Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[max161]

S**t is still a hundred pounds" as the old saying goes.

Part of the problem is that we default to a technical solution for everything. As we miniaturize something and make it smaller and more compact and lighter we (or industry) comes up with something new that will enhance our missions that much more. Communications, computers, more weapons and ammunition and of course the emphasis on force protection (which is not a bad thing but we have to understand that protecting a soldier from a kinetic weapon requires sufficient mass). And as long as we have large rucksacks and load bearing equipment and vests on which we can attach and hang things we are always going to add something new that we think we will need or supposedly help us to better accomplish the mission or protect us. Like nature abhors a vacuum, if there is space on a soldier (or in his ruck) we will fill it!!

[reed11b]

The thing that bugs me, is equipment that is fairly effective will be the first on the "cut" list. Body armor has grown, and perhaps needs to be scaled back, but I do not buy that it is the key weight holding us back. Part of this is from how the weight of the armor is carried and part is from what I have seen many units carry in the fields. I have seen units carry breaching kits on every patrol, take way more snivel gear then they need to survive, overload ammo, water etc etc. These items are carried in a backpack that carries the weight off balance from the body, while the armor weight is distributed across the torso. And really, do you need a breaching kit on every patrol? Why not keep it in the support vehicle and call it up if you need it, unless your going specifically on a raid. Just becouse there is space in your "3 day assualt pack" does not mean you need to fill it. I'll stop here before I wander too far from my point.
Reed

[Jason Port]

I remember this discussion occurring during Desert Storm/Shield, where the average dismounted 11C seemed to be carrying 700 pounds and a labrador retriever everywhere in the reports. Is it true that whereever there is space on the soldier, we feel a need to fill it. However, we have definitely lost sight of the METT-TC analysis which should go into equipping soldiers pre-mission. While we do the best we can for risk mitigation (Shoulder armor, groin protector et al), the point on the breaching kit is right on. In motorized maneuver, where the dismount is supported with vehicles, it is only appropriate to factor this support into the equation.

I also found it interesting the quantity of injuries and 10th MTNs story of success. While I agree that the average human structure is not really designed to carry the full weight of the basic combat load, the reality is that with proper conditioning, everyone can carry the 35 pounds of IBA and ACH. The truest warrior athletes train harder and are even more capable of enduring the additional weight. Does it suck? Sure, but conversely it beats the alternative. Improve the pre-mob physical training, and I suggest that the results will improve.

I am left to wonder though, if the decrease in physical fitness of the incoming soldier is related to this as well. I remember seeing 18-20 year old trainees who struggled to do a 10 minute mile at Reception station in the late 90's. I was recently at Ft. Bragg and saw two shaved headed non-combat patched members of the 82nd, who looked barely old enough to be in uniform. They were chowing at Arby's and were clearly doughy. I assumed that they had just gotten there, as they certainly didn't make the profile of the Airborne yet. I suspect that upon donning their gear, they would break under the weight. My point is - Does the incoming post-teenager now represent a physically weaker specimen? I am sure I would have struggled at 10,000 feet as a 34 year old platoon sergeant, but I could see these two getting injured doing gate vehicle checks and standing in the tower above.

Further the technology provided by industry is also at fault here. Radios down to the individual - I get it. Tacking on additional sensors? As a tech guy, I dig it. However, as a trooper I am only carrying it if there is real, responsive, and tangible benefit to me at the end of the day. So if the sensor gathers raw video data for example about the mission, then analyze it immediately, and feed it back to my platoon's leadership, so that tomorrow I am smarter because of what we did. If not, the sensor is getting left under my hammock. The reality is that too many current sensors or information requirements do not really assist the troopers who feed the data into the information monster. Close the loop and then I will carry it. To Reed's point, we would instead cut the effective stuff in exchange for the shiny objects.

[Danny]

I have fairly detailed coverage of body armor at my site. I have called for weight reductions so many times I have lost count. But there is something that everyone should face regarding this issue, or there will be no path forward on it.

The low hanging fruit has been picked. Period. The soft panel armor has been scaled back to minimal, losing only ounces or at the most a few pounds. The carrier (which is very low weight itself except for the groin and neck protection itself on the MTV) is light, the soft panels slightly more weighty, but the ESAPI plates HEAVY.

Unless and until we invest the dollars into the innovative design and testing of new hard plates (ceramic or otherwise), there will be no further weight reduction while maintaining the same level of protection. We must find a way to reduce the weight of the ESAPI plates. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve it. This means dollars, national labs, studies in fracture mechanics with finite elements codes, and real commitment rather than just nice words.

Now, for the weight. The IBA (and Marine newest, MTV or its replacement in Afghanistan which reduces the soft panel coverage a little) is about 32 pounds, give or take a few ounces. It's almost all due to ESAPI plates (well, maybe that's a slight exaggeration, but the majority of it is plates). But when you hear about the heavier loads, it's because, of course, they attach other gear (e.g., gun via a carabiner, ammunition, eye wear such as ballistic glasses, hydration system, etc., etc.). Most of the time the systems total out at 65 - 85 pounds, and that is if they don't have a backpack, at which point they might cross the line at 110 pounds.

Body armor is weighty, but it isn't the only thing that adds load to our troops. But the main target of weight reduction if we wish to improve the IBA / MTV is the ESAPI plates. I come back to this point again and again, because it is so true and obvious that I'm surprised that anyone even tries anything else to decrease weight. I advocate spending dollars where it will make a difference rather than trying to pick high-hanging fruit that won't help.

Best, HPS

[Schmedlap]

1. If we're talking about the weight carried on Soldiers' backs, then I agree that we need to find ways to reduce weight. Climbing around mountains with 85 pounds of gear on your torso, plus a full weight (60? 80 pounds more?) on your back, and doing it everyday for a year in sweltering heat - we need to work on that.

2. If we're only talking about standard equipment that Soldiers wear on their torsos then I don't see any issue. Okay, so we've got 85 pounds (usually less) of vest, plates, ammunition, explosives, first aid kit, water, weapons, NVDs, and communication gear. As it is worn now, that's not a problem. It is distributed evenly and close to the body.

I agree that the body is generally not going to react well to the heavy weight, giant ruck, and steep terrain trio (paragraph 1). But if you can't keep up with the standard equipment evenly distributed and closely held to your torso (paragraph 2), then you're probably in the wrong line of work. I think the R&D, in that regard, would be better spent on breathable, cooler uniforms that reduce sweating, thus reducing water intake.

[Danny]

I am assuming, Schmedlap, that the low hanging fruit has been picked for the other gear like it has for body armor. It really doesn't make any difference to the warrior whether the weight is coming from his backpack, hydration system, first aid supplies (for Corpsmen or Combat lifesaver), ammunition or body armor.

The point is that we can fiddle with the small stuff that won't make any difference, or we can attack the large stuff that will. ESAPIs are the gold mine. Fix this problem and you fix the problem of battle space weight.

[Schmedlap]

I think that where the weight is carried is very significant. Years of humping a 60 to 120 pound ALICE pack - before the advent of the interceptor or SAPIs - always sucked, no matter how much training preceded it. Patrolling in 85 pounds of gear distributed around my torso was nothing.

I agree that reducing ESAPI weight would be a significant step in reducing overall weight. But I also think that even if we reduced the amount of weight on the torso to zero, things aren't going to change all that much for the guy humping a ruck in the mountains of Afghanistan. Let Soldiers patrol those mountains with just a rucksack and no vest/plates/load-carrying equipment/etc and they're still going to develop the muscular-skeletal problems discussed. Figure out a way for them to patrol with the standard equipment that Soldiers have in Iraq, but no ruck, and I think the problem goes away.

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

[carl]

My comments are those of a civilian who has no practical experience in this area beyond camping and chasing juvenile deliquents down the street after jumping out of a patrol car so I expect to get torn to pieces. But...

This problem has been around for a long time. Hoplites could never catch peltasts unless they wanted to get caught or made a big mistake. Peltasts generally couldn't hold against hoplites. You needed both. Maybe we are reaching that point again. Maybe we need to develop a corps of skirmishers of some kind who would have some chance of catching or keeping up with a Taliban running up a mountain.

I think no matter how fit a heavily armored trooper is, he isn't going to match a very lightly equipped man in moving about.

If I remember correctly, one of the things used to judge increased American success againt the VC/NVA was how many contacts were initiated by them against us vs. how many were initiated by us against them. This is probably being tracked in Afghanistan. If some units are going about less heavily burdened than others, might this not affect how many contacts they started and could that be compared to other units?

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

[BayonetBrant]

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
No commander wants to have to face the klieg lights of C-SPAN and try to explain to people (who are proud of the fact that they don't understand) what life's like when you're chasing targets up the side of a mountain with 150 pounds of lightweight gear nestled comfortably in your MOLLE ruck...

[politicsbyothermeans]

I was looking at some pictures of my grandfather and great uncles in WWII (and, my great grandfather in WWI) and I was pretty well struck by them wearing ties... into combat. I do not doubt that the ties were quickly discarded but it does serve to remind us that soldiers have been doing this whole war thing for quite some time and armor is hardly new. The apt pupil will note that even though armor has shifted the balance towards "safe" war for some, it has invariably been sidelined by some advance in weaponry.

Apart from that, I do wonder if the answer to our question lies more in the realm of the logistician and the UAV crowd than at PEO Soldier. Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

[BayonetBrant]

Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight.

Just remember that rucks come in one size: full.

If you build it, they will fill it.

[Steve Blair]

Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

[politicsbyothermeans]

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

I'm completely with you and hope I don't sound the least bit snotty when I say that I hope that our logistical/technical skills have increased sufficiently in the last four decades that we could relook this issue.

Perhaps this problem will receive more attention as we shift focus away from the vehicle centric movements in Iraq to more dismounted operations in A'Stan.

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
.

...and there you have it. Until your Army is an institution that accepts risk taking, and does not have a culture of risk mitigation, you are screwed.

Certain armies and certain units, just do not have a load carrying problem, because they leaders and manpower prepared to make the choices.

Sorry to sound harsh, but there it is.