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Thread: Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

  1. #141
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    Quote Originally Posted by stevepower View Post
    The issue at hand is how we look at Force Protection. Both in our vehicles and our dismounted combat equipment, there is a tendency to want to achieve Force Protection passively, through protective equipment. The mindset is that protecting a Soldier from threats involves wrapping him with protective layers. By doing this, his equipment protects him even from threats that he is surprised by or cannot react quickly enough to avoid. Unfortunately, this aspect of Force Protection is the one that adds the most weight and bulkiness to our Soldiers and our vehicles. This increased weight has several downsides associated with it that the Army has not prioritized in the equation adequately. Long-term injuries are one of those downsides, but I feel that the very Force Protection the equipment exists to provide degrades it.

    To solve the issue of weight, the Army as an organization should start concentrating more on the other aspects of Force Protection: Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver. Each of these contributes as much to Force Protection as Kevlar and Ceramics do. If we prioritize these four things as much as we do ballistic protection, and therefore outfit our Soldiers with lighter gear, we will see a positive impact on casualties and mission accomplishment.

    Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness are just as important to Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment as protective gear is. Mobility enables forces to vary their routes, surprise the enemy, and once in contact move around the enemy’s engagement area. Maneuver adds accurate fires to that mobility to allow the Soldier to close with the enemy and accomplish his mission. Lethality allows the Soldier to kill the enemy before the enemy can place effects on friendly forces. Situational Awareness is crucial to all three. Too much of the heavy and bulky gear commonly associated with Force Protection are the biggest detriment to these four factors of force protection. Too little protective gear also affects a Soldiers ability to perform these tasks. The goal is the correct balance between burdensome and inadequate.

    The impacts of too much weight on mobility and maneuver are obvious, but keep in mind the impacts of temperature, equipment load, and Solder fitness on lethality and situational awareness as well. Shooting accurately and thinking clearly in contact is hard enough without having to do it with the burden of dozens of extra pounds on your head and body. It is very difficult to see the enemy, or his IED, before he sees you, when you are barely able to walk and keep the sweat out of your eyes under the load you are carrying.

    As the Army makes decisions about how to equip our Soldiers, we must keep in mind that Force Protection is not a decision about protective gear alone. We need to look at Force Protection holistically and understand that the more weight Soldiers carry the worse they become at the other elements of Force Protection and their job.

    -- MAJ Steve Power, Student, Command and General Staff College

    The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
    Well put.

    I can't see how to win this argument when one operates in such normally open terrain such as Afghanistan. Maybe removing the requirement for wearing protective gear when operating at night? Would this be a step in the right direction?

  2. #142
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    Default Think hard about Force Protection

    MAJ Steve Power has made some good points about thinking about Force Protection holistically. However, I think that Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness have only limited utility as a remedy to the Force Protection weight dilemma for both the individual soldier and fighting vehicle. I will just focus on the individual soldier in this thread.

    Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.

    Now, we ought to ask how Situational Awareness, Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver could change this situation. First, despite our intensive efforts to improve Situational Awareness through UAVs and sensors, the US soldier has continued to discover that his adversaries exploit complex terrain (especially urban terrain) to avoid detection. For the individual soldier, the question is how much does “body armor” decrease his situational awareness to the point that he does not see the enemy combatant or IED? While certainly the weight degrades soldier performance and alertness over time, is the degradation that significant?

    One could argue that an individual soldier with more Mobility (due to less weight) would be able to avoid contact by using different routes. However, in my experiences in Afghanistan, our individual force protection systems prevented dismounted maneuver on only the most treacherous terrain. Otherwise, the body armor had little impact on the dismounted routes we chose.

    I would also argue that it is the Lethality of the US soldier and his weapon systems that have caused our adversaries to choose longer-range engagements or the use of IEDs. One could argue that a more lightly equipped soldier could Maneuver better, and kill the enemy more quickly, thus ending the contact more quickly, and providing increased force protection. However, I wonder if we will ever win the “dismounted” foot race – our adversaries will almost always be more lightly armed and equipped than we are, and they will often know the terrain better, and will have preplanned escape routes. Instead, the US soldier gains a Maneuver advantage by maneuvering other elements of combat power (attack aviation, indirect fires, fighting vehicles, other dismounted forces) to kill the enemy.

    We ought to also consider the effect of full spectrum/COIN operations on combat engagements. In stability and COIN operations, the US soldier is forced to be somewhat predictable in routes, times of movement, and “objective areas” (location where the soldier conducts a military activity – checkpoints, meetings with local political leaders, joint police patrols, etc.). In these types of military operations, we are requiring the soldier to accept greater risk of the enemy initiating contact, and we place constraints on his Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver.

    Finally, we ought to consider the psychological component of Force Protection. Individual force protection systems give soldiers greater confidence that they can survive contact. Moreover, after they pass through the initial moments of contact, individual force protection systems give the soldier confidence to sustain the contact, assess & develop the situation, and then respond with precise, lethal fires. Also, in some ways, individual force protection systems have made the individual soldier more maneuverable: one reason for our soldiers’ aggressiveness in close combat and the MOUT fight is their confidence in their individual force protection systems to protect them from becoming a serious casualty.

    The point of this thread is not to say that soldiers should wear the “full kit” of individual force protection components on every mission – certainly the commander should make decisions about the level of protection based on the mission. However, based on the battlefield environment the US soldier will continue to face (full spectrum missions on complex terrain), the best solutions to our force protection weight dilemma are probably lighter systems (based on realistic expectations of what these systems ought to accomplish). Improvements in Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver will have only a limited effect on protecting the soldier at the most critical and lethal moment: the first seconds of enemy-initiated contact.

    MAJ Dwight Phillips, Student, Command and General Staff College

    -- The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

  3. #143
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    Default Deftness uber alles...

    Quote Originally Posted by dwightphillips View Post
    Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.
    All you say is true. Starting at the top, that the enemy initiates most contacts became true after mid 1968 in Viet Nam as several bad decisions (one year rotation or six months for many officers, infusion program, in-country training and others). That it has been generally -- but not always -- true in Afghanistan and Iraq is nothing more than an indictment of our poor training system adopted in the early 70s and not fully adapted to the current demographic. This led to today's essentially mediocre training AND to our risk aversion. Both those hand initiative to the enemy. There are admittedly other factors but they are minor; those two things are the major cause.

    Thus we have a couple of chicken-egg situations. Is risk aversion caused by our mediocre tactical ability demonstrated in too many but again, not all, cases or is our risk averse nature causing tactical ineptitude?

    Does our mediocre training foster a need for the SAPI plates or does the availability of that allow us to not train as well or hard as we should?

    Most casualties seem to occur because we repeatedly do the same things and present lucrative targets. Given IEDs as a major producer of casualties, your point that mobility and maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability is obviously correct. Given small arms or indirect fire that would not be the case, agility / mobility are as good or, usually, better lifesavers than a SAPI plate.
    ...First, despite our intensive efforts to improve Situational Awareness through UAVs and sensors...
    Most such do not do the individual soldier, your announced focus, much good...
    the US soldier has continued to discover that his adversaries exploit complex terrain (especially urban terrain) to avoid detection.
    Thus it has always been so. Therefor the statement that he "continues to discover" this raises the question 'why?' Why does he not know this from his training?
    ...While certainly the weight degrades soldier performance and alertness over time, is the degradation that significant?
    METT-TC. Try plate carriers in the jungle. As the Cockney said, "It ain't the 'eat, it's the 'oomidity."
    One could argue that an individual soldier with more Mobility (due to less weight) would be able to avoid contact by using different routes. However, in my experiences in Afghanistan, our individual force protection systems prevented dismounted maneuver on only the most treacherous terrain. Otherwise, the body armor had little impact on the dismounted routes we chose.
    On the routes. What about speed of movement? What about agility to avoid fire and / or engage an enemy force?
    However, I wonder if we will ever win the “dismounted” foot race – our adversaries will almost always be more lightly armed and equipped than we are, and they will often know the terrain better, and will have preplanned escape routes. Instead, the US soldier gains a Maneuver advantage by maneuvering other elements of combat power (attack aviation, indirect fires, fighting vehicles, other dismounted forces) to kill the enemy.
    Your comment on enemy capability is correct for most FID and similar missions, it may or may not be true in mid-intensity combat or major combat operations against a peer force. However, aside from the fact that one cannot depend on the availability of aviation or indirect fire, much less fighting vehicles due to a number of factors one still has to prevail or at least survive. Therefor, one must assess the terrain to determine possibilities and then out think the enemy.. That is admittedly difficult when this is the case:
    In stability and COIN operations, the US soldier is forced to be somewhat predictable in routes, times of movement, and “objective areas” (location where the soldier conducts a military activity – checkpoints, meetings with local political leaders, joint police patrols, etc.)...one reason for our soldiers’ aggressiveness in close combat and the MOUT fight is their confidence in their individual force protection systems to protect them from becoming a serious casualty.
    No question on any of that. Though I would submit that soldiers lacking individual force protection systems ( an appellation that is a minor indictment in its own right... ) have in many previous wars been every bit as aggressive. One wonders if being a bit better trained in some aspects made the difference -- or if a less risk averse society was responsible in some measure.

    Regardless this is correct:
    ...certainly the commander should make decisions about the level of protection based on the mission
    Couldn't agree more. My suspicion, based on talking to some who've been or are there and open source material is that the "commander" making that decision is often at an unduly high level...

    IOW, I agree with you, SAPI plate and carrier have great merit in the right place at the right time. The bad guys are initiating too many contacts; we, too few. Mobility, lethality and maneuver cannot in all instances substitute for protection (conversely, protection cannot ever substitute for mobility, lethality or maneuver). Commanders on the scene need to make sensible decisions based on METT-TC.

    The only thing I addressed that you did not, I think, is agility. Unless things have changed a great deal from my day and I suspect they have not, agility is in its fullest sense, intellectually and tactically more critically important for both survival and mission accomplishment than force protection, mobility, lethality or maneuver.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Given IEDs as a major producer of casualties, your point that mobility and maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability is obviously correct.
    Just some questions for clarification, neither for or against body armour. Do the plates offer reasonable protection against IEDs or are they mainly meant to protect against bullets (and shrapnel)? I should think that we need to differentiate between anti personnel IEDs (mines) and anti vehicle. For anti personnel the plates do nothing for the person stomping on the mine but may offer protection to bystanders (Not that they should be walking hand in hand to begin with of course)? Or are they not worth their weight in this case?

    Fuchs also tied the issue back to conventional warfare some time ago suggesting (IIRC) that body armour does little against HE, which is the biggest killer on the battle field. I would agree with regards to the blast but not necessarily with regards to shrapnel.

    If I’m not mistaken, hardhats first came in (some 100 years ago) for protection against shrapnel more than anything else, although they have of course been known to stop or deflect bullets.
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    Haven't read anything definitive on it, but I would assume that the soft insert can stop shell fragments. It has pretty good coverage, too.

    The plates will stop almost all common rifle rounds.

    Not knowing any better, I would think that in a high HE environment I'd want an ACH, soft armor and a shovel.

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    Quote Originally Posted by dwightphillips View Post
    Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.
    I suggest that this is the crux of the problem. The best place to start is to figure out why so much of the action is initiated by the enemy. If one can reverse this situation it would go a long way towards reducing own force casualties... and of course increasing the kill rate.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    I suggest that this is the crux of the problem. The best place to start is to figure out why so much of the action is initiated by the enemy. If one can reverse this situation it would go a long way towards reducing own force casualties... and of course increasing the kill rate.
    A big reason is that the enemy will be a farmer until it is time to fight. Initiative is hard to gain when your foe mingles amongst his people.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    A big reason is that the enemy will be a farmer until it is time to fight. Initiative is hard to gain when your foe mingles amongst his people.
    And these are the same farmers/locals on whom so much "hearts and minds" stuff is being showered? Don't you think that by the time he and others in his village have decided to take up arms against you its time get the message and to take the gloves off?
    Last edited by JMA; 07-06-2010 at 07:33 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    And these are the same farmers/locals on whom so much "hearts and minds" stuff is being showered? Don't you think that by the time he and others in his village have decided to take up arms against you its time get the message and to take the gloves off?
    Yup.

    What do you mean take the gloves off?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    Yup.

    What do you mean take the gloves off?
    Idiom Definitions for 'Gloves are off'

    "When the gloves are off, people start to argue or fight in a more serious way. ('The gloves come off' and 'take the gloves off' are also used. It comes from boxing, where fighters normally wear gloves so that they don't do too much damage to each other.)"

    or

    "with the gloves off Informal (of a dispute, argument, etc.) conducted mercilessly and in earnest, with no reservations"

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    I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?
    You need to decide what the guy is. Is he an insurgent or an insurgent doing a little domestic agric work? Is he a farmer who is also a part time insurgent or an insurgent who does a little farming to feed his family? Once who have that decided then what to do will become easily apparent.

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    Default Totally agree...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Once who have that decided then what to do will become easily apparent.
    Correct. Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...

    My recollection is that posed a significant problem a couple of places we've been before and my perception is that it's a problem in all the places -- not just Afghanistan -- we're operating today. So if you have a solution, even partial, it would be quite helpful.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...
    Indeed.

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    Rememebr, Rule .303 wasn't allowed as a defence in a Court Martial. Probably only because the priest was white, but there you go.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?
    Well, perhaps it is worth remembering what the Soviet version of it looked like in Afghanistan: c1 million dead civilians, even more maimed, 5 million driven out of the country.

    It didn't work all that well, either.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Well, perhaps it is worth remembering what the Soviet version of it looked like in Afghanistan: c1 million dead civilians, even more maimed, 5 million driven out of the country.

    It didn't work all that well, either.
    Yes, but we know why it failed. It's not a mystery. 16,000 KIA on the Soviet side.
    If the US hadn't sponsored the armed opposition, the Soviets would still be there today.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Yes, but we know why it failed. It's not a mystery. 16,000 KIA on the Soviet side.
    If the US hadn't sponsored the armed opposition, the Soviets would still be there today.
    Enough has been written about the failure of Soviet strategy, but the reason the Mujahadeen were so successful with those 16,000 KIAs, a staggering number given the imbalance between the sides, is that the Soviets had air support in theory but in practice it was hours away, allowing the Afghans to stage and carry out convoy ambushes and then fade into the countryside again. When the SAMs arrived, Soviet close air support pretty much disappeared entirely, but the Mujahadeen were doing quite well by themselves (well, with some help from the ISI) before they started getting U.S. help.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Correct. Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...

    My recollection is that posed a significant problem a couple of places we've been before and my perception is that it's a problem in all the places -- not just Afghanistan -- we're operating today. So if you have a solution, even partial, it would be quite helpful.
    Ken, this is all about knowing your enemy. If the enemy in Afghanistan can't be identified and dealt with is there any wonder why the situation there is getting to be so "difficult"?

    One minute we are being told that the fight is for the "hearts and minds" of the villagers (assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers), the next we are told is that the same villagers are actually the ones using weapons against ISAF. Which one is it? The first, the second or both? If its the second or both then surely its time to admit the war for the "hearts and minds" has been lost (in that particular village)? If so then getting rid of the poppies and the opium trade will have no affect on already offsides villager?

    Who said anything about shooting civilians?

    If the 'farmer' is a part time insurgent then he is fair game for detention or whatever? Like a bank robber, he does not rob banks everyday but makes a hit now and again when a target presents itself.

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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    (assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers)
    This is a poor assumption to make - one that is assumed by way too many outside viewers. I think it is a case of "situating the estimate" so that some can fit an FM 3-24 solution onto the problem.

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