It is pretty hard to read where the strategy is behind US reconstruction. Surge to Iraq in 2008, then to Afghanistan in 2009. Where in 2010? (Back to Iraq?)

Always seems to be an "after-the-problems-become-embarrassing" kind of effort rather than a serious understanding that post-war population stabilization and reconstruction is the critical next step to a safe landing at the end of a conflict.

As a civilian planning consultant/trouble shooter in real life, I served 2008 in Iraq as a Senior Urban Planning Adviser (DoS/Iraq), based in the North.

I saw a lot of great folks doing heroic work on the ground, but, in all seriousness, you can't rebuild a country that way.

Bruce noted that FSOs don't have the skill sets to do or direct actual reconstruction either, and that was evident in Iraq.

Once in a while, you found an FSO who learned a lot more than he should have, or was just a good leader, but for myself and most of the experts that came in under DoS, the organizational structure was very poor.

Bruce rightly said: "The problem is, FSOs only possess a slice of the skill sets needed to engage in Afghanistan. We need many more civilians, clearly, the paradox is that while the military is currently the most urgent element, it is ultimately the least important. In addition to State and USAID, we need people from Justice, USDA, Department of Commerce, experts from the legislative branch, experienced community organizers, city planners, electrical engineers, civil engineers, small town mayors, city officials, all of whom need to be spread liberally around the country. These are the people with the skill sets - not the DOS or the DOD (or its many parts)."

On this web site and others, I see a lot of naivety about the civilian side of the world. Grabbing a batch of civilians and throwing them into the fray without a clear strategy and structure doesn't get the value out of them, or bring the needed solutions.

System-level planners and experts are needed at the country level, and with a lot of regional and local movements and feedback, to set the framework and programs so other more specialized experts can do their thing at whichever level is appropriate for what they are working on. Sometimes problems like a regional drought need to be worked on many levels at a time, with a lot of different experts engaged in different ways, and at different levels of government.

In Iraq, only FSO's communicated with the mothership, and little came down to the field. Most of the experts were off on a FOB somewhere with little or no ability to do what they really do best---analyze a problem like failed regional water systems from all sides and find systemic solutions. Instead, they were just firing off non-lethal rounds of reverse osmosis plants and package generators---not much more than what the soldiers had been doing.

In Iraq, we built our informal civilian adviser networks at ADACs, lounges and hotels as we were coming or going on leave (and subsequent gmails). There was no formal communication, meeting structure or plan for civilian advisers, so we had to just make it up as we went. And do the best you could with what was available at your FOB or PRT.

There was a lot of great work done, especially at EPRTs at the grassroots level, but I suspect that much of that could have been done by CAs, etc... Civilians in a war zone need to be making a very big and unique difference in order to be worth the time, effort and sacrifice to put them there.

I was fortunate, during my tour to be heavily supported by a co-located division, so I got a lot of opportunities to get around to ministries, conferences, etc., and bring together a lot of pieces. But it was pretty ad hoc.

Too many other times, I heard about civilian advisers being cut-off and wasted by their PRT, or ineffective ones using the isolation as cover for poor performance.

In one PRT, there was an AG guy that specialized in taking Iraqi farmers on week-long trips to Jordan to study drip agriculture (luxury junkets by any measure) while the other AG guy, a nuts-and-bolts specialist in desert farm environments, was stuck on a one-man PRT in the boonies, but desperate to help Iraqis. The FSO didn't understand how to track and deploy a very scarce and valuable resource, so a guy that everyone needed in Iraq and Afghanistan went home unsatisfied and unsuccessful, while the other guy is still making regular runs to Jordan. Which one is likely to get a birth in Afghanistan?

Sending civilian experts doesn't help much unless there is a productive framework for their skills to be applied. Despite ad hoc successes here and there, the right framework did not exist in Iraq.

All the noise about civil/mil conflicts aside, I never met a good civilian expert that didn't have instant and great rapport with his military counterparts. The FSOs was always a different question. Maybe its just the grey hairs, which lots of civilian experts had, but not as many FSOs.

I just wonder what could be done if there was an improvement in structure for the civilian advisers, along with a lot more effective program planning, collaboration among the experts, feedback opportunities on the effectiveness of programs, and performance tracking to get the most out of the civilians.

Like most of the civilians, my tour ended and I got on a plane home. No "thank you for your service," and no DoS exit interviews. A lot of lessons not learned...

Steve the Planner