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Thread: Design for military operations

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    Default Design for military operations

    At the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 96 SAMS students, faculty and contractors recently finished a six week experimentation period using “design” to approach military operations. Students from the US Armed Forces, USAID, FBI and international militaries applied design theory to future scenarios templated in CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM. The design principles concentrated the student’s efforts not on solving “the” problem, but first on defining the “correct” problem set and developing a methodology to manage the environment through application of all elements of national power. The most recent experiment took the design efforts and focused on producing information to be used by planners. The interface for designers and planners in this case was a campaign directive.

    If the GWOT is a problem set, and we have been dealing with it as a government for nearly eight years, perhaps design is a useful approach for military leaders.

    I would like to hear from the SWJ community, many with experience in developing campaign plans, about what might be a useful product for planners from a design team. I would also appreciate engaging in a dialogue about the utility of design in general. Links to two recent Military Review articles about design are posted below.

    Thanks,
    Dave

    http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art015.pdf

    http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art016.pdf

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    These are very interesting papers, thanks for posting the links.

    From a USAR perspective accessibility to this type of training, availability of infrastructure (hardware and software) needed to bring this back to the unit so that geographically dispersed staff/units can use it (cloud computing - ako based?), and structured real world case studies/training packages for 'train the trainer' type situations are the first things that come to my mind.

    Effective operationalization of these concepts will require that active and reserve military (officers/warrant officers/ncos) and our other DIME partners have access (I noted that the 1st article mentioned that DIME personnel to include contractors attend SAMS).

    I enjoy many of the CALL products due to their practicality, accessibility, and teach-ability: Battalion Planning Process (No. 07-3) and others seem to reflect a familiarity with some Operations Research concepts. Perhaps CALL would be a vehicle for some of the products from this proposed process?
    Sapere Aude

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question As with Surferbeetle I was really intrigued by this

    Quote Originally Posted by DaveDoyle View Post
    At the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 96 SAMS students, faculty and contractors recently finished a six week experimentation period using “design” to approach military operations. Students from the US Armed Forces, USAID, FBI and international militaries applied design theory to future scenarios templated in CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM. The design principles concentrated the student’s efforts not on solving “the” problem, but first on defining the “correct” problem set and developing a methodology to manage the environment through application of all elements of national power. The most recent experiment took the design efforts and focused on producing information to be used by planners. The interface for designers and planners in this case was a campaign directive.

    If the GWOT is a problem set, and we have been dealing with it as a government for nearly eight years, perhaps design is a useful approach for military leaders.

    I would like to hear from the SWJ community, many with experience in developing campaign plans, about what might be a useful product for planners from a design team. I would also appreciate engaging in a dialogue about the utility of design in general. Links to two recent Military Review articles about design are posted below.

    Thanks,
    Dave

    http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art015.pdf

    http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art016.pdf
    My initial response was -yipeeee
    unfortunately followed by the realization that I have absolutely no idea what it would actually equate to by the time it works its way through all the levels required to really utilize it on a larger scale.

    I have the greatest confidence that those serving in todays military would be able to do amazing things if given the chance to really design COA' s and look at operational environments in a learning environment such as presented.

    The question that's still eating at me is can we actually get ourselves or those in the political realm to let the reigns that loose. Although it might not seem that risky up front; when those at the top start getting the kind of input that would result it may seem a lot less controlled (or perhaps better stated- risk averse than they might be comfortable with)

    IMHO it is where we really need to be but having spent a lot of time trying to look at it from every angle its likely to have some big fans and some pretty important leaders not so excited about it.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    We've actually been applying design at USSOCOM for about a year now in the Strategy Division, and not only is the command allowing us tremendous freedom of intellectual maneuver, the products that we have developed are having a major impact far outside out Command. The Chairman, other GCCs, Key Partner Nations, throughout the interagency community.

    Not everyone agrees with everything, but that is the point. It is driving new discourse, and breaking down some of the long held, misconceptions of what we are dealing with and how to move forward from here.

    We do not follow some rigid doctrinal approach to design, but have combined elements of a variety of proposed processess out there. In simplest terms it insert a step in the front end of Mission Analysys that takes a holistic look at what exactly the problem is that you have been asked to address, and how it really functions, and then through that understanding being able to better see second and third order effects from various COAs, and also to be able to better advise the commander.

    Takes MDMP out of the hands of the intel guys focusing the effort on a very threat-centric approach right up front. That part doesn't go away, it just has a better context to understand how that "threat" fits into the larger system. Often the solution lies somewhere other than by targeting the "threat" directly.

    We met with a couple of the SAMS seminars and left some products with them to help them grasp this new concept. They were getting a lot of "you have to always bring the Commander answers." With Design, often you bring him questions as well. And that's a good thing.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey View Post
    The question that's still eating at me is can we actually get ourselves or those in the political realm to let the reigns that loose. Although it might not seem that risky up front; when those at the top start getting the kind of input that would result it may seem a lot less controlled (or perhaps better stated- risk averse than they might be comfortable with)

    IMHO it is where we really need to be but having spent a lot of time trying to look at it from every angle its likely to have some big fans and some pretty important leaders not so excited about it.
    Good point. Some old Prussian General actually wrote about this a good deal. Can't remember his name, but he produced a book that dealt with this very issue. Carl something, I think...
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    Default USSOCOM Design

    Bob's World posted - We've actually been applying design at USSOCOM for about a year now in the Strategy Division, and not only is the command allowing us tremendous freedom of intellectual maneuver, the products that we have developed are having a major impact far outside out Command.

    Where does the Strategy Division fit within the staff and how often do you interact with planners?

    Also, when you say "outside the command" are you referring to IA partners? Are they finding design opportunities more acceptable than JOPP and MDMP planning tools?

    Thanks,

    Dave

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default We're in the J56

    Quote Originally Posted by DaveDoyle View Post
    Bob's World posted - We've actually been applying design at USSOCOM for about a year now in the Strategy Division, and not only is the command allowing us tremendous freedom of intellectual maneuver, the products that we have developed are having a major impact far outside out Command.

    Where does the Strategy Division fit within the staff and how often do you interact with planners?

    Also, when you say "outside the command" are you referring to IA partners? Are they finding design opportunities more acceptable than JOPP and MDMP planning tools?

    Thanks,

    Dave
    We are quickly becoming the foundation for everything the command does, and probably work with the planner as much as anyone. They have been using design as well within their shop as they attack revisions on the various plans we work.

    As to interaction with the interagency community, they really like our products, we don't spend a lot of time talking about the process that got us there. I think you'll find that Army planners even withing the military are way more wrapped around the axel on process than other military planners (did you do it right over did you get a good result), and civilian planners much less so again.

    My one fear as TRADOC works to codify this "art" of war process, that they inadvertantly squeeze the life out of it in converting it to a repeatable "science." Guard against that, please. This is definitely something where it is far more important to apply some broad concepts than to rigidly execute a specific process.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Default Problems

    From the stand point of Systems Analysis/System Engineering, I've got some problems with the papers cited. It could simply be the way concepts are expressed/presented, but I don't think so. As an example, in the second paper, the concept of "Reframing" is discussed:

    "Reframing is an intellectual activity to identify new opportunities and overcome obstacles to progress when interactions with the real world situation or new sources of information reveal issues with a current problem. Reframing shifts attention from trying to solve the current problem right to asking whether the right problem is being solved. It is a way for designers to pull back and reassess the operational environment, allowing them to challenge their situational understanding and review expectations of actor behavior against the evidence.12 When operators consciously and critically select theories and hypotheses that help to structure their view of reality, they gain the freedom to operate beyond the limitations of any single perspective." (Emphasis added.)

    Asking whether your tackling the right problem should be done at the beginning. (That's pretty much old school SE 101.) If you wait until you're trying to implement a solution, or in trouble, you're already screwed.

    The intent is solid. But there look to be some serious tweaks needed in the implementation. I'd suggest a DTIC search on "Missions and Means Framework." I think it will give a much more solid starting point, and one that dovetails with some other activities.
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    Default Reframing

    J. Wolfsberger,
    The reframing offers the design team opportunities to re-examine the problem set throughout the effort. Attempting to get the best picture of the problem set early is important, but the reality is that in almost every case the design team is not going to get it all the way right at the beginning.

    Reframing happens throughout the design effort and gives the team the chance to see what has changed in the environment. Simply studying the environment changes it, and if the organization introduces any energy into the environment or system then it definitely changes.

    Reframing does give the design team the chance to consider measures of performance and measures of effectiveness during the process. We have had difficulty getting this realistically accomplished in our experiments, so it doesn't seem that we've fully tested the feedback loop.

    I'll check out the DTIC search and see what it brings up. Thanks for the recommendation.

    Dave

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    Default Reframing, product vs. process, and the Army Planner

    Dave et al,

    I am a US Marine attending SAMS with Dave. Reading through this thread, I have just a few comments on some things that I found interesting.

    First, I would like to second Dave's description of reframing. Of course we need to ask the question if we are looking at the right problem in the beginning of planning as stated by Mr. Wolfsberger. But once you apply a solution, you have to evaluate the system you applied it to see the results. Those results help answer the question if your initial problem is still valid, or if a new one has presented itself. The situation continually changes within the action, reaction, counter-action cycle. Reframing is simply taking a holistic viewpoint of the situation within each step of this cycle.

    The second thought I would like to comment on comes from "Bob's World". Specifically,

    We do not follow some rigid doctrinal approach to design, but have combined elements of a variety of proposed processes out there. In simplest terms it insert a step in the front end of Mission Analysis that takes a holistic look at what exactly the problem is that you have been asked to address, and how it really functions, and then through that understanding being able to better see second and third order effects from various COAs, and also to be able to better advise the commander.

    I think this misses the point of design. In my humble opinion (backed up by MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and MCDP 5 Planning, design is not a process or a step to be added to MDMP, MCPP, JOPP or any other planning process. Instead, it is a MINDSET. It is nothing more than considering as many variables and factors that affect the ability for a unit to MANAGE, not SOLVE, complex adaptive problems. If you could understand and solve a complex adaptive problem, then I posit you were faced with a problem that was neither complex nor adaptive. Bottom line, I believe the Army is trying to "doctrinalize" a thought process/problem management methodology into an MDMP process. I don't think this is the right approach.

    This leads to my third point. Yes, I think Army officers focus way too much on developing a product, and are slaves to the processes that produce them much more than the other services. It's a cultural thing that I have gotten over a long time ago (this is my fourth resident Army school). Does it affect the Army's ability to plan and manage problems? Absolutely not. Does it make coming to a solution much harder than it had to be? Absolutely yes. Whether you climb over a wall or run into it as hard as you can a hundred times over, you eventually get to the other side....

    But what do I know? I'm just a dumb Marine tanker.....

    S/F,
    John

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    Link to another thread that is related to Design and Systems Analysis as it relates to the GWOT or any Violent System.



    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...7990#post67990

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    Default Good Post

    Quote Originally Posted by USMCTanker View Post
    Dave et al,

    I am a US Marine attending SAMS with Dave. Reading through this thread, I have just a few comments on some things that I found interesting.

    I think I get what your saying.
    If you take any situation and examine it you always have three known points and one unknown-
    Where you were, Where you are, and where you want to be

    What actually happens has to constantly be adjusted to in relation to the last(where you want to be). This may be where design methodology actually comes in most useful since it generally helps one to do what you speak of

    Instead, it is a MINDSET. It is nothing more than considering as many variables and factors that affect the ability for a unit to MANAGE, not SOLVE, complex adaptive problems.
    as to that last part

    Quote Originally Posted by USMCTanker View Post
    But what do I know? I'm just a dumb Marine tanker.....

    S/F,
    John
    Considering what it takes to do your job not sure thats possible
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I'd noticed that...

    Quote Originally Posted by USMCTanker View Post
    ...I think Army officers focus way too much on developing a product, and are slaves to the processes that produce them much more than the other services. ... Whether you climb over a wall or run into it as hard as you can a hundred times over, you eventually get to the other side...
    and you even used my simile...

    Er. Well, almost. I do usually specify 'brick' for the wall -- process thing, I guess

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    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by DaveDoyle View Post
    J. Wolfsberger,
    The reframing offers the design team opportunities to re-examine the problem set throughout the effort. Attempting to get the best picture of the problem set early is important, but the reality is that in almost every case the design team is not going to get it all the way right at the beginning.

    Reframing happens throughout the design effort and gives the team the chance to see what has changed in the environment. Simply studying the environment changes it, and if the organization introduces any energy into the environment or system then it definitely changes.

    Reframing does give the design team the chance to consider measures of performance and measures of effectiveness during the process. We have had difficulty getting this realistically accomplished in our experiments, so it doesn't seem that we've fully tested the feedback loop.

    I'll check out the DTIC search and see what it brings up. Thanks for the recommendation.

    Dave
    I seem to be stuck in a rut of expressing myself poorly.

    I should not have come across as critical of reframing - it is a Good Thing to rethink the problem, see if it's changed, reevaluate whether the solution you're executing is still effective or even appropriate.

    What I was driving at was the situation, which I have to contend with way too often, of poorly structured and understood problem statements. The most common issue I've encountered over the years is solving the wrong problem.
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    Dealing with the desgin issue in developing the Navy's Maritime operations Center concept, there are several points I think need to be brought out. USMC tanker gets to one with his point about the design "process" vs "mindset" (I might use "philosophy"). The more well structured a problem, the less difficulty there identifying hte problem and moving to attacking the solution. The more ill-structured the problem, the less amenable to systems engineering solutions and more one needs to "manage" (I would use "evolve") a solution.

    The USMC criticism (I can't find the Marine gazette article ...but there was one recently) of "operational design" and the "Commaders Appreciation and Campaign Design" pamphlet seems to be rooted in the idea well stated by USMCtanker

    "It is nothing more than considering as many variables and factors that affect the ability for a unit to MANAGE, not SOLVE, complex adaptive problems."

    I think that is on the face of it a true statement. The problem comes in defining what "manage" vs "solve" means. Looking at the types of issues that an operational level Echelon II -III command faces, we have found that different mission situations can have different scales of "structuredness".

    An ASW problem may be "moderately well structured" at the operational level, where the problem of protecting assets from adversary submarines is fairly straight forward - while the tactical level tasks that deter or seduce, or distract or engage particular adversary submarines becomes a very ill-structured, information poor problem.

    MIO on the other hand can be an operational-level ill-structured problem, trying to ferret out the fact that you think someone is trying to "get lost in the noise" of busy shipping lanes, that you do not have near enough assets to fully seach. Without piecing together and parsing out who may be of interest, you don't know who to apply the straighforward tactical solution of boarding and search to.

    In both cases, I would argue, no current doctrine in any service adequately offers concrete "best practicces" to perform the "management" of illstructured problems. While the USMC criticsm of CACD and "Design" I think has a point that the "problem requiring design as a solution has been framed poorly" - i don't think that necessarily means that design is not the answer to a slightly dofferent problem - that of how to "manage" ill-structured problems.

    This management infolves a "design" that includes not just "the fron end of a good planning effort" but a cyclical and iterative approach that one can argue is implied in some current doctrine (like the MCWD on "Campaigning"), I have not found anything that "completes the circle" in a holisitc fashion that includes the posibility of "nested" degrees of structured-ness in a problem, and how you integrate the managment of such a problem set - "mess of interconnected problems" from planning, to execution, to assessment, back to replanning - all within an framework that includes an explicit "mental model" of how tasks acheive desired effects and are assessed to advance toward a desired endstate.

    WE state in numerous places that that is what we want commanders to do - but we say very little on HOW they are to proactically accomplish it.

    So we have a situation where we tend to take "messes" of interconected problem sets of various degrees of "structured-ness"; abstract much of the complexity out in order to "simplify them for flag-level briefs"; then solve the remaining well structure problem through heirarchical decomposition of objectives into MOEs and MOPs, which we spend enormous manhours collating and scoring, but then simply "add up" and abstract again into stop-light charts or thrmographs that (in at least one occasion i saw personnally) summarily changed by senior leadership before being shown to the commander.

    To me the "design philosophy" indeed is "what good planners should be doing" - but in the over a dozen exercises and experiments I've seen in the last 5 years, we just don't do - at least in training.

    The design philosophy ensures that one "builds in" explicit "theories of action" to quote one of the papers above - a mental model of how causes (tasks performed) translate in effects achieved - too often we rely on "correlation equals causality" - or worse - "we are doing a lot of activity, therefore we are accomplishing what we intend".

    Design philosophy - whether a precursor "step" or whether integrated into planning and assessment needs to be explored in the maaner inwhich the SAMS folks are doing. We can argue about where to "hang" it in doctrine once we have a better undersatding of what you actually do to "manage" a complex problem set. But should not throw the idea out becasue of a disagreement over where it belongs.
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    I get concerned any time I see the military re-purposing a fairly well understood field of study and then referring back to internal military documents to support contention. The Air Force has produced some worthy documentation on systems analysis and design. I understand the scope of what is being attempted is further afield than simple mechanical, electrical, hydraulic systems. That does not mean the fairly well understood principles from engineering design will not serve.

    It seems like two field of study are being mixed; design and decision science.
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    IMO we are just learning that you can manage a "Process" but there is no "End" to it, you can improve the process but when you deal with living systems there is no end to reach at least as long as the system is alive.
    This is why I hate the term War On Drugs. Crime involves people and as long as people are alive you will have crime. There is know "End" or "Solution" to it, but you can certainly improve the LE process that controls or dampens the "Criminal Process". This has huge implications for COIN type operations.

    In the case of wicked problems the process is more important than the end. And just as criminals will adapt so should the COIN/LE control process. It needs to be deigned from the start with the ability to adapt and recognize that "Continuous Improvement" is the only thing that you could really say is the "End".

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    Former Member George L. Singleton's Avatar
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    Default All comments here are forward looking...

    ...Since USSOCOM is mentioned, the Strategy Division, a little background and "what we did" that may, or may not, be helpful re Doctrine & TTPs.

    As a formerly (reserve) Purple suiter, organizationally we were the wargamming section of J4 of the old US Readiness Command.

    We hired civilian programmers and our team, made up of active duty and reservists, all services, sat down with the design programmers to think tank existing war plans for the Folda Gap (sort of a dead item today) and Korea, among others.

    Our biggest problems came from an Army Major General (active duty) who hated computers and limited exercises combined with computerized wargamming...which back then we did at Ft. Lewis, Washington, later we moved the war gamming center to Hurlburt Field, FL.

    Our problem was "fixed" by retiring the General, and as we changed over from being USREDCOM into USSOCOM we brought in reservist US Coast Guard folks onto our formal computer driven wargamming team.

    Civil Affairs was a key driver and decision tree maker...considerations of
    (1) if we go into X country (2) what do we upset and how do we replace it to keep basic necessities going on such as power, water, sanitation, etc. (3) Whatever we do for ourselves for medical care, how does this compliment or how could it improve X nation's existing, or virtually non-existing health care.

    Civil Affairs (to include unique religious considerations as could/would/did impact intended operations inside or of the nation to be invaded) would have been theoretically mapped out within the existing political process. How the displaced government would be reformed and a new government plan with some reusable indiginous government officials kept on hand to keep continuiting in basic operability of services, police/security services to try to maintain a semblance of law and order, etc. was a basic ingredient of our wargamming/planning.

    The biggest problem we used to have (I hope this is resolved today) was lack of in common C4, communications, both among our own branches of the service and with and among our allies. The Grenada war experience was a huge C4 black eye for us. I had just joined USREDCOM as a reservist only a couple months before Grenada happened and was promptly thrown into the CAT and then tasked to do the after action report for the J4, then Brigadier General (retired as a Lt. General) Sam Wakefield, USA.

    Yes, this is an oversimplified commentary. But, basics of who, what, and where to go into any foreign nation with a civil affairs plan that is nation specific instead of generic...was all to often the problem for us using largely Army "standardized" plans...I hope civil affairs and overall planning is much done much better and more specifically today as you younger guys carry the ball.

    We eventually formed computerized wargamming teams from within old USREDCOM/replacement USSOCOM and did team wargamming studies on site with USCINCLANT to focus on strategic and tactical air, land, and sea factors (focused then on the Folda Gap from the beaches of France, Holland, etc, inland). I individually did wargamming visits and field exercises with FORSCOM, focused on the drug wars in Latin America. You guys have a "world" of plans to improve, create from scratch, whatever.

    To me, sitting back and taking the know it all arm chair coach viewpoint, people have to know and understand people to be effective. Trying to make sense out of the archaic, tribal chaos of Afghanistan is tough. Ditto the tribal areas of northern Pakistan.

    I concur or agree fully with the sharp point that the Army gets too caught up in trying to standardize the planning process, when today's world begins with unconventional warfare, stateless fighters, and our traditional concepts and "process" are as often as not destructive instead of being constructive.

    Which I why I wrote recently here on SWJ that being loose and improvising is "the" key ingredient today, not so much old style "by the book." It is damn hard to codify chaos.

    Sorry for the long input, but lessons learned does sometimes help, even if just in a ballpark, generalized fashion as is offered here.

    Bob, as you are in USSOCOM you have the good experience now of working with the SEALS whose use in Afghanistan has broken new ground for a formerly parochial water based outfit.
    Last edited by George L. Singleton; 03-17-2009 at 02:03 PM.

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    As someone who is headed for SAMS in the summer, I've been trying to get smart on "operational design" the last few months, and am taking an elective at CGSC to understand the current theory in greater depth and detail before SAMS.

    So far, and please, please, please correct me if I'm wrong, this is what I've been able to discern from "operational design":

    1. Frame the problem(s) associated with a specific potential conflict
    2. Have a wide focus on the problem, do not limit yourself to military threats, but incorporate history, ethnicities, culture(s), political entities, tribal issues, religious issues, etc...
    3. See what problems are easily solvable by military force, what problems are not easily solvable by military force, what problems are unsolvable by military force and what are the conditions for success in each scenario (perhaps an endstate, perhaps not)
    4. Identify issues that require other elements of national power that must be integrated with the campaign
    5. Pass the design over to the planners so they can develop plans for the forces involved in the campaign

    This is probably an oversimplification of the theory...can someone (preferbaly a SAMS attendee or graduate) add any other insights?
    "Speak English! said the Eaglet. "I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and what's more, I don't believe you do either!"

    The Eaglet from Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland

  20. #20
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default "Systemic" vs "systems" is the key to design

    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    I get concerned any time I see the military re-purposing a fairly well understood field of study and then referring back to internal military documents to support contention. The Air Force has produced some worthy documentation on systems analysis and design. I understand the scope of what is being attempted is further afield than simple mechanical, electrical, hydraulic systems. That does not mean the fairly well understood principles from engineering design will not serve.

    It seems like two field of study are being mixed; design and decision science.
    http://www.operationaldesign.net/default.html

    “A key distinction is that the Cold War-era use of systems engineering to solve problems no longer works. In order to effectively deal with the increased levels of complexity that we are now faced with today, we need to adopt a more robust method for understanding our environment, with all the inherent relationships, tensions and barriers to security, so to develop well thought out, adaptive solutions to the complex problems that we face.”


    BG (Retired)
    Huba Wass de Czege
    June 18, 2008


    More about understanding a problem vs a more linear systems targeting process. Why something is vs how something is. I'll need to dig up a more official definition to help clarify.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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