Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism

[jmm99]

for the moment (only), both George and Bob have raised a couple of points that do tie in with the OP and polling data - that is, what do the natives think.

First from George:

I still think "the wedge" belongs between Pukhtuns and Arab al Qaida. Arabs are simply a different lot vs. the Pukhtuns.

I think there may be merit in this wedge - also the wedge between Taliban and non-Taliban Pashtuns.

I've visited Global Hujra Online a number of times; and, yesterday, spent a good part of the night there (including the two threads George cited most recently below). I say that because there seems some tendency to assume that people are not reading things.

Global Hujra Online slants anti-Taliban and anti-AQ - and very pro-Pashtun (and less than friendly to "Punjabis"). But, having said that, the questions I would still ask are:

1. What is the magnitude of those sentiments among all Pashtuns - and then break that down by regions in "Pashtunistan" ?

2. What power base (if any) do these anti-Taliban and anti-AQ Pashtuns have - how many brigades can they field ?

In the run-up to Iraq, we had a surplus of anti-Saddam types who were going to be the solution to the problem. Yeh, right. So, I am leery about the talk, without seeing the walk.

PS - George: I've read that UN report and a dozen others; and also all of our DoS reports on human rights violations in Astan. What I was looking for are specific, documented cases where Taliban & AQ in Astan (or AQ in Iraq) committed war crimes - not just fought us - against our troops. Those cases belong in a new thread in Law Enforcement, if anyone is interested.

-----------------------------
Second, from Bob. No specific quote to start this off, but it has to do with propagating ideology and providing governance.

From the gitgo on SWC, you have made an excellent case for US ideology. While the two of us have disagreed on specific points, both of us are in love with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. OK, agreed that we (US) have an excellent ideology. And, I would say we have a good (albeit scarcely perfect) system of governance. A number of other countries could present the same message (albeit somewhat different, as in David's UK).

So far as assisting another country in countering an insurgency problem, I would ask how material are our ideology and system of governance in solving their problem. Both would be very material if we were willing to make that country our 51st state - not a likely scenario.

Let us take Vietnam as an example. Well-read Vietnamese were well aware of our ideology - Ho wrote it into the preamble of his first constitution. But, let's move south and ask the important question of which was more important to combatting the VC and PAVN: the ideology and governance system of the GSV (from Diem through the iterations of generals); or our ideology and governance system - which was unknown to the vast majority of the population and which was not going to be established in SVN no how, no way ?

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

Anyone on this one.

[George L. Singleton]

On your question #1, what is the magnitude of negative sentiment against the Taliban among Pukhtuns?

A healthy percentage (your should have data on this among the various contributors to SWJ, as you guys are sharp on detailed information and data) of the Pakistani Frontier Corp; the regular Pak military in general (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are ethnic Pukhtuns. But, under current circumstances the "loyalty" of these in uniform Paksitanis who are simultaneously Pukhtuns is questioned by some, of whom I am one.

As to how these existing Pak military folk who are ethnic Pukhtuns view this, we would slide into the awful discussion of the Pak general officership and leadership in general having used through the ISI the Taliban as surrogates to cause trouble both with Afghanistan and with India, primarily over Kashmir. Very messy topic.

As to the younger Pukhtuns, hundreds of whom belong to and write on Global Hujra Online, a minority want to work with today's Pak military in the hope that the Pak Government will actually use it's Army (more so than the Frontier Corp, which is or was designed to go along to get along with the wild frontier people...Pukhtuns of the most feudal background and levels of undersanding and lifestyle...).

Some (but not all) of the most outspoken young Pukhtuns on Global Hujra Online are high school and lower level university students abroad, mainly in Europe. Many such, but not all, were born in Europe of native Pukhtun parents. These heavily outspoken younger Pukhtuns, apart from my side e-mail I plan to send you shortly [privately] are [my opinion] disorganized day dreamers who dote on who conquered who hundreds of years ago down to the fight with the USSR in the 1980s. *As an Australian Army Captain currently in the field in Afghanistan recently noted some young observer Pukthun teenage boys recently joined Taliban Pukhtuns in a fire right against NATO forces in Afghanistan "on a lark" as it looked like a "fun" thing to do. This sort of spontaneous terrorism is a topic unto itself, but deserrves mentioning.

A third grouping of Pukhtuns who are daily on Global Hujra Online are the Taliban Pukhtuns themselves! They are learning the art of disinformation and confusion and move more and more adroitly between topics to create information chaos, simply put. They will also, of course, spread lies to alledge atrocities against the Pak miliary, the UN/NATO/US forces in the field over there. Of course don't expect these Taliban writers on Global Hujra Online to identify themselves as such. In general I have found some such are among those who are least able to write in English and thus tend to do postings in Pushtu instead of English. But, a few do try English and you can get "some" meaning out of their remarks.

My answer to your second, #2 question, is now in a private e-mail to you, as I believe it is best answered outside of public view at this time.

Stopping this open dialogue now, being "nice" for a change and not commenting at all in/on Bob's area of your counter questioning.

[Bob's World]

-----------------------------
Second, from Bob. No specific quote to start this off, but it has to do with propagating ideology and providing governance.

From the gitgo on SWC, you have made an excellent case for US ideology. While the two of us have disagreed on specific points, both of us are in love with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. OK, agreed that we (US) have an excellent ideology. And, I would say we have a good (albeit scarcely perfect) system of governance. A number of other countries could present the same message (albeit somewhat different, as in David's UK).

So far as assisting another country in countering an insurgency problem, I would ask how material are our ideology and system of governance in solving their problem. Both would be very material if we were willing to make that country our 51st state - not a likely scenario.

Let us take Vietnam as an example. Well-read Vietnamese were well aware of our ideology - Ho wrote it into the preamble of his first constitution. But, let's move south and ask the important question of which was more important to combatting the VC and PAVN: the ideology and governance system of the GSV (from Diem through the iterations of generals); or our ideology and governance system - which was unknown to the vast majority of the population and which was not going to be established in SVN no how, no way ?

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

Anyone on this one.

I know that I have called the tenants embedded within our Declaration of Independence "US Ideology," and given how confused the entire topic of the role of ideology in insurgency in general, and the GWOT in particular, I probably need to reconsider, to get my messaging right so that my message itself is not hindered by these diverse perceptions.

When I speak to the importance of the principles embedded in Declaration, it is not to say that we need to force others to adopt them, it is that we need to hold ourselves to them in our engagement with others. This is important so I will reiterate:

We need to hold ourselves to the principles contained within the Declaration of Independence in our engagement with others.

For example. The Saudi Monarchy derives its legitimacy not from its own populace, but from the security and support of the Government of the United States of America. When the Saudi populace desires to reshape their government to one that draws its legitimacy not from a foreign power, but from the populace of the governed, we resist those changes and focus instead on the preservation of the governance as it currently exists.

There are several aspects of such an approach that puts current U.S. Policy clearly at odds with the founding principles contained within the Declaration.
1. The sovereignty of a government should come from its own populace, not from a foreign government.
2. Every populace has the right to choose whatever form of government that it believes will best serve their needs.
3. Every populace has the right/duty to rise up in insurgency if need be in order to establish points one and two.

Now, what I typically see, is that when you take the words of the Declaration literally today (as they were certainly taken when it was written) it strikes nearly as much fear and causes nearly as much resistance among American officials as it did among the British officials when they received their copy back in 1776.

My peers say: "you can't let the Saudi populace chose its own governance, they would select a form of government heavily infused with Wahabist ideology!"

But the Declaration says that as an American, not only must I respect the will of populaces everywhere to sort out their own governance, but because I demanded this for my own nation, I am doubly held to contempt when I attempt to deny it to others for the sheer hypocrisy of my actions.

So I do not, and have not, ever suggested that America should set out to make every populace believe as we believe; in fact I am the strongest advocate I know of for being against that very proposition. We have done far too much shaping of governance of others to meet our own needs to date. What I do advocate is that we hold ourselves to our own principles; and then enable populaces and governances to evolve as peacefully as possible from their current governments that draw legitimacy from abroad, to new governments of their own choosing that draw legitimacy from the governed.

As I have stated before, we did what we needed to do to win the Cold War; but the Cold War is long over, and the populaces that had the greatest controls exerted over them in that Cold War effort that have not yet self determined are largely in the Middle East, and are largely in Sunni dominated states within the Middle East.

We do not need to apologize for our Cold War actions; but we do need to shape our post Cold War strategies to be far more in synch with our founding principles as a nation. The Cold Warriors were effective, but they are now as obsolete as the rotary phone line they set up between the Kremlin and the Whitehouse. We must evolve.

I don't know what America's new strategy needs to look like, and I can only speak for myself. But if asked to offer our new President one piece of advice it would be that I think he would be far better served drawing from the principles drafted by men like Jefferson, Adams and Franklin; than those drafted by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld. But that's just me. The later three are not bad men, but they are good Cold Warriors, and the model they sought to enforce no longer works in the current environment. The timeless model proposed by the first three still does.

[slapout9]

When I speak to the importance of the principles embedded in Declaration, it is not to say that we need to force others to adopt them, it is that we need to hold ourselves to them in our engagement with others. This is important so I will reiterate:

We need to hold ourselves to the principles contained within the Declaration of Independence in our engagement with others.

There is some super duper Grand Strategic Stuff here!!!

[davidbfpo]

Here in the UK much is made of our shared, common values as the bedrock of confronting terrorism / violent extremism / extremism (there is a seperate debate over which phrase is best). In the Cold War there were some shared values in the Western alliances, notably within NATO and the Pacific partners.

What values do we, the West, share with Muslim public opinion? The UN Declaration Human Rights and many other declarations?

Political Islamism is often explained as different from the Western notions of democracy, but embraces accountability, change of rulers etc (alas notes not to hand now).

Just a small contribution.

davidbfpo

[George L. Singleton]

What we must have is the ability to recognize that the war on terrorism will last generations.

That said,it has a great deal in common with how the Cold War was fought ideologically.

That is why last year I pushed and still favor better enhanced use of Voice of America to the Islamic world overseas who in so many cases are illiterate and dependant on their battery operated radios and tv sets for outside and even national news day to day.

The Internet is not a resource to these several hundred millions of poor, uneducated folks.

[jmm99]

My final question in my last post, which was this:

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

was targeted to the micro level - that is, what works or doesn't work in the Host Nation in-country - as opposed to the macro level (US national policy and the decision whether to assist the Host Nation in the first place).

I picked South Vietnam as an example because my impression of that situation was that the GSV (from Diem onward) generally lacked a message that could be successfully propagated among the vast majority of its population; and also failed in governance of that population.

The GNV did have a number of messages (land reform, nationalism, etc.) which appealed to the population on their face. Note that Communism was not the message that the GNV propagated to the masses. Also note that the GSV preached similar messages (land reform, nationalism, etc.). The GNV, via the NLF (which included non-communists and communists, but was controlled by the latter), also established a parallel system of governance (run by the LD cadres and their hit squads) throughout South Vietnam.[*]

The majority of the populace was caught between a rock and a hard place. The respective messages were not that distinguishable; and the traditional village-based system of governance was respected by neither the GNV nor the GSV. The folks who were anti-GNV and anti-GSV, and who wanted to chart an independent course, were "neutralized" by one side or the other well before we became more involved in 1964-1965. The governance by the GSV was corrupt in many senses of that word. The governance by the GNV, via its cadres in the South, was very totalitarian - from the muzzle of a rifle to paraphrase Mao. By 1964, the situation (in terms of respective areas of control by the GNV and GSV) had returned to much the same picture that existed in 1954.

Now, moving to the macro level (US national policy) and the three basic principles cited by BW, we have:

from BW
There are several aspects of such an approach that puts current U.S. Policy clearly at odds with the founding principles contained within the Declaration.

1. The sovereignty of a government should come from its own populace, not from a foreign government.

2. Every populace has the right to choose whatever form of government that it believes will best serve their needs.

3. Every populace has the right/duty to rise up in insurgency if need be in order to establish points one and two.

and my macro level question, assuming those principles were to be applied in 1964: What should the US have done in Vietnam in 1964 ?

-----------------------
[*] In 1954, the GNV, via the VM and PAVN, controlled large areas of South Vietnam (i.e., in Annam, the French held some coastal enclaves; the Central Highlands were GNV-controlled; Cochin China was a patchwork). The Geneva Accords resulted in a large movement of VM cadres north (ca. 100K; many later were infiltrated south) and theoretically gave the GSV control over the VM areas. The actual practice over the next 10 years was quite different.

I've tried to keep the facts as simple as possible in describing Vietnam between 1954-1964. If there are fallacies included, or added facts needed, feel free to add or subtract.

[jmm99]

from David
What values do we, the West, share with Muslim public opinion? The UN Declaration Human Rights and many other declarations?

The following links may help in answering these questions.

A few months after 9/11, American and Saudi intellectuals exchanged letters. The Americans started the exchange with a letter entitled What We're Fighting For, affirming American values and explaining the US response to 9/11. The Saudis replied with a letter entitled How We Can Coexist, welcoming a dialogue with Americans and explaining certain points of agreement and disagreement with the American letter.

Bin Laden went a bit ballistic because of the Saudi letter, not least by its title. He wrote an open letter to the Saudis entitled "Moderate Islam is a Prostration to the West".

My nite light reading last nite was UBL's screed, which is a good argument from one neo-fundamentalist Islamic standpoint. The Saudi letter represents one conservative Islamic approach.

An excerpt from the book I am reading (The AQ Reader), concerning the letter exchange and UBL response, is here.

Bin Laden's arguments are Koran- and ahaditha-based. He also renders his opinion (his Koranic references, etc., are elsewhere in the essay). Here is one of his bottom line conclusions from the book (link above):

What the West desires is that we abandon the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity, and offensive Jihad. That is the very essence of their request and desire of us. Do the intellectuals, then, think it's actually possible for Muslims to abandon these two commandments and simply to coexist with the West?

Battle, animosity and hatred -- directed from the Muslim to the Infidel -- is the foundation of our religion. The West perceives fighting, emnity, and hatred all for the sake of religion as unjust, hostile, and evil. But whose understanding of justice and righteousness is right -- our notions of justice and righteousness, or theirs?

Furthermore, how can [you] claim that we have no right to force a people to change its particular values, when they transgress the bounds of nature? Such are lies. In fact, Muslims are obligated to raid the land of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their system of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the Sharia from being publically voiced . . . .

PS: You will note (if you have the book and compare what UBL says to the Saudis, and what he has said to the US in other statements) that his statements as to his "causes" differ. The excerpt from the book (link above) discusses this apparent inconsistency. Not really an inconsistency. UBL and Zawahiri are masters of the "Tactical Manipulation of the Cause" - a topic discussed by Galula in his book.

See the index here for more from American Values.org.

[Ron Humphrey]

We need to hold ourselves to the principles contained within the Declaration of Independence in our engagement with others.

Always thought the most simplistic way to se this was that the overarching Ideology for us is liberty along with all the craziness that accompanies figuring out how to ensure it.

Everything else is those characteristics which contribute to the hows of that

[JJackson]

We need to hold ourselves to the principles contained within the Declaration of Independence in our engagement with others.

For example. The Saudi Monarchy derives its legitimacy not from its own populace, but from the security and support of the Government of the United States of America. When the Saudi populace desires to reshape their government to one that draws its legitimacy not from a foreign power, but from the populace of the governed, we resist those changes and focus instead on the preservation of the governance as it currently exists.

There are several aspects of such an approach that puts current U.S. Policy clearly at odds with the founding principles contained within the Declaration.
1. The sovereignty of a government should come from its own populace, not from a foreign government.
2. Every populace has the right to choose whatever form of government that it believes will best serve their needs.
3. Every populace has the right/duty to rise up in insurgency if need be in order to establish points one and two.

Bob thank you for all of your comments but this especially. Now if you could just get it incorporated in US foreign policy ...

[Bob's World]

For those interested, a piece I wrote recently is carried in special section on the Westphalian system in World Politics Review.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Default.aspx

It requires signing up for a subscription, but 4 months scripts are currently free, so really no cost. The piece is intended to be a civilianized follow-on to one I published here in the Small Wars Journal on a concept of Populace-Centric Engagement. I had tied my position to the historic U.S. principles described in this thread, but the editor felt that they detracted from the story they wanted to tell with the three ariticles, so that part was edited out.

I mention it only because I did try to make a case for a way the US could change our strategic perspective to be more in synch with our ideological roots, that would in turn also be more effective for the globalized world we live in today than our Cold War based policies.

[marct]

When I speak to the importance of the principles embedded in Declaration, it is not to say that we need to force others to adopt them, it is that we need to hold ourselves to them in our engagement with others. This is important so I will reiterate:

We need to hold ourselves to the principles contained within the Declaration of Independence in our engagement with others.

Thank You! As a Canadian and descendant of United Empire Loyalists who fought against your insurgency, all I can say is - right frakin' on! Any other stance is, IMO, totally unethical - a betrayal of your roots.

[Ken White]

the roots needed oil...

[Bob's World]

My final question in my last post, which was this:


and my macro level question, assuming those principles were to be applied in 1964: What should the US have done in Vietnam in 1964 ?

-----------------------
[*] In 1954, the GNV, via the VM and PAVN, controlled large areas of South Vietnam (i.e., in Annam, the French held some coastal enclaves; the Central Highlands were GNV-controlled; Cochin China was a patchwork). The Geneva Accords resulted in a large movement of VM cadres north (ca. 100K; many later were infiltrated south) and theoretically gave the GSV control over the VM areas. The actual practice over the next 10 years was quite different.

I've tried to keep the facts as simple as possible in describing Vietnam between 1954-1964. If there are fallacies included, or added facts needed, feel free to add or subtract.

Personally, I think we got sideways with American principles when we thanked Ho for helping us defeat the Japanese by reinstalling French governance in Vietnam. So that was the first off ramp that we missed.

The next off ramp was when the French were defeated. I'm no expert on the Geneva accords, but I've always perceived that it was a "cut the baby in half" decision to maintain balance between the Soviets and the West. Probably made great sense at the time, but it was also an opportunity to right the wrong of putting the French in power and instead creating a unified country then. Imposing ourselves only so far as necessary to ensure the entire populace had a voice in determing their governance, but not to intervene if we disagreed with what they chose.

By 1964 we had missed the to two best exits and were picking up speed. By then we were seeing South Vietnam as a separate country, and certainly the North did not agree. Much as China sees Taiwan as part of China to this day (ok, China probably sees Vietnam as part of China as well). I think one of Colin Powell's leadership principles is apt here: "Never get so close to your position that when your position falls your ego falls with it." We were too close and had too much ego invested, not so much over Vietnam itself, but over how it would be perceived in the larger Cold War power struggle. Personally I don't think South Vietnam should ever have been created in the first place; but once bad decisions compound they are harder to work your way out of.

I guess when in doubt, go back to the founding fathers for advice. George Washington's advice on foreign intervention from his farewell address in 1796, while obviously needing to be taken less than literally today to take in account the current global environment, is still sage advice:

"Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it ? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue ? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of nations, has been the victim."

[slapout9]

For those interested, a piece I wrote recently is carried in special section on the Westphalian system in World Politics Review.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Default.aspx

It requires signing up for a subscription, but 4 months scripts are currently free, so really no cost. The piece is intended to be a civilianized follow-on to one I published here in the Small Wars Journal on a concept of Populace-Centric Engagement. I had tied my position to the historic U.S. principles described in this thread, but the editor felt that they detracted from the story they wanted to tell with the three ariticles, so that part was edited out.

I mention it only because I did try to make a case for a way the US could change our strategic perspective to be more in synch with our ideological roots, that would in turn also be more effective for the globalized world we live in today than our Cold War based policies.

Rob, you put this up on the Grand Strategy Thread also....Slap

[marct]

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

Anyone on this one.

In short, not much.

Historically, the US has imposed its republican (small "R"... most of the time ) ideology on many societies where it was totally inappropriate to do so. Indeed, I am forced to ask why you consider US ideology and governance as "superior"? Superior for whom in what conditions?

JMM, I believe that you have fallen into what I call the Baskin Robbins Fallacy - 31 flavours of governance and they all taste the same. You are assuming that governance must come from the top; i.e. a systemic form rather than an organic, bottom-up form. Why?

Again historically, no democracy, whether an open free for all like Athens (if you were male and a citizen, say 10% of the population) or a republican system like Rome or the US, has survived for more than 500 years (the only possible exception is parliamentary democracies, but there are definitional problems there...).

The "US ideology" (there are actually competing ones including at least one that is technically Fascist, i.e. the older Fordist model), at least in the romanticized form Bob's World talks about (and that is the one that has galvanized world notice from the French Revolution on), bears little resemblance to the forms of governance either practiced currently in the US or exported via "reconstruction" efforts. If an HN system of governance is FUBAR, then it has to be up to them to reconstruct it, unfettered by inane systems that will not work for their people.

Shifting out of rant mode....

Okay, let's play this out. Ideally, what is needed is an updated international convention that parallels the old European concept of the Right of Departure. Since no system of governance will ever match the ideals of all of any geographically based populace, then a shift of populace would be indicated such that systems of governance become subject to "voting" [by their feet].

[Steve Blair]

Historically, the US has imposed its republican (small "R"... most of the time ) ideology on many societies where it was totally inappropriate to do so. Indeed, I am forced to ask why you consider US ideology and governance as "superior"? Superior for whom in what conditions?

Good point. I, for one, don't consider the US system to be inherently superior (or inferior, for that matter). Governments tend to arise (and fall) due more to local conditions than anything else, and ours has evolved over time to match our specific conditions and needs. Which, I might add, are (like most such things) almost impossible to duplicate.

Much of the early US dynamism was based on the idea of growth (more or less for its own sake), and that soon became conjoined with the idea that anything that created that much energy and movement must be superior to other things around it. Once it ran "from sea to shining sea," it started exporting itself (linked with masses of post-Civil War enthusiasm for the republic and all things linked to it) in ways that I don't know that its originators would have foreseen (aside from their fixation on Canada....).

[Ken White]

Re: Viet Nam. Had F.D.R. been in charge, we would probably not have helped the French back into Indo China. Unfortunately, he died, Truman took over and did help them because he disagreed with F.D.Rs announced plan of getting the British and French out of the Colonial business (Some stupid and Scowcroft-like 'realism'...).

He also came up with the Truman Doctrine and hard containment (which many seem to think was a. Good or b. worked...) and that was in reaction more to domestic political sentiment than anything else -- other than British urging which was quite strong. So you can place the blame for all that on Harry. The 54 accords occurred during Eisenhower's watch and John Foster Dulles was even more into containment than was Truman and a strong effort was made to get South Viet Nam into SEATO. It failed -- in any event, a part of the cost for those accords was a Mutual Defense Treaty.

Fast forward to John Kennedy and his desire to boost the US economy, then in the doldrums. He talked South Viet Nam into asking for more US assistance. Then we get to L.B.J. -- who simply didn't want to be seen as soft on Communism which the democrats had for some reason been accused of being.

Thus, most of that ignoring of our 'roots' was due to domestic, not international politics. That's sort of important.

Marc T. said:

"Historically, the US has imposed its republican (small "R"... most of the time ) ideology on many societies where it was totally inappropriate to do so. Indeed, I am forced to ask why you consider US ideology and governance as "superior"? Superior for whom in what conditions?"

We have? Well, I'll give you the Philippines. It seemed a good idea at the time and the Social Sciences were in their infancy and so no one was as smart as we are today. Then there was Japan, a special case due to circumstances and the persons involved. Other than that, where did we do this imposing? Serious question.

I'll grant it's not the best for many place and people but we haven't tried to impose it all that often. A lot of nations have tried to adopt all or parts of it -- that's their problem; it is not from our pushing it on them...

Marc further says

"The "US ideology" (there are actually competing ones including at least one that is technically Fascist, i.e. the older Fordist model), at least in the romanticized form Bob's World talks about (and that is the one that has galvanized world notice from the French Revolution on), bears little resemblance to the forms of governance either practiced currently in the US or exported via "reconstruction" efforts."

All true. I'd only note that the form of government currently practiced in the US is the bequest of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, a couple of cases of ultra liberal, left leaning idealists deciding that rules were to be ignored for the greater good of mankind. Both were inclined to ignore the Constitution as an impediment to getting what they wanted. I'll play nice and not mention Lyndon Baines Johnson again...

Nor will I cite Jimmy Carter, an imposer of some reknown.

As I said above, F.D.R. wanted to oil the roots -- and he got Ibn Saud to agree, the oil flowed and its been slippery out there ever since.

As Steve Blair correctly said

"Once it ran "from sea to shining sea," it started exporting itself (linked with masses of post-Civil War enthusiasm for the republic and all things linked to it) in ways that I don't know that its originators would have foreseen (aside from their fixation on Canada....)."

Or Canada's fixation on us???

All of which has little bearing on the fact that the US and every nation I can think of has abandoned their roots and tried to export their beliefs. We were just fortunate or unfortunate enough, viewpoint dependent, to be more successful than many because we happened to be bigger and more entrepreneurial than most. Sorry.

P.S.

We're still big but I think that entrepreneurial spark has been extinguished, it certainly seems to be sputtering in any event. I'm less sure the World will be as happy about that as they think.

[jmm99]

from Marc
Indeed, I am forced to ask why you consider US ideology and governance as "superior"? Superior for whom in what conditions?

JMM, I believe that you have fallen into what I call the Baskin Robbins Fallacy - 31 flavours of governance and they all taste the same. You are assuming that governance must come from the top; i.e. a systemic form rather than an organic, bottom-up form. Why?

First point. Please re-read this quote from me, especially the "if" clause:

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

Since the qualifying premise is that the host nation's ideology and governance system is FUBAR, our (US) ideology and governance system, which is not FUBAR, is superior to one that is FUBAR.

My opinion on US ideology and governance is in the same post, which you ignore:

While the two of us have disagreed on specific points, both of us are in love with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. OK, agreed that we (US) have an excellent ideology. And, I would say we have a good (albeit scarcely perfect) system of governance. A number of other countries could present the same message (albeit somewhat different, as in David's UK).

If I did not believe the first three sentences, I would move to Canada or Finland, both of which would be happy enough to give me landed status.

As to the second point - and your ice cream store, that is refuted by the last sentence of the quote immediately above. As to the trickle down vs. bubble up theories of governance, I've made it clear, in more than one post discussing US constitutional law, that I take the Preamble ("We, the People ... do ordain and establish") very literally. It is "You [who] are assumiing" what you think I am assuming - bad assumption and a bad windmill at which to tilt.

Now, as a final point, I happen to agree with this from you - and would add the bracketed insert:

If an HN system of governance is FUBAR, then it has to be up to them to reconstruct it, unfettered by inane [or superior] systems that will not work for their people.

My question, which I'll repeat again, was rhetorical:

In short, if the ideology and governance system of the host nation is FUBAR, what difference can our superior ideology and governance system make in the end result ?

My answer is the same as yours - "In short, not much."

For "COIN" to work, the host nation's message must work - not the US message, nor the Canadian message for that matter.

PS: In some of my first posts here, you and I discussed in some detail (and mostly agreement) why the US message failed in Canada during both the Revoltionary War and the War of 1812. We also discussed and agreed on why the British message and governance system, adapted for Canadian conditions, succeeded - albeit over a very long timespan. I still remember that discussion.

[jmm99]

that the US should have pulled the plug on South Vietnam in 1964 ? That is the impression I got from the six paragraphs of rhetoric.

If that is your conclusion, you'll get no flaming from me. That was one of many opinions concerning the better (note I did not say "best") course of action for the US to take.

The 1964 election decided the nation's course, for better or worse.