Commonalities and lessons learned between gangs and insurgencies

[reed11b]

Army (and the rest of the DOD) are in need of taking a strong stance on not allowing gang members into the service. This could take the form of a zero tolerance for enlistment of individuals with gang tattoos. Also any finding of gang activity in the background check and discipline for anyone making gang signs in military photos. Current soldiers with gang tattoos would have to have them removed or be discharged. The Army managed to get ahold of the skinhead problem in the 90's, they can do the same with the gangs.
Reed

[Blackjack]

Army (and the rest of the DOD) are in need of taking a strong stance on not allowing gang members into the service. This could take the form of a zero tolerance for enlistment of individuals with gang tattoos. Also any finding of gang activity in the background check and discipline for anyone making gang signs in military photos. Current soldiers with gang tattoos would have to have them removed or be discharged. The Army managed to get ahold of the skinhead problem in the 90's, they can do the same with the gangs.
Reed

I think it does relate in a way Reed, and I agree about how the skinheads got cleaned up. I was in during the 90s' and my leadership nipped that stuff in the bud quick. There were 3 chapter cases in 1-21, 1 chapter case in 1-27, and 1 chapter in 2-14 withing the span of a month for being affiliated with neo-nazi punks. If the Army did the same thing with the other gangs and handled it like the skinheads the army would be a lot better off.


I do not know if Fort Hood can get a hold on its' Crip/Sur 13/MEchA/GD/La Raza problem though. There are other gangs on Fort Hood, but those two are the largest. I should take some pictures of housing here on Ft. Hood, specifically Commanche III housing area. The welcome signs are tagged with gang markings.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...ng_analogy.pdf

Terrorists Organizations and Criminal Street Gangs Analogy

Both street gangs and terrorist groups are non-corporate groups. They are not organized as formal (legal) entities, so group leaders operate in different environments and with different kinds of authority than do those in charge of corporate legal actor. As a different type of actor, street gangs and terrorists also have different sets of actions available to them. Both terrorist groups and street gangs often are self-identified, that is, legitimacy and identity are not conferred upon them by some external body (they do not need to be ‘recognized’ by a larger community in order to act) but rather are self-proclaimed. Membership in both gangs and terrorist organizations is an active proposition. One does not become a member by virtue of (e.g.) birth, ethnicity, or residency, although there may be exclusionary criteria (that is, there may be criteria which determine [in]eligibility for membership). Rather, one becomes a member through some voluntary act, some act of choice. Both types of groups (gangs and terrorist organizations) engage in criminal and, often, violent behavior. They thus operate in an extra-legal environment and maintain an adversarial relationship with peace-keeping interests.

The emphasis is mine, and while it may well be an emphasis of the obvious, it is the obvious that we sometimes seem to miss. All too often we portray the enemy as an organization like us (mirror analysis), and in some cases we have going as far as labeling their perceived leadership as their battlestaff, so we're looking for a node to kill (the battlestaff) thinking we're going to solve the problem. We have to understand this enemy in order to defeat him.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

A nice line:

We have to understand this enemy in order to defeat him.

That maybe the US Army way, it certainly is not the UK police approach and I suspect other police forces rarely 'understand' their enemy.

Police officers deal with what I'll call DCI Detail: information, intelligence and above all evidence. Sometimes they gain Context: the why and the setting e.g. youth unemployment rates impact on property crime. Rarely we gain Insight, partly as so little studying is done (in the UK); it comes from informants, the rare defector, analysis and networking.

This police methodology may explain the diverging viewpoints in the (London) Metropolitan Police's Special Branch (intelligence) and Anti-Terrorist Branch (evidence) which lasted years and more recently the differences between NYPD offices.

How do the model(s) you know Bill differ?

[Bill Moore]

David,

We're still striving to find models, we have a couple of not for public release models we're experimenting with and now the Army is starting to use, and soon the Joint Force will, the Operational Design model or method (not to be confused with the Systemic Operational Design SOD), which in my opinion could be adapted for law enforcement.

The experimental methods and operational design have promise, but the challenge is they require extensive talent (the right kind of expertise) and lots of manhours to compile. This hints at another reason we need to transform the force to deal with the types of threats we're dealing with today. Anyone who really thinks the nature of the threat hasn't changed is living in the past.

The Army isn't there yet, but they're moving in that direction. I'll see if I can find some useful links for you.

[slapout9]

Link to another thread on similar problem,see post #56


http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...7466#post87466