Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

[Surferbeetle]

One approach that my last commander taught me worked well in a denied area- coercive civil affairs. Outside of Essential goods and services like food, water, etc..., projects were limited to a "you help me, and I'll help you basis." We made it absolutely clear that we had a lot of money to spend, we wanted to help, but we would not waste the US taxpayer dollars until the violence fell to a minimal level. Some thought the approach to harsh, but it worked. For example, what is the point in paving a road if three months later it will have thirty IED holes that require major repair?

Anyways, I think this discussion is important as we transition from COIN to SSTR in Iraq and try to rethink our strategy in Afghanistan particularly given the financial crisis at home.

So, when do you use our money in a COIN environment?

Mike,

These are meat and potatoes questions which would benefit from a quantitative study so that we could systematically target our training program on this subject both across the force and for our SME's.

Out in the field I provide guidance/make decisions using judgment, experience, and a quick rule of thumb: 1) Life threatening, 2) Life sustaining, 3) Life enhancing.

The FOG is handy for # 1 decisions.

Our SME's who work on #s 2 and 3 often have experience in cost estimating, cost-benefit analysis, technical project management, COTR training, etc..

The great majority of this background for reservists comes from our civilian work experience. IMHO It would be beneficial for the Army to formally consider who needs this type of training by ASI/MOS so that we can better synch the lethal/non-lethal mix.

Training days, money, and SME's are always in short supply...

Regards,

Steve