The Fallacy of HIC vs COIN

[reed11b]

The misleading notion of Nagl vs. Gentile

The HIC vs COIN debate that has been popularized by personas of LtCol. Nagl and Col. Gentile is erroneous in that it detracts from why we find ourselves involved in two ongoing COIN conflicts. In Iraq, it can be argued that we are involved in a COIN conflict because we handled the initial operations poorly, and failed to win in a matter that destroyed the enemies ability to continue to fight and that we failed to plan for after the shooting. The COIN fight in Afghanistan may have been unavoidable to some degree, but it can be argued that our failure to properly conduct the conventional operations has made the COIN fight harder. No conventional forces in theatre to trap and destroy Taliban and AQ forces allowing many to escape to fight again, and poorly planned operations by US forces later in the conflict such as Operation Anaconda are examples. What types of operations due we as country find ourselves most likely to initially conduct? My review of history suggests that punitive raids and preparing for major wars as a means of deterrence and policy role are the most likely. COIN operational knowledge will have little to do with our ongoing conflict with terrorism (that I predict we will see a resurgence of when the current OIF/OEF operations come to a close) or in our ability to deter aggressive nation states from attacking our allies overseas. In this sense Col. Gentile is right that we can not lose focus on our HIC capabilities. However, I would argue that we do combat operations incorrectly and that some of the fixes for this would lead to better performances in COIN and HIC operations. Properly trained, equipped, and supported forces can do both operations very effectively as has been discussed in depths in other threads on this board. So why do we have this argument about COIN vs HIC? I see three main reasons.
One, the command environment and culture leads to micromanagement and consolidation of forces. This further affects how we train and how we allocate resources.
Two, our methods of unit manning and training do not allow for units to develop a depth of combat knowledge and skills needed to operate in multiple conflict spectrums.
Three, despite vast public lip service, the armed forces failed to ever successfully incorporate the dreaded concepts of stability operations. This last point has dragged us into more COIN conflicts then anything else.
I will expand on the three points in follow on posts.
Reed

[Steel31968]

Agree with 2 of 3. The difference of HIC vs COIN has become muted. I view it more as phasing vs level of conflict.

We can expect most post PIII operations to include a significant COIN or insurgent activity during PIV. This should then allow planners to anticipate both P III and P IV ops.

On the one hand, someone could argue due to the current fight we are better prepared for P III and IV. On the other, we are less prepared for P III than P IV.

Add to your three arguments:

1) Agree, similar to target fixation for pilots etc... The current fight is the only one that matters, not well for a long term strategy. Tied to allocation of resources, MiTT's manning vs. BCT manning, UAV's vs F22's in the budget etc...

2) One relates to Two in manning. If MiTT's are priority then who suffers, BCT's and other combat functions (Fires BDE's, others) not dedicated to the COIN fight in total. This also applies to the whole of government aspect of supporting the current fight, something most of us have not seen; State DPT on a PRT, or Border Patrol or Customs on a BiTT, not the occasional visit from them.

3) I disagree on this point, the military has adapted, faster than the rest of government in this area. We now have folks with more experience in reconstruction and governance at the CPT/MAJ level than we even should have had. Unfortunately, many just did what they had to do without training to make it happen. A function better performed at the inter-agency level when talking reconstruction of governments and systems beyond the military. I could argue many CPT's have a better appreciation of border control/customs than our federal agents in the same departments, especially the impacts above the tactical level.

The doctrine may not have changed, but our leaders, at the tip of the spear have therefore fixing 3, if not due to any other purpose than accomplishing the mission. Nor can we, (military) expect the whole of government. It was not designed that way and we (military) are still the most capable of affecting change in a timely manner. Training in these areas is critical for future success, whoever we all have our limits.

Look forward to more posts
John

[reed11b]

Unfortunately I have chosen the topic hardest for me to describe subjectively as my starting point. While the topic has been discussed in some detail in the community at large and our community in particular; I have no real knowledge as to why U.S. military culture seems to lead to micromanagement. All I can see is the obvious results. I have seen Brigade commanders tell individual soldiers were to move too, Colonel’s direct fire teams, a mother may I attitude to initiative, and a focus on operational coordination instead of cooperation. While I am not in a position to know why, I do speculate that it has a lot to do with how the Army does not allow for units to have any long term cohesiveness thru constant manpower turnover and PCS, as I will address in the next post, and from the aggressive up our out policy. Regardless of the reason’s why, this environment that encourages micromanagement hurts our abilities to fight in many spectrums. While we have done ok in HIC with it recently, we have hardly faced world class opponents. I recall reading an AAR on the march to Baghdad that stated that the incompetence of the IA was legendary, and that many opportunities to create maneuver bottle necks, such as blowing bridges across the Tigris, were never even attempted. Many of the more successful tactical practitioners of modern HIC warfare used initiative from the there small unit leaders coupled with strategic directions from higher to direct there operations. This same technique is often sited as a necessary tactic for LIC and COIN operations as well. I would further argue that this trend towards micromanagement has had a significant impact on how our forces are structured and what weapons systems we acquire. Yes, an F-16 with 1,000lb bombs puts awesome firepower available for a squad in trouble, but what if that F-16 is directed to another priority? Why do we not focus more on firepower organic to the maneuver units themselves? Guided Mortars provides precision firepower at the Squad to fire team level, but we chose Brigade assets because they are more “economical”. They are also directed at a higher level, and I feel this is not anecdotal to there priority. Pure speculation of course, but one that has some support. To address this trend would benefit the nations’ combat operations capabilities, both HIC and LIC and even OOTW, but we would have to understand why it exists before we could fix it.
Reed
P.S. I am going to have to re-visit this topic at some point, and try to be more clear.

[Schmedlap]

I think micromanagement is less of a problem now than it was ten years ago - largely because conducting real-world operations has forced it upon us. Prior to 9/11 we trained to fight the OPFOR and safety was more important than training. When safety - caution, timidity, and fear - is more important than training, then training suffers, skills dull, and leaders fall back upon their corporate America risk management concerns. I don't see how a force can avoid being suffocated by micromanagement in such a climate.

Either I was lucky or we're reversing that nonsense. Leaders cannot be successful in Iraq or Afghanistan unless they delegate to point that it hurts (at least, it hurts for someone who rose through the ranks in the 1990s Army). There were some bizarre cases of micromanagement that I observed in Iraq, but they arose from DIV and higher (example) in most cases and the rest from BDE - and it seemed that the BDE folks slowly learned, over the course of each deployment, to lay off the reporting requirements, stop worrying about minutia, and let us make them look good. The only way that my battalion commanders could have given us more leeway would be to have packed their bags and gone home. When those guys are in charge of the Army in 10 years, I think that training and leader development will get the focus that safety and MILES gear got in the 90s.

[William F. Owen]

Reed,

I can't quibble with the picture you paint, but I feel there is corner missing from the canvas.

I don't see the Nagl versus Gentile argument as being constructive or even accurate, but...

However, there are a number of positions and ideas promoted and advocated by the Post modern COIN Avant garde, that have to be challenged.

Some are merely eccentric opinions, but others are just plain stupid. It is extremely doubtful that anything written on COIN, since 2003, is original or even useful, other than to re-state insights that already existed. You can make the US army a much better army, without ever mentioning the words HIC or COIN, and that is the approach that I favour, should anyone ask.

[reed11b]

I can't quibble with the picture you paint, but I feel there is corner missing from the canvas.

I don't see the Nagl versus Gentile argument as being constructive or even accurate, but...

However, there are a number of positions and ideas promoted and advocated by the Post modern COIN Avant garde, that have to be challenged.

Some are merely eccentric opinions, but others are just plain stupid. It is extremely doubtful that anything written on COIN, since 2003, is original or even useful, other than to re-state insights that already existed. You can make the US army a much better army, without ever mentioning the words HIC or COIN, and that is the approach that I favour, should anyone ask.

I think we may be arguing past each other Wilf. I agree with what you say, I just wanted to address why the debate exists in the first place and what aspects of military culture and doctrine have lead to the belief that COIN and HIC and any other form of warfare are not interchangeable. My conclusion is that certain failings in how we conduct all levels of combat have a greater recognizable effect on our ability to conduct COIN and other LICs then they appear have on our HIC ability, though I suspect this is false as well. Have I completely confused you yet?
Reed

[Ken White]

...The only way that my battalion commanders could have given us more leeway would be to have packed their bags and gone home. When those guys are in charge of the Army in 10 years, I think that training and leader development will get the focus that safety and MILES gear got in the 90s.

and I suspect you are -- as the micromanaging habits their predecessors learned in Viet Nam forty years ago led to the habit becoming thoroughly ingrained until recently -- then there is hope...

I also note that both the HIC-centric and COIN-centric communities have become somewhat subdued as it has become fairly obvious that DoD and the Army -- as well as the Marines -- are aiming toward a sensible balance. Now, if we could only get MG Dunlap on board...

[reed11b]

3) I disagree on this point, the military has adapted, faster than the rest of government in this area. We now have folks with more experience in reconstruction and governance at the CPT/MAJ level than we even should have had. Unfortunately, many just did what they had to do without training to make it happen. A function better performed at the inter-agency level when talking reconstruction of governments and systems beyond the military. I could argue many CPT's have a better appreciation of border control/customs than our federal agents in the same departments, especially the impacts above the tactical level.

Look forward to more posts
John

John, thanks for the feedback and comments and I will comment more in depth at another time, but I want to emphasize that I do not consider reconstruction and governance to be STABO operations, nor are they truly the mission of the military, CA being the exception. STABO is providing immediate post conflict security and insuring the population has access to basic needs; i.e. Food, water, sanitation, medical support and in industrialized countries, electricity. Rebuilding is the job of the population and if the security aspect allows that to move faster then good. This building schools nonsense to defeat or prevent insurgency is a rather poor utilization of military assets and cost effectiveness IMNSHO.
Reed