SOCOM and the CIA

[COMMAR]

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.



Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.



It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.



SO the MARINES went Proactive. In '02 they signed the MOA that established Joint Ops w/ SoCom & re-established the by then defunked USMC-SoCom Board which was supposed to meet every 6mths since SoCom's inception.

In '03 the Marines tried to get ahead of the proposed Composite Strike Force by Proposing another MOA that was a Proof of Concept for a Test Unit that would prove its MSPF Concept as capable of filling this role, which became DET-1.

HQMC was not however originally looking to begin a New Command under SoCom or turn over any forces, but just establish that its MSPF was as or more capable of running various Spec Ops as any Tier II Force and therefore should be competitive for all High Priority T-II Missions.

This was constantly repeated by the Commandant when asked if the Corps was trying to create a new SOF & his answer was, "The Marine Corps does not like Headquarters on top of Headquarters." & that "Present relationships were fine". This was echoed by Rumsfeld who repeatedly stated he had to literally force the Marines hand.



You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

SoCom was not going to sign off some of its future Global Hi-Pri Missions to Marine units they don't control & disbands every 18mths & is not totally dedicated to S-O; they won their arguement.

The Corps was determined not to permanently lose its Marines & have an Operational Structure that put other(Traditional) Marine Units in a position to play a part in future SOF Missions; they won theirs.

There's more detail to it but that about sums it up.


I could go on & on from here but would rather just go back & forth.



Also___ The Idea that the Corps was after SoCom's money is baseless, its really something that gets batted around on Discussion Boards then PARROTED until it becomes GOSPEL.

The USMC is asked by Congress every yr to greatly expand its budget but it declines. Could they use more money, sure, but that ignores the long history of fiscal discipline the Corps is known for. There've been some exceptions for some must have big ticket items, but even that was few & frugal compared to the other services.

This move was about Policy, plain & simple.

[George L. Singleton]

Simplistically said the Marines were a very important, hinge component if you will, of all the war gamming plans and exercises I helped develp and run for old USREDCOM...and our field exercises coupled with computerized table tops run as one total process for any single classified exercise worked well with the Marine Corp.

Can you imagine a non-rated USAF Reserve Colonel giving a Marine Corp Artillery Major training and guidance on battle field resupply of various types of artillery shells to keep all his tubes of various caliburs in action in a heavy exercise? I did, and somehow, it worked. That was the kind of interservice, active and reserve (I was an Individual Reservist with REDCOM/SOCOM to be clear once more) we had then.

[ODB]

[MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

But later you argue:

You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......

Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.

It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.

This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.

[George L. Singleton]

From only an arm chair nowadays I agree with your general observations about creating what we already have and could use in our forces structure.

It pained me to see the US Marine Reserve Artillery unit at the Bessemer, Alabama armory converted into what amounts to an MP unit for use in Iraq several years ago.

There was and still is a mission and need for Marine Corp field artillery. If the DoD wanted and wants MPs then use MPs or ask for volunteers to cross train to be MPs from all branches of the service, regular, reserve, and guard.

[ilots]

.....The reason we don't use it is both that our messages are truthful and it serves no useful purpose. .....

As another PSYOP'er I would respectfully, yet strongly, disagree. MSGS & PSYACTS are not always truthful - not even on the strat-side. Unfortunately, this idea has been further propogated by IO in recent years. PSYOP must not always be truthful, BUT it must always be credible. There is a distinct difference. Deception operations are difficult to conduct when you are only able to be truthful... however, they are fairly easy to conduct after you have used truth to establish credibility. That said - unfortunately, credibility is a rare currency; once spent it may or may not ever be earned back.


On a side & pet-peeve note, this is just one more reason that PSYOP day-to-day should be as far away from PA, Command Info, & (dare I say it) even IO as possible - but that is another topic.

[COMMAR]

But later you argue:


Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......

No... nothing I explained above had anything to do w/funds, but had to do w/the USMC(as a whole, not MSOF) positioning itself, due to DOD policy shift, to remain the In-Extremis Force of Choice in lew of a SOF TF.

A very complex relationship, expecting no direct MAGTF relationship to the T-SOC's CT goals, but indirect in involvement thru 1) MSOC association & 2) improved relations due to the renewed USMC-SoCom Boards including planned institutionalization of USMC-SoCom/GPF-SOF Joint Training Excercises.

This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.

Well thats the thing, they didn't re-create anything, b/c MarSoc as a whole & the MSOC's in particular (when complete) will provide an Fwd Dep'd Expeditionary capability unseen in Tier II SOF.

Which is something mentioned in SoCom's Official Report done on DET-1 by the JSOU & authored by SEAL LtCmdr Mark Divine.

This was the whole purpose of providing the DET in the Proof MOA. To pre-empt development of a composite SOF unit fr/being Fwd Deployed at sea, inwhich SoCom would've been Recreating the wheel.

The Corps was saying, "Hey, we already do that. If you need to see it, here's what we can do." Hence MOA Proof of Concept... DET-1.

The DET, which I mentioned before, was based off a MEU(SOC)'s MSPF a Mini Self-Sufficient/Contained Expeditionary Task Force comprised of DA/SR, Intel(HumInt & Sig) including a Deep Battlespace Strategic Ground SigInt capabilty (RRT), C2, Fires & Air Deconfliction, Support, etc.

The report stated the DET demonstrated a Direct Action & Reconnaissance capability on par w/ Tier 1 SMU's and that the MSPF regularly deploys w/ support only seen in SMU TF's.

Singled out was the Intel units, who while only comprising 3% of the Intel assets slated for the CJSOTF in Iraq during that 6mth time period provided over 29% of the CJSOTF's Actionable Intelligence.

etc, etc, etc...


But thats off subject...

SoCom liked what they saw, & the USMC saw an opportunity to dig into SoCom's MISSION pie(MAGTFs by assoc. w/MarSoc), NOT their MONETARY pie; & positioned themselves accordingly.







In other News:
This is a very complex issue that can't be viewed by down talking unit contribution as simply copying or not copying.


MarSoc's overall planned capabilities can't be gauged by missions run in A'stan to date...

B/C without its planned TF Enabler Structure in place(still growing) & w/its Global Transpo (ARG/MEU Ships), doing squares off the Kuwait coast b/c the MEU is dry docked as the Iraq Theater Resr'v; MarSoc's not in a position to take up its planned role as an Fwd Dep Expeditionary strike force & therefore seperate itself in your eyes.

It is however gaining valuable time learning its new command's(SoCom) Op Structure & TTPs before operating Independently in the near future.





W/that said, I'd say it'd be about another 1-2yrs before you see MSOC's doing what they were actually designed to do.

[Schmedlap]

The reason to separate covert action from intel is to avoid contaminating the intelligence and policy to the maximum extent possible...
I am not suggesting that seconding personnel with appropriate expertise to my covert action agency would be wrong... seconded personnel often develop a loyalty to their new organization...
Bottom line is that I think we can do much better than the current arrangement. Intel consumers should not be their own analysts.

Regarding the hybrid career paths for SOF/CIA mentioned earlier in the thread, it seems to me that allowing 18F's and certain WO's to run the hybrid path would help to bring out the positive aspects of the "seconded personnel" dynamic while familiarizing the military and CIA with one another. Maybe they worked together better than I got the impression they did, but I sensed a fair amount of friction between the SOF and CIA (and other) organizations in Iraq. My impression was that it was the result of a clash of organizational cultures. Some hybrid career paths could smooth this out, imo.

If limited to 18F's and WO's, I'd think that this could also avoid the danger of intel consumers being their own analysts. To the extent that an 18F is already an intel analyst consuming his own analysis, it doesn't seem that the hybrid career path would exacerbate this.

[John T. Fishel]

policy and doctrine were clear: PSYOP was not deception - that was an intel op - and our messages were always to be truthful (although, as I said before, not always the whole truth). My former CIA buddy confirmed that in his day, they followed the same doctrine and policy differentiating between a psyop and deception op. Things may well have changed since I left even the periphery of the PSYOP community in 1992. If they have, I am greatly saddened Otherwise, I generally agree with your point on separation but with the following caveat: At the command level, there needs to be coordination so that the right had knows what the left is doing and doesn't undercut the other.

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

I agree with you. I do think that the separation of function is required at the strategic level and to only a slightly lesser extent at the operational level. At the tactical level - which I think you are really talking about - there really can be no such separation. Nor is there in the tactical military world.

Cheers

JohnT

[ODB]

Think I'm getting COMMAR. The gist of things is that they will some day fill that void, but like most of us today, are not being utilized properly. This is the first time I've heard of them being a forward deployed strikeforce, then that may lead into another conversation to have elsewhere. Only time will tell how they end up being utilized. Thanks for putting things into perspective.

[ODB]

Regarding the hybrid career paths for SOF/CIA mentioned earlier in the thread, it seems to me that allowing 18F's and certain WO's to run the hybrid path would help to bring out the positive aspects of the "seconded personnel" dynamic while familiarizing the military and CIA with one another. Maybe they worked together better than I got the impression they did, but I sensed a fair amount of friction between the SOF and CIA (and other) organizations in Iraq. My impression was that it was the result of a clash of organizational cultures. Some hybrid career paths could smooth this out, imo.

If limited to 18F's and WO's, I'd think that this could also avoid the danger of intel consumers being their own analysts. To the extent that an 18F is already an intel analyst consuming his own analysis, it doesn't seem that the hybrid career path would exacerbate this.

What about that agency guy who wants his time on an ODA? We know how these games are played, we are letting some of your guys do this, so now some of our guys get to do that. If that happens, everytime you go into some country, that country will be playing "Let's see if we can guess which one is the CIA guy."

A lot of that friction is caused by trust or lack there of. Creditability is a huge one as well. Matter of fact this is how a buddy of mine got blown up. They get told to go clear an area that the CIA swears is full of Taliban. My buddy and his team were just there 3-4 days prior. They go out, stand on the exact grid, CIA tells them they can't be in the right spot. On the way back out they hit an IED, kills everyone in truck except my buddy. Now let's look at that:

1. The ODA had already been there recently, the CIA didn't take the ODA's intel on the location.
2. The ODA goes to the exact spot and because there is nothing there, CIA tells them they can't be in the right location.

Yes, trust and crediability! There are a number of reasons for the friction, and we'll leave it at that.

[Ken White]

1. The ODA had already been there recently, the CIA didn't take the ODA's intel on the location.
2. The ODA goes to the exact spot and because there is nothing there, CIA tells them they can't be in the right location.

Yes, trust and crediability! There are a number of reasons for the friction, and we'll leave it at that.

to relationships between Army units, between SF units, between Army and SF units -- and, most damaging, it particularly applies to the intelligence and reconnaissance business and reports by almost everyone involved in those efforts...

That is not only unfortunate, it also too often gets forgotten by too many who are unwilling to trust others. Caused by a bad combination of too much ego and too little self confidence, usually.

[Schmedlap]

What about that agency guy who wants his time on an ODA?

I was thinking more along the lines of him working at the JSOTF, as a member of the JSOTF, rather than what I saw before - CIA working in coordination with, but not as a member of, the CJSOTF.

A lot of that friction is caused by trust or lack there of. Creditability is a huge one as well.

I think this can be addressed with greater hybridization, not with less, especially in light of the experience you recounted. That's not to say that hybridization is the final or only answer. It seems to be "a" way.

[ODB]

my best to articulate here where a lot of that friction is generated. By nature type-A personalities clash. Pride and egos run rampant among these two entities. Agree Ken, it is among all. In the case between SOF and CIA a lot of that is home grown. Guys leave the SOF community after a few years and go to the agencies (won't limit it to one 3 letter agency). They then end up back in country with an even bigger head, the ground branch ones are usually the worse. What you don't see is that 35-50 year old prior SOF guy, you see that mid 20's guy with an over inflated ego. On the flip side you may get that book geek who hasn't experienced much outside his office until that point. Yes you get the overinflated SOF guy ego as well. I don't think hybridization is the answer, I think it lies in training. Knowing who you may be working with, building those relationship. Don't get me wrong like everything there are good and bad, some I'm still in contact with today after years. Honestly from my stand point my business is about building personal relationships, if I can't do that among my own how can I with local nation people. It's a people business.

The one thing out of all this that I'm still debating in my mind about the two blending into one is the utilization of SF as the ground branch. Would like others thoughts and insights on that.

I have had multiple thoughts, discussions and the like on this whole report, haven't made up my mind yet, but becoming more territorial by the day.

[ODB]

Doing a helluva lot of Googling these days, will get back with more questions in a few days. Some bold statements but researching.

[George L. Singleton]

As this discussion has gone on longer than I would have expected I guess I am going to have to file my claim for CIA equivlaent grade pay for the rank of First Lieutenanat I held during my tour of duty with the old US Embassy in Karachi...where I worked with...you might say on detail...the CIA Team Chief and his Deputy the last half of my 18 month tour of duty as the 1964/1965 India-Paksitan War with preamble... then conflict came on us...resulting in part of my work...the 6937th Evacuation Plan being used by mid to late 1965 when all hell broke loose impacting our base at Badabur, suburban Peshawar.

Let me see, GS-9 or GS-11 pay, with retroactive compound interest....just might help repay me the cost recently of putting our three now in their mid-20s children through two college degrees each!

[jmm99]

George brings up a practical point about lateral transfers and pecking order.

For example, at DoS Legal Advisor's Office, quite a bit of flexibility exists on lateral transfers:

Attorneys are paid according to the General Schedule for Federal employees. For recent law school graduates with less than 1 year of relevant legal experience, the standard appointment is at GS-11, step one. Candidates with at least one year of experience, such as judicial clerks, will be appointed at GS-12, step one. Non-government laterals are appointed at the grade level (up to GS-15) and step that they would have earned had they joined the Office directly from law school. On a case-by-case basis, we may be authorized to compensate a newly appointed attorney with “superior qualifications” at a higher step level. Attorneys at the GS-11 level may be appointed at up to step 10 in their salary grade. The possible step increase varies for the higher grades. Salary levels for laterals from other Federal agencies are based on their current grade and step.

This policy hasn't changed in 40 years - DoS LA was simply the best USG hire because it had to compete with the I Law firms.

If you were making a lateral move to LA from the "right place", you would take a $ hit, but not a hit in level of responsibility. In fact, LA probably would provide a higher level of responsibility than at the firm. Then, if later you made a lateral move back to the "right place", you would not be penalized for your stay at LA. In fact, time spent at LA in effect counted as time served in the firm - with no future promotion issues in the firm caused by that (in fact, it could be a plus).

So, while I am not necessarily a fan of what seems to be proposed, the issues of pecking order status, preservation of seniority and pay (probably the least issue in the short run) seem to loom large.

Is there a brave soul out there who can give us a chart comparing military grades with the GS grades ?

-------------------------------
For one man's view of how the CIA and SOF cultures co-operated - and clashed - in norther Iraq, Sam Faddis' book, Operation Hotel California, is interesting.

[Ken White]

Here are the substantive rank equivalents (scroll down to Paragraph 4):

LINK.

Basically, a GS 11 equates to a Captain, a GS 12 to a Major, a GS 13 to a LTC and a GS 14 or 15 to a COL, only in the SES to you get to FlagO equivalents. Note there can be and often are local variations due to position. I personally do not believe Civilians should rate Military personnel but they do and I had to rate a slew of LTC and even two COLs. No problems in spite of my reservations. Even got a Senior Rater profile on Captains and Majors...

For pay equivalents, Google the Military and Civil Service pay charts though they don't tell the whole story. You can pretty well figure pay comparability by the substantive rank. We're too material a society not to do it that way.

[jmm99]

Thanks for the link and its chart. Also helps on the reverse match-up between FS and GS grades.

[COMMAR]

Think I'm getting COMMAR. The gist of things is that they will some day fill that void, but like most of us today, are not being utilized properly.

Yeah something like that.

Here's what I know from talking to some guys fr/ my old unit Small Craft Co who are now in MARSOC & general reading. Nothing OPSEC Sensitive just basic info thats already been released in various papers & articles.

When MARSOC was first signed into existence it was considered a 5yr build to duplicate DET-1 plus some. They said they can do it in 3 which would put them at the start of FY 10 this October '09.

This was considered a multi-year build & not a straight turnover b/c it had to grow the type of personnel needed on the support side.

Reconnaissance Men & Grunts for the DA/SR & FID missions the Corps had out the wazoo to transfer, but they needed to grow the "Special Operations Mission Enablers", not just transfer over some maintenance guys to support Spec Ops.

Thats what one of things that set DET-1 apart, every member fr/ the Admin Clerks to the Topographic Intel guy was cross-trained in Direct Action & Special Reconnaissance.

You had 30 Reconnaissance Men plus another 70 SR/DA trained Enablers who could individually attach to the 5 man DASR tms & enhance any mission by allowing the DET to Task Organize to the specifics of whatever mission came their way.

Fast Foward, since the new MARSOC had Recon guys and the guys fr/the FMTU(MSOAG) readily available, you don't sit them out until everything else is ready, you use them.




Dec. 2008 (FY 09) MarSOC's Training Pipeline, starting w/the 7mth ITC, opened to All MOS's. The Individual Training Course teaches DA/SR, Operational FID, Light Infantry Tactics, Advanced Medical & Fire Support, among other skill sets.

This is the move that will allow the MSOC's to transition into the planned Expeditionary role.

It is Baseline training for all deployable MarSOC Marines before moving into MOS specific training; but for the most part, unlike other SOF, your previous MOS will determine your parent unit:

-Meaning if you were Recon B4 MarSOC your headed to the MSOBs.
-If you were a Combat Engineer, Intel, Comm, ANGLICO, etc. your headed to the MSOSG.
-An Infantryman your headed to the MSOAG.

The MSOAG & MSOC's will break into 14 man deployable MSOTs accompanied by Enabler Detachments.

Tactically the pipeline is nothing the Recon guys haven't seen before, but much like the SFQC that it closely resembles, its very Operationally & judgement focused-- March '07.



To illustrate how this will eventually look w/the MSOC's are two excerpts fr/ an article showing how it looked in the DET.

Lost in the shuffle
Det 1’s combat record showed it could stand out among spec ops, but the Corps cut short this unit’s stellar story

By Gidget Fuentes
May 01, 2006

...Tensions were flaring in the Iraqi town of Kut as insurgents took over key buildings in the city along the Tigris River south of Baghdad.

An Army Special Forces “A” team, supported by a small detachment of Marine Air-Naval Gunfire Liaisons (ANGLICO), had been working with the Ukrainian military, which was holed up in its base when insurgents overran the local police station.

Over five days in August 2004, the “A” team fought from its safe house, taking casualties before it requested support from headquarters.


That call for help went to a highly trained team of leathernecks who, at the time, represented an experimental unit that marked the Marine Corps’ official foray into the world of special operations forces.

Enemy fighters had taken over key parts of the city, “and we had to get it back. So we just helped the SF guys out doing that,” said Master Gunnery Sgt. Charles Padilla, the senior man and recon team leader.

“We got there just in the right time.”

Within hours and under cover of night, a 16-member team from Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 — including reconnaissance scouts, snipers, fire-support coordinators, communicators and radio recon operators — flew from its base near Baghdad to a nearby strip and worked its way into the city. The Marines arrived around 1 a.m. and linked up with Special Forces.

For one week, Det 1 and the Special Forces “A” team operated together, pulling security for local officials, taking the high ground around the city and river to provide cover and directing aircraft to strike buildings housing insurgent fighters.

When an Army Stryker brigade combat team arrived days later, Det 1 stayed to help quell the insurgents and plan the eventual retaking of the city before heading to Najaf, which was teeming with insurgents.

The men said it was a seamless blend of skills and high-tech capabilities that the Army units, including one battalion commanded by a Ranger-trained officer, welcomed with open arms.

“They just used us as if we were another one of their teams,” Padilla said, adding that without the Det’s capability to control and synchronize fires, and do command and control, “the Stryker battalions would have went in blind.”

The Det team’s accomplishment, repeated in similar fashion during the intense battle for Najaf later that month, is among the highlights of a combat deployment by an experimental unit that has stayed off the public’s radar.

Det 1 broke ground June 20, 2003, as a “proof of concept” designed to see whether Marines should become part of U.S. Special Operations Command. The Marines, who numbered 102 when they deployed, jumped into intense training before leaving on schedule in April 2004 for Iraq to a six-month deployment that, by most accounts, was successful in proving the Corps should have a seat at SOCom’s table of Army, Navy and Air Force commandos.



...Det 1’s strength, said its commander, came from the unique way the group organized itself around battlefield functions: maneuver, communications and control, fires, force protection, intelligence and logistics.

Along with the headquarters element, the Det comprised of a reconnaissance element, which included four five-man recon teams; a fires liaison element, which included two fire liaison teams and air controllers; and a 30-member intelligence element, which included radio reconnaissance, human exploitation teams and fusion cells.

“All functions can be executed in one grid square. We can do everything — all the intel process, high-end communications and everything,” said Col. Robert Coates, the Det’s commander. “We were fielded with emerging technologies that allowed us to do that. And you combine that with hard feet and strong backs, which made us very versatile and a force of choice on the battlefield.”



...In August 2004, the Det got a tasking order to support conventional forces fighting in Najaf. It would use its enabling capabilities to support the Army battalions, Marines and Navy SEALs poised to fight in the holy city.

“What they got was a full spectrum of battle-space capabilities,” Coates said.

Army and Marine forces battled militia forces loyal to radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, fighting amid the tight urban confines of the Old City and through expansive cemeteries.

U.S. forces fought their way in to encircle the gold-domed Imam Ali Mosque, a sacred Shiite shrine. It was the first major battle for the then-fledgling Iraqi government, which had assumed control two months earlier.

Padilla and the Det’s sniper team coordinated fire support, which included AC-130 and helicopter gunships, working closely with 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, of the Army’s 1st Calvary Division. Organized teams with snipers went several blocks forward of the friendly lines for observation, and the team integrated fires, air support and strikes and communications while heavily engaged, supporting the conventional forces.

“The snipers kept them down in the day, and fires kept them down at night,” Coates said. Some logged “kills” as far as 1,300 to 1,400 meters away.

With a communications architecture that provided “unheard of” amounts of bandwidth, the Det was able to reach back to its intelligence cell, which provided advanced imagery, data, signals intelligence and other products that the Marines were able to hand to the conventional forces to fight the fight.

“They got intelligence products ... that they had never, ever seen before,” Coates said.

“When we showed up, the maps they had were like the maps you buy at a gas station,” said Master Sgt. Ryan Keeler, the communications chief. “We sent back requests, and a day later ... we were able to print them off and take them to the field and also take them to the conventional units we were supporting.

“They couldn’t believe the photo imagery that we were able to get, one block over.”

For more than a week, “Kilo,” Keeler’s radio call sign, became a known voice among the air controllers and pilots hanging over the besieged city.

Keeler recalled that one day, as he caught a few precious hours of sleep after an intense night directing fires, an Army colonel he didn’t know went up to him and kicked him awake.

“So you’re Kilo,” the colonel said to him.

It seemed the colonel just wanted to pass along his thanks. “We put a lot of rounds downrange and put a lot of people out,” he recalled.

The Det left the city several days after a cease-fire was called. It was surreal, seeing insurgents they had been fighting now walking the streets. “It was like the rats coming out,” Padilla said.

I'll have to go thru my old papers to give you the titles of alot of the papers and articles dealing w/ the overall concept of usage for the deployable units.

The personnel will be very interchangeable not so much of a static difference like SEALs to SWCC or SF & Rangers, they plan to have the ability to be very mix & match across MarSOC units to build Task Specific tms when in theater along MOS lines.