Size of the Platoon and Company

[Ken White]

...and have found that it really doesn't make a huge tactical difference.

Only when you take 30 to 50% casualties does it become significant. That makes the USMC Squad of 13 with three ARs / SAWs a good one due to that depth (weapons become casualties also). Other than that, size and employment are highly situation dependent and there's no 'best.'

I guess I stuck that one in on the end to plug my view - but I think it works as a general principle. I found that when, for whatever reason, a platoon or company was denuded of that 4th maneuver element that it made things alot harder.

The triangular design was developed to prevent inexperienced or poorly trained Armies from being too predictable by forcing an unbalanced approach. With smaller, professional forces (pending the next major war), that need not be a concern. Organizing in fours facilitates rotations, lessen overhead and gives more flexibility and depth. It also offers a 25% increase in junior leader training slots.

...which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.

Can also impact your training level if you aren't careful to rotate those vehicle minders on a regular basis. Everyone needs some dismount time...

...So I guess if we wanted to discuss the "ideal" Sect, Platoon and Coy we should look at capabilities and how to most effectively set a unit up to manage those capabilities.

All TOE are, as you mentioned, an administrative device. Organization for combat is a totally different creature and is or should be totally METT-TC dependent. There is no one size fits all, no 'ideal' as every war, every operation will present peculiar demands and the error will lie with he who's a slave to the prescribed organization -- or doctrine.

The advantage to large platoons and companies is combat depth; you can sustain losses and still function. The disadvantage is bulk and clumsiness leading to lack of stealth and diluted training -- the more people you have, the more that will not be present for some reason. The key is to take what you're given, do the best you can with it and never stop studying and thinking.

[Infanteer]

I just finished reading through that 19 page monster which, on a lot of points, mirrors this one. I think it comes down to this:

My thinking for platoons focusses on generating patrol multiples. That is relevant, regardless of the conflict, terrain, or threat. Supporting and sustaining dismounted operation, regardless of numbers or weapons types, is something that has to focus thinking on the platoon level.

The fixation on squad size has proven worthless. We need to move beyond it.

I guess a TO&E sets, as discussed above, the admin foundation for a Platoon to launch. The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Need 3 groups of 12 each with a GPMG? Go with it. How about an assault group of 16, a support element of 16 (with 2 mortars an 84mm and a GPMG) and a security element of 8 (with 2 GPMGs)? Why not? How about busting your guys up into groups of 10 to mount in IFVs (involves splitting a group of 4 - oh well) or 20 to ride in helos? Sure. Smart, adaptable NCOs will make it work.

The key for a Platoon isn't to figure out if 3 or 4 Sections of 8 or 12 men will do better in a "2 Up, 1 Back" or "1 Up, 2 Back" formation. It is about figuring out a "Playbook" - something like an American football team which has multiple plays for offensive and defensive lines (and if it keeps setting up on the line with the same play it gets hammered). I've been trying to do this with my Platoon - devise 4-6 "configurations" to dominate a certain sized area through aggresive patrolling while still maintaining a footprint (mostly around our vehicles) and allowing a certain level of rest in order to sustain operations. It is important to have a variety of configurations so the bad guy - who in this war seems to always have better SA - does not really get a grasp on what you're doing.

Anyhow, just some random thoughts.
Cheers,
Infanteer

[William F. Owen]

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Concur. It does tick most of the important boxes, and the ADF is close to being on the money with this one. I know the two guys who came up with it, and they briefed me a couple of years ago.
Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

[Infanteer]

Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

Never heard of him - should I know who that is?

[William F. Owen]

Never heard of him - should I know who that is?

You missed nothing! Stag on!

[Rifleman]

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys.

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.

But if it's done that way do the fire teams need to be more robust? For example: we usually hear that four men is the ideal fire team but in order to have a good chance of having four present for duty should we ask for six?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?

[William F. Owen]

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.

Got any source material on the RLI Platoon Organisation? I think the C-47 was limited to dropping 16-men so 4 x 4-man teams?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.

True, but you have to have pretty well trained NCOs to make it work well. I've always come down on the 3-5 man fireteams.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?

Yes it is. Removing the Squad/Section level speeds everything up and makes everything a lot easier. This is the trick the Aussie 2012 structure misses. Fireteam groups can really only be about 24-30 men strong, but 4 x 30 man platoons is the same total as 3 x 40 man platoons. The 30 man platoons also need far fewer NCOs!

3 x 40 man 2012 platoons = 30 4-man fireteams
4 x 30 man FTGs = 24 5-man fireteams

[Rifleman]

Wilf,

My only reference is Chris Cocks' book Fireforce. I no longer have the book but I know he said the platoon was broken down into four-man "sticks." I don't recall if he mentioned how many per platoon.

I was just thinking that 30 men can also be 5x6. Or, 4x6 plus a couple of 3-man command cells if necessary. Just wondering if that would be worthwhile since the fireteams could take 50% casualties before having to be combined.

[Ken White]

The 30 man platoons also need far fewer NCOs!

specifically costs and a flattened structure. It does however remove an intermediate leader training structure of some relevance and value. Thus it would seem to me to be an option to be weighed dependent upon ones total force design and doctrine. Degree of professionalism would also be an issue. High turnover forces (the pre 2001 US army; post 2010 TBD ) would benefit from a Squad Leader, services having long term Privates (i.e. no 'up or out') would be okay without them.

As an aside, the US number of combat loaded jumpers for a C-47 was 22 with a door bundle or two, 24 without -- but it was crowded. A comfortable load would've been 16 but IIRC (always a danger with us ORF curmudgeons...), the RLI used 32 for the Fire Force; three x 4 for the three Alouettes, five x 4 for the C-47. Each stick had a leader, the senior being the Platoon Ldr or acting PL if the PL decided to remain aloft; next being his 2ic, location dependent upon the METT-TC and overall command being frequently being in a fourth helicopter which could and did play gunship. Sometimes the command was on the ground, sometimes in the bird. They were flexible and didn't mind risks -- which is why they were much better than most.

And they still lost...

[William F. Owen]

I was just thinking that 30 men can also be 5x6. Or, 4x6 plus a couple of 3-man command cells if necessary. Just wondering if that would be worthwhile since the fireteams could take 50% casualties before having to be combined.

They could also be 10 X 3. As Ken White always points out, you're going to have to alter based on METT-C. "Some assembly required" seems a pretty good basis to start!

[Rifleman]

Wilf,

Understood, "Some assembly required" for your proposed 30 man platoon. I was just asking about the base element to be used for assembly. I think everyone agrees that there has to be a base element to combine or break apart for task organization. You advocate that the base element be the fire team instead of the squad at platoon level. And while 3-5 has proven effective size for fire teams I was just wondering if that would lead to having to combine the remnants of attrited fire teams sooner.

In other words I was asking about "gaming" the system by planning for a 30 man platoon divided into six-man fire teams in order to insure that about four men per team are always present for duty - the same way the USMC squad does that by being extra big (by most army's standards) to start with.

[RJ]

Ken,

Are their C-47's dropping troops inthe 21st Century? What was the combat load for a C-130 a venerable air craft still being flown and utilized as a troop carrier and airborne delivery system.

The never ending story of the platoon and squad make up continues unabated. History repeats its self. Successful history has a thread.

For the record - with pride and tradition

The Marine Rifle Platoon has three 13 man squads and a 4 man Leadership component. Platoon Cmdr., Platoon Sgt., Right Guide and Communicator.

The Big Marne Squad - Squad Leader (Sgt or Cpl.) three 4 man fireteams.
Fireteam Leader L/Cpl, PFC Rifleman, PFC SAW or AR gunner, PVT or PFC Assitant SAW or AR gunner.

1943 to 2009 - 66 years

Is there any current western or eastern infantry organization that can boast of the proven effectiveness without change since 1943?

Instead of attempting to redress the size of the platoon to fit in an accounting summary, I suggest you adjust the basic units to fit the most successful and deadly unit configeration and get on with winning fights.

Add a two machine gun section, to the Marine Platoon and the unit grows to 52 Marines. Section leader CPL, L/Cpl Gunner, PFC assistant Gunner w/rifle, 2 Pfc or Pvt Ammo humpers w/ rifles.

US Army Platoon - With a 4 man Leadership unit and three 9 man Squads comes to 31. It is short 12 fighting men with the same number of leadership unit.

Any efficiency experts out there? The ARMY seems a bit top heavy in the management component.

When applying force to obtain an objective or to hold a strongpoint

Big is BAD and Big is BEST

66 years without a rest.


Any questions? The Marines attract the poet warriors among us!

And Ken is absolutely right about the ability to train up leaders to continue the fight.

[Ken White]

Are their C-47's dropping troops inthe 21st Century? What was the combat load for a C-130 a venerable air craft still being flown and utilized as a troop carrier and airborne delivery system.

Somebody somewhere is almost certainly dropping people from one of Donald's masterpieces. Last time I noticed, Colombia still had a few. Nothing gooney about that bird...

The H model 130, the largest production run, ACL is ~35,000 pounds, range dependent. 90 pax or 62 jumpers for the base model. In combat, take the seats out, stretch nylon tiedowns across the bird at about five foot intervals and let people sit on the floor and you can load over 150 combat equipped troops on one -- and plop 'em into a ± 1,000 meter strip. Great bird.

[RJ]

Thanks Ken.

I have a fishing buddy who flies the H model for the RIANG and has been deployed annually to Iraq, Afganistan and all the points in between since 2003. He loves that bird and just requalified with it to drop troops.

He's one of those airmen who was USAF who decided to skip the desk jobs and continue to fly whenever and wherever he and his aircraft is needed. A Lt Col. of vast experience and sagnacity. A happy warrior! And a officer who admires Marine Gunnery Sgts. and their ability to deliver parts, and fuel to him and his crew in dusty and dangerous places, with no questions asked.

You'd like him! He is a solid family man and a guy who delivers the goods.

[William F. Owen]

In other words I was asking about "gaming" the system by planning for a 30 man platoon divided into six-man fire teams in order to insure that about four men per team are always present for duty - the same way the USMC squad does that by being extra big (by most army's standards) to start with.

That's probably eminently sensible. Keeping teams together is considered important and seem to have considerable merit. I'd go for 5-man teams, but that's just because of the training I associate with the organisation. 6 -man teams may be just as good if you are starting a bunch of newly trained 2010 Marines.

[Clinkerbuilt]

I have some links:

HiMARS

...although I prefer the LAR-160, for it's flexibility and speed of reload.

Saw a lot of questions on the RLI/Fireforce concept. I have Cocks' book, and love it - the TOE/ECOI for Chimurenga was worth the cost alone - but here is JRT Wood's articles on the Fireforce concept. http://www.rhodesia.nl/firefor1.htm

(Main page at: Rhodesian and South African Military History)

[Clinkerbuilt]

What follows is based on this article (HTML and PDF), lots of research and more time than I like to think about wandering around in the boonies, wondering where the heck I was.

I am a firm believer in the notion of integration to a 'total force' up to the battalion level. As a result, what I'm trying to do below is enhance to good while avoiding the bad.

Here, I'm trying to keep sizes manageable, while keeping the battalion level to c.1,000 troops.

Here goes:

1. "Squad Leader" needs to have its own MOS designation - do they do that, yet?

2. A squad of 20 men, or 5 x 4-man teams: an assault team, an exploitation team, two suppression-fire teams, and a support team armed with a two-man RPG-type weapon or a sniper rifle team, an RTO and a Corpsman/"Combat Life Saver+". The squad leader is in direct control of the suppression-fire element.

A group this size is capable of maneuver, suppression and assault, while being able to communicate and lay down relatively heavy fire support in the short term, pending a call for proper artillery.

At the same time, this squad is able to absorb casualties and still function effectively, since it would have to take c.60% casualties to seriously cut into its ability.

The size also adds to the security and policing mission, by having more "boots on the ground" for presence.

3. Three of these squads to a company, plus a full sniper platoon of 20 (8x2-man teams, plus PltLdr, PltSgt, 2xRTO), and a 20-man HQ Platoon (including a 10-man mortar section).

4. Seven of these companies to a battalion, plus HQ, Support (MT/Maint/Supply) and Weapons companies of 100 each.

This battalion organization puts seven maneuver elements in the field, vs the three we typically have, now.


ALTERNATE: Two squads to a Platoon, plus a 10-man platoon HQ: 1LT, PltSgt, 4 x Corpsmen, 4 x RTO = 50 men. This, however, digs into the flexibility angle, as companies go from 100 to 190, but it can still work if an overall increase to battalion size can be handled.


That's what I have -- flame-retardant suit ready!

[Infanteer]

I just finished up reading another 2 threads, including a 19-page monster, on this in the forum. I should have read more before posting because I've retread covered ground. Perhaps these 2-3 threads could be merged or split into their respective parts (Squad/Section TOE, Platoon TOE, Company TOE, etc)?

Anyways, I've noticed discussion has touched on vehicles a few times. I'll just chime in from the Canadian perspective from the last few years in the green zones and arid badlands of Kandahar. We've developed a very keen appreciation for the LAV III, which is the Stryker chassis with a 25mm Bushmaster turret. The vehicle holds 10 pers (3 crew + 7 passengers). The vehicle is a superb tool. Its optics provide STANO excellent capability, the cannon is real slick and kills lots of badguys, the armour has saved lives and the vehicle itself is a shelter and a packmule for the troops and their gear.

Canada has been in the middle of a debate the last few years over "Mech Infantry" (6 battalions) and "Light Infantry" (3 Battalions) who maintain a parachute capability (with the current Army chief wanting to essentially do away with the Light Battalions). I find this to be a false dichotomy - at least for line infantry battalions. There is just "Infantry" - their method of delivery can be programmed ahead of time through proper managed readiness. The vehicle is simply too great of a "force multiplier" to be discounted as something only mech guys do. The "death before dismount" mentality that so many fear (that infantry with vehicles can't operate away from them) is really a function of leadership - Unimaginative or close-minded leadership is what allows an infantryman's skills to become so atrophied that he can't operate without his vehicle. I've done a good chunk of training away from the vehicles and we can leave them behind to go airmobile or footborne if need be.

This is why a high-end number (40) is better, in my opinion, than the lower end 28-32 I've seen. If you are operating with vehicles, they exist to crew vehicles. These guys aren't permanent crewman - my Platoon has spares and we rotate guys out for a break and to get bayonet time. This leaves 28 to 32 guys on the ground (depending on crew requirements of your platform) to operate but also gives you an extra "section" of your Zulu vehicles. If they are dismounted, those extra guys can become an extra section - or can be used as an "echelon" to help pack the ammo for the crew-served weapons that need to be manpacked now that you're out vehicles - or perhaps run the mule train?

[William F. Owen]

I find this to be a false dichotomy - at least for line infantry battalions. There is just "Infantry" - their method of delivery can be programmed ahead of time through proper managed readiness. The vehicle is simply too great of a "force multiplier" to be discounted as something only mech guys do. The "death before dismount" mentality that so many fear (that infantry with vehicles can't operate away from them) is really a function of leadership - Unimaginative or close-minded leadership is what allows an infantryman's skills to become so atrophied that he can't operate without his vehicle. I've done a good chunk of training away from the vehicles and we can leave them behind to go airmobile or footborne if need be.

Ahhh... a subject very dear to my heart

I strongly disagree with tying infantry to a vehicle type, but I strongly agree that vehicles are essential for most infantry operations.
Loosing trained infantry to crew vehicles makes no financial or military sense, unless they are specialist crews. IMO, the best way of maintaining the skills without the vehicles is to have vehicles organised separately from the dismounts. Something like:

• Vehicle Platoon = 4 Vehicles + 12 Crew
• Infantry Platoon = 28 infantry

90% of the training can be done separately, providing you are doing the right training.

[Infanteer]

I strongly disagree with tying infantry to a vehicle type, but I strongly agree that vehicles are essential for most infantry operations.

Agree. It could be a pretty substantial list of benefits, from area of ground that can be dominated to the security provided to soldiers for a bit of rest to the sustainability afar.

The balance comes from higher level managed readiness and a good grip on the troops:task ratio. If I know we are going to a jungle, I probably want to focus a chunk of my force on airmobility and living dismounted (or light). I use the appropriate work-up time to focus on these, while still tucking those mounted skills to the back should a more suitable venue come up in the future.

Loosing trained infantry to crew vehicles makes no financial or military sense, unless they are specialist crews. IMO, the best way of maintaining the skills without the vehicles is to have vehicles organized separately from the dismounts. Something like:

• Vehicle Platoon = 4 Vehicles + 12 Crew
• Infantry Platoon = 28 infantry

90% of the training can be done separately, providing you are doing the right training.

This is something I used to believe, but don't anymore after commanding a platoon armed with the LAV III. You don't lose bayonets to the crew anymore than you lose bayonets to be a number 2 on a GPMG or a mortar. The vehicle is a tool and nothing else. We have no qualms training infantryman to drive trucks or shoot crew-served weapons, so why is it all of the sudden an issue when we package those capabilities into a good fighting vehicle. It takes no longer to train these skills than any other PCF (Primary Combat Function - as we call them up here) skills such as recce patrolman, assault pioneer (now gone), mortarman (now gone), etc, etc.

We've discussed the idea of splitting the vehicles from the infantry and brigading them at the Company or Battalion level or going with a "Taxi" battalion of vehicles for a Brigade and the possibility of having armoured crewman crew the vehicles at another place I haunt (army.ca). None of these get around the difficulties associated with this (what happens if your driver goes down as I've had?) and quite lives up to the advantages of having integral crews. Owning the vehicle and its crew at the section and platoon level seems, to me, the easiest and most effective way of doing business. You crew your vehicle and you can provide backups or rotate for rest if your spending a long time mounted (something I've also done).

What needs to be systematized, or at least more properly thought out, is the proper ratio of training with vehicles to training without vehicles and how driving-gunning-crew commanding fits into the development of an infantry soldier (in conjunction with patrolling, helo ops, crew-served weapons, urban ops and all those other good skillsets) and how we balance rifleman's duties in a vehicle (when the unit is using one) and outside of one.