Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[JMA]

As does this:

Donkeys led by Lions

... but is anybody listening?

I would have thought comment on this document would have opened up a new line in this thread. Alas not. Where are the enquiring minds.

TE Lawrence lamented way back then of the British officer being too much body and too little head. Lind tells us that this crisis extends to the US military as well. Deeply troubling times.

[carl]

I would have thought comment on this document would have opened up a new line in this thread. Alas not. Where are the enquiring minds.

TE Lawrence lamented way back then of the British officer being too much body and too little head. Lind tells us that this crisis extends to the US military as well. Deeply troubling times.

I re-read that article and the thing about it that was even more distressing than the soldiers carrying too much weight was the HQs burdening themselves with so much useless make work that they are approaching the point where they can't function. They sling a lot of trons, the HQ people are all sleep deprived from overwork and mountains of 'product' are produced but they are approaching the point where they can't do what they exist for, guide and assist troops in combat. Napoleon and Grant did that for hundreds of thousands of men with pen and paper.

We are in a bad place.

[davidbfpo]

I think Jim Storr's book 'The Human face of War' has been mentioned elsewhere; it looks at many modern aspects of modern war, not IIRC the weight of combat kit, certainly command & control. A paperback edition is due out, though not shown here:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Human-Face-W.../dp/1847065236

Thanks to JMA for the copy of the BAR article 'Donkeys Led by Lions'. As the BAR is still print only and kept within the UK military, very few outsiders will have seen that.

At a recent presentation a British soldier displayed his kit, he was the Section machine gunner and explained if he laid down he had to helped up so heavy was his load. Asked if it was practical he said no and hinted as much as possible was dumped If the OiC was brave enough and no-one was watching.

[Compost]

Wider appreciation for risk aversion and overloading might be developed by ordering that duty wear for HQ personnel include body armour and 24 hours of water. Any such regimen would need to apply without exception.
It would presumably be necessary to enforce aperiodic checks of armour and containers.

The residual difficulty would be finding senior officers prepared to issue such orders.

So return to square one. The starting and restarting point where chiefs lay out unvarnished options and politicians make the decisions which can/should/might be publicised.

[jcustis]

Wider appreciation for risk aversion and overloading might be developed by ordering that duty wear for HQ personnel include body armour and 24 hours of water. Any such regimen would need to apply without exception.
It would presumably be necessary to enforce aperiodic checks of armour and containers.

The residual difficulty would be finding senior officers prepared to issue such orders.

So return to square one. The starting and restarting point where chiefs lay out unvarnished options and politicians make the decisions which can/should/might be publicised.

I am stealing this.

[BushrangerCZ]

If you ask US Army LRS what type of missions they do in Afghanistan, they will give you answer - recce. Overt recce in Hummwees, more like kind of demonstrative overwatch. Only very few units dare to ditch body armour (one mission mentioned in "No Easy Day" - good book) including SOF units. If they go like: "OK don´t wear it, but if you get killed, your family probably gets no money" what you gonna do?

Just for adding a bit of (ironic) fun to this sad thread:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1X6HnOA88vw
(end of the video is relevant to our discussed problem)

[tankersteve]

If you ask US Army LRS what type of missions they do in Afghanistan, they will give you answer - recce. Overt recce in Hummwees, more like kind of demonstrative overwatch. Only very few units dare to ditch body armour (one mission mentioned in "No Easy Day" - good book) including SOF units. If they go like: "OK don´t wear it, but if you get killed, your family probably gets no money" what you gonna do?

Actually, this is an urban myth. For US military, SGLI pays out no matter the cause of death - suicide, not wearing PPE, etc. However, if he survives the wounds, the unit could court-martial him.

As for kneepads, they help when going prone too, especially in rocky terrain. A sharp hit in the shins is excruciating. The new combat pants with build-in knee pads are awesome and finally solve all the issues about the clunky straps and skiing or skateboarding derivatives with their bulkiness.

Tankersteve

[JMA]

Carl,

This weight issue will not easlily be solved. The rotations are getting shorter and as a result commanders only start to get the idea when they are on the way home.

From a book currently to hand - and a re-read for the umpteenth time we hear 20 year old 2Lt Sidney Jary who learned the lesson early after D-Day (1944) has to convince his new/replacement company commander to allow his platoon - which was to be the forward platoon of the forward company in the attack on the town of Bedburg - to leave the small packs behind so as to allow them to 'move faster'.

From page 102, 18 Platoon by Sidney Jary:

I asked Freddie if 18 Platoon could fight without small packs until we had consolidated at Bedburg. If we could leave them on the Company transport with our picks and shovels we could certainly move faster. Freddie had not been with the Company when we had made our rapid advance at Vernonnet and did not understand the advantage that could be gained by very rapid movement in the type of situation which I sensed now existed. After some discussion, he finally agreed and 18 Platoon with considerable relief loaded their small packs into the 15 hundredweight Bedford.

Carl, you will find this book worth the cost or the effort to find a cheaper copy someplace else as this outstanding officer managed, writing some 40 years after the war to explain his wartime experiences better than anyone else I know of. Much of what gets discussed around here were experienced back then and the lessons learned. Annoying that so many youngsters of today - and sadly others too - perfer to talk about issues rather than read to learn and benefit from the experiences of others. We remain a long way from enlightned discussion around here.

I re-read that article and the thing about it that was even more distressing than the soldiers carrying too much weight was the HQs burdening themselves with so much useless make work that they are approaching the point where they can't function. They sling a lot of trons, the HQ people are all sleep deprived from overwork and mountains of 'product' are produced but they are approaching the point where they can't do what they exist for, guide and assist troops in combat. Napoleon and Grant did that for hundreds of thousands of men with pen and paper.

We are in a bad place.

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks for a good read tip JMA. Prices are insane, however I will try to ask around to borrow the book.

[JMA]

Try this place, cheapest I know of:

http://www.riflesdirect.com/18-platoon-1053-p.asp

Thanks for a good read tip JMA. Prices are insane, however I will try to ask around to borrow the book.

[BushrangerCZ]

Try this place, cheapest I know of:

http://www.riflesdirect.com/18-platoon-1053-p.asp

Thanks for a link!

[davidbfpo]

From a book currently to hand - and a re-read for the umpteenth time we hear 20 year old 2Lt Sidney Jary who learned the lesson early after D-Day (1944) has to convince his new/replacement company commander to allow his platoon - which was to be the forward platoon of the forward company in the attack on the town of Bedburg - to leave the small packs behind so as to allow them to 'move faster':18 Platoon by Sidney Jary:

I've not this book so wondered about the author. ARSSEE has this from 2008, which refers to other recommended books, only George McDonald Fraser's have I read:

Yes I believe Sydney Jary is still very much alive and well. He is a regular contributor to the British Army Review (BAR). The latest issue BAR 144 has an excellent article by him on "Readjustment". This covers the end of the War in Germany and demob, as far as 18 Platoon were concerned. The Platoon have arrived at Wilstedt, North of Bremen, having fought all the way from Normandy to get there. It ends with Sydney leaving his beloved 18 Platoon of the SLI and going back to the Hampshires.

In my humble opinion his book - 18 Platoon, Brigadier ED "Birdie" Smiths - Even The Brave Falter, George MacDonald Frasers - Quartered Safe Out Here and Major Bill Bellamy's - Troop Leader are the best and most human books written about WW2.

Link:http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thr...platoon.88903/

Sidney Jary is still alive, he retired ten years ago from giving talks to officers cadets @ Sandhurst and is still spritely - from a friend who saw him recently.

In my Google search I found this fasconating extract from Anthony King's 2013 book 'The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (another book I'd missed, after all I've never been a soldier ):http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R...20Jary&f=false

Link to Amazon.uk for this expensive book:http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Combat-S...pr_product_top

[davidbfpo]

The Daily Telegraph has a set of photos showing a soldier's kit from 1066 to 2014, mainly those who served in the British Army and the photo is the latest:


From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/w...?frame=2994181

[Kiwigrunt]

Mark and David, I hate you guys. If I end up destitute, it will be your fault. But at least – if I end up living in a cardboard box – I shall have some nice books in it.

18 Platoon: ordered (been chasing this for years).
The Combat Soldier: still pondering, credit card dangerously within range.
(The Human Face of War: also still pondering.)

[Tukhachevskii]

The Combat Soldier: still pondering, credit card dangerously within range.

Or at least until you have heard the podcast by the same author. Personally I would think twice (even three times) before accepting the conclusions of anyone who thinks S.L.A. Marshall was "misunderstood" or that any of his work can be considered valid even after his reputation (and thus the truth content of his research) has been so roundly trounced.

Marshall Myth letter in MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2000

"I am continually amazed and bitterly disappointed to find the S.L.A. Marshall ratio-of-fire myth alive and well in today’s Army. I refer to Major Kelly C. Jordan’s use of that myth in “Harnessing Thunderbolts” in the January-February 2000 issue of Military Review. Like many of his
peers, Jordan apparently does not know that Marshall’s ratio-of-fire has been debunked. If he is unaware of why the debunking, I will gladly send him the information.

I commanded a rifle company in the 84th Infantry Division in northwest Europe for four months during three campaigns from 1944 to 1945 and have disputed Marshall’s findings ever since they first appeared in the old Infantry Journal in 1946- 1947. Marshall never spent a day in combat with any infantry unit in Europe but claimed to have first-hand experience. I want to point out again that Marshall’s ratio of fire has no substance. I would bet that every West Point cadet believes in it, judging from the number of instructors at the Academy who apparently believe it.

My major complaint with Jordan’s article, though, centres on Marshall’s Operations Research Office (ORO) study, which he did for Johns Hopkins University in 1951. I have an original copy of the study, but I am certain its pagination is the same as the copy Jordan uses. Jordan also states that he uses information that can be substantiated from other than Marshall’s own somewhat suspicious data and a secret formula that died with him in 1977" to demonstrate that “the American infantry platoon’s ratio of fire increased from a high of 25 percent in World War II to approximately 55 percent by the end of the Korean War”. Secret formula? Get real! Other sources? Footnote 6 does not list those sources, but Jordan does tell us in that same footnote that he is publishing another article in a different publication on the same subject. Perhaps he will list those “other” sources with that article. I am looking forward to reading it.

I would refer your readers to the ORO study, pages 59-62. In those pages, Marshall tells how he arrived at his figure supporting the statement that “well in excess of 50 percent of troops actually committed to ground where fire may be exchanged directly with the enemy will make use of one weapon or another in the course of an engagement”. He then qualifies his estimate: “In the Korean fighting, there is manifestly a higher percentage of participation by riflemen . . . than in operations during World War II. This can be felt, rather than accurately counted, and therefore, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate percentage figure indicative of the increase. However, averaging
out the night and day operations (emphasis mine) . . . it is considered that . . . well in excess of 50 percent used a weapon”. What a reliable system!

Marshall also points out the differences between offensive and defensive operations and the different ratios of fire between the two types of operations. He excuses the soldiers in Korea from firing during an offensive operation because of the terrain, but I do not remember him giving us the same slack in Europe during World War II.

In my opinion, Marshall’s findings in Korea are as much a myth as are his World War II findings, at least as far as a ratio of fire is concerned. Yelling, screaming, shouting at each other? In the defence? Fine. In the offense? Seldom is this sort of thing necessary, except occasionally by leaders. But Marshall loves this sort of thing, so let us make his followers happy.

Finally, did my men fire? I haven’t the slightest idea, and I question whether any other company commander in northwest Europe during 1944 and 1945 went around after an action checking to determine who did and who did not fire. I remember querying a senior officer who had commanded a company at Hamburger Hill during the Vietnam War on this subject. He assured me every one of his men fired, despite the fact a number had been killed or seriously wounded before they ever got into close firing range. I wanted to know how he knew his men fired. He just knew they did, that’s how. Sounds like S.L.A. Marshall, doesn’t it?"
LTC Albert N. Garland,
US Army, Retired,
Columbus, Georgia

[JMA]

From the sandals and beret for example there are a number of items which would surely not be taken on four hour foot patrol?

Does anyone have a list of items with individual weights?

The Daily Telegraph has a set of photos showing a soldier's kit from 1066 to 2014, mainly those who served in the British Army and the photo is the latest:


From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/w...?frame=2994181

[carl]

I don't know which is why I am asking, but of how much utility are knee pads? It seems to me, no practical experience have I, that kneeling is sort of a betwixt and between position, it doesn't seem as if you could see and move as good as you could standing and you aren't as stable for shooting and are much more visible than prone. And humans aren't really constructed to kneel for long periods of time.

Like I said, I have no practical experience but everybody seems to have knee pads and I wonder how useful they really are.

[JMA]

Sydney Jary MC, is unique because he brings perspective to his narratives. A proven battlefield commander able to translate his experiences into a tool for the enlightenment and education of soldiers, especially young officers to be.

A book that needs to be re-read periodically IMHO as I discover new perspectives with each re-read. A classic.

Herewith an article from him in the J R Army Med Corps in 2000:

Reflections on the Relationship Between the Led and the Leader

Pure magic... don't know about the last paragraph though.

I've not this book so wondered about the author. ARSSEE has this from 2008, which refers to other recommended books, only George McDonald Fraser's have I read:

Link:http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/thr...platoon.88903/

Sidney Jary is still alive, he retired ten years ago from giving talks to officers cadets @ Sandhurst and is still spritely - from a friend who saw him recently.

In my Google search I found this fasconating extract from Anthony King's 2013 book 'The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (another book I'd missed, after all I've never been a soldier ):http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R...20Jary&f=false

Link to Amazon.uk for this expensive book:http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R...page&q&f=false

[Firn]

While some might disagree with aspects of the odd selection, especially when it comes to the older stuff, this is a stunning way to browse through the ages. Great way to present and compare kit through the ages. Kudos to the guy who came up with it and for the Telegraph to feature it.

[Chris jM]

Sydney Jary MC, is unique because he brings perspective to his narratives. A proven battlefield commander able to translate his experiences into a tool for the enlightenment and education of soldiers, especially young officers to be.

JMA, what did you think of Sydney Jary's view on popular opinion versus the reality of men suited for soldiering? I remember he mentioned, towards the end of 18 Platoon, that he would prefer to have poets in his platoon that were philosophically inclined and more capable of enduring hardship and suffering than the aggressive, alpha type that is often associated with infantry and elite infantry units.