Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[Bill Moore]

OK thanks, David.

I guess we get to the question as to whether the British Army actually believe that a soldier can engage in any reasonably intense combat carrying the sort of loads you mention?

As a matter of interest how much water is included in that load you mention?

IMO the U.S. errors with their risk management process/ideology. We went from a primary and alternate (contingency) approach to patrolling to the PACE concept (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) sometimes with different equipment for each category (especially for comms). Now add the modern body armor and you have fully suppressed soldier. Our loads were frequently well over a 100lbs without live ammo.

The bottom line is commanders have to learn to assume intelligent risk again and not assume you can mitigate risk by putting an additional 50lbs of light weight gear in the soldier's ruck.

If you're moving behind enemy lines the signature you leave with that type of load a blind man could follow, not to mention the noise, the inability to maneuver (skirmish), etc. I think these loads have an impact our tactics also, and soldiers too quickly default to calling in air strikes to resolve a problem in a situation where it risks collateral damage, because they can't skirmish effectively with the loads they're carrying. I have four forms of comms that I can call in air support with

This is a serious problem that gets talked about a lot, but I have seen little movement to seriously address. The only thing I saw in theory was a walking robot accompanying soldiers carrying their rucks for them. That might work in some situations, but the infantry/SF I grew up in you wanted to avoid being detected if at all possible to enjoy the benefits of surprise (instead of being surprised), and I'm not sure you'll have that with a horse sized robot, but maybe it's quiet if you give it sufficient 3 in 1 oil?

[carl]

This is a serious problem that gets talked about a lot, but I have seen little movement to seriously address. The only thing I saw in theory was a walking robot accompanying soldiers carrying their rucks for them. That might work in some situations, but the infantry/SF I grew up in you wanted to avoid being detected if at all possible to enjoy the benefits of surprise (instead of being surprised), and I'm not sure you'll have that with a horse sized robot, but maybe it's quiet if you give it sufficient 3 in 1 oil?

Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

[carl]

Oh, I have another question for you guys.

When a real hard war comes, how much of this problem will be solved by soldiers discarding equipment they judge not useful? It may be easier in a really hard war because command may have better things to do.

I ask this because of two stories I was told. The first was by a Vietnam War Army infantry man who said they ditched their body armor because it was too cumbersome and they judged it not useful. Nobody bugged them about doing so.

The second story was from a South African who went on long patrols in Namibia or somewhere around there. He said they were allowed to pick what equipment they each wanted to carry from a wide range of things available. He also said that the first small bit of the patrol's path could be found by tracing items of equipment dropped on the ground by guys who no longer felt the items were so useful.

[JMA]

Carl, there are units and there are units.

On my patch little discretion was allowed in what kit to take on patrols. I listed it and together with my sergeant all kit was inspected before moving out. Anything discarded had to be buried and camouflaged (under supervision).

One learns a lot about a unit from such anecdotes.

Oh, I have another question for you guys.

When a real hard war comes, how much of this problem will be solved by soldiers discarding equipment they judge not useful? It may be easier in a really hard war because command may have better things to do.

I ask this because of two stories I was told. The first was by a Vietnam War Army infantry man who said they ditched their body armor because it was too cumbersome and they judged it not useful. Nobody bugged them about doing so.

The second story was from a South African who went on long patrols in Namibia or somewhere around there. He said they were allowed to pick what equipment they each wanted to carry from a wide range of things available. He also said that the first small bit of the patrol's path could be found by tracing items of equipment dropped on the ground by guys who no longer felt the items were so useful.

[jcustis]

A two-pronged problem we face in carried loads is centered on the almost unquenchable appetite for battery power. In the first prong we have increased a patrol's carried load for force protection purposes with the addition of body-worn counter-IED devices. In the second prong we have not been disciplined enough to curb our demand for tactical information, which in turn drives up the weight penalty due to the suites of communication equipment carried.

We have created this vicious circle of demanding unrealistic reporting of reams of information, and it drives dismounted operations to carry ridiculous quantities of batteries to support 24-hour radio usage.

It goes back to uneducated, ill-informed tactical planning by folks inclined to carry the kitchen sink as insurance against all threats, rather than conduct a smart analysis of requirements and the tactical risks involved.

[Granite_State]

A two-pronged problem we face in carried loads is centered on the almost unquenchable appetite for battery power. In the first prong we have increased a patrol's carried load for force protection purposes with the addition of body-worn counter-IED devices. In the second prong we have not been disciplined enough to curb our demand for tactical information, which in turn drives up the weight penalty due to the suites of communication equipment carried.

We have created this vicious circle of demanding unrealistic reporting of reams of information, and it drives dismounted operations to carry ridiculous quantities of batteries to support 24-hour radio usage.

It goes back to uneducated, ill-informed tactical planning by folks inclined to carry the kitchen sink as insurance against all threats, rather than conduct a smart analysis of requirements and the tactical risks involved.

Couldn't agree more sir. And it infects everything, from majors at regiment calling down demanding storyboards for a cache find of a rusty old AK with two magazines to the expectation that we will have positive VHF comms at all times (God forbid HF be primary at a division exercise).

Far too often we're in the risk avoidance business instead of the risk management business (let alone the calculated risk taking business).

[carl]

Carl, there are units and there are units.

On my patch little discretion was allowed in what kit to take on patrols. I listed it and together with my sergeant all kit was inspected before moving out. Anything discarded had to be buried and camouflaged (under supervision).

One learns a lot about a unit from such anecdotes.

In fairness I must clarify one thing. The VN guy actually said they didn't wear body armor, not that they discarded it on the sly. I suspect that the unit just made the decision not to use it. I yielded to the temptation to use a colorful turn of phrase when a simple fact would have been better.

[JMA]

In fairness I must clarify one thing. The VN guy actually said they didn't wear body armor, not that they discarded it on the sly. I suspect that the unit just made the decision not to use it. I yielded to the temptation to use a colorful turn of phrase when a simple fact would have been better.

Fair enough. I wonder under today's circumstances what would be the outcome if a soldier were wounded through not having plates in? I guess it is not discreationary so his commanders would be in trouble and presumably he could lose his service/medical benefits?

[JMA]

Fear not the Marines still train to use them:

The Virtues of Stubbornness: Mules at War

I suggest the key remains looking at what is being carried by the troops on operations. 70-100lbs load for a day patrol (6 hr ?) ... I can't imagine what 'essential' equipment comprises those loads.

Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

[Bill Moore]

Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

Carl,

SF actually has done a fair amount of training with horse and mules, but I don't know how much they're being used today in Afghanistan, if at all. I think they would be good fit in some scenarios, but not all. Furthermore, that doesn't address the need to reduce the load to what is truly essential and not pack for every possible contingency. If we keep the same mind set, it will be oh boy, we have a horse now we can give the team another 250lbs of gear.

[carl]

Everyone seems to agree that the basic problem is a human one, the attitude of command. So the question is what will it take to change command attitude? The past 13 years of experience hasn't changed it. My fear is that this problem, like so many of the problems we have, won't change short of a really big war resulting in a really big defeat. Is there any hope that things can change in an important way short of that?

Another example is contained in the post by Davidbfpo on May 7, 2013. A big bad guy was lost because we moved too slow. One helo was involved, a Kiowa. It occurred to me that in VN, if I read things correctly, an Aerorifle platoon might have been just the thing to do the mission shown in David's post. But I've also read that we just don't have the numbers of helos we used to have. One reason for that is Blackhawk's are far more capable but far more expensive than Hueys, so we just don't have as many. For this mission, a sophisticated machine wasn't needed, just something to get a few troops into a spot fast. But we didn't have it.

It seems like if things go on like this, we may have a perfect everything, but only one of them-one perfect rifle, one perfect MG, one perfect plane, one perfect helo etc. We'll lose of course but our stuff will be cooler than anbody else's. After a catastrophic loss though, then we might change. Again, I fear that.

[AmericanPride]

There's also a political dimension to this problem. Senior leadership can't justify to the American public the necessities of taking risks when the public doesn't understand the trade-offs involved in combat related decisions. What will be reported are the casualty statistics and the 'scandal' of that the administration did not properly equip soldiers to fight. The solution it seems would be to keep pursuing lighter equipment - though that doesn't address the problem Bill mentioned of adding more equipment to fall that gap.

[JMA]

Senior leadership can't justify to the American public the necessities of taking risks when the public doesn't understand the trade-offs involved in combat related decisions.

The public? Or are you talking about congress?

[carl]

The public? Or are you talking about congress?

Mark, if the point of your question is what I think it may be, I very much agree. Out problem is mostly the leaders not the people. People out here in flyover country are pretty smart and would well understand how ability to move affects ability to win and ultimately keeps casualties lower, if the leaders took the time to explain it to them. The leaders don't, neither military or civilian. It is my opinion they don't for two reasons. First an awful lot of them, even military, are too stupid to get it themselves. Second, most of our leadership class is supremely arrogant and don't figure that the flyover population of the US has the smarts to get it. If they did admit to themselves that the flyover people do have the smarts to get it, where would that leave them?

[KenWats]

Carl (responding to Post #240 on the previous page)

Food for thought: Is the reason we don't have as many helos in Afg (compared to Viet Nam) the expense of the helos? Or is it possible that the logistics tail can only accommodate so much in Afg? There is no port to bring in fuel, spare parts, etc in country and the two routes somewhat open to us are both undesirable for different reasons. I'm not claiming either one is solely the reason and I have no more knowledge than any other bystander.

[carl]

Carl (responding to Post #240 on the previous page)

Food for thought: Is the reason we don't have as many helos in Afg (compared to Viet Nam) the expense of the helos? Or is it possible that the logistics tail can only accommodate so much in Afg? There is no port to bring in fuel, spare parts, etc in country and the two routes somewhat open to us are both undesirable for different reasons. I'm not claiming either one is solely the reason and I have no more knowledge than any other bystander.

That leads us into a whole discussion about what the supply chain has to support. Given the nature of the war in Afghanistan over the past 13 years, did we need all the fast jets we have based there?

But as far a helos go, we should probably look to see how many helos were normally allocated to a unit in the VN era and how many are allocated to a unit now, which I don't know how to do. If there are fewer now, it would be a good guess that expense is a big reason.

In any event, it seems to me we can't do things we did in VN and what Mark's army did in Rhodesia, in both places using much less sophisticated tech than we have now.