Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

[Rex Brynen]

In Gaza, there is considerable uncertainty as to how reconstruction funds might be spent, since donors don't want Hamas to be able to claim any of the credit, and the PA has no real administrative control on the ground (although, ironically, it continues to pay the salaries of Gaza civil servants). Moreover, unless 1) Israel opens the border to construction materials it is almost impossible to do any reconstruction (especially since most of the cement factories in the Strip were destroyed in the recent fighting), and 2) unless Israel opens the border to regular commerce the reconstruction makes little difference (since the economy was already sharp decline due to closure).

When one looks at polling data from the territories it is hard to see much correlation between aid and attitudes, or indeed between any socio-economic indicators and political attitudes. I suspect who controls Gaza reconstruction, and how much there is--however important in a humanitarian sense--will only have marginal effects on the political views of Gazans, or the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas.

In Lebanon, Hizbullah has certainly spent money faster (in its areas) than has the weak and often very ineffectual Lebanese government. The conventional view of this is that it purchased Hizbullah considerable good-will. I'm doubtful, to be frank: I think other factors account for most of its support among Shi'ites, and its reputation among southern Sunnis and Christians has probably never been worse.



I don't doubt at all that money greases the wheels of politics, and that patronage can be an effective tool of stabilization and regime consolidation. However, this is not always the case: normative/ideological and other concerns are also important, and although some people, causes, and groups can be bought, others can't. People are also perfectly capable of taking aid and still disliking you! Social science has done a poor job of determining when patronage works, and when it backfires.

Donors also have a terrible tendency to throw around big offers of assistance, to the point of frankly making up pledging numbers for press releases that bear only passing resemblance to likely disbursements.
They then fail to deliver or deliver slowly, for both good and bad reasons). This can create a real crisis of unmet expectations among locals, who start to wonder why they aren't seeing any of the promised benefits.


Regards sources on all this, Shep Forman and Stewart Patrick, eds. Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (2000) has a lot of useful comparative studies. I did considerable work on assistance to the Palestinian territories, pre-intifada. I'm not aware that anything systematic has been written about Lebanese reconstruction.

[MikeF]

Thanks to all for the links and synopsis of relevant case studies. I'm still sorting through all the information. As COL Jones (Bob's World) stated in an earlier thread,

The U.S. currently does not possess a Grand Strategy of any sort, let alone one designed for the post-Cold War world we live in today.

If we look at the overall problem from that perspective, then the issue of over-spending or inappropriate use of funds is one of process deriving from the absence of grand strategy. So, I suppose we need to begin with the elephant in the room (strategy), develop the proper big government task organization (structure), and derive the appropriate doctrine (processes) equipped with adequate funding and resources (means) from congress to meet the desired endstate.

Sounds simple.

In the short term, it is probably imperative for junior officers to get smart on USAID doctrine and comparative nation-building case studies to ensure that we are honest brokers and good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

v/r

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

The Rand Technical Report TR 633: Guidebook for Supporting Economic Development in Stability Operations

This guidebook is designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development. The guidebook should help tactical commanders choose and implement more effective programs and projects in their areas of responsibility and better understand the economic context of their efforts. It describes key characteristics of the economic environment, the key players that soldiers are likely to encounter, and who may be involved in what sorts of assistance efforts. It also provides suggestions on what to and what not to do, with examples from current and past operations. Suggestions on providing assistance are grouped into the following areas: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure and essential services; agriculture; currencies, budgets, finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; natural resource management; and the effects of the U.S. military on local economies. To write this guidebook, the authors visited commanders in Afghanistan, conducted interviews with returning U.S. military officers, drew on their own experiences in Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans, and tapped the substantial literature about effective economic assistance.

[MikeF]

After we established a reasonable level of stability in Zag, we started working with the local leaders to re-establish essential services. We deliberately tried to do it as cheaply as possible for two reasons:

1. We were an economy of force mission so most resources and funding went to Baghdad and Baqubah.

2. I had a standing philosophy that we shouldn't waste US taxpayer's dollars.

I've observed several units using metrics of how much money they spent with no regard to Return on Investment (ROI) as if that was an indicator of success. To me that was absurd.

Anyways, instead of spending several hundred thousand dollars to build schools and medical clinics, we met with the local doctors and teachers and either reopened the old facilities or turned existing buildings into the new facility. We paid the professionals to go back to work, the IA to pull security, and we provided CL VIII supplies and school supplies.

At the time, we did it on the fly. Most of the ideas stemmed from some of my sharp Staff Sergeants. In retrospect, it was pretty successful. Below is a link to two of my boys coordinating the efforts.

http://www.realmilitaryflix.com/public/313.cfm

After all the death and violence we observed throughout the civil war and the surge, this transition was welcome for the boys. They felt like they were starting to see some fruits from their labor.

v/r

Mike