Ralph Peter's Best to Worst COAs for Afghanistan

[Ron Humphrey]

As an alternative to Ralph Peters' five options, see Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan), by Nathaniel C. Fick, David Kilcullen, John A. Nagl, Vikram J. Singh.

Maybe it will spark a discussion of what our strategy should be.

I'll start it out since i so enjoy over-simplifying anything

Move to largest cities with sufficient training forces for pol,army,NP,etc and sufficient security to let you focus on that training(add development,ed,etc)

Establish larger FOB-like bases in or around villages along the border where you have been able to find those who really want change and are going to work with you.

ISR up like crazy and focus on agro development, security, and training.
Find those who can influence change in those areas and enable away/ keep them safe. Wack a mole when or if you have to but make sure you know which mole your wackin Find out who got screwed in the past (a result of our lack of followthrough after helping them kick out the Russians, and do whatever you can to "make it right" within the context of societal norm / acceptable to our norms.

pay them more to grow something else than T pay them for opium , set it up for future dependance on the new product so that in the future the overall prices can and will revert to norm.

Look for any area where you can coop passive support for enemy movements but don't waste time trying to coop active support. Instead the aforementioned actions should help to either move them towards passive or put them sites either way works just one more permanent and painful than the other.

For God's sake get your leadership both military and political on a common theme (whether they all agree or not) it'll at least cut back on consistant bickering in the public forum and allow for more meaningful actions in the private communications.

Say what you mean, mean what you say, and make sure theres sufficient reason for them to believe you.

Let the enemy have to move and plan, watch their back and always be looking over their shoulders. Let them know where your at but make sure their visit won't be a pleasant one.

And most of all don't grow so big that those who need to grow can't because there's

1- no need
2- no incentive

[Ken White]

Plan A.

It is better to destroy submarines in port. That is much easier than trying to find them when they're in the sea...

Plan B.

Ya always have to have a plan B at a minimum. If major strategic raids are deemed not acceptable and / or if Pakistan does not move more rapidly, then:

Do not go to the cities; Afghans are essentially and psychologically a rural people.

Do not try to force a 'nation.' Let the Afghans sort it out but give them a sensible time limit -- say three years -- to come up with what they want to do and who is included in the governmental entities. That entails accepting their solution and not trying to get what we want (and quite probably do not need).

Continue to equip (sensibly but more rapidly) Afghan forces, continue the training regimen about as it is.

Decrease wheeled traffic by using deploying, contracting * and using more aircraft (including armed helicopters and A-10s).

Do not deploy more troops, remove some that are there. Train and equip those that are to stay to operate in platoon and even squad ** packets with nearby and rapidly available CAS plus rapid reinforcing Co size elements on strip alert. There must be interoperation with Afghan forces for several reasons to include their lead frequently but it will also be desirable in certain areas for us to have the sole responsibility for the AOR due to demographic / tribal constraints on the Afghan forces.

Lastly and more importantly -- pay more for development workers and Afghan national forces (and tribal or other 'militias') than the opposition is paying. For over seven years only SF and the CIA have had enough sense to do that.

If we're serious about fixing it, we can train up a force, Army GPF, Marines, SOCOM immaterial or combined (with a single chain of command). The air effort can rotate, it does not need the continuity and local knowledge required for the ground effort. Tell the ground force they'll train hard for almost a year then serve three years in Afghanistan or until we leave sensibly whichever is first -- and they'll not deploy again for a minimum of five years. You wouldn't get a whole lot of volunteers but you'd get enough. You'd have to pay them well but that would be cheaper than what we're now doing. Yeah, I know...

The personnel pogues and TJAG said what?

* developing and using local capability in the process.

** Yes, that can be done IF the troops are well trained and carry sensible loads. Yes, that means no Armor. Yes. I know we won't do that -- but he asked...

Being prudent, I also have a Plan C -- whatever the Think Tank crowd du jour gens up.

All the foregoing, BTW and smileys not withstanding is a totally serious and considered answer to the question.

Any option selected must consider that 'clear and hold' is the best operational technique (it is not a strategy) but that neither NATO nor we can provide enough troops to do that; that Afghanistan cannot afford an Army large enough to do that and that the time to even approach getting the numbers to apply that technique is probably in excess of ten years; that even if Afghanistan could train and deploy an adequate number of troops to use that technique they would merely be training future insurgents as they had to release large numbers of said troops due to an inability to pay them.

That's a big sentence. It's a big problem. Realism bites...

[J Wolfsberger]

MarcT could address this better than me, but here's something to add into the mix. The critics of McMasters' approach of paying the sheiks in Anbar missed the point. (I think this was his.) What they referred to as "payoffs" or "bribes" were, in a tribal society, the disbursement of patronage. Hence the observation that the US is the biggest tribe - I think that statement referred to more than firepower.

Would it not be a good starting point to plan on deliberately building a "representative" government around the existing tribal structure?

1. Approach the idea of the central government in Kabul as a permanently constituted National Jirga.
2. Maybe introduce the ideas of an "Elders Jirga" with two or three members (not representatives) from each tribe, and a "Clans' Jirga," where each clan within the tribe elects/selects/has selected (by the elders) members (not representatives) based on size. The few truly non tribal areas, such as Kabul, could be treated as tribes for the purpose of Jirga membership.
3. The chief elder/leader of the National Jirga (i.e. chief executive of the country) could be selected by a joint vote (or argued out consensus) of both Jirgas.
4. The National Jirga (i.e. central government) disburses patronage in return for loyalty.
5. The tribes, in turn, accept the obligation to provide support, as requested, to the Jirga. The "support" ranges from contracting for provision of water, sewage, etc. to whacking any Taliban that show up.
6. As part of a general amnesty, make the support a shut down of the opium trade, with payments disbursed through the tribal structure to subsidize payment for other crops, or development of other economic activity.

I realize these are pretty rough ideas. But at least they would get us into the realm of thinking about a central government that the majority of Afghanis would feel was theirs, and thus they could buy into.

[George L. Singleton]

1. There appears rationally to be no cash value substitue for the opium crops.

2. Centralized government as known to us in he West is totally alien to the grassroots in Afghanistan.

[Ron Humphrey]

1. There appears rationally to be no cash value substitue for the opium crops.

2. Centralized government as known to us in he West is totally alien to the grassroots in Afghanistan.

1- Luckily there are things in life besides cash which can be seen as "valuable" enough to bring the value of a given action (growing something besides opium) at least on par with growing it. The trick would seem to be finding what those are. Outside the box

2- Was it any less alien to many of the so-called "western" nations before they adopted it. Not sayin it would work just always think of the old adage
NEVER say NEVER

[ODB]

The final two options.

1. Level it with nukes and make it one huge parking lot.

2. Breed it out of them.

Just humor

Actually wanted to address the "cash crop" issue. I think we did well not touching the opium the first 5 years, although the Brits had another agenda in those regards. Unfortunately we did not have an economic plan to replace the opium. Have read other threads covering cloud seeding to getting Universities involved agriculturally. I have to wonder if they can sustain economically on agriculture in todays world. Maybe we should move all American car manufacturers to Afghanistan and kill two birds with one stone.

Aghanistan is a hard nut to crack don't know if it can be done with our political views today vs those of 60 years ago. Too much let's make everyone happy involved, it is not going to happen, some will be pissed off, but overall what is best for the country?

[Bill Moore]

We're in Afghanistan, so even if we share Peters' frustrations, we have to get to an acceptable state where we can transition the state of Afghanistan, or the various tribal regions to local authorities. I don't think we know what the so called end state in Afghanistan will be, nor should we make public statements saying that we do (which can lead to a loss of credibility), eventually we'll recognize what the acceptable transition point is and it will be based on what our finest minds think is feasible and ultimately what the Afghan people really want. That is sometimes a hard reality for our idealistic policy makers to come to grips with.

One of my main concerns is indirectly related to the conflicts we're currently involved in, but rather how they are shaping the transformation of our military and other government agencies. We have security concerns equal to (or greater than in my opinion) Al Qaeda, but I'll focus my argument on the Al Qaeda Network threat. Afghanistan was not important to us after the USSR departed, and it didn't become important until the attacks on our Embassies in East Africa and the attack on the USS Cole, yet the threat was resident there prior to the attacks alerting the majority to the threat. How many other countries right now are a future Afghanistan (next host to the preparaton of a major terrorist attack on a modern country)? Are we then going to swarm to that country, and then after we hammer the known terrrorist elements there are we going to stay and try to convert that country into a functional democracy with modern market models?

Arguments can be made that in select strategic locations (Iraq being one of them) this is worth the investment in time, blood and treasure, but is it the answer for every failed state. And for those where we agree it is not in our interest to make that commitment, what other options do we have to address the threats there? I for one would argue that Peters' coercion strategy is still viable for many foreseeable threats.

[Ken White]

Arguments can be made that in select strategic locations (Iraq being one of them) this is worth the investment in time, blood and treasure, but is it the answer for every failed state. And for those where we agree it is not in our interest to make that commitment, what other options do we have to address the threats there? I for one would argue that Peters' coercion strategy is still viable for many foreseeable threats.

Totally agree and would opt for launch of strategic raids before major troop commitment in almost all cases.

However, there are a few nations -- Afghanistan is one -- where I don't think there's enough "there there" to justify a launch ...

[ODB]

What will be our final "debt" or IOU (not monetary) to Pakistan after this is all said and done? Or will we cut ties and run ala 1980s Afghanistan?

Originally Posted by Bill Moore
How many other countries right now are a future Afghanistan (next host to the preparaton of a major terrorist attack on a modern country)? Are we then going to swarm to that country, and then after we hammer the known terrrorist elements there are we going to stay and try to convert that country into a functional democracy with modern market models?

Unfortunately some are much, much closer to home, there is no ocean to cross this time.

[120mm]

WWGMD? That is, What Would Greg Mortensen Do? I've become an instant fan of "Three Cups of Tea" and think there might be some lessons in that example.

I think engaging the smaller tribes/communities directly might have some good outcomes with minimum investment. Heck, we could even sell it to the Muslim world as I/O showing that we care. Despite the unique nature of Afghanistan/Pakistan and it's apparent irrelevance.

Hiding behind our borders, and lashing out blindly at perceived slights to America, ala Ralph Peters, will eventually brand us the rogue elephant, that needs to be put down by the rest of the world. Maybe not today, or tomorrow, but sooner or later.

Not a big fan of grand modernization/aid projects, either, as we repeatedly batter ourselves bloody against the USAID constructed canals of Nad-e Ali district in Helmand Province and the warlords who inhabit them. Unintended consequences, and all that....

[Ken White]

Hiding behind our borders, and lashing out blindly at perceived slights to America, ala Ralph Peters, will eventually brand us the rogue elephant, that needs to be put down by the rest of the world. Maybe not today, or tomorrow, but sooner or later.

But I haven't seen anyone who advocates hiding behind our borders and hopefully, if we lashed out, it would not be blindly. We've been pretty good about ignoring perceived and even real slights, no reason not to expect that to continue.

Certainly real problems versus perceived slights should be addressed in some manner; the question is merely how. I know of no one who would advocate what you write. Why would you suggest that they have?

I'm sure you're aware that some in the world have already labeled us as Rogues or worse but that most don't agree -- they don't like us because we're rich and arrogant but they don't think we're rogues. No particular need for us to react in ways that cause them to think that.

Acknowledging that some tend to react that way.

[120mm]

But I haven't seen anyone who advocates hiding behind our borders and hopefully, if we lashed out, it would not be blindly. We've been pretty good about ignoring perceived and even real slights, no reason not to expect that to continue.

First, we have always lashed out blindly, as a nation. I see no reason why this would change.

Second, we ignore perceived and even real slights... until we don't. I don't care what we advocate, I only care what we DO.

What we, as a nation, appear incapable of doing is long-term engagement in a politically patient manner. Perhaps it's the nature of the representative republican democratic beast.

I think the rest of the world does not appreciate our inconsistency, as much as our wealth.

[Ken White]

First, we have always lashed out blindly, as a nation. I see no reason why this would change.

Not always by a long shot, we really tend to not lash out and then we get pushed a bit further (as you point out below) -- then we lash out. Almost every war we've been in resulted from that effect.

If you look deep, a lot of that lashing is not nearly as as blind as it seems to be. We tend to disrupt rather than to conquer; WW II was an exception. Disrupting is generally chaotic and less orderly than many like.

Second, we ignore perceived and even real slights... until we don't. I don't care what we advocate, I only care what we DO.

Agree with that. It is a problem, induced mostly by the governmental system but also by our impatience and rather naive approach to the world. Plus our ignorance -- due to a screwed up educational system (itself partially caused by a screwed up legal system). We've done some dumb stuff -- a lot of it by getting OVER involved with other nations but on balance over the years we've done more good than harm. By a broad measure.

What we, as a nation, appear incapable of doing is long-term engagement in a politically patient manner. Perhaps it's the nature of the representative republican democratic beast.

Agree and I think that's the largest factor but all things considered, looking at a lot of folks in the world who 'do it better' (in the eyes of themselves and some in the US), I can put with those downsides for the positives.

I think the rest of the world does not appreciate our inconsistency, as much as our wealth.

True. They also distrust us because we say we're going to do things and then quit. Never a way to keep friends. That concerns me more than does our inconsistency and the occasional dumb stuff; everyone screws up on occasion. Regardless, the big guy is always everyone's favorite target.

Stay alert over there...

[120mm]

What I would like to see out of American policy is a wide range of diversified and fundamentally cheap small projects that quietly, and inobtrusively address education, health and welfare issues, without demanding quid pro quo.

Mortensen's Central Asia Institute might offer a prototype.

[Ken White]

...Mortensen's Central Asia Institute might offer a prototype.

and we started on the other in the 50s -- then Congress demanded the QPQ. They are a big part of the problem...

Since then it's been in fits and starts as people change in the jobs. No question but that we need a relook -- and it would be nice if we could do it so Congress can't tamper with it but they'll never buy that. Sigh...

Watch 'em rockets.