Regarding the main effort … true, it started with the air and then switched to the ground. Now…and I don’t want to take anything await from General Warden…because the air campaign was very good…and extensive. (I still remember a B-52 strike waking me up in the middle of the night the second or third day of the air campaign and the strike was almost a 100 miles away. As a grunt getting ready to “cross the line” into Kuwait, I was probably yelling the loadest to “Do that again!”) … but here are the “buts”… the Air Force PR machine kicked in right after the war…with little analysis. They had perfect air superiority and could bomb whatever they wanted with very little risks for 35+days…the Iraqies and Sadam did not give up …it still took a ground attack to do that. It also took some effort for the ground guys to get the Air Force to stop bombing the bridges of Baghdad and start bombing the Iraqi artillery in front of the supporting attack (2 Marine Divisions+) just before the ground attack. The “Effects Based” bombing also had its issues…for example, we could be easily accused of a major war crime when we took out the Iraqi power grid with the justification of paralyzing their command and control…(lets ignore the fact that most command centers carry their own power generators). What no power meant, was no fresh water (no power, no pumps)…no fresh water meant disease …we about wiped out a generation of Iraqi kids. The numbers vary greatly but the smallest ones I saw were significant.
http://www.cesr.org/downloads/waterundersiege.pdf
BTW…Boyd was there (at CENTCOM) physically and helping with the planning.
Originally Posted by Polarbear1605
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