Ralph Peter's Best to Worst COAs for Afghanistan

[Rob Thornton]

DOn't know how many have read this yet. Ralph Peter's has an interesting piece in the USA Today on COAs in Afghanistan. Peter's as almost always is candid.

His opener tells you exactly where he stands -

The conflict in Afghanistan is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead of concentrating on the critical mission of keeping Islamist terrorists on the defensive, we've mired ourselves by attempting to modernize a society that doesn't want to be — and cannot be — transformed.

and why:

Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in the Muslim world. Backward and isolated, Afghanistan is sui generis (only example of its kind). Political polarization in the U.S. precludes an honest assessment, but Iraq's the prize from which positive change might flow, while Afghanistan could never inspire neighbors who despise its backwardness

He goes on to lay out his view of best and worst COAs

Best. Instead of increasing the U.S. military "footprint," reduce our forces and those of NATO by two-thirds, maintaining a "mother ship" at Bagram Air Base and a few satellite bases from which special operations troops, aircraft and drones, and lean conventional forces would strike terrorists and support Afghan factions with whom we share common enemies. All resupply for our military could be done by air, if necessary.

Stop pretending Afghanistan's a real state. Freeze development efforts. Ignore the opium. Kill the fanatics.

Good. Leave entirely. Strike terrorist targets from over the horizon and launch punitive raids when necessary. Instead of facing another Vietnam ourselves, let Afghanistan become a Vietnam for Iran and Pakistan. Rebuild our military at home, renewing our strategic capabilities.

Poor. Continue to muddle through as is, accepting that achieving any meaningful change in Afghanistan is a generational commitment. Surge troops for specific missions, but not permanently.

Worst. Augment our forces endlessly and increase aid in the absence of a strategy. Lie to ourselves that good things might just happen. Let U.S. troops and Afghans continue to die for empty rhetoric, while Pakistan decays into a vast terrorist refuge

.

My questions - did he leave anything out? Is his view to narrow, too broad or just right?

Best, Rob

[gh_uk]

Without forming a judgment as to whether he is right or wrong, the Best/Good options do not sound too dissimilar to the approach advocated by Rupert Smith in the Utility of Force, who said...

The supporting arms and services must be kept to minimum so as to present the fewest targets...I think we must conceive of the application of force, in contrast to the intelligence and information operation, as a raid at theatre or strategic level rather than a sustained operation

Smith, R. The Utility of Force, Penguin, London, 2006, p401

[Bob's World]

We would probably differ on rationale somewhat, but I think he's essentially right.

The decisive point for the US is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until we are willing to begin adjusting our foreign policy from that point, working outward, we will simply be gnawing on the edges of the problem. (Note, I am in no way suggesting a military solution to the policy problem we have with the Saudis).

Establishing a Shia dominated democracy of some sort between Iran and Saudi Arabia is certainly the long hard road toward adjusting our policy in the region, but it will have more effect than increased efforts in Afghanistan to try to turn it into a "little America."

Biggest problem is that the politicians are so focused on the "two wars" in the region, that they ignore the giant policy disaster that those two wars are sitting in the middle of. My vote is to get a new comprehensive policy for the region that focuses on populaces over threats worked out first, and then decide where the "M" in DIME needs to be adjusted.

[slapout9]

The decisive point for the US is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until we are willing to begin adjusting our foreign policy from that point, working outward, we will simply be gnawing on the edges of the problem. (Note, I am in no way suggesting a military solution to the policy problem we have with the Saudis).

I have always believed this from the start, as in 911. Especially if you look at it from a crime satnd point. Almost all the suspects were from Saudi, we call that a clue in Law Enforcement. I don't think military action is appropriate now, but I would not have ruled it out following 911. If you really want to get Bin Laden start going after the Bin Laden family dynasty and the massive wealth they have acquired. Go ahead with the Flame Thrower attacks now

[John T. Fishel]

about Afghanistan to know what I do not know. I do not know if there is a critical mass of modernizers among the Afghans. I do not know if the Taliban is sufficiently unified to be perceived as a threat in in itself. I do not know if the Taliban are owned/rented by AQ. I do not know if there is an effective alternative to the opium crop. I do not know the tribal relationships in Afghanistan and how those really break out linguistically, religiously, and politically, etc. I do not know what constitutes corruption in Afghan culture - presuming, of course, there is such an animal.

OTOH I do know that our C2 structure is screwed up. I do know we have not paid more than lip service to the obligations we incurred in 01 and 02. And, I do know that we have yet to develop a strategy either military or whole of govt - combined. I do agree that the British 19th century experience there is relevant as is the Soviet. I just don't know how relevant they are or in what way.

The problem, then, is to get the information quickly, do the analysis, develop the strategy to include a unified C2, and execute it in short order - which, of course, will be longer than we would wish.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The problem, then, is to get the information quickly, do the analysis, develop the strategy to include a unified C2, and execute it in short order - which, of course, will be longer than we would wish.

Whoops. We missed that suspense date. My, how time flies...

Very good post, John.

[Bill Moore]

Ralph Peters is all about thumping the bad guys hard, then going home with our heads held high, while ready and willing to return to do the same as required. Bob's World is more focused on influencing the population to solve the problem, but amazingly both Bob and Peters are at least in partial agreement on Afghanistan, and it sounds like many SWJ members (to include myself) find ourselves generally in agreement with Peters, which is many ways is telling. One can only hope that those proposing these seemingly pie in the sky policies are seeing a reality that many of us have simply not seen yet.

I argued in previous posts that a viable alternative strategy was to go into Afghanistan (as one example) as we did initially, but with more force and hammer Al Qaeda, and yes pursue them into Pakistan while we had the political will to do so immediately after 9/11. Then hand over the reigns to whomever with a stiff warning that if AQ resettles in Afghanistan (or anywhere else in the world) we'll pay another visit. Unfortunately we can't re-write history, and the coercion course of action is no longer a feasible option now.

While only an opinion, from what I'm seeing, I agree with Peters' that it isn't worth the cost to convert Afghanistan into a functional state (assuming it is possible). We have other national interests that we can't pursue because too many of our force has been tied down in OIF and OEF-A, but Peters doesn't really explain how we and our NATO allies would leave Afghanistan with honor at this point. We seem to be a catch 22 position, we know staying isn't practical, but leaving sends the wrong message to the world, and that wrong message will significantly impact our ability to garner support for future military adventures. However, we do have a new administration, so that does allow some room for significant change.

Peters' pointed out the obvious, in South Asia the main threat is in Pakistan, and sadly Pakistan is in a precarious situation. They desparately need our help, but that help must be provided in a careful manner to avoid further polarizing the people from their government. We don't see much reporting on the food riots, looting, etc. tied to the severe economic crisis in Pakistan, one that rapidly getting worse. The Taliban imposing Sharia in Swat is big news as it should be, but that is only a small part of the overall tragic story unfolding in Pakistan.

Back to Afghanistan, lets assume we Afghanistan to function as a weak state in the future, what is the so what factor of that for our security interests? The AQ training camps are elsewhere now. The money still flows to the global Jihadists from the Middle East, and while very one likes to point to Saudi, that is not the only "friendly" Middle Eastern nation sending millions of dollars to these Jihad wackos. As Peters' stated, Afghanistan is the wrong war, wrong place, wrong time (it wasn't in 2001/2002). Afghanistan was the geographical center of gravity for Al Qaeda at one time, that is no longer true, and the problem has morphed into a problem set much larger than Al Qaeda, and much larger than Afghanistan and Pakistan, so maybe we should take Peters' advice about the audacity of realism one step further and review our entire strategy to counter Islamist extremism.

[Ron Humphrey]

My questions - did he leave anything out? Is his view to narrow, too broad or just right?

Best, Rob

That said I do wish he would have given more weight to the fact that despite many of the considerations he brought forth, in the end there is very much a certain level of requirement to do something.

The fact that so much is out of wack and could be approached differently doesn't change the reality of a need to do something. We are stuck looking for the best of bad solutions because at least for now that seems to be all thats available.

To do what needs to be done right will take a lot more time, and dedication of govt resources then we are likely to see anytime soon. It also doesn't help that so many of the "things" going on here contribute greatly to the perception of our ability to accomplish things over there.

Perhaps that would be something to really focus on. Third, fourth order effects of words and actions here on our ability to speak and act on the international front.

[Old Eagle]

I love Ralph like a brother.

BUT a coupla points --

Ralph's rant on killing all the Sunnis in Iraq, while thought provoking didn't bring much to the fight.

What British experience is he talking about? 19th Century?

During my tour, I met too many Afghans who really want a chance to break out of the cycle of war, poverty and exploitation. I remain convinced that they can make a difference if we give them even a modicum of support. At the same time we do need to help them keep from making the same mistakes our erstwhile Vietnamese allies made -- trying to maintain a thugacracy/kleptocracy when, in fact, real change was needed.

As usual Brother Peters presents us with a great point of departure for a meaningful discussion.

[Ken White]

Looking at Ralph's option, I think:

- Best: Agree but would continue development

- Good: In the first place 'we' told them we would not do that * and in the second the OTH bit won't work.

- Poor: Agreed.

- Worst: Agreed.

Strongly agree with gh_uk

Also agree with Bob's World -- we're getting wrapped up in the minutia as we are entirely too prone to do...

* Thus I also agree with Ron Humphrey:

"...in the end there is very much a certain level of requirement to do something...Third, fourth order effects of words and actions here on our ability to speak and act on the international front.

Add to that Old Eagle's comment re: what many Afghans want and consider the facts that we said we'd not abandon them and we need to restore the credibility of our words internationally -- that IMO, is a bigger hit on us with many than all the media rhetoric stuff -- and that the Afghans are just like anyone in else in that they will take every handout they can get and ask for more; that they will fix things in their interest when it can be shown that it is indeed going to be a benefit. They respect honor, pride and strength -- and we must show them that taking all you can get is ultimately counterproductive. They are not likely to come up with a strong central government but I believe they'll come up with something that works for them. We have opened a window for them to improve their situation. It is up to them and not up to us what they do with that opening. We should not try to sort it for them , we simply should continue to hold that window open for a bit and encourage but not push them to get it sorted.

I'm bothered that we are dispatching 17K more troops and as yet have no announced goal. That's why I believe Ralph's "Best" option is an excellent idea until we sort out what we're trying to do.

[davidbfpo]

Here is a link to the article, which took awhile to locate on USA Today:
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/...ty-o.html#more

(Added later) This article, far longer, is more helpful, but no options given: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...illafranca.pdf

Old Eagle: the comment on the UK's experience is: 'As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can't be profitably occupied or liberalized'. IIRC on SWJ there is a comment akin to "You only rent Afghan loyalty". Don't overlook there was a substantial minority, in the cities, that supported reforms before the Soviet intervention; some of whom fought with the Soviets and many emigrated - I suspect far more stayed put.

IMHO the British / Imperial history is as relevant today as then; why? Simply Afghanistan appears to have changed so little and has a strong conservative culture.

The current approach IMHO is dangerous and vulnerable to sudden changes in public opinion. I cite the tiredness of the Canadian and Dutch in support i.e. time to go.

davidbfpo

[George L. Singleton]

The ignore the opium, kill the terrorists statement.

I agree with killing the terrorists, but do not agree with ignoring the opium. That would be a huge mistake.