That's one of the verities of the profession that is repeated again and again when one reads military history. "Tiger tanks, hundreds of 'em ... "Originally Posted by Ken White
Not sure exactly what the quote means: "There aren’t many soldiers or marines who would voluntarily dump kit and risk their own lives for some vague idea about the collective good."
But, if it's implying that not many in uniform would dump kit to save tactical execution, then the article is way off base. Soldiers and Marines are dumping kit constantly in order to save weight, move around, and execute the tactical fight.
We're going to have to accept that there will be a few more dead bodies with holes in them where a SAPI plate would have covered them. Or, we're going to have to accept tactical defeat.
Unless the DOD is willing to allow (and provide) real performance enhancing substances, then human physiological limits will have to be taken into account.
That's one of the verities of the profession that is repeated again and again when one reads military history. "Tiger tanks, hundreds of 'em ... "
Actually, it's time to get the God Damned medical corps out of the business of making what are in effect tactical command decisions about what armor a soldier wears.
I see these reports from idiot f*cking doctors who keep talking about how one more plate put right "here" or making this bit just a little bit bigger or thicker that would allegedly help save XX number of troops a year, and these MD morons have no clue nor do they give a #### about what that collection of "just one more piece of armor" does for the burden that soldiers are forced to wear by cowardly, risk averse chains of command.
"Me Doctor of Medicine, I no wear body armour, me expert"
120mm,
Would I be correct that US Army doctors never wearing body armour? Not even in pre-deployment training or basic training?
Unsure about the British Army, another contributor may be along shortly.
davidbfpo
120MM,There is a lot of medical evidence to support just what you saying. Anything that creates "Vertical Compression of the Spinal Cord" is bad. Carrying a large rucksack or ballistic vest over long periods of time will do you a lot of damage (can be severe).
Let Medics Be Medics
The use of statistics on morbidity and mortality is quite common in medical publications such as the New England Journal of Medicine and The Lancet. Occasionally those data shed light on positive correlations between one thing happening and another condition, or even cause-and-effect relationships between the two. It is through the study of those statistics that the causes of many tropical diseases and other illnesses have been determined. On the other hand some researchers take cheap shots, such as in medical journal articles that show a positive correlation between the presence of firearms and incidents involving them.
Last edited by Pete; 04-26-2011 at 07:02 PM. Reason: Spelling.
Neither the U.S. Army Surgeon-General nor his Medical Department run the U.S. Army -- but the conbat arms gunfighters in positions of high command do. The current policies on force protection go back to around the end of the Vietnam conflict, when senior leaders came to believe that mounting casualties would undermine public support for operations overseas.
What has been missing from the operational equation for around 40 years, maybe longer, has been achieving decisive results in a hurry. To an extent force protection and the desire to appear to be "reasonable" about the use of military force undermine our ability to get the job done in a decisive manner. There have been disconnects between strategic goals and the military operations used to achieve them; for domestic political reasons we decide to "do something" with military forces but then we don't think through the ends and means.
Strategy and Operations
It happens again and again. When LBJ sent the first Marine Corps infantry battalions to Da Nang in 1965 to protect the air base it was to appease domestic political pressure. He had to "do something."
What was missing from the decision to send combat troops to Vietnam was a strategic appreciation of the situataion -- had we invaded North Vietnam and approached its northern border the Chinese may have come in, like in Korea; we had a fictitious and make-believe peace agreement in Laos where major elements of the NVA and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were located. For that reason ops in Laos were all CIA, MACV Special Studies Group and SF, concealed as it were from the U.S. State Department ambassador there. Thus we were stuck with attrition warfare within the geographic confines of South Vietnam and supporting a complacent government and armed forces run by a corrupt ruling elite.
At the highest levels of our government there is a passive-aggressive attitude between the administration in office and DoD and the armed forces. More four-stars should have the stones to ask, "Mr. President is your goal to 'do something,' win this war or get out of it?"
Last edited by Pete; 04-27-2011 at 08:47 PM. Reason: Fine-tuning.
I suggest one needs to go beyond the focus on the body armour even though it undoubtedly is unacceptably restrictive.
The weight of the body armour is 13 kgs - 29 pounds (for Brits) out of an all up weight of 45.5 kgs -100 pounds or more whilst restrictive is clearly not the biggest issue.
The SA80 with optic and full mag weighs 4.98 kg (11.0 lb) which is nothing so it is really down to all the other stuff carried. ammo, water and what?
The article referred to a short patrol as follows:
How much water does a soldier need for a five hour patrol? The article says:They’ll never be more than a few thousand meters from the patrol base as they take a wide counterclockwise loop from base to hamlet and
back. They aim to be back in about five hours; taking it steady but back in the patrol base before the day gets really hot.
Does this imply that everyone can load as much as they like? How much of this water obsession is as a result of poor acclimatisation procedures on arrival in Afghanistan? etc etcEveryone carries a litre more fluid than they think they’ll need
So even if one carried 1 litre per hour plus 1 that would be 6 litres = 6 kg (13.2 pds) - which would be over the top anyway.
No food required for a 5 hour patrol other than maybe some dog biscuits (or whatever they are called now).
A quick addition brings that to a total of 23.98 kg (52.8 pounds).
So what makes up the other 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds) for a 5 hour patrol? Ammo and what?
Just to repeat... the basis of this post is the above quoted article and it is accepted that this may differ from other Brit forces and certainly US forces.
Possibilities (quick brainstorm - I'm sure there's lots of other stuff):
- first aid kit (tourniquet, IV bag w/needle, pressure dressing, etc)
- communication equipment
- night vision devices
- batteries
- flashlights
- ancillary equipment on weapons (optics, infrared aiming lights, white light)
- tripods
- litters
- cameras (still and/or video)
- mine detectors
- biometric scanners
- information products to distribute to population
- humanitarian supplies
- spare barrels for MGs
- smoke/frag/stun/incendiary grenades
- grenade launcher & ammo
What if a soldier gets a heat stroke?
What if they are engaged/change missions and are forced to stay for a longer tine?
Water is not something you want to be skim about (especially not in an environment like Afghanistan and not when carrying all that weight, notice the catch 22?) , I'd personally throw my body armor way before I'd give up my water.
I have a 50's book written by a team led by a WW2 GHQ officer. He wrote after the war that soldiers must never be weighed down again.
His unrealistic demand was for a 10 kg weight limit.
Then he went on to devise what equipment would be necessary and I guessed that incl. clothes at abut 20 kg and it was just the basic personal equipment.
It's a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. There's not much to be gained by optimisation, and playing around with a mix of light and heavy infantry (weight-wise) isn't going to succeed due to political and bureaucratic dynamics.
In case of doubt, delegate the decision to company level (with the power to delegate it further) and never criticise your well-trained company leaders for a wrong load of their troops.
What is the chance of that among fully acclimatised, fit and well led troops on a five hour patrol?
I'm being serious. We must assume that having slept in base the previous night that they woke fully rehydrated on the day of the patrol. No sick or unfit or otherwise unsuitable soldiers are selected for the patrol. Then during their final inspection prior to the patrol (do they still do such a thing?) each man drinks a litre of water containing rehydration "salts" (or whatever they are called in various parts of the world) under close supervision of the platoon sergeant and patrol commander. The patrol leader then paces the speed of the patrol to make sure the patrol members never reach a state of exhaustion where they are unable to function in combat.
So if a soldier goes down with heat stroke the platoon commander/platoon sergeant/patrol commander would be required to provide some answers.
Spoken about this sort of stuff in the Brits in Afghanistan thread some time ago. This paranoia over water is a direct result of poor officer leadership, lack of acclimatisation, an obvious failure to teach and enforce water discipline during training. This stuff comes back to bite an army later when they really don't want it to.
You will however note that I (begrudgingly) accepted the 6 litre water load as part of the unavoidable stuff.
What and stay out at night? You must be jokingWhat if they are engaged/change missions and are forced to stay for a longer tine?If that were ever to happen I would apply the term "resupply" (but only in the context of the local water being designated unusable due to chemical contamination) as they would also need food. I hope here you are not suggesting that when going out on a five hour patrol you pack extra in anticipation of an extended deployment?
The problem (as stated up front in the article in The British Army Review Number 150) was that:Water is not something you want to be skim about (especially not in an environment like Afghanistan and not when carrying all that weight, notice the catch 22?) , I'd personally throw my body armor way before I'd give up my water.
So what we should really do is accept that water is but only one component of the combat load and discuss exactly what the realistic water requirements are/should be for ISAF soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan. Always comparing this with what the locals and Afghan forces require/use....We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.
Last edited by JMA; 05-01-2011 at 11:58 AM.
Was that an all up weight including personal weapon?
Well if he could not get near his own target load then his original target was indeed unrealistic... unless he based the 10kgs on a load which would marginally impair mobility and movement of individual soldiers.Then he went on to devise what equipment would be necessary and I guessed that incl. clothes at abut 20 kg and it was just the basic personal equipment.
The question to ask at each point is "what is the mission?"It's a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. There's not much to be gained by optimisation, and playing around with a mix of light and heavy infantry (weight-wise) isn't going to succeed due to political and bureaucratic dynamics.
Remember (maybe you do from another discussion about patrolling) where the question I asked was what was/is the aim of wandering around in the open areas of Helmand where the TB can initiate contact at long ranges if your patrol does not walk into a prearranged IED field? Here they talk about:
Aimless stuff, actually surprised the casualties have been so low. Must be something to do with the third grade enemy with poor shooting skills.They’ll be trying to dominate some ground, ‘show presence’ and maybe win a few hearts and minds.
You apply a specific load table or equipment table for the specific type of operation. If you (as patrol commander) play the what if game then eventually you get to a chronic overload level. I do understand that there appears to be more top down load enforcement (like for body armour) which to an extent lets battalion, company and platoon officers off the hook.
Has it not reached the point where patrols are tasked on missions they have no chance of attaining?
You must be joking. In this risk averse world that is not going to happen. Some would suggest that company level leaders are not of the required competence and training to receive this degree of delegation of authority.In case of doubt, delegate the decision to company level (with the power to delegate it further) and never criticise your well-trained company leaders for a wrong load of their troops.
There are too many "if's" about it.
You're talking about a single, specific scenario, while I'm trying to include a larger verity.
Not all soldiers are always fully acclimated and not all soldiers wake up fresh after a good full night sleep (to say the vary least).
Of course there are ways around it, there could be a squad/platoon water pack or something of that sort, but that's not my point really- which is, in the weight department, aside from whatever technology would bring us, the biggest bone in the infantryman's throat is armor, which is not only heavy but is also clumsy, prevents you from assuming proper positions, accelerates dehydration, etc.
All in all I think armor as a concept does more damage then good, I personally saw people who were saved by the armor, no doubt, I also heard of people who were more severely hurt because of it, but there are no numbers (and there will probably never be...) of how many people got shot because they had armor on, because they presented a bigger-easier target, because they weren't flexible enough, because they were exhausted.
I'm no medical expert- but I don't reckon the human body can be trained into needing less water and unlike food deprivation, lack of water can result in irreversible damage.Spoken about this sort of stuff in the Brits in Afghanistan thread some time ago. This paranoia over water is a direct result of poor officer leadership, lack of acclimatisation, an obvious failure to teach and enforce water discipline during training. This stuff comes back to bite an army later when they really don't want it to.
Is the correct distribution of water a subject that should be taught? definitely.
Can 'water discipline' be trained? I'm not sure.
You should always strive to be ready for what can happen, not going mad about it, but postponing an opportunity due to lack of water is unfortunate, again- (lack of) food is doable and not as urgent.What and stay out at night? You must be joking
On the bottom line I'd have to agree that the authority should be delegated to the battalion/company level (depending on the level of operations etc.) that's what we started doing here and so far it seems to be doing well, in training anyway.So what we should really do is accept that water is but only one component of the combat load and discuss exactly what the realistic water requirements are/should be for ISAF soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan. Always comparing this with what the locals and Afghan forces require/use.
Yes I am talking about the contents of a specific article which I assume not too many people here have access to. So go ahead and talk more broadly if you wish.
Acclimatisation of troops is a command responsibility and newly deployed troops should not be deployed on tasks where the exertion required tests them beyond their acclimatisation level. I tend to think that a mere five hour patrol should be within the capabilities of newly deployed troops who are fit and healthy (unless they are ridiculously overloaded, that is).Not all soldiers are always fully acclimated and not all soldiers wake up fresh after a good full night sleep (to say the vary least).
Let me talk about that for a moment. There are five factors relating to body adjustment during the acclimatisation process: Skin, cardio-vascular system, fluid-salt balance, glare and time to acclimatize (as per the Brit manual).
Further:
I did not suggest that troops for a day patrol wake up "fresh after a good full night sleep". I mentioned that they likely "woke fully rehydrated" (sleep - length of, or broken or comfortable or peaceful in an operational area in close proximity to the enemy is a separate subject beyond the infantryman's load).Acclimatization. The time it takes to become acclimatized depends on the season and location. For example, during the hot season in the North African Western Desert and Sinai it usually takes about two weeks, in the Arabian Peninsula about a month, provided that troops work in the heat and sweat. A very few men cannot acclimatize properly and they have to be sent home. Fit, thin men do well in the heat. Fat men cannot lose heat so easily and hard work in high temperatures can be dangerous for them. Some desert and gebel climates are so hot in the summer that operations requiring considerable exertion should be carried out at night.
... more
Even during the hottest months, provided troops are fit, work in the heat and sweat profusely for two hours a day, 80% acclimatization can be achieved within four days and 100% in a fortnight.
So patrol member wakes rehydrated and takes in a litre with rehydration salts before departure under supervision.
A "a squad/platoon water pack"? What would that be?Of course there are ways around it, there could be a squad/platoon water pack or something of that sort, but that's not my point really- which is, in the weight department, aside from whatever technology would bring us, ...
I agree but add the comment that according to my calculations the weight of items carried other that personal weapon, body armour and water (and presumably rations as well as not being needed for a five hour patrol) amount to 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds). This would be ammo and other stuff. What?... the biggest bone in the infantryman's throat is armor, which is not only heavy but is also clumsy, prevents you from assuming proper positions, accelerates dehydration, etc.
Your personal experience seems to similar to that expressed in the article where it was stated:All in all I think armor as a concept does more damage then good, I personally saw people who were saved by the armor, no doubt, I also heard of people who were more severely hurt because of it, but there are no numbers (and there will probably never be...) of how many people got shot because they had armor on, because they presented a bigger-easier target, because they weren't flexible enough, because they were exhausted.
Perhaps it is time to discuss the unusual and undesirable combat behaviour again. Maybe those who were so quick to defend the circus out there will now be able to revise their positions, put their finger on the problem and figure out how to fix it all....We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.
OK I think we need to discuss "water discipline": From the Brits again:I'm no medical expert- but I don't reckon the human body can be trained into needing less water and unlike food deprivation, lack of water can result in irreversible damage.
Is the correct distribution of water a subject that should be taught? definitely.
Can 'water discipline' be trained? I'm not sure.
So can we agree that nobody is suggesting the human body can function on reduced water intake but water discipline over how the water is used is indeed desirable.Water Discipline. The human body cannot be trained to function without water or to operate on a reduced intake. If there is a shortage of water, the following rules of water discipline should be enforced:
a. There have to be orders for drinking to prevent troops husbanding supplies and precipitating a state of dehydration leading to a deterioration in performance.
b. All water should be sterilized before being used for drinking or for washing and cooking food. Water for personal washing does not need to be purified unless grossly polluted. All water sources should be reported; their positions logged at unit or formation HQ and a medical officer should test them for diseases and poisons. Individual sterilising kits are issued for use whenwater is not available from a military water point.
c. Issue of water has to be strictly controlled. Sources likely to be required for drinking must not be polluted by washing or by animals.
d. If drinking has to be temporarily restricted when supplies are inadequate, fluid balances must be fully restored by the end of each 24 hour period.
It should be carefully considered. If it means that you throw a few more kgs to each soldier on the basis of just in case, I say no. I suggest that junior leaders and patrol commanders should be required/trained to solve these problems at their level.You should always strive to be ready for what can happen, not going mad about it, but postponing an opportunity due to lack of water is unfortunate, again- (lack of) food is doable and not as urgent.
Got to be careful with one thing here. Often you hear battalion HQ officers demanding that more authority be delegated to them... which if they receive they don't always delegate to the doers down the line. There are control freaks at every level who tend to want to carry the main command decision making with them as they move up the command structure. Dangerous people.On the bottom line I'd have to agree that the authority should be delegated to the battalion/company level (depending on the level of operations etc.) that's what we started doing here and so far it seems to be doing well, in training anyway.
If you're talking about a specific micro-level event without deducing broader conclusions then at least my part in the debate is futile, I don't know the incident I don't personally believe it's effective.
In this specific case- true, on a broader level- it's not always possible.Acclimatisation of troops is a command responsibility and newly deployed troops should not be deployed on tasks where the exertion required tests them beyond their acclimatisation level.
It is a "stand alone subject" but I can't agree that it's separate it intertwines with other subjects, the infantrymen's load for example and directly effect a broader issue which is the end result, physical capabilities, viewing each subject separately and separately alone can lead to many errors.I did not suggest that troops for a day patrol wake up "fresh after a good full night sleep". I mentioned that they likely "woke fully rehydrated" (sleep - length of, or broken or comfortable or peaceful in an operational area in close proximity to the enemy is a separate subject beyond the infantryman's load).
Just like any other company level weapon if you will, a dedicated soldier that carries extra/emergency water instead of further burdening the men.A "a squad/platoon water pack"? What would that be?
I didn't see the breakdown of equipment nor do I have much knowledge of the specific equipment needed to carry their specific task (or- what was the purpose of the patrol- "standard"- fine, no extra equipment needed, but civic affairs? explosive i.d? etc. all require dedicated equipment).I agree but add the comment that according to my calculations the weight of items carried other that personal weapon, body armour and water (and presumably rations as well as not being needed for a five hour patrol) amount to 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds). This would be ammo and other stuff. What?
So again, in this very specific incident you might be right, but what happens when you're set to operate, say 24 hours based on what you're carrying alone, I'd probably drop the armor before anything else in most scenarios.
Sorry but I jumped in rather late in the debate, therefore I have no idea what you mean.Perhaps it is time to discuss the unusual and undesirable combat behaviour again. Maybe those who were so quick to defend the circus out there will now be able to revise their positions, put their finger on the problem and figure out how to fix it all.
Very well, but these are all examples-solution of a higher-level of activity/deployment, none of these are solutions to an Lt. that is tangled in an engagement and running low on water.OK I think we need to discuss "water discipline": From the Brits again:
So can we agree that nobody is suggesting the human body can function on reduced water intake but water discipline over how the water is used is indeed desirable.
Of course not all bases can be covered, ever, but water seems so basic that the notion of deliberately reducing it is too much for me.
I have an inherent dislike to HQ types (Got to be careful with one thing here. Often you hear battalion HQ officers demanding that more authority be delegated to them... which if they receive they don't always delegate to the doers down the line. There are control freaks at every level who tend to want to carry the main command decision making with them as they move up the command structure. Dangerous people.
That's at least one interpretation of what he wrote, he wasn't very specific.
He advocated assault rifle, helmet and Korean-style body armour IIRC; already 10 kg without ammo.
It has a lot to do with who you are fighting. If you are fighting an enemy armed with a AK's and the odd RPG7 and maybe a RPD then you tool up accordingly.
Nothing beyond 1st line ammo needed, a medic pack and some odds and ends and a bottle (litre) or two of water. The ability to lighten up on the load increases with experience and confidence and the reliability of CAS and resupply should it be required.
Photo RLI Fire Force stick circa around 1978:
Should be very similar in Afghanistan other than the load requirement for anti IED stuff. As to experience and confidence with quick rotations (short tours) the 6-month wonders never reach that level.
(As an aside I remain pretty surprised that Brit patrols see the inclusion of Javelin rocket(s) as essential kit on a patrol. At 11.8 kg (26 lb) at a cost of $40,000 (£20,000) per missile can't see the point. Why not buy a bunch of RPGs from some (now friendly) ex-Warsaw Pact country and issue to the troops? I'm told the explosive (thermobaric) warhead is a sweetheart.)
Mentioned too elsewhere that instead of (Brit troops) going to Kenya for a month pre-Afghanistan training rather to do a two weeks to a month battle camp held in Afghanistan should be carried out. This allows for acclimatization and all the other good things (including the realistic training which due to the Health and Safety nazis can't be carried out in the UK) before the newly deployed soldiers are deployed operationally.
The thermobaric warhead works by pressure and this again works best inside structures.
The 'Western RPG-7' issue has been debated a lot. Essentially, the 'Western RPG-7' is the 40mmx46MV round.
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