OSINT Assessment of the Afghan War

[jmm99]

from Cav
The personnel embedded don't necessarily have to be coalition either.

Could be indigenous mainforce (army or gendarmerie) + local militia Puffs - assuming that the mainforce is competent to do CAPing. ARVN wasn't in SVN; on Astan forces, that's a conclusion to be reached by you and others.

Also, more or less agree (how's that for a lawyerly line ) with this:

from Cav
But each village/hamlet doesn't need its own CAP - only key ones as identified in your analysis of the area.

I'll buy this if you (using "you" generically for a competent field officer) make the analysis for your TAOR. I'd be afraid that "political action" would start calling the shots either at a higher military level (to shift personnel to their higher priorities; e.g., Westmoreland in SVN - "the military professionalism of the Marines falls short.." - p.3); or at a still higher civilian level for any number of reasons inconsistent with sound military tactics.

Hmm...

from Cav
Clear, Hold, Build, and move on - but sustain the ones left behind.

CAP wasn't a "Build" operation. When CAP left and ARVN took over, the ville was subject to the same VCI pressures. So, agreed that "build" and "sustain" are essential unless a permanent CAP-like garrison is the plan.

If IIRC, your company accomplished that essential in your 2nd OIF tour - after you gained a barracks PhD in counter-insurgency tactics. Good job.
Has the "sustain" held up there ? - if you can say.

Still, in the long run, "sustain" requires political action and good governance by the incumbant nation outside of the scope of direct military actions. Not in SVN; perhaps, in Astan ?

These questions could be getting nearer to OpSec issues than we should go.