Reed:

I agree that the coin/hic debate is a false one, at least simplistically in terms of how that label is used as an either or. It is not a zero sum discussion over whether the army should do ONLY coin, or ONLY Hic. As Ken White points out correctly neither John Nagl nor I have ever taken such stark positions. Nagl has consistently said that the Army must maintain its capability to fight large conflicts at the higher end of the spectrum, similarly as I have always maintained that the Army must have a coin/stabo capability and moreover must institutionalize the coin lessons from the last 7 years.

But let us play with a hypothetical here. Let us imagine that by next year the American Army is completely out of Iraq and the mission in Afghanistan has been greatly reduced to mostly SF with just a couple of combat brigades on the ground. In short the Army has some breathing space to get back into what General Casey calls "balance." So in that hypothetical scenario if you were king for a day what kind of general guidance would you give to the Army in terms of resources and training (having in mind your conception of the future security environment)? In overly simplistic terms, but useful I think, what would be the aggregate percentage dedicated to coin vs Hic? Would it be to focus 70% of our resources and training to coin and the rest hic, or vice versa?

The problem here is that in principle we all agree that we need balance, but when you get down into the details then things becomes much murkier and where debate and discussion over these issues I think is relevant and needed.

gian