As for this assumption:
"Instead we used MDMP (military decision making process) and focused our efforts on the alleged center of gravity, which was Saddam’s Regime. The regime collapsed, then we entered the decisive phase (transition to peace) and didn’t have a plan. If we used EBO, and realized one of our objectives was a democratic government installed, we would have built a plan to support the effects to achieve that objective, but we didn’t, and we’re still picking up the pieces."
It is just flat out wrong... there is a whole litany of reasons for why the post combat phase of OIF I went poorly... However, not identifying Phase IV as a critical phase is not included in that list... there was no shortage of planners questioning "where's the beef" regarding Phase IV... just as there is no shortage of planners who argue passionately that very detailed plans for Phase IV were developed, but either ignored or not promulgated based on command decisions... I can state definitively that by May 03, the 101st AASLT had published and were implementing the Long-term Strategy for stabilization of Northern Iraq, and before that had implemented stability lines of operations in Mar 03 that were subsequently formalized by the May 03 Plan.
That plan, even before it was finalized, was used by the Div CDR as a forcing mechanism with every high ranking officer/civilian who ventured into the Mosul Palace... each took a copy of the plan with them as seed to spur others to write their own (my own conjecture as to his intent)...
IMHO... the problem wasn't a failure to identify the importance of Phase IV... rather an unwillingness on the part of SECDEF and those closes to him (up and down) to acknowledge the possibility that the locals might not all be joyous-joyous to greet the conquering heroes of the Coalition...
We are probably all still too close to have a full-picture, but I can state without any reservation and with complete confidence that EBO wasn't the solution to a poorly coordinated phase IV
Live well and row
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