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Thread: Design for military operations

  1. #101
    Council Member Polarbear1605's Avatar
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    Default Yep!

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    This is a good example of why I think Combined Arms is really selection of the Main Effort. The War started as the ME being the Air Force and once they were finished with all they were going to be allowed to do, the ME switched to the Army/Marines for the ground offensive. Maybe Boyd had his fingerprints on it, but is was Warden's hands that planned it
    Regarding the main effort … true, it started with the air and then switched to the ground. Now…and I don’t want to take anything await from General Warden…because the air campaign was very good…and extensive. (I still remember a B-52 strike waking me up in the middle of the night the second or third day of the air campaign and the strike was almost a 100 miles away. As a grunt getting ready to “cross the line” into Kuwait, I was probably yelling the loadest to “Do that again!”) … but here are the “buts”… the Air Force PR machine kicked in right after the war…with little analysis. They had perfect air superiority and could bomb whatever they wanted with very little risks for 35+days…the Iraqies and Sadam did not give up …it still took a ground attack to do that. It also took some effort for the ground guys to get the Air Force to stop bombing the bridges of Baghdad and start bombing the Iraqi artillery in front of the supporting attack (2 Marine Divisions+) just before the ground attack. The “Effects Based” bombing also had its issues…for example, we could be easily accused of a major war crime when we took out the Iraqi power grid with the justification of paralyzing their command and control…(lets ignore the fact that most command centers carry their own power generators). What no power meant, was no fresh water (no power, no pumps)…no fresh water meant disease …we about wiped out a generation of Iraqi kids. The numbers vary greatly but the smallest ones I saw were significant. http://www.cesr.org/downloads/waterundersiege.pdf
    BTW…Boyd was there (at CENTCOM) physically and helping with the planning.

  2. #102
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    Regarding the main effort … true, it started with the air and then switched to the ground. Now…and I don’t want to take anything await from General Warden…because the air campaign was very good…and extensive. (I still remember a B-52 strike waking me up in the middle of the night the second or third day of the air campaign and the strike was almost a 100 miles away. As a grunt getting ready to “cross the line” into Kuwait, I was probably yelling the loadest to “Do that again!”) … but here are the “buts”… the Air Force PR machine kicked in right after the war…with little analysis. They had perfect air superiority and could bomb whatever they wanted with very little risks for 35+days…the Iraqies and Sadam did not give up …it still took a ground attack to do that. It also took some effort for the ground guys to get the Air Force to stop bombing the bridges of Baghdad and start bombing the Iraqi artillery in front of the supporting attack (2 Marine Divisions+) just before the ground attack. The “Effects Based” bombing also had its issues…for example, we could be easily accused of a major war crime when we took out the Iraqi power grid with the justification of paralyzing their command and control…(lets ignore the fact that most command centers carry their own power generators). What no power meant, was no fresh water (no power, no pumps)…no fresh water meant disease …we about wiped out a generation of Iraqi kids. The numbers vary greatly but the smallest ones I saw were significant. http://www.cesr.org/downloads/waterundersiege.pdf
    BTW…Boyd was there (at CENTCOM) physically and helping with the planning.

    Didn't know for sure if Boyd was there but I had suspected it. Warden retired a Colonel. Yes the AF machine kicked in and there were certainly problems with the targets, what most people generally don't know is less then 50% of the targets from Warden's original plan survived the cut list. There were and may still be articles about taking down the electrical grid and the problems and some of the advantages it provided.

  3. #103
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Polarbear1605 View Post
    and what he is presenting are the elements that ensure you are the winner in a very competitive environment.
    I do not agree. I do not think Boyd accurately or usefully understood what creates success in combat. If he did, he could not explain it in a coherent way.
    My only defense here is to review the bibliography of Patterns in Conflict…it is extensive.
    For insurance purposes I have just had to catalogue my library. I have about 20+ meters of bookshelf space on military history, theory and thought. Not saying I know more than Boyd.
    Surprise is very important but I see much more in that statement…it is an entire system that (by US organizational standards) encompasses everyone from the President and Combat Commander to the squad leader and down to the individual Marine/Soldier.
    Yet from Korea to Somalia that coherency and understanding was noticeably lacking. I see no good evidence that Boyd really understood the linkage between Policy, Strategy and tactics.


    Your right…and I should not use the term Boyd Theory, it is way too sexy and fashionable. Let’s call it what it is “A Discourse on Winning and Losing”.

    Specifically, he observes that we went from a war of movement to stagnation and discusses the reactions to that stagnation, its exceptions and what worked and didn’t work in those reactions via infiltration and guerrilla tactics.
    Yes but he cannot explain why, and his observations are inaccurate. He completely side steps why "infiltration" often fails, and why the British system of operations developed in 1917, persisted, successfully, into the 1950's.
    Were you conned or did you have bad teachers?
    Bad teachers, like Boyd. I was Boyd Groupie from 1985 onwards. In about 2004, I realised I had been conned.
    It is exactly that statement that convinces me that attrition warfare does exist. In my mind, attrition warfare is trading resources with the enemy knowing (or at least hoping) you have more resources than you opponent.
    That is merely mutual attrition symptomatic of any sustained engagement of closely matched enemies. It is not a "Style" of Warfare. The Battles of Trenton and San Jancinto leveraged surprise. They were not distinct in tactical style. Surprise works. Its not a style.
    It does work…Grant in the Civil War and as you stated the British (and American) counter-attacks at the end of WW1…but I also think that the historians of Verdun would also think that it does not works.
    Which credible historians? The MW crowd cherry pick history and ignore the any of the facts that undermine their theory.
    MW contains no technique or idea that defines it as unique of distinct.
    To do that it has to invent stuff that fails to withstand rigour - Recce Pull being a good example.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  4. #104
    Registered User Fred Bernh's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I do not agree. I do not think Boyd accurately or usefully understood what creates success in combat. If he did, he could not explain it in a coherent way.
    I would say it could be useful to put Boyd's works, as well as Lind's MW handbook and so on, in the right historical context. It is my understanding that MW grew up mostly in the late 70's - early 80s in contrast with the Revolution in Military Affairs. From this perspective, it is well true that it does not represent, per se, something new in the military thinking panorama, but at least it helps kicking the .... of the war-zero-defect, manager-officer RMA supporters by promoting the human factor as still the core of the combat proficiency of an Army. And this fight is still on, right?
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-17-2010 at 07:00 PM. Reason: Fix quote

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