Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
Could be indigenous mainforce (army or gendarmerie) + local militia Puffs - assuming that the mainforce is competent to do CAPing. ARVN wasn't in SVN; on Astan forces, that's a conclusion to be reached by you and others.


I'll buy this if you (using "you" generically for a competent field officer) make the analysis for your TAOR. I'd be afraid that "political action" would start calling the shots either at a higher military level (to shift personnel to their higher priorities; e.g., Westmoreland in SVN - "the military professionalism of the Marines falls short.." - p.3); or at a still higher civilian level for any number of reasons inconsistent with sound military tactics.

Hmm...
Certainly and always a risk. I would argue (as did my BN CO at the time) that we withdrew from Tal Afar far too quickly in late 2006. In the context of the time (wheels coming off the bus), you couldn't justify keeping an entire BCT (Feb-May), and then a heavy BN (May 06 -Oct 06) comitted to an area with only .2 violent incidents daily when you had other cities (like Ramadi) in flames.

We knew that the civil governance and HN security forces weren't fully prepared to assume full responsibility for the AO, but were sent south anyway, and risk was accepted. 3-4 CAV (a light div cav sqdn) replaced 2-37 AR in October and subsequently withdrew outside the city to FOB Sykes - this small organization was responsible for all of west Ninewah (a sizeable chunk of land).

Fortunately, things have held together there, the local government and security forces have maintained order despite a few hiccups. I would offer we were more lucky than good in some respects. However, it would not have succeeded if not for the efforts described by our BN S5 in this article.

I would also submit the MNC-I leadership at the time just had a bad set of choices all around, and made a decision to accept risk of re-failure in Tal Afar in order to attempt to stabilize other, more critical locations.

On the analysis comment, once you understand what is unique about COIN and read FM 3-24, you can use systems like ASCOPE to analyze your environment, it becomes much easier to do proper "Clear, Hold, Build". Of course, this requires a good understanding of the nature of insurgencies and some good leadership. (sorry, promo for some classes I use in the COIN Knowledge Center under OPD/NCOPD)

CAP wasn't a "Build" operation. When CAP left and ARVN took over, the ville was subject to the same VCI pressures. So, agreed that "build" and "sustain" are essential unless a permanent CAP-like garrison is the plan.
Exactly.

If IIRC, your company accomplished that essential in your 2nd OIF tour - after you gained a barracks PhD in counter-insurgency tactics. Good job.
Has the "sustain" held up there ? - if you can say.
As far as I know it has. I do know that when I left in Feb 07, there had been zero enemy SIGACTs in Sa'ad since May 06.

Still, in the long run, "sustain" requires political action and good governance by the incumbant nation outside of the scope of direct military actions. Not in SVN; perhaps, in Astan ?
Absolutely. You point out the RVN was not capable of this. Neither were the IP's or IA when we began operations in Tal Afar or Ramadi. By the time we left, they were very far along, and in the lead in most cases. As I described in my "Sisyphus" article, we had to partner completely with HN to achieve success.

You've given me a great idea for another article.