COIN & The Media (catch all)

[Ken White]

non-interference and allowing people to get on with their job only intruding if they see what looks like a potential screwup or something they don't like.

The public reaction to these wars is not one bit different than it was to Korea or Viet Nam -- 1/3 supports (President's Party), 1/3 objects (opposition party) and 1/3 swings back and forth depending on how well or bad the war is going.

Right now we're in a State of flux because for only the second time in our history, we've got a political party transition during a war. The Korean transition was different because there was only one theater and the transition President had campaigned specifically on ending that war. Today, the transition President has said he will end (sort of, not well defined) operations in one theater and ramp up operations (sort of, not well defined) in the other...

It's going to be interesting to watch the Republicans and their supporters transition to anti-war types. I figure that will take about 18 months to two years. I'm also curious to see how the old 'anti-war' crowd that was adapts to the new regime.

So Joe Six Pack is waiting to see what happens. It's not apathy.

[TristanAbbey]

on Ameirican willingness to bear the burden of war has been done by Peter Feaver of Duke. Although it was written pre-9/11 the Iraq war data seems to bear him out. Sorry, don't have the cite but you should be able to find it pretty easily.

Cheers

JohnT

Remember reading about Feaver in the context of the Bush administration's focus on the word "victory" to describe the Iraq strategy. Wikipedia says he worked for both Clinton and Bush admins, but I'm not sure if that's as rare as it appears.

[Ken White]

well documented, what difference does it make who a researcher 'worked for?'

That's like saying a news report on Fox or MSNBC is invalid based on one's ideological viewpoint. I've never understood that logic.

[davidbfpo]

TristanAbbey started with a Q&A with John Nagl. The basic theme is whether counterinsurgency is even possible given:

a) media-driven society
b) counterinsurgencies take a long time
c) counterinsurgencies are very messy

Nagl says yes. URL is: http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=370

Tristam,

Back to your question. Yes, a COIN campaign is possible.

Historically not all insurgencies in countries where we - the West - have had a long term strategic interest have fitted the three themes, e.g. France in Chad, which led to a clash with Libya. Short, sharp, very few "boots" on the ground and almost no (English speaking) media coverage. Oman is another old campaign, sparse UK media coverage and more currently the Phillipines.

Note Afghanistan was not of strategic interest to the USA / West after the Soviet departure and further back in the Cold War almost out of sight. The use made by AQ led to some interest, with war by remote means i.e. cruise missile attacks, but only became of strategic interest with 9/11. Pakistan has a different history regarding levels of interest and rightly to the fore now.

How to wage a COIN campaign abroad today? A point covered in many different threads, for example http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6755 (see Bill Moore's comment there) and Ten Commandments on COIN: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6543

Keypoints:

1) clear national / alliance strategic interest (even if denial of use of space)
2) use professional staff only (military and non-military)
3) do not commit conventional, bulky military forces (GPF in US terms)
4) support local efforts to prevail - here to help, not win for you
5) admit local "rules" are not your own, declare torture is bad, bad
6) allow local restrictions on press reporting (no satellite phones)
7) avoid English speaking countries (so buy up "terps")
8) never use the word War, Emergency even Troubles far better

From my armchair.

davidbfpo

[TristanAbbey]

TristanAbbey started with a Q&A with John Nagl.

Keypoints:

1) clear national / alliance strategic interest (even if denial of use of space)
2) use professional staff only (military and non-military)
3) do not commit conventional, bulky military forces (GPF in US terms)
4) support local efforts to prevail - here to help, not win for you
5) admit local "rules" are not your own, declare torture is bad, bad
6) allow local restrictions on press reporting (no satellite phones)
7) avoid English speaking countries (so buy up "terps")
8) never use the word War, Emergency even Troubles far better

Thanks, David -- want to push you a bit on conventional forces. Having armor helps in force protection -- airbases, barracks, and what not, no?

[davidbfpo]

Thanks, David -- want to push you a bit on conventional forces. Having armor helps in force protection -- airbases, barracks, and what not, no?

Tristam,

A mixture of logistics available, imagery of foriegn tanks on patrol for example, preference for engineering - those hexagonal bags are better and cheaper methinks. Once in place GPF appear difficult to remove. Smaller "boots on the ground" is better, I concede not without risks. Not being a military professional very much opinions on impact and politics.

davidbfpo

[Tom Odom]

Being a compulsive index and bibliography scanner, I was somewhat to see absolutely no FMs, Joint Pubs, CALL products, or anything other service or agency listed. That to me indicates this study on marketing is shaped by its own sources.

That said, I will scan read it further.

Tom

PS Somewhat eating my own words I looked again. Found 2 FMs on PSYOP and 1 on IO. 4 Joint Pubs on PAO, IO, Urban Ops, and PSYOPs. 7 other pubs from DoD, UN, DoS, and USMC. Still there are no studies from CALL--and we have done many that are relevant--and other forums like SSI.

More later

[Jedburgh]

...I was somewhat to see absolutely no FMs, Joint Pubs, CALL products, or anything other service or agency listed. That to me indicates this study on marketing is shaped by its own sources.....

Same here. I would have expected to at least have seen current PSYOP doctrinal pubs included in the bibliography. The "marketing approach" is not a new concept.

However, there are quite a number of interviews listed with CA, IO, PAO, PSYOP and other military personnel. In that context, you are 100% correct in that the study is "shaped by its own sources", and it states up-front in the Preface that the contents of this monograph rely heavily on interview comments made by members of the U.S. military and the commercial marketing industry.

[Tom Odom]

Jed,

Where the shaping concerns me is the selection of the military participants. I don't see a lot of operators or operational HQs here, suggesting that the study like the entire subject of IO has been "desynched" from the operations side.

Again more later.

Best

Tom

[Tom Odom]

Ok quick read later and I pretty much restate the concerns here. this study makes some great points and totally misses others. It is fine to talk to civilian advertising types and military IO, PSYOPs, and even CA types. They speak a similar language and their ideas are mutually supporting. But to mean anything, you have to engage the operations and the intelligence side. Making suggestions concerning training is easy if you do not engage those doing the training.

It is not bad--it is just in a bubble.

Tom

[SWJED]

20 July Washington Post - The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue by Karen DeYoung.

In the advertising world, brand identity is everything. Volvo means safety. Colgate means clean. IPod means cool. But since the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, its "show of force" brand has proved to have limited appeal to Iraqi consumers, according to a recent study commissioned by the U.S. military.

The key to boosting the image and effectiveness of U.S. military operations around the world involves "shaping" both the product and the marketplace, and then establishing a brand identity that places what you are selling in a positive light, said clinical psychologist Todd C. Helmus, the author of "Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation." The 211-page study, for which the U.S. Joint Forces Command paid the Rand Corp. $400,000, was released this week...