Class Analysis and COIN

[William F. Owen]

III. The Political Decision in the Military Act
While Clausewitz defined war as an extension of policy, he further argues that the political object sought by war is suspended and replaced by the immediate desire for military victory. Military acts therefore do not have a political nature to them except for the strategy as a whole. However, in insurgency every military act is a political decision. This is because the classes within a society, rather than the state itself, are using war as an extension of their own interests.

That's not what I take from CvC. The destruction of the enemies forces has political effect on the other elements of the trinity - Leadership and people. All useful military acts have political effect at some level and for some duration. In fact I would submit that is how you judge the usefulness of military action, and I think CvC makes this point.

An insurgency exactly mirrors CvC's trinity. If it doesn't it's not an insurgency. Destroying the military capability of an insurgency, is one way to defeat the insurgency. - and this alwasy makes me wonder why all the great and good are trying to examine insurgencies as some kind of exclusive case, instead of starting from the premise that COIN is warfare, and not "social work with guns," or some other post-modern take on a very ancient problem.

[AmericanPride]

The destruction of the enemies forces has political effect on the other elements of the trinity - Leadership and people. All useful military acts have political effect at some level and for some duration. In fact I would submit that is how you judge the usefulness of military action, and I think CvC makes this point.

I agree. I think we are talking past one another rather than actually disagreeing. What I pulled from Clausewitz is that a tactical decision, while subordinate to strategy (and ultimately the political object), is aimed at the immediate destruction of the enemy's capacity to fight. Because this is the case for all sides in a conventional conflict, the political decision can be separated from the military act. The decision to destroy one battalion vs. another, for example, is driven by a desire to degrade the enemy's capacity to fight rather than any political decision made on the battlefield and, with everything else being equal, will produce similar results regardless of what battalion is targeted. In contrast, because in insurgency each belligerent is assuming the faculties of a state (that is, to make political decisions, specifically to make war), even the lowest tactical decision is political. Targeting one militia vs another may generate significantly different results based on the politics of those militias.

Destroying the military capability of an insurgency, is one way to defeat the insurgency. - and this alwasy makes me wonder why all the great and good are trying to examine insurgencies as some kind of exclusive case, instead of starting from the premise that COIN is warfare, and not "social work with guns," or some other post-modern take on a very ancient problem.

I agree. I am starting from that same premise, except that I would argue in addition that in an insurgency environment, the various classes of a society assume the political characteristics 'traditionally' reserved for the state.

[Bob's World]

That's not what I take from CvC. The destruction of the enemies forces has political effect on the other elements of the trinity - Leadership and people. All useful military acts have political effect at some level and for some duration. In fact I would submit that is how you judge the usefulness of military action, and I think CvC makes this point.

An insurgency exactly mirrors CvC's trinity. If it doesn't it's not an insurgency. Destroying the military capability of an insurgency, is one way to defeat the insurgency. - and this alwasy makes me wonder why all the great and good are trying to examine insurgencies as some kind of exclusive case, instead of starting from the premise that COIN is warfare, and not "social work with guns," or some other post-modern take on a very ancient problem.

While I will certainly agree, and history supports, that the defeat of the insurgent's military capacity within ones populace will effectively suppress an insurgency, often for years. But it has not to my knowledge ever truly resolved an insurgency. So long as the conditions giving rise to insurgency exist, the insurgency will re-emerge. It may come back with new leaders, or a new ideology, but it will come back.

Make defeat of the insurgent a supporting effort, but do so while understanding that he is a part of the same populace who's support you are trying to regain as the counterinsurgent and tailor your defeat mechanisms accordingly. The main effort must be upon reestablishing conditions of good governance with the populace writ large. This is not social work with guns, but simply a recognition that when governance fails, it often has to use force in its efforts to re-establish itself with the populace.

To hold that one size fits all, that the solutions that one seeks with ones own popualce are the same that one seeks with a competing state is a concept that I have not seen any convincing arguments made to support. Frankly, I suspect CvC would scratch his head at the concept as well.

[Bob's World]

I know WILF is a smart guy, and that he believes strongly in his position. While I will not simply roll over when confronted with such, nor will I doggedly simply entrench myself in my own position and refuse to listen.

There must be something there, that either I need to examine more closely, or that I need to point out to him so that he can examine it as well. So, after posting, I did a little research to see what others have written about Clausewitz as it applies to Insurgency, and found a paper written by a US Army Major at Leavenworth back in 1995.

As it happens, the position he takes agrees more with the one I hold to than WILF, but that is not why I share it here. I share it because the author takes an approach I had not seen before, and does a nice job of laying out a logical, easy to read argument. I particularlly like his simple diagram that expands the CvC trinity model to include the insurgent. Worth a read, regardless of which camp you happen to subscribe most closely to.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

[John T. Fishel]

class. The classical definition of social class depends on a relationship of income and occupational prestige. This is often predicted by - often determined by (but not always) level of education. So, if you define class differently - and operational definition is always your right - be prepared to be challenged and to need to keep reasserting your definition.

That said, there is much evidence that societies do not simply organize themselves in terms of class - I/O class. Culture is often seen (particularly by anthropologists like MarcT) as determining social organization. Of course, it may be that individual actions determine both culture and social organization. My point here is to suggest that you not get overly committed to one form of explaining complex human phenomena. As Hamlet said, "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Cheers

JohnT

[slapout9]

American Pride, you can use the SBW method I learned in LE. To find out who has the real power in any country,organization,etc. build a System Map based on the 3F's. Family,Friends and Finances and how they are connected. It may sound to simplistic but give it a shot...it can be very revealing

Tips:
1-Real power is often concealed both in stable and unstable countries,organizations,etc.
2-Always follow the money.
3-If a person has a lot of publicity he/she probably dosen't have that much real power. Not always, but more often then not this true.
4-Genology data bases are often gold mines if you take the time to map them.
5-The CIA used to have book that was open source about this....saw it on Robert Steele's website a while back....can not remeber the title.

[AmericanPride]

I pieced together a powerpoint to illustrate the concepts and their relationships. If anyone is interested in reviewing it, let me know and I can e-mail it you.

[William F. Owen]

I know WILF is a smart guy, and that he believes strongly in his position.

IF I am smart... I would hope it is because I do not believe in anything strongly, and am prepared to understand things based on the evidence! However I am moved by the compliment coming from a man of your stature, Sir.

As it happens, the position he takes agrees more with the one I hold to than WILF, but that is not why I share it here.

I will read it with interest. Travelling at the moment, but top of my list when I get back.