How do we say the Afghan Surge is not just mil when civilians are not participating?

[Bruce]

The old "why aren't there more birkenstocks on the ground?" Blame the DOS for all ills.


Well, let's take a look at what is really needed. First, more FSOs? Absolutely. Anyone with access to the DOS OpenNet knows that the Afghan surge is on the way, including consulates in Herat and Mazar. There will also be more FSOs in PRTs.

The problem is, FSOs only possess a slice of the skill sets needed to engage in Afghanistan. We need many more civilians, clearly, the paradox is that while the military is currently the most urgent element, it is ultimately the least important. In addition to State and USAID, we need people from Justice, USDA, Department of Commerce, experts from the legislative branch, experienced community organizers, city planners, electrical engineers, civil engineers, small town mayors, city officials, all of whom need to be spread liberally around the country. These are the people with the skill sets - not the DOS or the DOD (or its many parts).

The question isn't whether Embassy London should be shut down. The real issue is will the Obama administration take on the challenge that was ignored for the last seven years: Is America at war or not? Who will make the call (at long last) for middle America to mobilize?

As for the military being in charge: well as long as there are more military musicians than there are diplomats, as long as DOD rounds off greater sums than are in DOS' budget, it ain't gonna happen.

Instead of pointing the finger and blame the lack of success on the absence of an extra 300 FSOs, let's all take a big step back and view this through a framework of leveraging all of the elements of national power.

[Bruce]

There are no lack of volunteers. The issue is one four letter word: Iraq. Up until this year the Administration's priority was Iraq, plain and simple. The DOS personnel system was slanted to make it easier, more attractive and more rewarding to go to Iraq. There were (publicity aside) never any shortage of volunteers for Iraq or Afghanistan. It's all been an issue of what the Administration thinks is important. Now, finally, Afghanistan will get its due. The word on the street is 900 more civilians for Afghanistan. Let's wait and see what the response is. As a DOS veteran of two wars, I'm willing to lay money that the DOS response will be up to the numbers needed. ( Now that the great sucking sound of Iraq seems to be quieting down.)

[davidbfpo]

If Afghanistan and Pakistan are seen as long term national security interests, what provision is being made for language and cultural training by DoS and others? From this armchair faraway having some language skill and understanding enhances other skills and reduces the need for an interpreter (nay HTT).

This article (many other topics covered) illustrates the potential gains, rather surprisingly cites an Irish diplomat serving with the EU in Afghanistan: http://entertainment.timesonline.co....cle5992800.ece

davidbfpo

[jmm99]

tribalism, faction fighting and switching sides run in an Irishman's genes.

All very useful talents on the Astan scene.

So, the story of Mr Frog and Mr Scorpion - "I can't help it, it's in my nature."

[John T. Fishel]

the only place in the USG where all the skills you call for are found - and found in a readily deployable form ie can be ordered to deploy - is in the Civil Affairs units of the US Army Reserve. Maybe it's not so odd, give the history of CA. When it was founded in WWII GEN Marshall had planned to transfer the CA/Mil Gov units lock, stock, & barrel to the DOS at the end of the war for occupation duty. But State wouldn't have them. Short version of a long story, CA (97% anyway) found its place in the USAR where it remains with exactly the skills needed (but still not enough numbers).

Cheers

JohnT

[Schmedlap]

There were (publicity aside) never any shortage of volunteers for Iraq or Afghanistan.

I think that I know what you are referring to regarding the publicity thing (see here). That was what impacted my impression. If that reporting on the State Department was an instance of the typical disingenuous reporting that the DoD is often subjected to, then I am both glad that I was wrong and a bit frustrated with myself for having been snookered by it, especially since I am so often annoyed that others are snookered by crappy reporting on the DoD.

The word on the street is 900 more civilians for Afghanistan. Let's wait and see what the response is.

Agreed. In the mean time, have you heard any rumblings as to what capacity those numbers will serve in? As someone who spent OIF III seething at the knowledge that my company was undermanned and doing a mission appropriate for a battalion, while a nearby FOB had 10,000 idle personnel doing basically nothing, I am always more curious as to the utility of the personnel rather than their quantity.

[Bruce]

A couple of points:

DOS trains the majority of the people going to Afghanistan in either Dari or Pashto. The course lasts 44 weeks and includes area/cultural studies as an integral component. While this does not make them fluent, it allows them to interact without interpretation on a reasonable level. For example, last year the DOS officer in an Eastern Afghan PRT was a Pashto speaker. In military terms, this is an impressive force multiplier that wracked up significant achievements. This, despite being a younger woman working in the heart of "Manistan."

Regarding the qualities/utilities issue. I couldn't agree more. It seems that much of the civilian component in Iraq was built around the concept of having as many people there as possible, regardless of their skills or tasks.

This gets to my original point of why we need the proper skill sets. Army/Marine CA are great, there just aren't enough of them (which is why you have PRTs in Afghanistan that are run by SWOS, nukes and F-18 jocks). If we want to be serious, we're going to have to ask the American people to get into the war in a way that the previous administration avoided doing.

That said, there is a large role for FSOs at the PRT/BCT/CJTF level as Polads, as negotiators, as the human face of the US. The issue is force protection. 900 more civilians will need security. Does this mean more military, more Triple Canopy, ANA/ANP? Or will they be expected to go out with no armor, kevlar, up-armored vehicles? Will they be expected to assume an "outside the hesco" level of risk that others don't? I think they should, to some extent, but it's a difficult call.

[Charles Martel]

Bruce,

The career FSOs bleating about being sent "to their deaths" in Iraq when it looked like volunteers wouldn't fill the numbers weren't media hype. There are lots of skills that FSOs have gained along their careers that would be useful in RoL, Governance, Economic Development, etc.

Should the other agencies step up too? Sure. But they don't continue the drumbeat that our foreign policy is "too militarized" or that their agency should be in charge. I'll welcome all their help, but let's not say its a whole-of-government approach when it is DOD and some others. Can't blame that on Bush. State has had lots of opportunity to step up.

[Bruce]

With over 1/3 of the Foreign Service having served in Iraq and Afghanistan you'll understand if I take a different view.

Blaming State for what the previous administration did is kind of like blaming the military for having abandoned southern Afghanistan to go to Iraq in 2003. We all follow the instructions and priorities of the national command authority.

As for Jack Croddy whining last year, the fact is that even when the DOS positions were increased virtually overnight by 25%, all the billets were filled by volunteers within 3 days.

Yes, I have picked up many skills over 24 years as an FSO. City planning? Agronomy? Electrical grid planning? My experience does cover two wars, one as a more junior officer, one as a senior.

The other point is: before the military arrives, and, then, long after it goes, the FSOs are there. A single case in point: In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, a small group of FSOs volunteered to stay trapped behind enemy lines. One of these was a woman, who, as consul, was responsible for the well-being and safety of AMCITS. For this she ended up spending five month as an Iraqi human shield. After she was released, she volunteered to go back in and spent the war in Saudi, flying into Kuwait the day the war ended. She spent the next 18 months breathing oil smoke, living tactically and serving her country. She was there before the military arrived and was there long after. She is my wife.

So, having lived it, having seen the facts, knowing the ground truth, all I can say is that I'm confident in my views on the subject.

[Tom Odom]

With over 1/3 of the Foreign Service having served in Iraq and Afghanistan you'll understand if I take a different view.

Blaming State for what the previous administration did is kind of like blaming the military for having abandoned southern Afghanistan to go to Iraq in 2003. We all follow the instructions and priorities of the national command authority.

As for Jack Croddy whining last year, the fact is that even when the DOS positions were increased virtually overnight by 25%, all the billets were filled by volunteers within 3 days.

Yes, I have picked up many skills over 24 years as an FSO. City planning? Agronomy? Electrical grid planning? My experience does cover two wars, one as a more junior officer, one as a senior.

The other point is: before the military arrives, and, then, long after it goes, the FSOs are there. A single case in point: In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, a small group of FSOs volunteered to stay trapped behind enemy lines. One of these was a woman, who, as consul, was responsible for the well-being and safety of AMCITS. For this she ended up spending five month as an Iraqi human shield. After she was released, she volunteered to go back in and spent the war in Saudi, flying into Kuwait the day the war ended. She spent the next 18 months breathing oil smoke, living tactically and serving her country. She was there before the military arrived and was there long after. She is my wife.

So, having lived it, having seen the facts, knowing the ground truth, all I can say is that I'm confident in my views on the subject.

Most excellent response and have any number of FSO friends who have had similar experiences as you and your wife. What I have found is the ones who have had the experience tend to accept more of the same. I can also say the same thing applies within the military.

Best

Tom

[Schmedlap]

Blaming State for what the previous administration did is kind of like blaming the military for having abandoned southern Afghanistan to go to Iraq in 2003. We all follow the instructions and priorities of the national command authority.

That has been questioned. Obviously if the President says, "go to Iraq" or "go to Afghanistan" then you can't really parse those orders into something resembling, "stay stateside." But the mechanics involved in those endeavors can suit the desires of the organizations, rather than the spirit and intent of the orders from the CinC. Leaks from the Pentagon seemed to stop as soon as Secretary Gates took the helm. It has been stated more than once in this forum that the Pentagon tends to resist change by waiting out SECDEFs' limited time in tenure. A complaint about the Bush administration is that it failed to overcome the institutional inertia of DoS - that the President was pulling the levers of diplomacy, unaware that they were not attached to anything, because DoS allegedly had its own ideas of how to guide our foreign policy.

[120mm]

A couple of points:

DOS trains the majority of the people going to Afghanistan in either Dari or Pashto. The course lasts 44 weeks and includes area/cultural studies as an integral component. While this does not make them fluent, it allows them to interact without interpretation on a reasonable level. For example, last year the DOS officer in an Eastern Afghan PRT was a Pashto speaker. In military terms, this is an impressive force multiplier that wracked up significant achievements. This, despite being a younger woman working in the heart of "Manistan."

Then where the hell are they? I work for DoS as a contractor, and I haven't met a DoS regular employee who speaks anything but English, yet. And some of them can't even do English very well.

Regarding the qualities/utilities issue. I couldn't agree more. It seems that much of the civilian component in Iraq was built around the concept of having as many people there as possible, regardless of their skills or tasks.

I was raised on a farm, and the ADT guys are great, the Ag guy for the PRT is ok, but the DoS guys are freaking lost when it comes to any "real" ag issues. I've heard more DoS guys bull#### agriculture than I care to, though.

This gets to my original point of why we need the proper skill sets. Army/Marine CA are great, there just aren't enough of them (which is why you have PRTs in Afghanistan that are run by SWOS, nukes and F-18 jocks). If we want to be serious, we're going to have to ask the American people to get into the war in a way that the previous administration avoided doing.

CA is voluntarily a small community. I spent most of the '90s trying to get in, without luck. And now, during a time of war, they want you to mobilize for a year and then be unemployable for the next however many until you get mobilized again. Either that, or divorce your wife and abandon your family and volunteer for back-to-back-to-back tours. How are you guys going to get quality people again?

That said, there is a large role for FSOs at the PRT/BCT/CJTF level as Polads, as negotiators, as the human face of the US. The issue is force protection. 900 more civilians will need security. Does this mean more military, more Triple Canopy, ANA/ANP? Or will they be expected to go out with no armor, kevlar, up-armored vehicles? Will they be expected to assume an "outside the hesco" level of risk that others don't? I think they should, to some extent, but it's a difficult call.

Gee, I've rolled around in Afghanistan in an unarmored Ford pickup for the last 2.5 months. ANA/ANP make excellent security. And that's in a role where people have a huge self-interest in killing me/us. It's just not that risky, here. But that's my mind-set vs. the typical guy in a tie.

The problem as I see it is that the DoS is made up of the type of guys who don't know their heads from their butts in an agrarian/pastoral/sectarian setting. But I get the impression that State wants to grow their own from fellow Ivy Leaguers and Biff's tennis buddies and is actually frightened by people with real experience. The State guys I meet almost universally meet that model. Good on them for being here, but in practical terms, they might know office infighting, but don't know jack about the things Afghans care about.

Here's the deal: Show me a way to do this while staying married to my wife, and I'd do the job. Heck, I'd do 6 months on and 3 months off for the rest of my natural life. But don't making me fricking move to that hell-hole known as DC. Now THERE is your other problem....

[Steve the Planner]

It is pretty hard to read where the strategy is behind US reconstruction. Surge to Iraq in 2008, then to Afghanistan in 2009. Where in 2010? (Back to Iraq?)

Always seems to be an "after-the-problems-become-embarrassing" kind of effort rather than a serious understanding that post-war population stabilization and reconstruction is the critical next step to a safe landing at the end of a conflict.

As a civilian planning consultant/trouble shooter in real life, I served 2008 in Iraq as a Senior Urban Planning Adviser (DoS/Iraq), based in the North.

I saw a lot of great folks doing heroic work on the ground, but, in all seriousness, you can't rebuild a country that way.

Bruce noted that FSOs don't have the skill sets to do or direct actual reconstruction either, and that was evident in Iraq.

Once in a while, you found an FSO who learned a lot more than he should have, or was just a good leader, but for myself and most of the experts that came in under DoS, the organizational structure was very poor.

Bruce rightly said: "The problem is, FSOs only possess a slice of the skill sets needed to engage in Afghanistan. We need many more civilians, clearly, the paradox is that while the military is currently the most urgent element, it is ultimately the least important. In addition to State and USAID, we need people from Justice, USDA, Department of Commerce, experts from the legislative branch, experienced community organizers, city planners, electrical engineers, civil engineers, small town mayors, city officials, all of whom need to be spread liberally around the country. These are the people with the skill sets - not the DOS or the DOD (or its many parts)."

On this web site and others, I see a lot of naivety about the civilian side of the world. Grabbing a batch of civilians and throwing them into the fray without a clear strategy and structure doesn't get the value out of them, or bring the needed solutions.

System-level planners and experts are needed at the country level, and with a lot of regional and local movements and feedback, to set the framework and programs so other more specialized experts can do their thing at whichever level is appropriate for what they are working on. Sometimes problems like a regional drought need to be worked on many levels at a time, with a lot of different experts engaged in different ways, and at different levels of government.

In Iraq, only FSO's communicated with the mothership, and little came down to the field. Most of the experts were off on a FOB somewhere with little or no ability to do what they really do best---analyze a problem like failed regional water systems from all sides and find systemic solutions. Instead, they were just firing off non-lethal rounds of reverse osmosis plants and package generators---not much more than what the soldiers had been doing.

In Iraq, we built our informal civilian adviser networks at ADACs, lounges and hotels as we were coming or going on leave (and subsequent gmails). There was no formal communication, meeting structure or plan for civilian advisers, so we had to just make it up as we went. And do the best you could with what was available at your FOB or PRT.

There was a lot of great work done, especially at EPRTs at the grassroots level, but I suspect that much of that could have been done by CAs, etc... Civilians in a war zone need to be making a very big and unique difference in order to be worth the time, effort and sacrifice to put them there.

I was fortunate, during my tour to be heavily supported by a co-located division, so I got a lot of opportunities to get around to ministries, conferences, etc., and bring together a lot of pieces. But it was pretty ad hoc.

Too many other times, I heard about civilian advisers being cut-off and wasted by their PRT, or ineffective ones using the isolation as cover for poor performance.

In one PRT, there was an AG guy that specialized in taking Iraqi farmers on week-long trips to Jordan to study drip agriculture (luxury junkets by any measure) while the other AG guy, a nuts-and-bolts specialist in desert farm environments, was stuck on a one-man PRT in the boonies, but desperate to help Iraqis. The FSO didn't understand how to track and deploy a very scarce and valuable resource, so a guy that everyone needed in Iraq and Afghanistan went home unsatisfied and unsuccessful, while the other guy is still making regular runs to Jordan. Which one is likely to get a birth in Afghanistan?

Sending civilian experts doesn't help much unless there is a productive framework for their skills to be applied. Despite ad hoc successes here and there, the right framework did not exist in Iraq.

All the noise about civil/mil conflicts aside, I never met a good civilian expert that didn't have instant and great rapport with his military counterparts. The FSOs was always a different question. Maybe its just the grey hairs, which lots of civilian experts had, but not as many FSOs.

I just wonder what could be done if there was an improvement in structure for the civilian advisers, along with a lot more effective program planning, collaboration among the experts, feedback opportunities on the effectiveness of programs, and performance tracking to get the most out of the civilians.

Like most of the civilians, my tour ended and I got on a plane home. No "thank you for your service," and no DoS exit interviews. A lot of lessons not learned...

Steve the Planner

[Bruce]

From todays NYT:

"The officials predicted that the requirement for the “civilian surge” would eventually include hundreds of people with experience in areas that include small-business management, legal affairs, veterinary medicine, public sanitation, counternarcotics efforts and air traffic control.

In addition, officials said, the number of diplomatic positions at the American Embassy in Kabul and at provincial reconstruction outposts could increase by several hundred more. Some officials supplied details of the plan on the condition of anonymity because the decisions were not final.
….

(DOD U/S Flournoy said that ) the government was still “playing a game of catch-up” after years of not setting aside money to create this civilian expertise, and she described the reliance on reservists as part of “a whole host of stopgap measures” necessary until teams of civilian experts could be created."

This fits very closely with what I said in some earlier posts. The diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, refugee coordination, governance jobs, etc, can be filled by DOS. Much of the rest will simply have to come from elsewhere. The reserves are not the best answer, but they have many of the skills. The problem is that the civilian agencies (USDA, DOC, EPA) are neither configured nor functionally capable of compelling people to deploy.

A significant chunk of the specific civilian surge will likely fall to contractors.

Regarding some previous posts:

A couple of thoughts. Steve the Planner makes some great points. As an FSO with gray hair (what little I have of it), I have a good sense of the strengths and limitations of DOS skill sets. There is a definite role for the right FSO, but it seems that, in Iraq, quantity often trumped quality.

As for no thanks for the service or outbrief. I agree. I got neither myself.

RE: "120mm" Based on 2.5 months somewhere in Afghanistan, 120 MM states:

"Gee, I've rolled around in Afghanistan in an unarmored Ford pickup for the last 2.5 months. ANA/ANP make excellent security. And that's in a role where people have a huge self-interest in killing me/us. It's just not that risky, here. But that's my mind-set vs. the typical guy in a tie."

Well, based on my year in Afghanistan, there are DOS people (Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Nuristan) where you simply can't drive around in an "unarmored ford." In Helmand, the DOS rep (who has been there for nearly two years) would have been dead a long time back.

Sure, up in Mazar and Kunduz, Bamiyan, Panjshir, you can ride around in the open. Herat as well. Not in the Pech river valley or on the road to Musa Qala.

As to language skills? Do we all have them? No. Right now all except one or two of the DOS people heading out this summer are finishing their 44 week high intensity language course. As for previous DOS people, I won't give her name, but, for one example, we had a Pashto speaker working near the Pak border for over a year. She had specific death threats against her. If she had ridden for "2.5 months" in an unarmored ford pickup, she would be dead as well.

"But I get the impression that State wants to grow their own from fellow Ivy Leaguers and Biff's tennis buddies and is actually frightened by people with real experience."

I've got 24 years as an FSO. I graduated from a California State College. Not many Ivy Leaguers at State. This is a sterotype from 50 years ago, maybe. I'm one of many FSOs with more than one war under my belt. And no, we don't wear ties out at PRTs. Sorry.

[Charles Martel]

This is the DoS press release that explains that the State Department is going to use military reservists because it can't fill the 250 slots it has in Afghanistan. It says it is "essential" to have a civilian increase, but reservists will be the "most effective way" to fill the slots. 21,000 Soldiers, 250 civilians, but we'll use Soldiers to fill the civilian slots because the civilians can't. Guess that qualifies as "extraordinary steps."

CM



* President Obama has made clear that a significant increase in
civilian personnel in Afghanistan is an essential component of our
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens
in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

* We welcome the participation of military reservists in a
civilian plan if that is the most effective way to reach our plan
levels.

* The United States is taking a "whole of government" approach to
meeting this critical need for civilian expertise. The process for
identifying and hiring civilians has already begun, and in close
coordination with our international partners and the Afghan government,
we are determining the right mix of civilian expertise required to meet
our shared strategic goal.

* We will be using all authorities, including extraordinary steps
such as term appointments and curtailments of current assignments, to
fill the positions required for this mission. We intend to fill the
civilian positions on schedule. The civilian plan is totally integrated
with the military plan and will move seamlessly behind counterinsurgency
efforts.

[120mm]

This is the DoS press release that explains that the State Department is going to use military reservists because it can't fill the 250 slots it has in Afghanistan. It says it is "essential" to have a civilian increase, but reservists will be the "most effective way" to fill the slots. 21,000 Soldiers, 250 civilians, but we'll use Soldiers to fill the civilian slots because the civilians can't. Guess that qualifies as "extraordinary steps."

CM



* President Obama has made clear that a significant increase in
civilian personnel in Afghanistan is an essential component of our
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens
in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

* We welcome the participation of military reservists in a
civilian plan if that is the most effective way to reach our plan
levels.

* The United States is taking a "whole of government" approach to
meeting this critical need for civilian expertise. The process for
identifying and hiring civilians has already begun, and in close
coordination with our international partners and the Afghan government,
we are determining the right mix of civilian expertise required to meet
our shared strategic goal.

* We will be using all authorities, including extraordinary steps
such as term appointments and curtailments of current assignments, to
fill the positions required for this mission. We intend to fill the
civilian positions on schedule. The civilian plan is totally integrated
with the military plan and will move seamlessly behind counterinsurgency
efforts.

As I stated in another post, there are already too many "experts" in the area. What we need are practitioners. Look at the Agricultural Development Teams, such as the one deployed by the Nebraska National Guard for an example of how to do this right.

Unfortunately, what DoS will probably get is a bunch of guys with degrees and precious little practical experience. Or, they'll get guys with practical experience, but not the right mindset. But, through chance, they'll get a few guys and gals who will probably make it work in spite of the rest of the folks that go.