New to S2, need FM 34-20 and collection management info

[schmoe]

I have recently been tasked the collection manager for an IBCT and I am trying to find information on how other BCTs have set up their SOPs for collections... particularly on the information gathering phase and the different types of collection management products/processes that are used.

Also, I have not been able to locate an elec. copy of an FM 34-20 online and I was wondering if anyone knew where I can access this online.

Anything would be helpful. Thanks.

[Jedburgh]

FMI 2-01 ISR Synch, dated 11 Nov 08 (AKO log-in required) replaced FM 34-2 Collection Management - FM 34-20 is the old CEWI Corps-level manual.

Try MI Space on the BCKS forums (AKO log-in required). There's a Battalion/BCT S-2 topic area where you should find stuff related to what you're looking for - you should also get a decent response on RFIs posted there.

You should also get good responses from RFIs on the INTELST list-serve.

[Schmedlap]

I have recently been tasked the collection manager for an IBCT and I am trying to find information on how other BCTs have set up their SOPs for collections...

For those of us not well-versed in intel stuff - what is a collection manager? If the job is what the title sounds like to me, then you might be able to answer an earlier question that I had (kind of a pet peeve of mine, when I was a consumer of intel).

[Meinertzhagen]

Collection management/ISR synchronization is one of the more difficult jobs (behind BN S-2) that could be given to someone new to the S-2/MI community. The confluence of balancing an ever increasing number of ISR assets and ISR demands along with the nature of the S-3 tasking and S-2 ISR planning relationship add a special degree of difficulty to the position.

I recommend you begin by resourcing two NCOs (one day and one night shift) and planning a training program for your section through Foundry and internally resourced training. Begin with some foundation courses like the National Systems Information Course at DIA to familiarize the section with assets and capabilities and attend the USAF DGS Pre-Deployment Training and Pre-deployment Predator Familiarization Training to learn the Air Force processes for the Predator and other assets (easily one of the more frustrating aspects of CM&D). Once you have the base, attend a course specific to ISR sync and learn the art of matching limited assets to a multitude of requirements and demands and the systems (PRISM, COLIESEUM etc) specific to the CM&D community. Exercise your processes in the MRX and then you'll be ready actually learn to do the job once deployed.

More importantly, build a solid intellectual base in counter-insurgency, warfare in general, and your future AO in detail. The dynamic nature of the current fight and the general inapplicability of legacy collection management techniques necessitate that you develop procedures that are specific to your Brigade’s LOOs and the environment in which you are operating. Otherwise, non-creative use of assets you will control, typically designed for Cold-War style HIC, will leave you with sub-optimal results.

[Tom Odom]

and never forget that ISR planning is not done in an MI bubble--the plan should reflect use of ground forces as well as standard MI collection systems.


Tom

[davidbfpo]

There are several threads here that should help and from a non-miltary observer this thread is probably the best: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=coldstreamer

If that helps PM me and another item is available - not yet online.

davidbfpo

[Cavguy]

Don't forget this article and thread:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...ement-in-t.php

This is one of the better COIN Collection "Mindset" Articles around.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN
Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness
by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems which met CM needs within counterinsurgency (COIN) to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons…. Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a COIN environment.

[Van]

For those of us not well-versed in intel stuff - what is a collection manager? If the job is what the title sounds like to me, then you might be able to answer an earlier question that I had (kind of a pet peeve of mine, when I was a consumer of intel).

A necessary evil?


A collection manager is the middle man (or woman) between whoever is creating the requirements, either users like military and civil leaders or analysts, and the folks collecting the information. Theoretically, if they're doing their job properly, they parse the incoming requirements, check to see if they've been answered already (a frequently missed step), request collection support from higher, and in coordination with the operations officer plan the use of internal collection assets. (I've hit the high points, didn't want to drag Schmedlap through the weeds.)

The problem you discuss in your other query is primarily with the analysts and the dissemination folks. The information is collected and crammed into databases. At this point, contrary to the belief of many, no analysis has been done. Either the requestor's query has been answered or they resubmit the request, or submit a new and different request. What you are asking about is where the analytical products are and who can get them to you.

Isn't there one analyst - at least at DIV level or higher - who focuses exclusively on one faction? If not, I don't understand why. If there is, then not nearly enough people know about his work because none of the MI officers whom I spoke to seemed to know.

Not necessarily. Or there may be many seperate analysts in their quiet little stovepipes not talking to each other. What is getting better is that more analysts are hanging their stuff on SIPR and looking for feedback. And a S2 should have access to this, or be fighting for that access.

[Entropy]

To add to Van's comment, a counter intuitive aspect of the intelligence business is that, in general, no collection or analysis is done unless there is a requirement to produce that intelligence. Collection and analysis resources are always constrained, so what gets collected and what gets analyzed is subject to those requirements and their relative priority. The requirements and their relative priority are set by various levels of the national security bureaucracy.

Now, there are two basic kinds of requirements (and this is simplifying things a bit) - standing requirements and ad hoc requirements. Standing requirements are anything that needs to be regularly updated on a periodic basis, which can be anywhere from continuously to every few years depending on the topic and situation. Some examples are military capabilities, orders of battle, indications and warning, etc.

Ad hoc requirements are one-time or limited duration deals. In a crisis, for example, you'll see a ton of high priority ad hoc requirements (and periodicity of standing requirements will be almost continuuous). When the crisis abates, those requirements tend to go away and return to "normal."

To add to the complexity, there can be standing collection requirements, but no standing requirement to put that collected information into a comprehensive, all-source product. Things get even more complex when one factors in the organizational and technical differences between the various collection disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, ect.) and the agencies that support them. Now add in the various levels of classification and special access programs and caveats that restrict information dissemination.

That complex reality, combined with legacy stovepiping (still around, but somewhat better than it used to be) and completely inadequate tools for finding existing information on our networks, make intel an often frustrating business, particularly at the low end of the intel food chain. For those at the pointy end of the spear, who require information to do their mission, and who often don't have dedicated intel support that can translate their needs into requests, it's even more frustrating. On top of all that is the chain-of-command, which tends to severely frown on any attempts to get information from the source or bypass needless layers of "management."

See what a confusing mess the intel world can be?

Van mentioned that it's important to check to see if requirements have already been answered. That's true, but the sad reality is that in too many cases it's actually quicker and easier to simply task an asset to collect the information again.

[Schmedlap]

To add to the complexity, there can be standing collection requirements, but no standing requirement to put that collected information into a comprehensive, all-source product.

I guess that was the source of my frustration. I raised it with lots of people during my last deployment and, more importantly, post-deployment during some surprisingly detailed AARs. Unfortunately, the reaction seemed to be, "well, sorry, but that's how the broken system works" rather than, "good point, Mr. Operator, maybe we need to find at least a half-assed solution."

Several deployments ago, when I was in Bosnia, our S-2 shop assigned one analyst (an E-4 or E-5) to each opstina (which generally coincided with AOR boundaries). In response to our repeated requests for intelligence on areas that we were going into that had little to no contact with US forces in several years, we finally convinced the S-2 shop to have the analysts continually update a product for each opstina that had all of the most up to date intel and analysis. It was, for lack of a better word, a Wiki on their AOR. By the end of the deployment, it was actually a product that they each seemed to take some pride in, rather than just a daily grind of processing intel reports and then forgetting about them. Most importantly, it was a great reference to hand off during RIP/TOA.

I don't see how you do an effective RIP/TOA any other way. How else do you ensure that your replacement knows what is going on? There's only so much you can convey during your limited time together, between introductions with local leaders, property transfers, et cetera. In every RIP/TOA where I've been the incoming guy, I got a once-over-the-world and was then left to dig through intel reports, discard the redundant and outdated, and piece together the rest to put the picture together. Given how simple it is - and how useful of a mental exercise it is - to keep a continuously updated product for certain areas or groups, I don't understand why we don't do this. For example, let's say that your battalion operates in one geographic region and its primary adversaries are al-Qaeda in Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna. Wouldn't it make sense to maintain a continuously updated product that paints a thorough picture of the operations of those two organizations in your AOR? Our current practice is to simply assume that everyone has that information in their head because they attend the update briefs. Maybe that is a reasonable assumption. But, even if it is, your replacement is not attending the update briefs.

The success of your deployment only matters if your successor can build upon it. It's tough for him to build upon it if he doesn't know what you did or how it affected the situation. If you're handing him a blank slate, you're not giving him much to build upon.

[Bob's World]

One of our greatest handicaps in this war to date is the failure of the intel community to recognize and embrace the fact that this type of warfare is far more about the populace and the environment than about threats; and that as they are the ones with the trained personnel and processes for analysis they have a duty to cover the entire spectrum.

You hear the "Red-Blue-Green; and we just do red" argument a lot, and it just doesn't wash. It is no wonder our commanders are so focused on who do they need to go kill or capture, as that is what their staff briefs them on every morning.

So my advice, is make sure you understand the big picture, and what the true measure of success is in your AOR. Then ensure that you are collecting and analyizing intelligence that addresses the full spectrum of the problem you are working to resolve.

Even when looking at HVTs, you need to be able to clearly prioritize these guys based not upon their "rank" in an organization, but by how important they are to the effective overations of the network in your AOR; as tempered by the negative effect associated with engaging certain personnel. Some should be "targeted" for much softer forms of engagement than a JDAM in the night. Some just need the JDAM.

Every civil event executed in your AOR should be designed, planned, and synched into a grand scheme of engagement based upon a holistic intelligence picture that is constantly striving to understand all of the many factors at play in a community where there are potentially a variety of insurgent organizations with varying agendas, as well as AQ related cells conducting UW to incite and enable the insurgency. Each must be understood both uniquely and as they fold into the whole. All of this is then woven into the overall fabric of legitimate activities, actors and organizations just trying to go about their daily lives. If you can do this, you wil be a rock star.

Or you can just strum out endless "smoke on the water" quality rifs of "here are the bad guys in our AOR..." (This is what I usually see, and it is depressing in its myopic tunnel vision nature)