT
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 02-25-2009 at 03:35 PM. Reason: Added link.

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    I wonder what's worse... an honest national dialogue concerning our strategic aims, to include counterinsurgency, or the national apathy we are currently experiencing.

    Oh wait, nevermind.
    In war there is no prize for the runner-up.

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