Insights on DOS / country team culture?

[John T. Fishel]

published a memoir called Mr. Ambassador, OU Press in 2007 or 8 more or less. I haven't read it but I suspect it does give a view of the Contry Team.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

We had a saying out at SOCPAC: "If you've seen one Country Team, you've seen one Country Team."

[John T. Fishel]

How true it is. Still, there are common elements.

What I'm really waiting for is Tom Odom and Stan to chime in on this.

Cheere

JohnT

[DGreen]

Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Dobbins has written a book about this time in country which might be useful.

[CR6]

Robert Earle's Nights in Pink Motel highlights how DOS worked with DOD personnel in Iraq in the '04-'05 period. Earle was Ambassador Negroponte's "thinker" (read strategist) on Iraq. While more memoir than proceedural it has some good insights on DOS culture and approach to strategy.

[Old Eagle]

Bob's point is too true. Been a member of four of them and each one was truly different. There are many reasons for this, but at the center is the fact that the ambassador is the president's (not DOS') rep in country and can do things pretty much however he/she wants. Instead of more specifics, I think I'll simply recommend The Special Forces Advisors' Reference Book by Research Planning, Inc. Think it was a contract for USASOC and may require AKO access. Some of the info is dated and there are a coupla inaccuracies, but overall, a good effort. Maybe Max 161 can secure a copy.

[Stan]

Where to begin?

Let’s start with my background as I rant herein…
Since 1984 I have worked in 14 Embassies. Not one was even remotely similar to the others (even though nine were in Africa and the remainder in Europe). With that, I’ll start by saying that Bob’s version is dead on the money. DOS should actually make Bob’s quote part of every State Department Magazine from this day forward

While Old Eagle is perfectly (and theoretically) correct - much like the Defense Attaché is in fact the SECDEF’s rep., the Ambassador is indeed the POTUS’ rep. But, that is where it starts and stops. Fact is (from my point of view), the Ambassador is unlikely during his/her tour to ever directly communicate with the POTUS (unless the POTUS or his better half visits your country), and much like the DATT, will unlikely ever meet the SECDEF (unless he happens to visit your country), yet alone communicate directly with him/her.

So what’s a Country Team and why ?

An executive measure granting the Ambassador the means to coordinate all USG activities to the max effectiveness of US foreign Policy in the country he/she is assigned. Holy Sierra !

The Ambassador is basically responsible for the entire U.S. effort and leadership at post. That is, all USA representatives in or at the country level at the US Embassy. There are actually two versions of country teams - Expanded and "overly classified" conferences. The former includes all the working folks that possess what the Country Team members actually don’t know, and the latter purportedly takes place where the big cheeses try to make sense of US and local policy.

Simpler terms…
Tom Odom (then Colonel Odom) opined “Puzzle Palace” while attempting to explain his abysmal position with (then) OPSCO Stan in Zaire. Not far off the mark even today .

The Ambassador is your Team Leader, and you could actually have one of at least three versions of Country Team Leaders.

1. First (and worst) is a Charge’ d’Affairs (stuck in limbo like an acting person in charge, but unlikely to ever be considered for the position);
2. Second (worst) a political appointee (typically business savvy and smart, but by no means a diplomat) and;
3. Third, a (career) Senior Foreign Service Officer (rising through the ranks with mucho time in service and many Sierra posts with which to back his/her experience as both a diplomat and leader).

I’ve seen shrinks and IGs come and go trying to determine what went wrong with the basic concept at post. We struggled with two primary issues: The Ambassador’s authority and the Ambassador’s abilities.

There’s nothing wrong with Country Teams and there’s no secret in dealing with them. It’s a leadership issue… plain and simple.

[Old Eagle]

Coupla more points.

As Stan points out, there are usually two levels of meetings in any embassy: a broad information-sharing meeting and a policy meeting. Broader meetings are useful to learn what other off-the-wall offices are doing and to share the U.S. government position on issues with a broad audience so that everyone is speaking with one voice. The smaller policy meetings are used to sync activities of those offices directly engaged with the HN on policy-type issues (DCM, POL/ECON/CIA/DATT-SDO).

As opposed to a military hierarchy, State types appear to enjoy getting "buy in" and consensus. It's a culture thing. Can you spell kumbahya?

In contrast to Stan, my experience with the politicos was more positive (2 out of 3). In fact, I was very comfortable working with the two business people because they understood resource management and WANTED to make decisions rather than water things down to a consensus. But I digress.

[Stan]

Hey Bob,
A brief response from Tom Odom (His server is blocking access to the discussion board at this time).

We had a saying out at SOCPAC: "If you've seen one Country Team, you've seen one Country Team."

As for Bob's world--tell him 2 Majors from group found out that one
country team was not the same as was the one I was in....

Best

Tom

[Outsidethewire]

A few thoughts in response to the original question below, having served in several embassies:

The country team SHOULD BE the mechanism that keeps all the disparate elements of an embassy in synch -- not unlike a daily or weekly BUA to a CG, but generally more interactive.

That said, a country team is like the NSC in that it ultimately reflects what the boss (the ambassador) wants/needs out of the team. It can be a tightly run synchronization process or a very loose Kaffeeklatsch, and being able to adapt is an important skill for those in the mix. As somebody said below, the effectiveness of the country team is at bottom a leadership issue.

Most country teams are far more "interagency" than just State and DOD -- generally any agency head is included, at least in the weekly routine, though it's true there is sometimes a "core" country team that may be smaller. Think USAID, CDC, Commerce, Customs, DEA, etc. etc. So for you bureaucratic cultural anthropologists out there, a good country team can be a gold mine!

Seriously, though, the country team may just be the most effective interagency coordination mechanism the USG has. Most of the time, participants understand they need to synchronize their efforts and act constructively. Yes, as in any office setting, there is usually one or two stereotypical characters to be found (the whiner, the withholder, the suck-up, the clueless, the climber, etc.). Those generally don't correspond to agency affiliations, either. But unless there is really a leadership vacuum at the top, you can usually expect to get done what you need to get done.

A lot of good basic information about how an embassy works can be found in the American Foreign Service Association's Inside a U.S. Embassy. It doesn't go into the differences in corporate cultures between State and DOD, but it's otherwise informative. I'll try to post some observations I've learned about State-DOD cultural differences later.

OTW

[davidoff]

Does anyone know if DOS funding will increase soon, either directly or through the stimulus, to bridge the gap between the mission and our current capabilities?

[SteveO]

Does anyone know if DOS funding will increase soon, either directly or through the stimulus, to bridge the gap between the mission and our current capabilities?

uh, no. Secretary Gates made the case. Secretary Rice argued in front of Congress with Gates by her side. Secretary Clinton is taking up the case. At the end of the day, resource levels are roughly the same for FY 10.

My two cents on this is that entrenched DoD contractors and their enablers in Congress are barriers to significant shifts. Obama achieved a token victory by capping production of the F-22. But appropriations to DoS have not increased.

For example, Congress still funds State's new S/CRS through appropriations to DoD with the understanding that they will transfer the money to State so that DoS can fulfill one of their new core missions, reconstruction and stabilization.

Maybe we will see some change in FY 11 for spending in calendar 2012.