SOCOM and the CIA

[ODB]

he also notes that it takes time to build SOF people

He does but I took it to be tinged with sarcasm:

What makes SOF special? The short answer to this question
is: carefully selected, highly trained personnel that can conduct
challenging missions that often exceed the capabilities of
general purpose forces. However, the rigorous and lengthy
selection, assessment and training required to create SOF has
a downside: small force size. A truism within the SOF community is that special operators cannot be mass-produced. (Bold for my emphasis)

I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."

Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

I cannot agree with the shifting of forces focus as well. When one looks globally, Russia is awakening, Central/South America are running right up there with ME, so I personally do not see reorganizing focus as a good thing.

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
• MARSOC is a recent addition to SOCOM
• Still not fully stood up
– Currently at around 1500 personnel
– Building to 2600
• Will eventually consist of three primary elements
– Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups (MSOAGs)
• Formerly know as Foreign Military Training Units (FMTUs)
• Focus on FID
– Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs)
• Organized into deployable companies that focus on DA and CT
– Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG)

Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

[Uboat509]

Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

Nowadays? This is hardly a recent phenomenon. Everybody wants to be John Rambo when they join SF. Most adjust to the reality of what we do. Some don't. Some don't have to.

SFC W

[ODB]

Nowadays? This is hardly a recent phenomenon. Everybody wants to be John Rambo when they join SF. Most adjust to the reality of what we do. Some don't. Some don't have to.

SFC W

Find it funny when I ask a guy after his 4-5 years in the Army, why he is getting out and they reply "SF isn't what it use to be"......... We are our own worst enemy.

What I was referencing in my previous post are those "color" guys.

[George L. Singleton]

..who is Air Force but enjoyed the purple suit world, I think the SOCOM/CIA interoperability is already there and works just fine.

In days of yore (mid-1960s) the US Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan CIA In-coountry team was headed by a CIA pureist or careerist, but his Deputy was a retired Navy Commander (05) who had been a pilot.

As the then USAF Liaison Officer for the US Base at Badabur, Peshawar, in the NWFP part of Pakistan (then West Pakistan) the National Secuity Council was our uppermost command structure. We had CIA involvement with our U-2 survelliance site associated with our base, as well as Army Security Agency involvement with our USAF Security Service communications (over the horizon communications intercept intel)... across the Arabian Sea in several North Africa nations we had related Naval Intel field sites (small, communications related) as well.

History repeats itself, people are forever trying to feather and refeather their career and economic nests by various forms of mixing and matching. Nothing new here, really.

I do like the role and good work which the Navy SEALS have as a key part of USSOCOM, but the Army and Air Force Special Forces play equally important integrated and inter-related roles also.

You youngsters know today's structure and world of SF, etc. much better than us old coot retirees so I will shut down. But, history repeats itself, we hope for the good, but not always is that the outcome.

[William F. Owen]

..who is Air Force but enjoyed the purple suit world, I think the SOCOM/CIA interoperability is already there and works just fine.

I concur from the stand point it seemed to work just fine back in the 1960's and with the NSA as well. I know at least 3 old SOG guys who went to work for "civilian SF" and then went back on the Teams. Of course everyone knows the sad story of George Bacon!

[Boot]

He does but I took it to be tinged with sarcasm:



I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."

Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

I cannot agree with the shifting of forces focus as well. When one looks globally, Russia is awakening, Central/South America are running right up there with ME, so I personally do not see reorganizing focus as a good thing.

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.



Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

I'm not a MARSOC apologist or even part of them. I did serve in Force Recon back in the 90's. From what I was told by some, one reason for MARSOC was to get the DA and more importantly Deep/Distant Reconnaissance specialty of Marine Recon. Also remember the Marine Corps back in the eighties opted not to send anyone to USSOCOM as it feared it would lose those assets to USSOCOM. Fast forward to the 2000's, Det 1 was tested under NSWG and was very successful however was DA not FID or the such. The Marine Corps had the opportunity to become part of USSOCOM and opted for it, so now you have MARSOC. We now have our SOF, which wasn't the case with Marine Recon as it wasn't a USSOCOM asset, even though Force Recon was pretty comparable to other SOF type organizations. I know from speaking to some there, they are constantly evolving and I don't think the final version of MARSOC has shown itself. Hope this helps.

Boot

[ODB]

My initial thought was what are we trying to do now. But after thinking about this off and on all day, I started to come around. I can see the benefits on both sides, if (and that's a big if) both sides played together right. As I looked from a historical perspective, IMO the two have complimented each other quite well in the past and to some degree the not so distant past. May be more of the same issues all organizations are currently going through. Seems many think they are inventing some new great thing, only to realize it has exsisted before, but was forgotten. I'm still digesting the full report and may think differently afterwards.

Additional thought is that maybe we aren't thinking a big enough change. Bring all of the services SOF and the National Level Assets into one organization. Part of the problem with multiple entities is the inner fighting and trying to prove their worth over the next, what if we did away with this issue? Might be too bold of a move and rub quite a few people wrong along the way, but would the endstate ultimately be more effective Intel/Operations?

Boot, thank you for the historical perspective, sheds some of that light I was looking for.

[Uboat509]

This whole thing is a symptom of the idea that if one is good then two must be better. If closer cooperation between SF and all the various Intel agencies is good (and it is) then actually assigning ODAs to one or more of those organizations must be better (it is not).

There is some discussion of this over at PS.com. BLUF while there is certainly overlap between what SF does and what the civilian Intel agencies do, they are not interchangeable. They have very different missions, very different cultures and very different pools of manpower that they draw from.

SFC W

[John T. Fishel]

on original sin. "Once upon a time" , COL William O. Donovan, Coordinator of War Information was granted license by Pres FDR to create a full blown intel agency. Donovan borrowed a great deal from the British but concluded that having a separate intel collection/analysis agency (MI6/SIS) and covert action/paramilitary agency (SOE) was inefficient so he combined the capabilities in the OSS. This "original sin" was incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947 when the CIA was created. It has been, IMO, responsible for all sorts of mischief such as the Bay of Pigs, among other dumb ops.

Fast forward: The Intel Reform Act of 2004 did not rectify the original sin. So, combining military SOF with CIA will likely compound the error. What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE. I would also keep it separate from SOCOM although there could be much work done together under an OPCON authority.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

on original sin. "Once upon a time" , COL William O. Donovan, Coordinator of War Information was granted license by Pres FDR to create a full blown intel agency. Donovan borrowed a great deal from the British but concluded that having a separate intel collection/analysis agency (MI6/SIS) and covert action/paramilitary agency (SOE) was inefficient so he combined the capabilities in the OSS. This "original sin" was incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947 when the CIA was created. It has been, IMO, responsible for all sorts of mischief such as the Bay of Pigs, among other dumb ops.

Fast forward: The Intel Reform Act of 2004 did not rectify the original sin. So, combining military SOF with CIA will likely compound the error. What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE. I would also keep it separate from SOCOM although there could be much work done together under an OPCON authority.

Cheers

JohnT

Agreed, John T. We went through an episode of this in the 1980s. I researched and wrote about some of it in the 60s and again in the 70s in the Congo/Zaire. It also tends to give CIA its bifurcated personality although completely as part of that comes froom the clan side.

Best
Tom

[zenpundit]

"What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE"

Not all paramilitary covert ops should look like a raid by Delta Force. Sometimes- maybe often -the government might want a very quiet and unobtrusive operation that while requiring a limited use of paramilitary skills to be done quietly by people who have plausibly blended into the environment. That blending requires the sort of cultural/in-country familiarity of experienced collections personnel or diplomats.

For that reason I'm not sure that rigid organizational separation is a great idea unless you intend to also slide ppl with the right experience into place.

Sort of like they are talking about in the news article.

[COMMAR]

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.



Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.



It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.



SO the MARINES went Proactive. In '02 they signed the MOA that established Joint Ops w/ SoCom & re-established the by then defunked USMC-SoCom Board which was supposed to meet every 6mths since SoCom's inception.

In '03 the Marines tried to get ahead of the proposed Composite Strike Force by Proposing another MOA that was a Proof of Concept for a Test Unit that would prove its MSPF Concept as capable of filling this role, which became DET-1.

HQMC was not however originally looking to begin a New Command under SoCom or turn over any forces, but just establish that its MSPF was as or more capable of running various Spec Ops as any Tier II Force and therefore should be competitive for all High Priority T-II Missions.

This was constantly repeated by the Commandant when asked if the Corps was trying to create a new SOF & his answer was, "The Marine Corps does not like Headquarters on top of Headquarters." & that "Present relationships were fine". This was echoed by Rumsfeld who repeatedly stated he had to literally force the Marines hand.



You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

SoCom was not going to sign off some of its future Global Hi-Pri Missions to Marine units they don't control & disbands every 18mths & is not totally dedicated to S-O; they won their arguement.

The Corps was determined not to permanently lose its Marines & have an Operational Structure that put other(Traditional) Marine Units in a position to play a part in future SOF Missions; they won theirs.

There's more detail to it but that about sums it up.


I could go on & on from here but would rather just go back & forth.



Also___ The Idea that the Corps was after SoCom's money is baseless, its really something that gets batted around on Discussion Boards then PARROTED until it becomes GOSPEL.

The USMC is asked by Congress every yr to greatly expand its budget but it declines. Could they use more money, sure, but that ignores the long history of fiscal discipline the Corps is known for. There've been some exceptions for some must have big ticket items, but even that was few & frugal compared to the other services.

This move was about Policy, plain & simple.

[George L. Singleton]

Simplistically said the Marines were a very important, hinge component if you will, of all the war gamming plans and exercises I helped develp and run for old USREDCOM...and our field exercises coupled with computerized table tops run as one total process for any single classified exercise worked well with the Marine Corp.

Can you imagine a non-rated USAF Reserve Colonel giving a Marine Corp Artillery Major training and guidance on battle field resupply of various types of artillery shells to keep all his tubes of various caliburs in action in a heavy exercise? I did, and somehow, it worked. That was the kind of interservice, active and reserve (I was an Individual Reservist with REDCOM/SOCOM to be clear once more) we had then.

[ODB]

[MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

But later you argue:

You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......

Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.

It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.

This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.

[George L. Singleton]

From only an arm chair nowadays I agree with your general observations about creating what we already have and could use in our forces structure.

It pained me to see the US Marine Reserve Artillery unit at the Bessemer, Alabama armory converted into what amounts to an MP unit for use in Iraq several years ago.

There was and still is a mission and need for Marine Corp field artillery. If the DoD wanted and wants MPs then use MPs or ask for volunteers to cross train to be MPs from all branches of the service, regular, reserve, and guard.

[COMMAR]

But later you argue:


Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......

No... nothing I explained above had anything to do w/funds, but had to do w/the USMC(as a whole, not MSOF) positioning itself, due to DOD policy shift, to remain the In-Extremis Force of Choice in lew of a SOF TF.

A very complex relationship, expecting no direct MAGTF relationship to the T-SOC's CT goals, but indirect in involvement thru 1) MSOC association & 2) improved relations due to the renewed USMC-SoCom Boards including planned institutionalization of USMC-SoCom/GPF-SOF Joint Training Excercises.

This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.

Well thats the thing, they didn't re-create anything, b/c MarSoc as a whole & the MSOC's in particular (when complete) will provide an Fwd Dep'd Expeditionary capability unseen in Tier II SOF.

Which is something mentioned in SoCom's Official Report done on DET-1 by the JSOU & authored by SEAL LtCmdr Mark Divine.

This was the whole purpose of providing the DET in the Proof MOA. To pre-empt development of a composite SOF unit fr/being Fwd Deployed at sea, inwhich SoCom would've been Recreating the wheel.

The Corps was saying, "Hey, we already do that. If you need to see it, here's what we can do." Hence MOA Proof of Concept... DET-1.

The DET, which I mentioned before, was based off a MEU(SOC)'s MSPF a Mini Self-Sufficient/Contained Expeditionary Task Force comprised of DA/SR, Intel(HumInt & Sig) including a Deep Battlespace Strategic Ground SigInt capabilty (RRT), C2, Fires & Air Deconfliction, Support, etc.

The report stated the DET demonstrated a Direct Action & Reconnaissance capability on par w/ Tier 1 SMU's and that the MSPF regularly deploys w/ support only seen in SMU TF's.

Singled out was the Intel units, who while only comprising 3% of the Intel assets slated for the CJSOTF in Iraq during that 6mth time period provided over 29% of the CJSOTF's Actionable Intelligence.

etc, etc, etc...


But thats off subject...

SoCom liked what they saw, & the USMC saw an opportunity to dig into SoCom's MISSION pie(MAGTFs by assoc. w/MarSoc), NOT their MONETARY pie; & positioned themselves accordingly.







In other News:
This is a very complex issue that can't be viewed by down talking unit contribution as simply copying or not copying.


MarSoc's overall planned capabilities can't be gauged by missions run in A'stan to date...

B/C without its planned TF Enabler Structure in place(still growing) & w/its Global Transpo (ARG/MEU Ships), doing squares off the Kuwait coast b/c the MEU is dry docked as the Iraq Theater Resr'v; MarSoc's not in a position to take up its planned role as an Fwd Dep Expeditionary strike force & therefore seperate itself in your eyes.

It is however gaining valuable time learning its new command's(SoCom) Op Structure & TTPs before operating Independently in the near future.





W/that said, I'd say it'd be about another 1-2yrs before you see MSOC's doing what they were actually designed to do.