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    Default Flexibility

    Sounds like the Brits almost formalized the process of task organizing for the mission in Ireland. For US forces, it seems to be fairly ad hoc. However, most people I think tend to forget that the light units getting HMMWVs and MRAPs is just as much of a 'change' in status/capability, as a heavy unit trading down to the same platforms. In fact, since the heavy guys have mechanics, they might have an easier time doing it. I won't say the same is quite true for armor guys to start dismounted patrolling.

    Wilf, while trying not to sound like a giant asskisser, I was hoping to hear from you. Is 36 men OK, but 45 too many? Where do span of control and effectiveness intersect and where do they diverge? I like larger formations - had to do too much with little ones and know the pain. I know there is a limit - you seem to be a good source on previous research - but what has been shown?

    Tankersteve

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tankersteve View Post
    Wilf, while trying not to sound like a giant asskisser, I was hoping to hear from you. Is 36 men OK, but 45 too many? Where do span of control and effectiveness intersect and where do they diverge? I like larger formations - had to do too much with little ones and know the pain. I know there is a limit - you seem to be a good source on previous research - but what has been shown?

    Tankersteve
    I think I should point I'm not more qualified on this question than many others, however my current research would indicate the following,

    A Fire team between 3-5 seems good. 6 may be a bit big.
    Given that most people can control up 5 entities, then a the platoon would seem to be 6 x 5 man fireteams, organised around one level of command. This is my preference, however, 36 man platoons seem to work perfectly well if you include two levels of command, and that may apply to 45. There is no really right or wrong answer. It's the method and how you train in light of that method. Personally I see great merit in getting rid of one level of command.
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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Lessons from Ulster?

    There is an earlier thread which may have suitable links for 1258Dave's question: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1377

    From my outsider's recollection the UK Army, particularly in the early years of "The Troubles", deployed units from all arms on short tours of duty, six months IIRC and there was a very comprehensive training schedule eventually developed. The vehicles used were "old warhorses", notably the Humber "Pig", alongside Land Rovers and much later Saxons. Re-roling was difficult, say for an air defence artillery unit (from Germany) compared to a non-mechanised infantry battallion and comments on this do appear in the open literature. There were a large number of units on garrison duty, for three year tours (with families in barracks); mainly infantry, engineers, helicopters, signals and SOF (later not with families). A timetable was available so units knew - within operational needs - when they would go to Northern Ireland.

    Most non-mechanised infantry units only had Land Rovers and virtually no armoured vehicles. Armoured cars were attached, not integral.

    Hope that helps - from an outsider and read alongside insider Wilf's comments
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-16-2009 at 10:47 PM. Reason: Piecemeal writing

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    David,
    Thanks. I keep forgetting that British Army units were, and are, stationed in Ulster (like 1st (US) AD in WWII). From my reading it sounds like it took over 5 years for the British government to really get a system in place (including rebuilding the Police, getting rid of the B-Specials, and standing up the UDR) - and then about 3-5 more years for the "Internal Security" systems to really have an impact.
    Am I reading this right?
    Also ,what was your general impression of the UDR operations? Was that a generally successful model for internal security? I know there were problems, but my impression is that the UDR played a vital role, despite the problems.
    From your on line info this sounds like your area.


    Will,
    How does the 12 man sqd work?
    Is the SQD LDR part of one of the fire teams?
    Is the medic organic?
    What does the PLT HQ look like?
    Why only one MMG (PICKEM DEEP, the P=pairs right?) and why not a SAW in every fire team?
    And the big question: what is the impact of conscription? If any?

    Seperate question: have you seen tests with a PLT built with 6 x 5 pax Fire Teams?

    Thanks.
    Last edited by 1258dave; 02-17-2009 at 05:33 PM. Reason: more questions!

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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Part reply (Wilf may follow)

    Quote Originally Posted by 1258dave View Post
    David, Thanks. I keep forgetting that British Army units were, and are, stationed in Ulster (like 1st (US) AD in WWII). From my reading it sounds like it took over 5 years for the British government to really get a system in place (including rebuilding the Police, getting rid of the B-Specials, and standing up the UDR) - and then about 3-5 more years for the "Internal Security" systems to really have an impact. Am I reading this right? Also ,what was your general impression of the UDR operations? Was that a generally successful model for internal security? I know there were problems, but my impression is that the UDR played a vital role, despite the problems. From your on line info this sounds like your area. Thanks.
    "The Troubles" lasted a long time and it simply took a long time for the violence to be contained and reduced to an acceptable level. Violence came from both sides of the communal divide and sadly some collusion by local security forces. This was mainly the UDR and one UK report cited 5-15% had strong links with Protestant paramilitaries; collusion was rarely found in the RUC and to my knowledge not in the regular Army.

    The intelligence effort appears to have taken longer to get right and still causes controversy e.g. Omagh bombing and whether GCHQ helped (Try: http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/fr...00/7868236.stm. )

    The UDR initially had a significant Catholic minority for a few years, now often overlooked, but by its end it was 99% Protestant. Through out it was mainly a mix of full-time and part-time, locally recruited soldiers - with a cadre of regular UK Army officers and NCOs. IIRC their main role in later years was in the rural areas, the RUC handled the urban areas and rarely had UDR support. Being in the UDR could not be easily hidden in the rural areas and they paid a very high price, often even when retired or had left the UDR (264 dead).

    I suspect the UDR initially was a quick fix and politically motivated - to keep loyalist support in uniform. Their existence after many years enabled the UK Army to reduce its numbers and extended "Ulsterisation" in policing to the military in the mid-1970s it was eleven battalions strong and 57,000 served in its history. I am not aware of how vital a role the UDR played, nor can I readily locate an expert comment.

    My judgement or comment reflects the fact that the main focus throughout "The Troubles" was that the "hardcore" Republican areas were urban, where the UK Army handed primacy over to the RUC in the mid-1970's, so the UDR's value was not crucial IMHO.

    In the rural areas the UDR had an active role long after primacy was handed to the RUC, but the regular UK Army dominated intelligence and surveillance roles.

    Many other factors had a part in ending "The Troubles".

    Late addition: On my bookshelf and relied upon for much of my response is this book 'Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992', John Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-18-2009 at 08:46 PM. Reason: Extended composing and adding source book used

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    Default Udr

    David,
    Thanks for the response. I realize that building an organization like the Ulster Defense Regiment, and the Home Service Force of the Royal Irish Reg, was a stop gap during the worst part of the war ("troubles") that turned into the "least bad" solution long term.

    It is easy to forget that the British Army executed Operation Motorman in 1972 for 6 months with a 28k+ pax Division- not counting the UDR or the Royal Ulster Constab. Add it all up and the Government forces were probably putting close 40k (or more?) armed personnel on the streets (police, Regular Army, UDR, HSF etc).

    As an "Full Time" Army National Guardsman - I am always interested in how other "reservist" or "Home Service Force" units organize and operate.

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    Quote Originally Posted by 1258dave View Post
    Will,
    How does the 12 man sqd work?
    Is the SQD LDR part of one of the fire teams?
    Is the medic organic?
    What does the PLT HQ look like?
    The 12 man squad works just like the USMC arrangement except, as far as I can tell, the squad leader is IN one the fireteams. Don't know about the medic. I think every platoon has one, and not sure about the PLT HQ, though based on what I have heard from the class of 67' 73' and 82, an officer carrying his own radio, IS a platoon HQ!
    Why only one MMG (PICKEM DEEP, the P=pairs right?) and why not a SAW in every fire team?
    I'm still exploring this one. THis is my general impression, based on talking to folks. Something critical to understand is that the IDF is extremely informal and adapts to circumstance very quickly. No two platoons seem to be the same!
    And the big question: what is the impact of conscription? If any?
    The impact is that the infantry gets very high quality manpower, and places for the infantry are oversubscribed in some units.
    Seperate question: have you seen tests with a PLT built with 6 x 5 pax Fire Teams?
    The UK tested 5 x 4 man fire teams and it worked extremely well, in the attack - but that was the only thing tested. The 6 x 5 man teams is merely an enhancement
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by tankersteve View Post
    Sabre, that was the kind of info I was looking for. However, since we are so rarely up to full strength, I am interested in a company design of just (and it's close) under 200, with the four platoons being approximately 45, with their medic and FO. I wonder what things can be done to bring larger organizations to have a closer feel of community. Obviously, training hard together and having competitive sports outside of training will help bond a military organization. But would it suffice for a company that is that robust? I had a tank platoon attached to a Marine infantry battalion in Ramadi, and the weapons company was right at the 200-man mark, and seemed to have good cohesion.
    Tankersteve
    Heh, when I design a rifle company, I end up with 180ish personnel.
    USMC Rifle Co's clock in at what, just over 180?
    Army Rifle Co's are (with FO's and medics) just under 150.

    I don't know that 150 is a "hard" limit, but stray too far away, and at some point (perhaps past 200?) things will not go so smoothly.

    Perhaps cohesiveness was a poor choice of words. I think that it is more about "knowing" everyone. In combat, that means details about them that could be very important. I catch sight of someone, and I should know their name, so I have a better chance of getting their attention, and I know where they fit in the organization (that is so-and-so, from 1st platoon - and what the heck is someone from 1st platoon doing there???), and hopefully, I know a little about them (perhaps some idea of how agressive they are, any special skills, etc). I can envision situations where these little details can make a big difference.
    I'm not sure that there is too much that you can do to enhance things for a large organization - one with, say, 300 pax. How could you change the 3-to-6 span of control, for example? At battalion and above, you can have a staff to handle all of the "moving parts", but not really at company and below.

    That's my understanding of it, anyway.

    As a side-note, I find it interesting that the Army seems to be loath to add additional leadership at the company or below level (e.g., a company gunny), which in the current BCT designs would have "cost" 6 to 12 people in total, but will happily add 40 staffers to each BCT...

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Interesting. My hip pocket design had 191...

    Quote Originally Posted by Sabre View Post
    Heh, when I design a rifle company, I end up with 180ish personnel...I don't know that 150 is a "hard" limit, but stray too far away, and at some point (perhaps past 200?) things will not go so smoothly.
    However, lately I've been rethinking that as some comments here triggered my recall of being in a ROTAD Rifle Company in the 101st long time ago. Four Rifle Platoons, weapons Platoon and Co Hq for a net (IIRC) of 233. It was definitely unwieldy...
    As a side-note, I find it interesting that the Army seems to be loath to add additional leadership at the company or below level (e.g., a company gunny), which in the current BCT designs would have "cost" 6 to 12 people in total, but will happily add 40 staffers to each BCT...
    True. Really dumb -- but true...

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