Debating defense priorities and expenditures

[Ken White]

Neither Galrahn or Winslow Wheeler seem to understand that the US defense budget perpetually has three huge millstones around its neck. Nor do most of the commenters at your link.

Congress must appropriate the money for what DoD wants and Congress prefers bases and programs that spread largesses about Districts to defense purity. Been that way since 1787 with only rare exceptions -- usually occurring only when there's a MAJOR threat or a major screwup -- and is unlikely to change.

DoD does not have the luxury of spending to support a 'strategy' -- that is a terribly misused term (often by a lot of folks who should know better) -- because our governmental system has never allowed such a creature. Politicians distrust the ideas of their predecessors and will force changes that impact any chance of a 'grand Strategy.' A lot of people have urged and are urging that we adopt such a creature -- not going to happen. Never has and the Cold War was not such an animal; there were dozens of strategies back than -- most not too swift.

Thus the services are forced to buy things Congress will support in an effort to be prepared for who knows what contingency and Flag Officers, like politicians, distrust their predecessors. Or just have a different idea about what is great and good...

Fortunately, we seem to luck out and get it pretty well right most of the time; as long as we're beating 50% I suppose that's good. It would be nice to get the percentage of good over about 60 or 70 though...

It's also been beneficial that most of the folks we've had to fight have been more goofed up and generally less competent -- some less wealthy -- than we are.

Add to those perpetual difficulties the old American psyche. I recall a German LTC talking about Kärcher's little portable Decon outfit: "The Americans will buy a few, engineer it for seven years until it doesn't work and then buy several thousand of that variant..."

Still, if we did not push ideas like the Zumwalt's, F-35, EEV and FCS, the technology would get pretty stagnant. As for the great COIN/HIC debate, we'll shuffle along doing neither well and it'll work out. I've become reconciled to the fact that no matter how badly the Politicians and Flag Os foul up, the Kids pull their fat out of the fire. Heck of a way to run a railroad (Hmmm, what happened to them??? ).

That seems to be the American way...

[Steve Blair]

I also found the commentary to be a touch short on any perspective about American history. Our external strategies (such as they are) tend to arise due to a perceived foreign threat, and they usually generate many offspring of widely varied practicality and viability. Those same strategies also sink into the ground as soon as the threat (real or otherwise) disappears...and we get yet another "peace dividend."

[Galrahn]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

[Ron Humphrey]

Very interesting. I guess I have largely missed the perspective that Grand Strategy is a bridge too far for the US, or that peacetime strategy is even possible. The CDI paper was the first time I had seen this perspective, but it does appear to be more widely shared.

Are these views a concession to the industrial system, a failing in our politics, or due to inability of the services to articulate their vision?

I like to think the content on my blog is intended to promote thinking about maritime strategy from the perspective of war and peace. If I was to buy into either of your comments, it sounds as if they imply military strategy during times of peace and/or unthreatened prosperity simply isn't realistic.

I respectfully disagree.

And I note you didn't get the opportunity to share your informed input on the subject. I'm sure you would probably be able to contribute quite a bit to help the the yungin's like myself develop a more holistic frame of the debate.

Realizing your time may be limited I still have provided the Link for your perusal.

[SethB]

It isn't really a surprise that the Defense budget is going to get smaller. I say Defense because DOE will probably see a cut in its nuclear weapons budget.

Gates was a supporter of building new warheads, but I doubt that that will happen now.

The downside is that saving money without spending some isn't really possible.

If it were a goal, using a relatively small amount of money to replace some key equipment could reduce personnel, operating and maintenance costs. In 1996 the DSB released a report in which they indicated that aging equipment was increasing costs. The lasting quote was that "the tail is eating the tooth." We may be entering a period that has similar consequences.

Just cutting the amount of money coming in and not adding any new equipment is a good way to ensure that you reduce possible savings while simultaneously decreasing readiness.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I agree with you to a point, but at least during the Cold War there was a focus. Many (not all, obviously) weapon systems were designed with specific Soviet threats in mind, so the capability we were buying was a bit clearer then, IMO, and spending on those systems was easier to justify.

The same thing for numbers. We could look at the Soviets and come up with a rational basis for how many fighters or destroyers we might need in the case of a war. Certainly there were a lot of politics involved, but I think our war-planning and strategy informed those decisions much more than today, where there is no focus.

That lack of focus along with vague QDR's result in system where anything can be justified. The COIN/HIC debate is, I think, partially about differing views on what our post-Soviet focus should be. I think the result is that procurement decisions are more political than they once were. I can live with that to an extent (another "feature" of our peculiar system of democracy), but I think there will have to major changes to fix or ameliorate the broken development and procurement processes which are not providing enough value for our money.

[Ken White]

I agree with you to a point, but at least during the Cold War there was a focus. Many (not all, obviously) weapon systems were designed with specific Soviet threats in mind, so the capability we were buying was a bit clearer then, IMO, and spending on those systems was easier to justify.

I'd submit most all weapons systems are designed with a clear vision of the potential threats so that was not unique to that period. We also bought a lot of dumb stuff that would not have lasted long in combat and was terribly difficult to maintain. I can name you a dozen birds that were bought that were a total waste of $$ -- start with the B-58, B-70, F-104 and F-105 or the A3D, A5, F11F. Where are the Nuke Cruisers today? Then there's my personal Army favorite:

""When the computer was activated, it immediately started aiming the guns at the review stands, causing several minor injuries as members of the group jumped for cover. Technicians worked on the problem, and the system was restarted. This time it started shooting towards the target, but fired into the ground 300 m in front of the tank. In spite of several attempts to get it working properly, the vehicle never successfully engaged the sample targets."" LINK.

The same thing for numbers. We could look at the Soviets and come up with a rational basis for how many fighters or destroyers we might need in the case of a war.

Ah, yes. Like our late 1980s ploy "We will put ten Divisions in Europe in ten days." Lot of people believed that; a lot knew better because the MSC Reserve Fleet couldn't be activated and manned in time and we didn't have the airlift. We never had enough tracked vehicles or pure troop strength to do our part in offsetting the USSR. Only after the Reagan buildup did we get even start to get close. During the period, the Navy certainly and the USAF mostly were in threat range -- the Army, not so much. Thus our perspectives differ a bit but the truth is things then weren't much better than they are today...

Certainly there were a lot of politics involved, but I think our war-planning and strategy informed those decisions much more than today, where there is no focus.

What strategy? War plans we had. However, I was talking to a Reserve unit Commander in 1988 or so; "Okay," said I, "you're not doing any field training because you know the warehouse in Antwerp from which your unit will operate. What are you going to do if the 141 lands in Torrejon because Antwerp and its Port were ground zero for a 50 KT warhead while you were flying cheerfully across the Atlantic?" He had no answer for that.

As I said, your recollection and mine differ...

That lack of focus along with vague QDR's result in system where anything can be justified. The COIN/HIC debate is, I think, partially about differing views on what our post-Soviet focus should be. I think the result is that procurement decisions are more political than they once were. I can live with that to an extent (another "feature" of our peculiar system of democracy), but I think there will have to major changes to fix or ameliorate the broken development and procurement processes which are not providing enough value for our money.

I agree on the need for changes in many thing -- not least the procurement system.

However, my recollections from Korea forward are of the same incoherence I see today. Some things got worse then better; others improved and then went downhill. We had good years and bad years but anyone who thinks there has been or was during the Cold War any real coherence in our defense budget is missing a few things.

The process is badly flawed and it will not change because in the absence of a major threat, Congress likes it that way. So do some in DoD because they can manipulate the system to get stuff in the POM. then a new CNo/CoS/Cmdt comes along and scrubs stuff and inserts HIS vision.

The reason for less than prescriptive QDRs (you do recall who insisted on those...) is that wiggle room factor I mentioned. DoD has to do what they can to prepare for an uncertain future in the absence of any finite political guidance on defense matters. Thus they opt for vague.

Congress would really like to give such guidance but that's not their job, so they try to do it by juggling funds and priorities. Administrations are reluctant to give such guidance because even though it emphatically is their job, they don't want to be wrong -- thus no guidance other than rarely.

I also know that the few times there has been such guidance, it was generally badly flawed. Reagan and Bush did not give finite guidance, they just said 'go shopping.' That's not a strategy, it's not even a plan, it is an invitation to waste and flawed procurement actions. My sensing is that if any finite guidance is received in the next few years, it also will be flawed.

[Galrahn]

Ron,

I need to read that thoroughly and come back to it, several interesting links in that thread.

Ken,

I think you and I agree in that we both see policy as the driver, not strategy. I think we disagree in that I believe that can change, where you do not. I agree with many of your observations though. You may appreciate this, 8 Minutes of DoD Acquisition History.