Size of the Platoon and Company

[GI Zhou]

I found part of an internet reference/abstract but alas I gave my copies of RUSI Journal to my old univertsity many years ago. According to an abstract from iformaworld.com an article by N.C. Baird in the RUSI Journal Vol 99 Issue 595 August 1953 pp; 439-442 titled: 'Economy of Infantry-Some Thoughts of Improving Flexibility' is the quote:

to a company of four platoons (as opposed to five by Captain Liddell-Hart), a battalion of four companies and a support company (this agrees with Captain ...

I dug up the reference from Liddell-Hart when I was in the military and had access to defence libraries. Now I have to pay my local library for the privilege. Perhaps someone on the site has access to a copy of the journal?

[Tukhachevskii]

I have discovered another early advocate of the “Rifle Platoon group” that does away with the section/squad level of leadership. This interesting, and detailed, proposal was made by Major Alexander McColl who advocated what he called a Commando Square concept for the Infantry Battalion in an article entitled "The Infantry Battalion Revisted" in Military Review, April, 1975, No. 4 (scroll down to find the article). Note he emphasises fire team principles based upon the M16’s automatic capabilities (similar to Webb’s arguments but still sees a need for plt level LMGs), uses the SF squad idea as his starting point (much like Wilf) and note also the presence of 90mm rcl rifles for heavy direct fire (talk about HE protectors! IIRC Dragon was just a twinkle in some lab coat’s eye). Remarkably for the times (c. 1970s) Major McColl is also an early advocate of the “arms room” idea and configures his unit to be multi-mission capable inc. COIN; interesting given the contemporary troubles in SE Asia and our present troubles in the near east/south Asia (is Afghanistan South or “South Central” Asia?). Given that links to articles often do not work I’ll liberally sprinkle some excerpts below rather than attempt to summarise his arguments in my own quaint prose;

“Meet the Special Forces reconnaissance team (RT) in one of its more or less standard variations, otherwise sometimes known as a "commando squad." In Vietnam, the six-man RT proved to be a very versatile, efficient organization, as a practical matter the smallest infantry element that can operate effectively by itself. It was easier to control and hence more responsive and flexible than the standard 11-man rifle squad. Four RTs plus a couple of machineguns and a command element were found to make a very workable sort of rifle platoon. This is the germ of the first half of the commando square concept. The other half comes out of the rediscovery during the Vietnam War of the virtues of a "square" infantry battalion, one with four rifle companies. Among other things, this structure permits leaving one rifle company to secure the base camp or fire base while the other three go out and try the old two-up-and-one-back on the enemy. This structure also can be used to establish a mixed Active Army/Reserve component battalion with sundry advantages by way of cost-saving and improved training for the Reserve components (pp-52-52)”.

&

“...in units armed with M16s, we have wall-to-wall automatic weapons and a need to do many things in addition to "take and hold the high ground." For most types of operations, any size squad from six to 13 men can be made to work effectively, but the smaller squad is easier to control. An "all-square" battalion based on 11-man squads would have rifle companies with about 250 men and an overall strength of about 1300, which is a bit large. An all-square battalion based on six-man squads, however, comes out to a total size of a little under 900 people, about what we have now. Specifically, the proposed "commando square" battalion has the following structure:
• The basic element is a six-man RT or commando squad, armed with five M16s and one M203 (or M79 plus pistol).
• Square organization throughout -that is, four rifle squads per platoon, four rifle platoons per company and four rifle companies in the battalion.
• Limitation of the size and number of crew-served weapons and other equipment to assure a high degree of foot mobility.
• Multicapable [sic] organisation. In addition to the usual duties, the unit can be structured to provide long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), mounted commandos and a variety of other specialized functions.

Within the battalion, the rifle platoon has four rifle squads plus a weapons squad with two M60 machineguns and one 90mm recoilless rifle. The rifle company has the usual company headquarters, a mortar section with two 60mm mortars and four rifle platoons. Four such companies plus a headquarters and headquarters company constitute the battalion. HHC heavy weapons would include four 81mm mortars, six 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifles on 1/4-ton and eight scout vehicles with M60 machineguns. In off-road situations, the scout platoon dismounts, breaks out the tripods and becomes a heavy machinegun platoon. Conversely, all 1/4-tons in the battalion, except those carrying recoilless rifles, would be fitted with pedestal mounts for M60 machineguns or 90mm recoilless rifles for road security, urban counterinsurgency and mounted commando operations(pp.53-4)”.

&

“This concept envisages a battalion with the following, assets (radios and individual weapons not listed):
• Personnel: 44 officers (1 lieutenant colonel; 2 majors; 10 captains; 1 captain, Medical Corps; 30 lieutenants) ; 2 warrant officers, 173 non-commissioned officers, 667 enlisted men equalling 886 aggregate.
• Heavy Weapons: four 81mm mortars, eight 60mm mortars, six 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifles on 1/4-ton, sixteen 90mm recoilless rifles, forty M60 machineguns including eight on 1/4 -ton or tripod.
• Vehicles: forty-three 4 -ton including 14 with machinegun or recoilless rifle, twenty-three 1 1/4 or Gama Goat, fourteen 2 1/2-ton, ten 5-ton, five field ambulances, one 5-ton wrecker for a total of 96 wheeled vehicles
plus eight 1 1/2-ton and five water trailers.

Compared to the present battalion, commando square is about the same size, but strong in officers, strong in
riflemen (64 X 6 = 384 versus 27 X 11 = 297), machineguns and other direct- fire platoon weapons and wheeled vehicles. It is weak in mortars and heavy antitank weapons. This is the price of foot mobility. Within limits,
the mortar firepower is less a function of the number of tubes carried than of the amount of ammunition carried. A column of men on foot can carry only a certain overall weight and still move out. Structurally, in addition to its primary missions, the battalion is able to provide LRRPs and other six man teams for saturation patrols, support of civil authority, house searches, and so forth. It also has a number of machinegun vehicles for duty as street and road patrols, convoy escorts, and so on.

Other possible variations include:
• In a conventional, mid-intensity operation with limited off-road requirements such as Korea or Alaska,
substitute 81mm for 60mm mortars, 4.2-inch for 81mm mortars, and add one or two additional soldiers to each mortar squad.
• The battalion-level anti-tank weapon is the 75mm or 106mm recoilless rifle. The choice is a function of
the terrain and the tank threat and, possibly, of the availability of 75mm weapons and ammunition in the inventory. In a situation with an imminent tank threat, such as in Europe, Korea or the Middle East, the battalion would have to be reinforced with a TOW platoon and/or a platoon or more of tanks or M551 Sheridans in a tank-destroyer role.
• Conversely, for extended backcountry off-road operations where there was a minimum tank threat and
not much requirement for destroying fortifications, the 90mm recoilless rifles could be left behind and their crews used to provide additional eyes, ears and rifles, and to carry more ammunition for the machineguns.
• There is a mechanized version of commando square, but elaboration of this is outside the scope of this article. Otherwise, the concept applies to airborne, airmobile and armour battalions. Finally, the commando square organization lends itself to formation of mixed Active Army, Reserve component battalions. In such a unit, the Active Army element would be able to operate alone as a thin triangular battalion of 457 men, a light but viable combat organization(p. 54)”.

& finally,

“Other advantages for the commando square battalion, as compared to the
existing battalions, are:
• The smaller squad is inherently easier to control and, therefore, more efficient, flexible and responsive, and
easier to train.
• The square organisation provides greater flexibility of employment; we are no longer locked into two-up-and one- back as the only way of doing business.
• Real, built-in off-road foot mobility, admittedly at the cost of some loss of heavy weapons firepower but about twice the number of machineguns.
• Pre-planned, built-in capability to "beef up" or "slim down" the crew served weapons and other heavy items depending on the terrain and expected enemy threat.
• Capability to provide LRRPs, mounted commandos, road patrols and other specialized functions. These are substantial merits, making the commando square concept worthy of consideration and evaluation by the Army's force structure planners(p.55)”.

[GI Zhou]

The structure of the infantry company of the Chinese People’s Volunteers )People's Liberation Army) that crossed the Yalu in November 1950 had three platoons of infantry each of three squads of 12 men, a machine gun platoon with three belt-fed machine guns and a mortar platoon of two 60mm mortars.

The CPV units that faced the United States Marine Corps did not have the machine gun platoon and although the authorised strength was around 852 men for the battalion its actual strength was around 700 men. However there were belt fed machine guns available for use at the company level. After one assault the USMC captured 10 heavy machine guns, seven light machine guns, 12 Thompson sub-machine guns, 76 rifles, four pistols and 500 hand grenades. This shows that belt fed machine guns were pushed forward in an assault and were left after the repulse of the attack.

In October 1951 the PLA and CPV infantry company was reduced in size to three platoons and the 60 mm mortar squad. Each platoon had three squads of 12 men and the company strength was reduced from 190 to 151. This was based on the Soviet model, the result of losses sustained in Korea, plus the need to simplify administration. The previous light machine gun squad in the platoon was disbanded and the light machine guns became part of the three remaining rifle squads. With the influx of Soviet weapons the amount of automatic weapons was increased. The PLA and CPV infantry company was actually stronger in numbers and close-range firepower than its equivalent in the British Army.

The CPV quickly found that this structure was clearly insufficient against the firepower of the United Nations in Korea and the infantry company was again restructured, more in line with that prevailing at the start of the Korean War. The infantry company commander needed to bring his support weapons with him as a lack of communications equipment meant he could rarely obtain on call artillery support in the defence and none during the attack. The People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteer infantry company now became a self-contained task force. It was also a notably ‘square organization’ compared to the Soviet triangular model. It was comprised of three rifle platoons, one machine gun platoon and one rocket (bazooka) platoon. Each platoon was still comprised of three squads of 12 men, and the company’s strength rose to 201. The battalion was now comprised of four rifle companies, one 82 mm mortar company, one heavy machine gun company, one recoilless rifle platoon and one communications platoon. The battalion at full strength had 1,068 officers and men. The 60mm mortars were removed as it was a defensive structure with landline communications to the rear enabling on-call fire support.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have discovered another early advocate of the “Rifle Platoon group” that does away with the section/squad level of leadership. This interesting, and detailed, proposal was made by Major Alexander McColl who advocated what he called a Commando Square concept for the Infantry Battalion ........

McGoll mentions the 6 man rifle squad a lot and lists all the advantages. Yet he doesn’t say anything about the size of the weapons squad with 2 x GPMG and one 90 mm kickless cannon. If his idea of keeping heavy weapons down in numbers because ammo needs to be man handled is anything to go by than I wonder how large this weapons squad needs to be. I could see the two GPMGs in a squad of perhaps six. But the cannon would need a squad of about six for itself I should think, if a useful amount of rounds needs to be carried. Unless of course he expects the rifle squads to carry the ammo in which case some of the advantages are lost again.

I too am starting to like the idea of square over triangular. Not sure if the NZ army still has four rifle companies per battalion now but we did when I was in about 10 years ago (Chris jM?). British air-landing battalions in WWII had four platoons per company and four companies per battalion. That gave 26 men per platoon with three seven man sections. This was however done to fit a full (smaller) platoon into a Horsa glider. I have never read any reference as to whether it was actually advantageous on the ground.

[GI Zhou]

McGoll mentions the 6 man rifle squad a lot and lists all the advantages. Yet he doesn’t say anything about the size of the weapons squad with 2 x GPMG and one 90 mm kickless cannon. If his idea of keeping heavy weapons down in numbers because ammo needs to be man handled is anything to go by than I wonder how large this weapons squad needs to be. I could see the two GPMGs in a squad of perhaps six. But the cannon would need a squad of about six for itself I should think, if a useful amount of rounds needs to be carried. Unless of course he expects the rifle squads to carry the ammo in which case some of the advantages are lost again.

In the 1962 Sino-Indian War a 57mm recoiless rifle team of eight men carried the gun and 17 rounds of ammunition. They were deployed one per company to destroy bunkers.

[William F. Owen]

In the 1962 Sino-Indian War a 57mm recoiless rifle team of eight men carried the gun and 17 rounds of ammunition. They were deployed one per company to destroy bunkers.

In about 1970, North Vietnamese DshK Platoons were observed to more than 30 men with only 2 guns. So basically each gun needed 15+ men to support it, in terms of carrying ammo.
....not much changes.

BTW, GI, apart from your somewhat odd inability to use the [QUOTES], I'm pretty impressed with some of the sources you keep digging up. Good stuff.

[Steve Blair]

BTW, GI, apart from your somewhat odd inability to use the [QUOTES], I'm pretty impressed with some of the sources you keep digging up. Good stuff.

This is EASILY fixed. GI, all you need to do is close your quoted text with a /QUOTE instead of just QUOTE.

[Firn]

It is rather interesting to see just how tradition, ressources, experience and reflections on the METT-T shaped the various concepts across time and space. All differ, but there are quite some similar approaches and results.

Take for example the German Raiding Skiparty:


21. SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF A RAIDING PARTY

a. Typical Organization

A typical organization for a raiding party consists of one
platoon, reinforced by one heavy mortar squad and one engineer
detachment. It is assumed, for purposes of illustration, that the
party will be gone for 2 days.

1 Platoon HQ of 11 (1 officer, 1 NCO, 4 massenger, 1 Medical NCO, 2 aids, 2 litter bearers)
3 Squads of 12 (1 NCO, 1 SIC, 3 MG-team, 3 sharpshooter, 1-2 grenadiers, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Mortar Squad of 13 (1 NCO, 1 range setter, 3-4 mortarteam, 4 sharpshooter, 4-3 riflemen)
1 Pioneer Detachment of 6 (1 NCO, 5 pioneers with SMG)

Advisable: Radio teams; Artillery and heavy weapons observer or liasion team on ski if their support is possible;

In this case the point of much ammunition for fewer weapon-systems gets stressed and stressed again beside the focus on shedding as much light as possible. Note that usually the German platoon had a 4 squads IIRC.


Firn