CNAS on the NSP: Echos of El Sal

[jmm99]

JTF
JMM, interesting you should mention these but not Peace Corps.

it's just that I have lived with "CAP" for 40 years. Can't say the same for the Peace Corps, although a friend was one of its directors.

As to Alinsky, my preference is his later "Rules for Radicals", which is a more mature version of his methodology.

[John T. Fishel]

an excuse to expand on the theme. I, personally, liked both Reveille and Rules. Who says civilians don't have tactical doctrine manuals?

One of the things that I find puzzling is that Peace Corps - except for the period when it was lumped with a bunch of other agencies (which your friend took care of) has pretty much stayed the same - although its focus has changed over the years as the needs of the countries in which it operates have changed, the internal USG volunteer programs have changed their names and focus over the last 40 years including term of service. Alinsky might have hypothesized that the reason was the threat to local power elites posed by these organizations if they were allowed to become instituionalized.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

I, personally, liked both Reveille and Rules. Who says civilians don't have tactical doctrine manuals?

LOL - I grew up with those two (plus a certain little Red Book), got the chance to meet Alinski (I think I was 6 or 7 at the time; a big protest in Toronto), and got a ground floor look at "civilian tactical doctrine" via my parents and the rest of my family who were founding members of the NDP . When I grew out of my "Socialist Phase" (about age 8 or 9), I carried over a lot of that tactical doctrine and still use it today in my teaching.

Alinsky might have hypothesized that the reason was the threat to local power elites posed by these organizations if they were allowed to become instituionalized.

I'd agree with that, John. We saw the same thing happen up here, and it really makes me mad (it's also getting much worse under our current Provincial gov't). It's not so much the local elites who are the problem, at least here, it's the neuveau, self-procalimed elites (the older elite families were either staunch, right wing [NOT neo-con] Conservatives or NDP).

[John T. Fishel]

Successful COIN really means making a better Revolution than the insurgents can make. Maybe that's why we keep reinventing VISTA with a new name every few years.

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

from JTF
Successful COIN really means making a better Revolution than the insurgents can make.

Happen to agree with this - and did back in the early 60's, especially as to the Americas (Canada excepted since they are incorrigible ). Apparently, you helped to make that happen in El Sal, which is a good thing.

The question I have had in reading the various pros and cons about Vietnam - which really don't discuss it very much among the arguments for and against "conventional" vs. "non-conventional" - boils down to this: Was it feasible for us (US) to make a "better Revolution" in SVN given the politics and "governance" of the GVN, whether under Diem or the Generals ?

My perception then and now was that the GVN was FUBAR (where the R word could be any of "Recovery", "Rehabilitation" and "Rescue", etc.). So, when I read such as Krepinevich or Nagl, I tend to say "so what" - that is, assuming we did all of what they say, the South Vietnamese villagers would still have been left with bad governance by the GVN - which the North could have exploited after we left upon "successful pacification" of the South.

Maybe someone with a more optimistic view of what could have happened in SVN should talk me down.

[John T. Fishel]

COL Robert M. Herrick, was of the opinion that we simply sold President Thieu down the river after Nixon resigned. That is a correct statement, IMO, but hardly the whole story. For all the incompetence and corruption of the GVN, life in RVN was one hell of a lot better than in the North. The indigenous South Vietnamese insurgency had been decimated and defeated during Tet 68 and the continuing war was against the NVA. One of the best analyses of the post Tet 68 period that I have read is COL Stuart Harrington's Stalking the Vietcong originally published as Silence Was a Weapon. In many ways, his account supports my view expressed here.

I recall in 1973 hearing (seeing or reading) that President Thieu had dismissed the local elected governments and replaced them with appointed district and province chiefs. The short lived experiment in local democracy, which could have been the focal point of a NSP?MEA type COIN/development program was over. I recall telling my classes that I thought by that single act Thieu had just lost the war.

So, was there no possibility of redemption/recovery? Not after that IMO. But before - when we still had some real leverage over both Thieu and the conduct of the war (eg the ability to resume bombing the North and to keep the RVN supplied) - I think the war was winable by a largely population centric strategy. Going after the enemy, the NVA, was still both necessary and desirable without any significant negative impacts on GVN legitimacy.

That's my view and I'm sticking with it (until somebody comes along with a more accurate one).

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike in Hilo]

In basic agreement with you, John... Concur on Herrington, who lived in Hau Nghia while I was on the CORDS team in adjacent Tay Ninh Province. Now, the decree you are thinking of was issued in Sept 1972 and called for appointment of hamlet chiefs by Distict Security Committes (essentially, by District Chief cum Subsector Commander, unquestionably in consultation with and approved by Province Chief). Province Chief was a colonel's slot, and always appointed. District was essentially a military command (subsector), as GVN civil service departments were not represented at district level. District Chief was an LTC or major's slot. The most important level of local administration was the village (hamlet is subordinate). Village council members continued to be elected.
From my observation at the time, I believe events did not bear out that the decree constituted a watershed in people's attitude toward the GVN. I say this because of (1) a deep cynicism on the part of the Vietnamese people toward democracy....echoed, I believe, in Moyar (quoting Rand studies?). As an aside, a common belief among the South Vietnamese was that election day was an unwanted tribulation visited upon the people--because that was when people would predictably get blown up in VC "atentados."...;
(2) The decree dwarfed in relevance compared to greater outrages, viz.: Virtually every rural family had members in RF or PF. By 1973, and much more so in 1974, commanders were pocketing sizeable portions of these poor troops' pay. By 1974, certainly, officers saw themselves in a race against time to amass nest eggs to tide them over while building a new life in France or the US after the anticipated fall (source: my conversations with ARVN colonels mid 1974)
(3) A tactical, military problem that compelled cooperation with the enemy-- hearts and minds antipathy to the NLF, as in Catholic communities, notwithstanding. Elections or their absence would have made no difference. The country remained a mosaic of "leopard spots." There were enemy base areas and mini-bases. A hamlet's security status could not be judged in isolation to its geographic environment. Every community had some security forces--RF/PF and from 1972, National Police. But their capacity to protect the villagers, even where there was a minimal VCI presence, was negated when a robust enemy unit was based in close proximity outside the population--which was far from uncommon. By 1971, when I arrived, the rapid US military withdrawal (courtesy SecDef Laird, I believe, not Congress) had, in MR-III, left a serious vacuum which ARVN could not fill, and NVA rapidly exploited.
(4) Excessive (by Vietnamese standards) corruption government wide did not inspire confidence. My opinion: a modicum of sound governance would have been sufficient to elicit loyalty. but this would not have negated problem (3)above.
(5) The VC political message through my tenure in RVN was Peace for the War-Weary.."We will never leave and never quit...If you want peace, help us win quickly and peace will come that much sooner." But the medium was the real message. The enemy were held in awe for fighting for principle (and it mattered less what the principle was, IMO) as opposed to fighting for money. Annecdote: One of our Tay Ninh FSNs who had been an interrogator related having asked a captured VC how much his pay was. He relates that when the VC replied that he received no pay, "I knew we would lose the war." His sentiment was not unique. The GVN, of course had no electrifying message, but the view of virtuous communist asceticism could at least have been given a run for the money had there been some honest GVN efforts toward probity.

Nevertheless, my point, I guess: I find it telling that despite real, deep fatigue, "political" shortcomings and weaknesses among which the above are only a few, the prospect of reunification and life under communism was so unattractive that, frankly to my surprise, the country held together until the 1975 offensive--And in a cratering economy, the literally shortchanged troops continued to fight and die in shocking numbers. Yes, they were severely tested militarily time and again 1973-74 --see inter alia, Col. LeGro, Sorely...Plus, I believe we can also attribute this cohesion to a deep, traditional, culturally-mandated obedience.

Sorry for a meandering and somewhat convoluted, hurriedly written posting, but you can probably get the drift.....

Cheers,
Mike.