Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[Schmedlap]

1. If we're talking about the weight carried on Soldiers' backs, then I agree that we need to find ways to reduce weight. Climbing around mountains with 85 pounds of gear on your torso, plus a full weight (60? 80 pounds more?) on your back, and doing it everyday for a year in sweltering heat - we need to work on that.

2. If we're only talking about standard equipment that Soldiers wear on their torsos then I don't see any issue. Okay, so we've got 85 pounds (usually less) of vest, plates, ammunition, explosives, first aid kit, water, weapons, NVDs, and communication gear. As it is worn now, that's not a problem. It is distributed evenly and close to the body.

I agree that the body is generally not going to react well to the heavy weight, giant ruck, and steep terrain trio (paragraph 1). But if you can't keep up with the standard equipment evenly distributed and closely held to your torso (paragraph 2), then you're probably in the wrong line of work. I think the R&D, in that regard, would be better spent on breathable, cooler uniforms that reduce sweating, thus reducing water intake.

[Danny]

I am assuming, Schmedlap, that the low hanging fruit has been picked for the other gear like it has for body armor. It really doesn't make any difference to the warrior whether the weight is coming from his backpack, hydration system, first aid supplies (for Corpsmen or Combat lifesaver), ammunition or body armor.

The point is that we can fiddle with the small stuff that won't make any difference, or we can attack the large stuff that will. ESAPIs are the gold mine. Fix this problem and you fix the problem of battle space weight.

[Schmedlap]

I think that where the weight is carried is very significant. Years of humping a 60 to 120 pound ALICE pack - before the advent of the interceptor or SAPIs - always sucked, no matter how much training preceded it. Patrolling in 85 pounds of gear distributed around my torso was nothing.

I agree that reducing ESAPI weight would be a significant step in reducing overall weight. But I also think that even if we reduced the amount of weight on the torso to zero, things aren't going to change all that much for the guy humping a ruck in the mountains of Afghanistan. Let Soldiers patrol those mountains with just a rucksack and no vest/plates/load-carrying equipment/etc and they're still going to develop the muscular-skeletal problems discussed. Figure out a way for them to patrol with the standard equipment that Soldiers have in Iraq, but no ruck, and I think the problem goes away.

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

[Danny]

With the above.

Best,

HPS

[carl]

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

How about pack animals?

[politicsbyothermeans]

The question I asked myself, and had my Team Sergeant ask our bubbas, is "Do I really need this?" If the answer was no, put it in your bugout bag or in the truck. If the answer was yes, hang it somewhere. Even so, the reality of our tactical situation often had us with loads that were certainly a consideration in planning the missions. Our agility was certainly not what it would have been without the armor but I imagine agility is also heavily degraded when 7.62x39 or shrapnel are investigating your innards. Not a truly serious point there but I can safely say that I saw guys saved by their armor and I can't think of a single instance where someone was wounded/killed as a result of wearing their armor.

There is little doubt that the weight of gear needs to be reduced but I'll be darned if I can find where that is going to happen. Sure, lighter armor is a good place to start. But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately. That is, until Mother Army gets around to designing our nano everything gear.

[Surferbeetle]

...reported on this a while back, interesting, but I am not sure about it's practicality in the real world. I suspect that's why we are still issued rucks

Politicsbyothermeans,

Vehicles are indeed nice to have. Good to see another ca-bubba here.

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately.

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

[politicsbyothermeans]

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

Agreed.

If only we could remember to worry less about our OERs and more about our dudes, we might not be having this discussion right now.

[bismark17]

It reminds me of the Ranger telling me about how he jumped into Grenada with 100 pounds of light weight gear.

[Schmedlap]

How about pack animals?

I think that addresses the medical concerns, but not always the tactical ones. I understand some ODAs had good experiences with them. But I can't imagine that working well for the types of missions that an Infantry Battalion will be doing; at least not to a degree where the Soldiers will all be able to ditch their rucks.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Must feel that the process has now reached certain logical conclusions.

Wish to address armour on men & trucks.

(not tanks since I feel armour belongs on them...seperate issue)

The flak vest and gun shield have evolved into quite obtuse systems which constrict movement severely.

In the nature of adaptation the counter to Coalition vehicular plate overcastings has been the implementation of penetrating devices, commonly called EFPs , which essentially render all vehicle armor useless.

I expect that armour penetrating rounds could be improvised for sniper rifles, etc. that would place dismounts in the same over-dressed, unprotected state.

Change is continuous in all conflict.

[Schmedlap]

I remember a Pentagon briefing, several years ago, when the MOLLE gear was first being introduced and the latest ruck was being modeled. A spokesman on the podium said something to the effect of, "this new ruck will allow Soldiers to carry 150 pound loads comfortably." And, to demonstrate, a short, older woman wearing spit-shined jumpboots was standing proudly on the podium, sporting the full ruck, apparently quite comfortable with it bearing down on her shoulders (I have no idea whether it was full of ammo or pillows).

While I do not miss the lackluster training or garrison-minded madness of the pre-9/11 force, I have to admit that spectacles like that did provide for an occasional good laugh.

[Sylvan]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

[carl]

As an always been a civilian, I will risk getting excoriated for the following comments by those who've been there and done that.

The Romans put a lot of effort into building extremely good roads so their soldiers could march those distances with those loads.

"a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite."
This quote begs the question-why just the most elite? Why not everybody else? Wouldn't there be more options available if the less elite could stay out as long? Wouldn't it be easier to stay out so long if less weight was carried.

"Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable." The question isn't whether it can be done. The important question is can it be done so as to keep the Taliban looking over their shoulders thinking those guys might be gaining on them.

"What would you have me leave behind?" I talked to a South African once who went on long patrols in Namibia. They were allowed to take what they wanted and thought they could carry and still move at the speed required. I think our people should be trusted to take what they want and leave what they don't need.

[Uboat509]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

That would depend on the mission. There are times when body armor is need and times when it is not. There are also times when 7 bangs might be needed and times when they would probably not. Other things could also be adjusted as needed.

[JMA]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

I dunno... could you repeat that in English?

[stevepower]

The issue at hand is how we look at Force Protection. Both in our vehicles and our dismounted combat equipment, there is a tendency to want to achieve Force Protection passively, through protective equipment. The mindset is that protecting a Soldier from threats involves wrapping him with protective layers. By doing this, his equipment protects him even from threats that he is surprised by or cannot react quickly enough to avoid. Unfortunately, this aspect of Force Protection is the one that adds the most weight and bulkiness to our Soldiers and our vehicles. This increased weight has several downsides associated with it that the Army has not prioritized in the equation adequately. Long-term injuries are one of those downsides, but I feel that the very Force Protection the equipment exists to provide degrades it.

To solve the issue of weight, the Army as an organization should start concentrating more on the other aspects of Force Protection: Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver. Each of these contributes as much to Force Protection as Kevlar and Ceramics do. If we prioritize these four things as much as we do ballistic protection, and therefore outfit our Soldiers with lighter gear, we will see a positive impact on casualties and mission accomplishment.

Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness are just as important to Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment as protective gear is. Mobility enables forces to vary their routes, surprise the enemy, and once in contact move around the enemy’s engagement area. Maneuver adds accurate fires to that mobility to allow the Soldier to close with the enemy and accomplish his mission. Lethality allows the Soldier to kill the enemy before the enemy can place effects on friendly forces. Situational Awareness is crucial to all three. Too much of the heavy and bulky gear commonly associated with Force Protection are the biggest detriment to these four factors of force protection. Too little protective gear also affects a Soldiers ability to perform these tasks. The goal is the correct balance between burdensome and inadequate.

The impacts of too much weight on mobility and maneuver are obvious, but keep in mind the impacts of temperature, equipment load, and Solder fitness on lethality and situational awareness as well. Shooting accurately and thinking clearly in contact is hard enough without having to do it with the burden of dozens of extra pounds on your head and body. It is very difficult to see the enemy, or his IED, before he sees you, when you are barely able to walk and keep the sweat out of your eyes under the load you are carrying.

As the Army makes decisions about how to equip our Soldiers, we must keep in mind that Force Protection is not a decision about protective gear alone. We need to look at Force Protection holistically and understand that the more weight Soldiers carry the worse they become at the other elements of Force Protection and their job.

-- MAJ Steve Power, Student, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[40below]

I don't have an opinion on combat load except to say after slogging around Afgh in body armour and helmet, it's a PITA, but a few commentators have brought up the issue of drinking local water rather than carrying it, and after six months of treatment, during which time I lost 25 per cent of my body weight for what was eventually diagnosed as a form of blastocystis that hadn't been seen in the west since 2001, all I can say is DON'T.

Got caught in the Aghan thing where it's impolite to refuse tea. My tropical diseases specialist later told me it wasn't the tea or the water but the cup, which probably hadn't been washed since a Soviet drank from it.

[JMA]

The issue at hand is how we look at Force Protection. Both in our vehicles and our dismounted combat equipment, there is a tendency to want to achieve Force Protection passively, through protective equipment. The mindset is that protecting a Soldier from threats involves wrapping him with protective layers. By doing this, his equipment protects him even from threats that he is surprised by or cannot react quickly enough to avoid. Unfortunately, this aspect of Force Protection is the one that adds the most weight and bulkiness to our Soldiers and our vehicles. This increased weight has several downsides associated with it that the Army has not prioritized in the equation adequately. Long-term injuries are one of those downsides, but I feel that the very Force Protection the equipment exists to provide degrades it.

To solve the issue of weight, the Army as an organization should start concentrating more on the other aspects of Force Protection: Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver. Each of these contributes as much to Force Protection as Kevlar and Ceramics do. If we prioritize these four things as much as we do ballistic protection, and therefore outfit our Soldiers with lighter gear, we will see a positive impact on casualties and mission accomplishment.

Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness are just as important to Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment as protective gear is. Mobility enables forces to vary their routes, surprise the enemy, and once in contact move around the enemy’s engagement area. Maneuver adds accurate fires to that mobility to allow the Soldier to close with the enemy and accomplish his mission. Lethality allows the Soldier to kill the enemy before the enemy can place effects on friendly forces. Situational Awareness is crucial to all three. Too much of the heavy and bulky gear commonly associated with Force Protection are the biggest detriment to these four factors of force protection. Too little protective gear also affects a Soldiers ability to perform these tasks. The goal is the correct balance between burdensome and inadequate.

The impacts of too much weight on mobility and maneuver are obvious, but keep in mind the impacts of temperature, equipment load, and Solder fitness on lethality and situational awareness as well. Shooting accurately and thinking clearly in contact is hard enough without having to do it with the burden of dozens of extra pounds on your head and body. It is very difficult to see the enemy, or his IED, before he sees you, when you are barely able to walk and keep the sweat out of your eyes under the load you are carrying.

As the Army makes decisions about how to equip our Soldiers, we must keep in mind that Force Protection is not a decision about protective gear alone. We need to look at Force Protection holistically and understand that the more weight Soldiers carry the worse they become at the other elements of Force Protection and their job.

-- MAJ Steve Power, Student, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Well put.

I can't see how to win this argument when one operates in such normally open terrain such as Afghanistan. Maybe removing the requirement for wearing protective gear when operating at night? Would this be a step in the right direction?