"... and Jagdkampf Forces." March 1983?

[kaur]

Wilf,

It's a nice idea, which briefs well, but it requires considerable planning, preparation and resources, which they were seemingly unaware of.

Planning, preparation and resources in what sense? Peacetime planning?

If you are looking to learn from their mistakes, you don't need to read the paper (which I have not, but I am very familiar with the ideas in general)

Your suggestion is ...? Patrol-based infantry?

I'm chaseing light infantry concept, that has integral poor man's CAS in the sense of precision indirect fire. Chechen urban concept machine gunner (7,62PK), marksman (7,62 SVD) and AT guy (RPG), seems suicidal in rural conditions (if you consider Estonian geography with wide open areas around main approaches).

[William F. Owen]

Planning, preparation and resources in what sense? Peacetime planning?

Both peace time training and operational planning. Large AT minefields need time to be laid, and deep gallery systems need to be built and packed with stores. Light infantry running around hiding in cellars is not really going to make much difference. They can make some sensible contribution, but it requires lots of engineer resources, and good C3I.

Your suggestion is ...? Patrol-based infantry?

Patrol based infantry is a training concept. Not really an operational one, though there are cross-overs.

More to the point, I am working on this very stuff, right now, so PM me and I'll tell you where I think we stand in terms of current best practice.

[Distiller]

The Austrian idea was quite similar to Werwolf/Gladio, just with regular light infantry. It was never executed on any larger scale, though, just a few locations in the eastern provinces and those safe houses and stores were probably betrayed to the Soviets the moment the plans were drawn up in the MoD. Austria was all leaky.

For such a concept to work one needs a lot of trust (political and personal) and resources, hiding MGs, ATGMS, MANPADS, mines, IED material, some com gear, &c all over the country. Techs/mechs are the primary target.

Plus do regular clandestine training for the folks. And beware of central data hording! Nothing above platoon level, maybe even squad level. Give the toys, but don't ask and don't tell. Don't bother about uniforms.

The Minutemen and the Swiss concept expanded into heavy infantry firepower. Put a Spike in your garden shack and the go-bag under your bed. Hamas showed in le sud de Liban that it's possible with guided missile technology. C2 is not an issue since everybody knows who the enemy is.

But in the case Bear vs the Baltics be prepared to take heavy non-combatant casualties as the Bear would without doubt retaliate against the civilian population. No need to tell you that, I guess. And then the problem with the 25 percent ...

[William F. Owen]

The Minutemen and the Swiss concept expanded into heavy infantry firepower. Put a Spike in your garden shack and the go-bag under your bed. Hamas showed in le sud de Liban that it's possible with guided missile technology. C2 is not an issue since everybody knows who the enemy is.

Hamas are not in the Southern Lebanon. That is Hezbollah, and the statistics clearly show they did not know how to use their ATGMs effectively. They managed to make a 90% effective weapon, 5% effective. C2 is critical. Nothing to with knowing who the enemy is.

Hezbollah tried to create an old style Soviet "Fortified Region," and failed to apply the training and C2 that is fundamental to making the idea work.

[kaur]

Distiller said:

Techs/mechs are the primary target.

In case NATO 5th article works I think the only target for local light forces should be those systems:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Engag...mozTocId687041

Tanks, IFV's, ships, temporary bases etc should be left to NATO air force.

This is just my humble opinion.

Ps I hope that NLOS Netfires is still alive after US budget cuts