Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
while we agree that Policy is indeed the driver, I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Very serious question.
I will look at it from the Navy's perspective, but I would argue an Air Force example could apply as well. To operate at sea, or in the sky, you require equipment. We can field light infantry on land without major technologies, indeed low tech light infantry rules in many parts of the world.

This technology requires long lead times for development and often will be utilized for about 2/5s of a century, meaning every technology decision shapes several generations. Even the JOE doesn't look out far enough to cover the life of a new program.

So I would argue strategy is necessary for effective planning, and also necessary for avoiding mistakes that can take time to develop and even more time to overcome. Policy isn't enduring because it changes. However, strategy is driven by policy so it is constantly changing too, which tends to reinforce your point.

But even with that said, I would argue the Navy's Surface Combatant 21 program, the DDG-1000 and LCS, is a failure not of policy, but strategy. The Navy's littoral strategy is severely flawed in several ways.

The Navy believed:

1) 14,500 ton ships could somehow be stealthy in populated maritime littorals.
2) Unmanned systems can replace manpower in complex human terrains, like the littorals
3) Speed is protection, as if a ship will outrun a missile

Policy, economic in nature, will almost certainly cancel the DDG-1000, but only to save money. The same economic driven policy may mean we build the LCS, not because it actually makes any sense as a technology for the littorals, but because it is relatively cheap as navy ships go.

Then we will spend more money later because the LCS can't do what it needs to do against littoral challenges, because the unmanned systems we have all over the sea allows us to either "shoot" or "watch." The absence of sailors prevents alternatives like "inspect" or "arrest."

If RoE prevents shooting, we don't secure the maritime domain, we watch it. In the end, policy drives future naval capability because strategy failed, and as a result was ignored...

Make sense?