From Gitmo to Taliban Command

[Anthony Hoh]

Wilfo,
I could not agree more, although the facts in these releases are usually skewed. I only see more of this as the President delivers on his promise to close GITMO. I believe in basic human rights and dignity, I continually argue with myself over how I feel about GITMO. One thing is for sure I dont feel that non-state actor combatants should be given the same rights and privileges under the law that a US citizen has. But I also know you cant lock'em up and throw away the key. I still dont understand why a military court is considered insufficient for alot of Americans when it comes to trying terrorists.

[jmm99]

AGR (detainee 008) has a long Gitmo record, which is summed by Wiki. His statement given in his CSRT hearing.

After his initial CRST hearing, there were three annual reviews. The first two (for which we have unredacted records) continued his detention. As to the third hearing, we have a nada record - everything is redacted; and soon after, he was released by Gordon England. From Wiki (footnotes 13-15 are in above link):

Third annual Administrative Review Board hearing

One January 9th, 2009, the Department of Defense published two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[13][14] The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on 2007-04-23. He was transferred back to Afghanistan on December 12, 2007.[15]

No MCA charges were brought vs. Rasoul. I am not aware of an individual DC habeas case - although he may have been included in one or more of the multi-detainee filings.

His release, based on the facts in Wiki, was solely the decision of the Bush administration in 2007 - motivated by ????

Based on the facts in Wiki, and comparing those to the habeas cases where Judge Leon found "enemy combatant" status, Rasoul most likely would have been found an "enemy combatant" by such as Judge Leon.

As the history of the Bush II Gitmo era becomes better known, I expect we will find more and more evidence of inconsistent policies in regard to the Gitmo detainees.

PS: Anthony - you may want to slog your way through this thread (started by David), which will answer some of your questions - and probably cause you to ask others.

[davidbfpo]

Below are two paragraphs taken from this longer general article (also on the main thread on these issues):

http:/Link broken, see below fix by JMM

'He might, as he insists, be innocent of any wrongdoing. But the risks of taking the protestations of innocence of a former Guantánamo detainee at face value have been graphically demonstrated this week by the revelation that another inmate, Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul, has re-emerged as one of the Taliban's most effective commanders in southern Afghanistan.

During the six years he was held at Guantánamo, Rasoul, now known as Mullah Abdullah Zakir, managed to convince his American interrogators that he had never held a military command, even though it turns out he was a high-ranking commander close to Mullah Omar, the Taliban's supreme leader. Rasoul was eventually released after claiming he wanted to return to his family and farm. British officials believe he is the mastermind behind the deadly surge in roadside bombings in Helmand since last spring'.

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

David, your link to the excellent Telegraph article was broken, so here it is.

I am shifting my discussion about Rasoul and others (since Rex has posted a related Canadian situation) to the main thread, which is now up to here.

[Culpeper]

Ah, what the heck. During the offensive to Baghdad the troops were forced to let nothing but military aged men dressed in civilian clothes continue to push south in the opposite direction; i.e. behind ally lines. This turned out to be a mistake. So, we let few guys go from Gitmo and they end up shooting and bombing again. What is the solution?

[jmm99]

from Culpeper
What is the solution?

A starting point is assembling the known evidence (I'm not talking CSI) and keeping it in individual dossiers that can be retrieved. However, the process from the field to the initial and later detention centers is one of separating the sheep from the goats. Some goats will escape.

Obviously, screening of 100000s of Iraqi Army types was not possible given the manpower (does PC demand "personpower" ?) employed in that operation. A lot of this depends on knowledge (intelligence) of the enemy going into the operation. Letting a Taliban officer buffalo and game the system is an example of lack of prior and later intelligence.

IMO: from reading a lot of these cases, is that the more serious omissions did not occur in the field, but with what was done after the detainees were initially detained - more than one case where evidence was lost or misplaced.