COIN v CT

[William F. Owen]

9/11 - Act of Aggessive War.

9/11 was an act of aggressive war against the US waged by a VNSA (Violent Non-State Actor). Not having cruise missiles, AQ improvised and, as a weapons system, used the functional equivalent - hijacked airliners. AQ's selected targets (WTC, Pentagon and the DC government complex) were militarily logical (disruption of US C&C and of the US economic system). In many ways, the AQ attacks resembled Pearl Harbor (a VSA, Violent State Actor, attack), and was so regarded by many here (including JMM).

I think some useful simplification might be in order here.

9/11 = Acts of War.
OK, so how does 9/11 differ from the Canary Warf Bombing or Madrid or the London Tube Attacks? These were not acts of war. The 1993 Attacks on the WTC were AQ perpetrated terrorism. How is 911 different? Use of civilian aircraft?

I don't doubt you are correct, but I need to see the reasoning. However I see no relationship between the IJNs attack on Pearl Harbour, which was entirely military, with AQ's entirely symbolic attack on DC and NY. Terrorism is generally and primarily symbolic. Do they have sever political effect? For sure. Symbolism can have massive psychological impact.

I don't see this as subjective. Political Violence using criminal means is not Political Violence using military means. Correct me if I am wrong, but isn't the FBI investigating 911? Are there not arrest warrants?

Now the only reason this matters to me at all, is that I personally don't see much merit (there is some) in studying Terrorism, from my subject area of military thought, because it is not military. Insurgency however is.

[Bob's World]

One thing we should have learned is that in this globalized world, it is far easier (and getting more so daily) for a group of individuals to conduct an act of war against a state than it is for a state to wage war against a group of individuals. This is one of the newly important forms of 'sanctuary' that we must learn to deal with.

When we simply counterattack and wage war in the sovereign nation in which this group resides we risk a broad range of very dangerous blow-back. As I advised a boss once "Sir, you don't want to risk strategic defeat when the greatest possibe gain is merely a tactical one."

We have been very focused of late in achieving such tactical victories in Afganistan over AQ and the Taliban. They make our soldiers feel like they are kicking some butt, they make our populace feel like we are taking it to the enemy; but they also validate much of the propaganda about our true nature and intention, join elements of the targeted populace to bond together over their historic objections to face a common threat, and also destabilize the legitimacy of the government who's sovereignty we have violated in the eyes of their populace.

Arguably the three most unstable states in the middle east are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To think that our efforts to wage war against a group of guys hiding within sovereign states has not contributed significantly to that instability is naieve at best.

So, in addition to getting the legal status straight, it is EXTREMELY important to take operational and strategic planning out of the war construct and instead place it within a holistic strategy-driven, policy-based construct that seeks to stabilze these fragile states through a program of engagement that includes tailored programs for each of these violent groups to remove the problems. Simply conducting a COIN or CT or any other war campaign won't cut it.

Back in the day, the US military routinely conducted military operations in areas of conflict without demanding that the entire nation join them in a state of war. Somewhere we lost sight of that. We've come to believe that if our military is fighting then we must support them by ensuring that our entire nation is at war. I thought it was supposed to be the opposite. That a few of us, some 1% of the total populace, volunteered to train, sacrafice, go where we need to go, do what we need to do, so that the nation can remain at peace.

So, put the nation at peace, develop a grand framework for our foreign policy, identify where our critical national interests lay, seek understanding of the dynamics of what is really going on in those critical areas and how our actions as a nation are contributing to those dynamics; then design State Department led holistic programs of enagement that are built around the changes we made to our own behavior first, and then supplemented by the behavior modification we impose on others. This works in the Middle East, it works in Mexico, it works everywhere. But it is complicated; so instead we respond instinctively instead of intelectually.

It gives our major opponents a good chuckle as they watch us flounder. China thinks in terms of hundreds and thousands of years, and they have to watch in wonder as we flail away in the moment. I'd really like to wipe that smile off of their faces. We aren't down and out by a long shot, we just need to focus a little less on fighting small wars, and a little more on crafting and implementing big strategy. We can do this.

[jmm99]

I will try to answer your first two sets of questions, these two ...

from gh_uk
How do the evolving US Laws of War etc impact on the status of the protagonists? I realise there has been a long running debate on this but interested in your views. If the sovereign state makes a political decision as to how to deal with a threat, is it then also up that state to make its own (unilateral) decisions about the status and rules applied to those identified/captured/detained in the process of fighting that conflict?

And how do we account for the selective use of criminal/legal procedures for those captured on home soil against that applied to those killed/captured on foreign fields? For example the alleged Fort Dix plot - use of armed individuals (of foreign origin) to attack a military target in the US in apparent support of the wider AQ agenda. Terrorists, insurgents, criminals?

at a later time than today or tomorrow. Reason being that I have things other than SWC that have to finished within the next few days - so, I'll have to "duck and cover".

In the meantime, you might try slogging your way through the War Crimes thread, started by David, which has covered many of the questions you ask. So also, the Hamdan thread. Although that is more Astan-centric, it delves with some detail into the issue of detainment under Common Articles 2 and 3 of the GCs - which is where the US courts have gone and where the Obama DoJ has refined the definition of who may be detained and for what reasons.

---------------------------------------
I'll briefly cover this question - in a word:

from gh_uk
So in effect the US (or presumably any other state) can make the political decision to take that shift in either direction, depending on the context of specific cases? Even within the boundaries of the 'state of armed conflict' between the US and AQ?

Yes.

But since lawyers are never satisfied with brevity (consider their briefs - of the paper kind only), I'll expand a bit.

Assuming a nation has decided to enter into a state of war (armed conflict)with a Transnational Violent Non-State Actor (e.g., AQ), it does not have to employ solely military violence; nor, when that is applied, apply it in its harshest forms. Presumably, the application of force is governed (at least to some extent) by the intellect. So, some benevolence and moderation should be used when the totality of circumstances demand the same. Or, in Northern Michigan homespun: You don't kill everything in the woods simply because you have a hunting license.

Since members of a TVNSA generally do not have combatant immunity (TVNSAs do not comply with GCs), their acts are subject to criminal prosecution, which may in a particular case be the better way to approach the problem. In some cases (those involving US citizens and legal aliens resident in the US), US constitutional law virtually forces criminal prosecutions, as opposed to detainment under CAs 2 & 3 of the GCs - that issue is technically still open since SCOTUS has not decided it re: the impact of the 2001 AUMF and other legislation.

It also is quite plausible for a nation to adopt a police-intelligence + criminal prosecutions policy, without entering into a state of war (armed conflict) with a TVNSA. That is exactly what the UK has done, as David has pointed out in his thread here; and as we see in the UK national CT strategy, now called Operation Contest Two, which David recently cited in War Crimes.

Apparently, that policy has worked for the UK - although there has been a bit of controversy (e.g., RH David Davis) concerning length of initial detentions, etc. It clearly has a less "militaristic" flavor than US policy, though I do note that there is a vague reference to employment of military assets in extraordinary situations. In any event, "we can co-operate, as they say" (credits: Michael Caine in Zulu).

It is important to keep in mind that, even if an "armed conflict" policy is adopted, the present hot-botton issues (extraordinary rendition, expanded interrogations and torture) are totally separate from, and are not a requisite part of, that policy - the legal meanderings of John Yoo aside.

Hope this helps for the present.

PS: Wilf and BW. As noted above, I'm not going to be able to spend the time on this that it deserves until later this week. A brief thought is that the two of you juxtapose the conventional (Wilf) and unconventional (BW) military views on military strategy, operations and tactics. What I am proposing (basically at the national policy level) does not necessarily impinge on either.

[Bill Moore]

BW's post intentionally, or unintentionally, supports my repeated argument throughout the SWJ council for a transformation in our thinking (which will require a new set of terminology) about our security problems, instead of the stale responses of narrowly trying to define the problem so we can define and apply the opposite as a solution: terrorism = counterterrorism, insurgency = counterinsurgency, etc. We ignore the complexity of context at our peril.

Below are some BW's quotes that are worth considerable thought and discussion. If the irregular warfare concepts that the SECDEF is trying to get the military to master is simply going to be a reintroduction of our stale doctrine on COIN, UW, CT, etc., then IMHO we are missing a golden opportunity to adjust they way we think about our security interests and how we develop and implement appropriate strategies. The military is great ship that can evolve rapidly, but revolutionary change is prohibited by our bureaucracy and ingrained perceptions. Doctrine is a double edged sword, and at this point in time it is harming us, more than helping us.

One thing we should have learned is that in this globalized world, it is far easier (and getting more so daily) for a group of individuals to conduct an act of war against a state than it is for a state to wage war against a group of individuals.

"Sir, you don't want to risk strategic defeat when the greatest possibe gain is merely a tactical one."

So, in addition to getting the legal status straight, it is EXTREMELY important to take operational and strategic planning out of the war construct and instead place it within a holistic strategy-driven, policy-based construct that seeks to stabilze these fragile states through a program of engagement that includes tailored programs for each of these violent groups to remove the problems. Simply conducting a COIN or CT or any other war campaign won't cut it.

Exactly, thus the risk of trying to define the problem as simply terrorism, insurgency, instability, etc.

Back in the day, the US military routinely conducted military operations in areas of conflict without demanding that the entire nation join them in a state of war. Somewhere we lost sight of that. We've come to believe that if our military is fighting then we must support them by ensuring that our entire nation is at war.

Bravo! How many commanders are more focused on public affairs than strategy and fighting? There is a difference between grass roots engagement to shape perceptions of the local audience and the constant striving for a Kodak moment so we can push a so called good news story to our homefront. We're conducting operations in many places very effectively that never see the light of day in our press, that should be the norm, not the exception.

China thinks in terms of hundreds and thousands of years, and they have to watch in wonder as we flail away in the moment. I'd really like to wipe that smile off of their faces. We aren't down and out by a long shot, we just need to focus a little less on fighting small wars, and a little more on crafting and implementing big strategy. We can do this.

We can, but not without a "significant" change in our government institutions and thought processes.

[William F. Owen]

From what I can see from the previous posts, there seems to be leg missing from the three legged stool.

Almost all assume Strategy to be the rational and logical exercising of state power. It is not. It never has been and never will be. Strategy is Politics. Politics has all the rationality and logic of the fashion industry. In fact fashion has to make money, so some skill is required. No so in Politics.

Politics is not informed by information. It is informed by opinion and belief. It seems to me that what is being talked about is the Political beliefs surrounding Terrorism and Insurgency.

Seems to me that anyone assuming otherwise is set to work against the chaos instead of within it. We may make progress if we stop using the word "Strategy" and start saying Politics/Policy.

[Bob's World]

Bill, appreciate the support (considering that I wrote that in a Jet-lagged, 3 AM stupor...I always say I do my best thinking when I'm asleep...)! But yes, we have to broaden our aperture for every problem we seek to address, and also take a longer view so that we can put those problems in the proper context to guide the nature and extent of our engagement.

We were able to take a Tie in Korea and a Loss in Vietnam (in the face of tremendous pressure to apply our full power to achieve a Win in each) because we had an overarching grand strategy of "Containment." Ike's son David said in a recent interview that his dad believed that this was as much to "contain" ourselves as it was to contain the Soviets. Think about that everyone. Post Cold War what did we do once the "constraints" were lifted??? There are few demonstrations of power more impressive than the wise constraint of its application. (Feel free to quote me on that line)

Wilf: You raise an excellent point about strategy. I enjoyed a rare opportunity to engage with some of America's brightest minds on this topic at the recent Grand Strategy conference hosted at Duke University. Even these experts agreed that there was no agreed upon definition of what Grand Strategy was. They did agree that historically it has been a collection of policies applied over time, often named by some speech writer, and discovered 20 years later by historians and political scientists who are looking back and studying the era in which they occurred.

But I do not enjoy the luxury that Historians and Political Scientist enjoy. I will not have to face a classroom full of bright young students tomorrow and have the challenge of engaging them and the risk of falling short in some debate that will hinder their ability to someday contribute to our nation. I and all of my peers who are out there reading this carry the immediate future of our nation on our shoulders. We must look back, we must think and discuss, but we must move forward and act concurrently. We are pretty good at the last part of that sentence. A state of War enables the last part of that sentence. It also, unfortunately, enables the policy making aspect of our governance to be lulled into a "wait until the war is over so that we can shape what happens next" mindset.

What is the next "big idea" for America? To argue about "do we use COIN or CT in Afghanistan" is like being tasked to build a house without a blueprint and being asked if you are going to use "hammers or saws to build it." We're arguing about tools instead of the blueprint.

The little team of guys I work with has laid a proposal on the table, and we call it "A Grand Strategy of Credible Influence." I haven't seen any other proposals on the table, or even a broad recognition that such a guiding concept is a critical first step.

In a nutshell our proposal is based on the premise that understanding and shaping the overall environment is more important than any individual immediate threat; that our national security is based on every element of our national wherewithal (DIME, reputation, etc), and that we ensure our future security by keeping the constant development of credible influence as our guiding light. A rebuilding of trust and credibility so that we can both deter more effectively without having to apply power; and so that we rally more allies to our causes without having to apply strong-armed pressure to join us. To become the America we see ourselves as, and not the one that much of the world is increasingly coming to see us as.

This is why I draw so much from our first national document. The Declaration of Independence is one of histories great documents. Step one of embarking on a Grand Strategy of Credible Influence is to get our actions, words, and policy back in line with this document.

The President just announced his new way forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and while I have not seen any details, it sounds like a mix of SFA in Afg; and CT in Pak. I would only add that without a grand strategy to measure it against, it is hard to assess if this is the right way or not. I know I will look at it in terms of "how does this contribute to the greater Credible Influence of our nation."

[Ken White]

...Back in the day, the US military routinely conducted military operations in areas of conflict without demanding that the entire nation join them in a state of war. Somewhere we lost sight of that...

I missed that. Demanding the entire Nation join them in a state of war. I didn't see it at all in Korea or Viet Nam; There were in both wars a few folks who grumbled about the fact they were engaged and others were not but they were a quite small minority. I did see a glimmer of such thinking during Desert Storm and it is certainly, oddly IMO, quite prevalent today. I just figured it was due to better communication and the mass media effect.

It gives our major opponents a good chuckle as they watch us flounder. China thinks in terms of hundreds and thousands of years, and they have to watch in wonder as we flail away in the moment. I'd really like to wipe that smile off of their faces. We aren't down and out by a long shot, we just need to focus a little less on fighting small wars, and a little more on crafting and implementing big strategy. We can do this.

That's what I wish you success in achieving. I believe you're asking for more than this nation can deliver -- not because we're evil or stupid but simply due to the governmental structure and functioning mode. We're too big, diverse and chaotic to settle on a coherent long term strategy, thus the effort IMO should go to influencing policy. That is achievable, a long term strategy, I'm afraid, is in the too hard box.

From your later post:

In a nutshell our proposal is based on the premise that understanding and shaping the overall environment is more important than any individual immediate threat...

Couldn't agree more. US History, however, does not lead me to be very sanguine about your prospects. The Chinese do indeed think very long term -- we, OTOH, tend to think four years is an eternity. I'm not sure the "Now" generation we have created can focus long enough to do that. Still, I hope you're correct and I'm wrong.

The President just announced his new way forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and while I have not seen any details, it sounds like a mix of SFA in Afg; and CT in Pak. I would only add that without a grand strategy to measure it against, it is hard to assess if this is the right way or not. I know I will look at it in terms of "how does this contribute to the greater Credible Influence of our nation."

I suspect the answer to your question will be 'not much.'

You and Bill are probably correct in what you wish for but I think Wilf has it right on the reality. We can influence policy...

The attachment below gives the reason I'm not terribly hopeful that your strategy concept will be adopted at the national level -- or that Afghanistan is going to work out too well. I would note that the Upper Time Line is far too short; five years is not a long time to most others. The Lower Time Line reverses that and is probably too long for the US general public -- or body politic...

[William F. Owen]

But I do not enjoy the luxury that Historians and Political Scientist enjoy. I will not have to face a classroom full of bright young students tomorrow and have the challenge of engaging them and the risk of falling short in some debate that will hinder their ability to someday contribute to our nation.

I both understand and sympathise.

What is the next "big idea" for America? To argue about "do we use COIN or CT in Afghanistan" is like being tasked to build a house without a blueprint and being asked if you are going to use "hammers or saws to build it." We're arguing about tools instead of the blueprint.

Good analogy. I would suggest that there may be merit in asking what purpose the house is meant to serve politically. Status, shelter, or accommodation?

Military objectives are always political, or must have a political effect eventually. To continue the analogy, for a house of a given material, the tools pretty much stay the same.

[jmm99]

Please take a look at this thread, post #32.