Size of the Platoon and Company

[Fuchs]

However believe there are good reasons for organising such mortars into two or more sub-units. Such organisation firstly enables a battalion to have a mortar sub-unit firing or emplaced/ready to fire while its other mortar sub-unit(s) are moving in leap-frog or other manner.

Even platoons can be separated like that. Leap-frogging is probably a lesser reason for this need than the different range and bearing dispersion and the need to reach behind obstacles (hitting a street behind a large building, steep rear slope).

Two 4-tube platoons with 81mm mortars might be enough firepower for most light infantry battalions.

I never quite understand why people pay attention to mortar tube quantities so much. Mortars can shoot at up to 16rpm, and electric laying systems even permit a fine accuracy at such a RoF.
The greater issue is in my opinion the ammunition supply. Even mechanised forces may be limited in their indirect fire support first and foremost by ammunition carried, not by tubes carried (since mechanised spearheads got to expect resupply only every 2nd day on average).
Infantry with more limited carrying capacity (especially in airborne / heliborne / mountain / swamp context) needs to look at ammo carried more than tubes as well. 81.4 mm mortars may be crew-portable, but their ammo is portable only in very restrictive quantities, even with a few mules.

Realise that some commentators prefer 6-tube mortar sub-units and the redundancy of 3-tube sections. Others might insist on the need to standardise on either 81mm or less likely 60mm long-barrel. Believe that very few would propose 120mm smooth-bore mortars for a light infantry battalion and that none would propose 120mm rifled mortars.

120 mm rifled mortars can actually fire 120 mm smoothbore ammo and as far as I know their only real drawback is their higher weight.

120 mm has probably passed its prime since the cluster munitions ban (smaller calibres = more efficient in terms of fragmentation effect divided by ammo weight). It is nevertheless the standard calibre for almost all guided mortar munitions and thus a must-have for well-funded ground forces.


The challenge is as usual to get a long list of things right
* leader training
* technical personnel training
* grunt training
* training with vehicles
* security training
* qty of ammunitions in national stock
* quality and age of ammunitions
* signatures of propellants (smoke / flash)
* quality and reliability of fuses
* qty ammunitions carried
* composition of ammunitions carried (enough smoke!)
* resupply with ammunitions
* communications reliability - radio, cable
* communications prioritisation
* encryption/decryption/authorization
* spacing barrel-radio emitter-other personnel or shoot&scoot for survival
* observer training (not just dedicated forward observers)
* observer authority
* observer equipment
* qty of tubes
* heat transfer and thermal capacity of tubes
* tube laying system
* deconfliction rules
* RoE
* authorised personnel strength
* actual personnel strength
* sleep deprivation, sleep discipline
* anticipation of mortar support needs
* location of tubes relative to target, friendly troops/civilians and obstacles
* readiness / reaction lag
* nighttime effectiveness / illumination
* camouflage and concealment


The qty of tubes almost disappears in this list of important factors and is definitively not #1.

[Black Brunswicker]

My two cents as a former mortar man:

It is useful to use three or four mortars simutaneously, because it is often intended to hit suprisingly at the same time with as much as impact as possible. With four mortars you get in an aerea of 80x80 meters enough splitters to hit with a high percentage any uncovered target with 16 rounds. With just one mortar that doesn't work. So I recommend using more then one mortar at one time. That doen't apply for platoon mortars.

Mortars are simple and effective weapons, but normally need specialist operators and and a lot of ammunition. I would normally organise them on battalion level. For light infantry I would even on battalion level go for 60mm oder 81mm. There are different possiblities for organizing them, but I would group them, that always at least 2 mortars are always together, either in a section or platoon. It can be useful to detach a mortar section or platoon to a rifle company. The heavier the mortar the less like it is detached to a company.

[Compost]

It’s past time to organize, describe and employ the squad and the section as different infantry sub-units.

The US Army has recently been reported to be considering reducing the size of its standard infantry squad from nine to eight or fewer. So this could be a useful time to review the nature and structure of the British-Canadian-Australian-New Zealand infantry 'section', the equivalent US Army 'squad' and the 50 percent larger USMC ‘squad’. Also more usefully a time to use the words squad and section to differentiate and employ each to mean a distinct type of infantry sub-unit.

Is there any good reason for the US Army to use the term squad to mean a 9-man infantry sub-unit composed of a squad leader and two 4-man fireteams while the USMC uses the term squad for a more capable 13-man sub-unit with a squad leader and three 4-man fireteams ? And is there any logical - as opposed to historical - reason for BCANZ armies to use the term section to mean their standard 8-man infantry sub-unit composed of two 4-man fireteams ?

A reader who considers the solution obvious could skip the next six paragraphs.

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For much of the period from the 1950s and into the 1980s, a full-strength BCANZ section had 10 men: a 2-man scout group, section commander (usually a corporal), 3-man machine gun group (led usually by a lance corporal) and 4-man rifle group (which usually included another lance-coproral). The structure of that 10-man section was oriented toward movement and especially patrolling. The leader had to be a capable NCO. Also that section often needed more lift space and weight than was available in a single utility helicopter or a single armoured personnel carrier of that era. So for those and other reasons the structure was changed to provide a smaller, evenly balanced and more easily led sub-unit. Possibly to imply historical continuity or to deflect criticism, that smaller sub-unit was also confusingly referred to as a section.

Until recently the common BCANZ rifle section had at full strength two 4-man teams each with 3 riflemen and one LMG gunner. The section was/is commanded by a junior NCO - commonly a corporal - who also leads one of the teams. The other team is led usually by another junior NCO, typically a lance-corporal. That standard 8-man rifle section is nominally capable of concurrent fire and movement. Provided suitable fire positions are available for use as bounds the 4-man rifle teams may actually alternate between fire and movement. In other circumstances one team may move or manoeuvre - continuously or in rushes - forward, backward or sideways while the other team remains comparatively static and provides suppressive and destructive fire support from an overlooking or somewhat offset position.

The current US Army rifle squad also has two 4-man rifle teams – each having three riflemen and one LMG gunner - augmented by a squad leader (usually a sergeant) to form a 9-man sub-unit. Similar to the BCANZ section that 9-man squad is nominally capable of concurrent fire and movement but with the squad leader static or moving with one or other 4-man team each of which usually has a PFC as its leader.

If the US Army wanted to continue having a separate leader then the squad might reduce to 7 with two 3-man rifle fire teams. Alternatively a 7-man squad might have two dissimilar teams as does the French Army whose infantry sub-unit has a 300m rifle team and a 600m MG team. Elsewhere some German infantry is organized in 6-man squads. Those 6-man squads may be usually employed as indivisible fire teams but some division into two 3-man fire teams seems likely. One problem with small squads is that they tend to increase the counts of parent vehicles and vehicle crews. Fuchs for one is likely to regard 6-man squads as appropriate for panzer grenadiers but inappropriate for light infantry.

Finally there is the 8-man rifle squad which AusArmy has retained in its ‘Beersheba’ reorganization. The AusArmy infantry platoon now has a 4-man HQ, three rifle squads and a 12-man Manoeuvre Support Section (MSS) organized into three 4-man support weapon teams. The whole MSS can be employed together and led by the platoon sergeant. Alternatively one or more MSS weapon teams can be assigned one each to a rifle squad to form a rifle section(s). It that latter form the 40-man ‘Beersheba’ platoon resembles the 34-man rifle platoon of the 1960s which had three 10-man sections each with its own GPMG.

The next iteration of ‘Beersheba’ is likely to adopt an organization that even better satisfies and also balances the needs of fire and movement, and those of fire or movement. Such an organization could well extend the system of fours to become four 4-man rifle teams and four 4-man weapon teams variously combined to form four 8-man squads, or for example a squad and two 12-man sections.
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Generally it would seem useful for ABCA to have a consistent and readily understood system for describing infantry sub-units. A system that clearly and usefully delineates the differences could be arranged as follows:
buddy team: 2-man team
fire team: 3-man or 4-man rifle team (w or w/o LMG) or 3-man or 4-man support weapon team (eg: one or two MG and/or RCL/grenade/other launcher)
squad: two similar or dissimilar fire teams w or w/o separate leader (6 to 9 man)
section: three fireteams w or w/o separate leader (12 or 13 men), eg: squad plus attached rifle or support weapon fireteam.