CNAS on the NSP: Echos of El Sal

[John T. Fishel]

with a better explanation. I defer and agree, Still, it is clear from Mike's comments that the possiblity, even the probability, existed for the rVN to have won the war had we and they followed an effective pop centric strategy that addressed the legitimacy issues weighing down the GVN and not abandoned Thieu to his fate.

Cheers

JohnT

[Surferbeetle]

I am going to tackle three of the five principles Mike in Hilo observed in Vietnam (and perhaps in parts of Latin America) and use them to discuss what I have seen in El Salvador, Iraq, and Nicaragua. Unfortunately/fortunately I was too young to see Vietnam on the ground; my views were shaped by carefully low crawling to the edge of the living room and remaining undetected in order to watch the evening news coverage of the firefights & bombing runs and Walter C’s commentary while wondering about what my Dad was up to over there…

My take on Mike in Hilo’s observations:

1) A deep cynicism on the part of the (insert country)’s populace toward democracy
2) Dismissing local governments as policy
3) A tactical military problem that compelled cooperation with the enemy
4) Excessive corruption government wide
5) The (oppositions) political message was Peace for the War-Weary

My observations:

1. Local politics was working at a certain predictable level in each of the three countries that I mentioned that I have worked in. I am going to use Taylorism, and its unending quest for efficiency, as a representative proxy for 1st World Western Capitalistic/Democratic philosophy. I’ll also state the obvious and note that life moves at a different pace and in a different way outside of the Golden Bubble that characterizes 1st World Western Democracies. The majorities of Hoi Polloi in the areas that I worked in did not see a favorable cost/benefit calculation in order to buy into and make the changes needed in order to score high on the litmus test of Taylorism. But, I would ask: How often do we show/explain by local examples, which fully take into account local cultural norms, the benefits of what we are in effect selling in order to change the outlook of the populace? Perhaps it is true that our 2-year and 4-year political timelines and the general hyperactive/ADD characteristics of our political and cultural landscape are not compatible with what the requirements of such a strategy. I think about the example of the 99-year lease on Hong Kong vs. the current level of cooperation we currently see in Washington regarding our economic crisis when I think about differing approaches to long-term strategy. Perhaps this is part of why we face cynicism when we push Democracy upon non-Democratic cultures?

2. We have played some role in dismissing the governments of communist challengers in El Salvador, Daniel Ortega, and Sadaam Hussein. As I have mentioned elsewhere IMO we shot ourselves in the ass in Iraq (if our objective was stability) when we fired the majority of the Iraqi populace from their jobs in civil service (Baathism/SOE’s, etc) and the military. By now we have more than enough experience and examples of the need to fully consider 2nd and 3rd order effects upon the populace (which are the center of gravity) of dismissing local governments as policy. Are we watching for/advocating the application of these hard won lessons in Afghanistan?

3. Cool and very lethal high-powered weapons, high-tech walkie-talkies, the anonymity of soul concealing celebrity-style sunglasses, short attention spans, and simplifying powerpoint briefings are stereotypical images associated with the American Soldier. Does the application of just short-term force result in long-term changes to a society? Can we kill our way to victory? Our opponents use local knowledge in order to systematically apply a mix of lethal force and social service arms in order to discredit local governments not in line with their views. They try and use a longer timeline than we like to their advantage (although overall we did relatively well with the Cold War timeline). What, if any, are the stereotypes of Americans who successfully use local knowledge to sway a populace by a mix of lethal and non-lethal means over long time periods?

More questions than answers this Saturday…

[jmm99]

After the Fall, Stephen B. Young (a young USAID advisor 1968-1971) included a couple of excerpts in Al Santoli's oral history (here is one at page 48), with bio at page 367. But, very relevant to the present discussion, is his longer excerpt on Village Development, starting at page 209 (some pages are not incuded in the Google snips, but you will get where he was coming from).

His was a more optimistic view of what could have been done than that of the CIA analysts and historians (see recent thread on CIA histories - Vietnam). Not surprisingly, he too advocated a populace-centric approach - ala Alinsky and many others, including JMM (under the right conditions).

Stephen Young went on to a distinguished career (as a lawyer and business consultant) - see bio here in middle of page and .pdf here. He has kept his hand in things Vietnam (e.g., AEI paper here).

Here is a heavy hitter (IMO) who saw a favorable course of action as being "possible" - though his excerpts (from Santoli) did not really get into whether that COA was feasible or probable.

My concerns about feasibility (much less probability) boiled and boils down to several factors which, in my perception, controlled the GVN:

1. Oligarchy - a mix of paternalism, classism, urbanism and family ties, which were very strong and affected all of the other factors.

2. Venality - present in both military and civilian appointments and promotions; nothing close to a meritocracy.

3. Corruption - not only who you knew and who you paid; but also corruption in the larger sense of "power corrupts", etc. - often hidden by use of family members and friends (e.g., mistresses) as middle persons.

4. Close involvement in outright criminal enterprises (following a long Saigon tradition); and "nation-defeating capitalism" (e.g., the shadow supply system and the brass concessions).

5. Conservatism (not in a good sense) by carrying on the military and civilian mentality learned from the French and those who co-operated with them.

6. Very much of a threat-centered policy vs. "enemies" (including not only Coms, but also the nationalists and non-Com socialists) - who were "neutralized" first by Diem and then by the generals.

7. Absence of rural-focused empathy. In short, the GVN from Diem on had no real feelings for the farmers - and they none for the GVN. Thieu was pushed to some rural reforms in 1969-1972 (confirming title in small farmers to some 2-1/2 million acres of land, which BTW had been "given" - with strings - to small farmers by the VM in the 40s and 50s; and then restored to the landlords by Diem).

8. Absence of a cause - other than self-preservation - and, indeed, Diem and the generals were anti-communists (the primary common link with us). The farmers didn't like the communists either; but their other choices had been foreclosed.

To me, all of this seemed too high a mountain to climb, without good feasibility of success in revolutionizing the GVN (which is what would have had to be done).