Debating defense priorities and expenditures

[Entropy]

I think this is a topic we'll be revisiting a lot this year, if early indications hold. Most of what I read is pretty typical and predictable, but this post I found quite interesting. An excerpt:

The reason Winslow Wheeler stands out as a perfect example of what is happening in the Defense debate today is because the Defense discussion under the Obama administration with Gates isn't about a future we are building towards, it is about meeting the obligations of a predeclared agenda. There is no shift in strategy that is recognizable under Gates, rather a shift in priority. Instead of debating what we need to meet the obligations of political leaders who call upon the military to do, well... just about everything, we are debating ways to save money. There is nothing observable that defense thinkers are working towards, and the predictable result is that everyone is digging in to push back against the pressures.

Personally, I think this observation hold some truth, but I also think it didn't just come about with the new administration - rather it's a "feature" of our defense policy debate.

And:

So what is the answer? The House and Senate appear content with the status quo of being told by the Navy how it is going to be. The Navy is forbidden to discuss the budget, which is clearly a tactic to insure as few tough questions as possible get asked regarding new plans. When a program is on track, justified, and on budget... populism is allowed to trump process. When a program is way off course, well, any number of reasons end up insuring continuation. How can money be the problem when processes are ignored and leadership is never held accountable? No matter how much the defense budget gets cut, the problem is still centric to people and culture, not money.

The defense budget fight looks like it's going to be a bloody one.

[Ken White]

Neither Galrahn or Winslow Wheeler seem to understand that the US defense budget perpetually has three huge millstones around its neck. Nor do most of the commenters at your link.

Congress must appropriate the money for what DoD wants and Congress prefers bases and programs that spread largesses about Districts to defense purity. Been that way since 1787 with only rare exceptions -- usually occurring only when there's a MAJOR threat or a major screwup -- and is unlikely to change.

DoD does not have the luxury of spending to support a 'strategy' -- that is a terribly misused term (often by a lot of folks who should know better) -- because our governmental system has never allowed such a creature. Politicians distrust the ideas of their predecessors and will force changes that impact any chance of a 'grand Strategy.' A lot of people have urged and are urging that we adopt such a creature -- not going to happen. Never has and the Cold War was not such an animal; there were dozens of strategies back than -- most not too swift.

Thus the services are forced to buy things Congress will support in an effort to be prepared for who knows what contingency and Flag Officers, like politicians, distrust their predecessors. Or just have a different idea about what is great and good...

Fortunately, we seem to luck out and get it pretty well right most of the time; as long as we're beating 50% I suppose that's good. It would be nice to get the percentage of good over about 60 or 70 though...

It's also been beneficial that most of the folks we've had to fight have been more goofed up and generally less competent -- some less wealthy -- than we are.

Add to those perpetual difficulties the old American psyche. I recall a German LTC talking about Kärcher's little portable Decon outfit: "The Americans will buy a few, engineer it for seven years until it doesn't work and then buy several thousand of that variant..."

Still, if we did not push ideas like the Zumwalt's, F-35, EEV and FCS, the technology would get pretty stagnant. As for the great COIN/HIC debate, we'll shuffle along doing neither well and it'll work out. I've become reconciled to the fact that no matter how badly the Politicians and Flag Os foul up, the Kids pull their fat out of the fire. Heck of a way to run a railroad (Hmmm, what happened to them??? ).

That seems to be the American way...

[Steve Blair]

I also found the commentary to be a touch short on any perspective about American history. Our external strategies (such as they are) tend to arise due to a perceived foreign threat, and they usually generate many offspring of widely varied practicality and viability. Those same strategies also sink into the ground as soon as the threat (real or otherwise) disappears...and we get yet another "peace dividend."

[Galrahn]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

[Ron Humphrey]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

And I note you didn't get the opportunity to share your informed input on the subject. I'm sure you would probably be able to contribute quite a bit to help the the yungin's like myself develop a more holistic frame of the debate.

Realizing your time may be limited I still have provided the Link for your perusal.

[SethB]

It isn't really a surprise that the Defense budget is going to get smaller. I say Defense because DOE will probably see a cut in its nuclear weapons budget.

Gates was a supporter of building new warheads, but I doubt that that will happen now.

The downside is that saving money without spending some isn't really possible.

If it were a goal, using a relatively small amount of money to replace some key equipment could reduce personnel, operating and maintenance costs. In 1996 the DSB released a report in which they indicated that aging equipment was increasing costs. The lasting quote was that "the tail is eating the tooth." We may be entering a period that has similar consequences.

Just cutting the amount of money coming in and not adding any new equipment is a good way to ensure that you reduce possible savings while simultaneously decreasing readiness.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I agree with you to a point, but at least during the Cold War there was a focus. Many (not all, obviously) weapon systems were designed with specific Soviet threats in mind, so the capability we were buying was a bit clearer then, IMO, and spending on those systems was easier to justify.

The same thing for numbers. We could look at the Soviets and come up with a rational basis for how many fighters or destroyers we might need in the case of a war. Certainly there were a lot of politics involved, but I think our war-planning and strategy informed those decisions much more than today, where there is no focus.

That lack of focus along with vague QDR's result in system where anything can be justified. The COIN/HIC debate is, I think, partially about differing views on what our post-Soviet focus should be. I think the result is that procurement decisions are more political than they once were. I can live with that to an extent (another "feature" of our peculiar system of democracy), but I think there will have to major changes to fix or ameliorate the broken development and procurement processes which are not providing enough value for our money.