Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success

[patmc]

The report states the OCS-IS is the most costly because it robs peter to pay paul, taking usually senior NCOs out of units, and directing them to officer corps. It also takes them out of the Warrant pool, which pulls from senior NCO's. The report claims that OCS takes a NCO with 5-10+ years experience, takes him away from Soldiers, platoons, companies, etc... and puts him/her into OCS. After completion, they will serve as a 2LT, but then have to go to degree completion. Once back, many will be close to 20 year retirement, and many are eligible to retire before they make MAJ, which does not fill the mid-career officer shortage.

Years of service + OCS + branch training + degree = most costly. That's their metric.

[ODB]

The report states the OCS-IS is the most costly because it robs peter to pay paul, taking usually senior NCOs out of units, and directing them to officer corps. It also takes them out of the Warrant pool, which pulls from senior NCO's. The report claims that OCS takes a NCO with 5-10+ years experience, takes him away from Soldiers, platoons, companies, etc... and puts him/her into OCS. After completion, they will serve as a 2LT, but then have to go to degree completion. Once back, many will be close to 20 year retirement, and many are eligible to retire before they make MAJ, which does not fill the mid-career officer shortage.

Years of service + OCS + branch training + degree = most costly. That's their metric.

But that is where I see no reason it cannot be streamlined. If I stay in the same branch, say Infantry to Infantry, what branch qualification would I need? I guess to put this into perspective one would have to talk about at what rank of soldier we are talking about. Do we not always rob Peter to pay Paul? The bottomline is, which in the end would have the bigger overall impact? Soldier staying NCO or Soldier becoming an Officer? Ultimately what is the biggest bang for our buck?

I can't buy the losing NCO bit. That is always the arguement when it comes to OCS, SF, Ranger BN, etc...... If that was the case the only NCOs left in units would be the ones who didn't make the cut or undesireables if you want to say.

I understand the system, just not one to fall into the system is always right. I tend to look at how the system could be improved and question the system a lot.

[Shek]

I can't buy the losing NCO bit. That is always the arguement when it comes to OCS, SF, Ranger BN, etc...... If that was the case the only NCOs left in units would be the ones who didn't make the cut or undesireables if you want to say.

Not every solid NCO wants to go do something else, but for each one that does, you have to replace him/her. Sometimes the backfill was ready for the responsibility and the platoon is no worse off or maybe even better off (win-win), and sometimes they simply weren't ready and the platoon suffers from it (win-lose).

It's the same argument that pops everytime that you have mandatory promotions - "they're a good soldier, but they're not ready to be a sergeant" - when you start thinning the ranks to make officers, then you're simply putting more people in the position to where they're given more responsibility than they are ready for.

[Ken White]

...when you start thinning the ranks to make officers, then you're simply putting more people in the position to where they're given more responsibility than they are ready for.

LINK.

LINK.

I can give you a fairly long list of Colonels including this one LINK

Not to mention the smartest and best Major, bar none, that I ever worked for LINK.

Yes, those are exceptions but if your statement is correct -- "you're simply putting more people in the position to where they're given more responsibility than they are ready for." -- then your system is flawed.

Fortunately, in my experience, your statement is far from correct in most cases.

[Shek]

LINK.

LINK.

I can give you a fairly long list of Colonels including this one LINK

Not to mention the smartest and best Major, bar none, that I ever worked for LINK.

Yes, those are exceptions but if your statement is correct -- "you're simply putting more people in the position to where they're given more responsibility than they are ready for." -- then your system is flawed.

Fortunately, in my experience, your statement is far from correct in most cases.

Ken,

Misfire! Here's the preceeding paragraph:

Not every solid NCO wants to go do something else, but for each one that does, you have to replace him/her. Sometimes the backfill was ready for the responsibility and the platoon is no worse off or maybe even better off (win-win), and sometimes they simply weren't ready and the platoon suffers from it (win-lose).

I was still speaking about the backfills in the snippet your cut, some of whom are ready and it's a win-win and some of whom aren't ready and then the platoon is worse for the departure.

[Ken White]

Especially by moi...

I was still speaking about the backfills in the snippet your cut, some of whom are ready and it's a win-win and some of whom aren't ready and then the platoon is worse for the departure.

I addressed that reality with my first bullet. All platoons go in cycles, they get really good folks and are well trained then they have bad weeks or months due to our total Army totally screwed up personnel system.

That first bullet mentioned the fact that competence is not totally experience derived and is not time dependent -- yet the SYSTEM says those are the criteria...

I did mention that Shalikasvili et.al. were exceptions and they are. I realized you were addressing the NCO backfill. I applied those Links to counter your earlier point that the intellectual capacity might not be present as well as to make the point that they and others not as exceptional, just good average Officers, left units, generally in far worse conditions for the units and the Army than we are now experiencing -- and the units survived...

That intellectual capacity it is available but we will have to change the way we do business. Backfill is always available and my first bullet above also made that point -- we do okay when we fill and operate at less than design optimum -- but it takes an 'emergency' to allow (deliberately chosen word) us to do so. That, too, argues for changes...

[Shek]

I applied those Links to counter your earlier point that the intellectual capacity might not be present

Once again I think you're misapplying what I said. There's certainly plenty of talented, intelligent, and intellectual OCS officers out there - some of them are even my friends

I was speaking to using an OCS only model as per Wilf's allusion to the IDF, Germany, and Sweden. In increasing the percentage of OCS commissioned officers from 15% to 45% of all officers, we have increased the number of below CAT II commissioned officers.

As a result, the share of OCS-IS candidates with a U.S. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score below Category II has increased from 15 percent in 1997 to 35 percent in 2007 (see Figure 5). This is significant because the AFQT score is used to determine basic qualification for enlistment, and to help predict future academic and occupational success in the Armed Forces.

If we were to increase OCS accessions even further, then you'd expect that the increase would have to dig deeper. If we screened harder and encouraged more OCS amongst the enlisted and NCO, then we could be more selective and I'm sure you could reverse this trend to some degree, but at the cost of your NCO corps. The authors make this exact point.

6. NCOs are sergeants. Similar to those found increasingly in professional armies, the U.S. Army’s NCO Corps consists of seasoned enlisted soldiers with increasing levels of rank, responsibility and authority. While subordinate to commissioned officers and not commissioned themselves, they are invaluable to the leadership of troop formations. Their direct leadership of
soldiers and their focus upon building and sustaining individual proficiencies allows commissioned officers to focus upon collective training, as well as the organizational and strategic levels of leadership. Importantly, NCOs are critical not just to the development of soldiers but to the development of junior officers as well, with whom they team in the effective leadership of
formations. Any improvements to an army’s officer corps gained at the expense of its NCO corps will likely have a deleterious effect upon that army.

[Eden]

I personally wouldn't worry that much about how we generate officers, or what the exact ratio of enlisted-NCO-Officer should be. Those all need fixing, but I would say there is already plenty of talent in both the NCO and officer corps. The problem is we don't do a very good job (as an institution) of identifying various talents, of retaining those talents, and of matching those talents to the proper job. Our current system matches experience to jobs; that is, we assume if an officer has had certain schools and assignments, he is a good match for particular jobs. On the other hand, we assume that lacking certain prerequisites, an officer cannot be successful in a given job. For instance, if he hasn't been to the branch Advanced Course, he can't be a company commander no matter how talented. As another example, a superb captain, a peerless leader of men, with advanced degrees in Arabic and two tours under his belt in Iraq, could not be made commander of a PRT in, say, Iraq, because that is a liuetenant colonel's slot.

So tinkering with sources of commission and degree requirements is just working around the edges until the institution learns how to employ the considerable pool of talent it already possesses.

[Stevely]

Perhaps there is too much centralization and credentialism in the current officer management system? It seems too much is taken away from commanders for placing their officers where they need them in favor of a faceless, complex Army-wide officer management system. Maybe the Army needs to find a way to decentralize career management for officers up to maybe O5 or so. This way not only does a commander get the most out of his officers, but it could be advantageous to the "managed" as well - good commanders could stay commanders where they best belong, good staff officers could stay on staff where they are most effective, etc.

[Ken White]

The report states the OCS-IS is the most costly because it robs peter to pay paul, taking usually senior NCOs out of units...

Rarely, most OCS types are SSG or below, mostly below.

and directing them to officer corps.

Who has more value?

It also takes them out of the Warrant pool, which pulls from senior NCO's.

In many specialties -- but Warrants could be commissioned and NCOs could do Warrant jobs. If the response to that is increased pay, I suggest that we really need a system to reward good performance with a pay increase and NOT a rank increase. I have never seen a motor sergeant who wasn't the best mechanic in his platoon -- and most of 'em would rather be Mechanics than Platoon Sergeants. I've seen some Warrant Crypto and other types -- they didn't do much. The Marine make Marine Gunners Platoon Leaders -- why not just commisioon them and let 'em know they may make Captain but higher isn't likely.

The report claims that OCS takes a NCO with 5-10+ years experience, takes him away from Soldiers, platoons, companies, etc... and puts him/her into OCS. After completion, they will serve as a 2LT, but then have to go to degree completion. Once back, many will be close to 20 year retirement, and many are eligible to retire before they make MAJ, which does not fill the mid-career officer shortage.

I can think of several responses to that but do not believe that's any where near the norm. I KNOW it was not 15 years and more ago. Regardless, the bulk of that complaint hinges on regulatory requirements. Regs can be changed.

I'll also again state that the Army is over officered and much of that excess is on Staffs that are far too large. I once serve in a large headquarters with over 100 Field Grades. The vast majority of whom would far rather have been elsewhere and many of whom were terribly underemployed.

Years of service + OCS + branch training + degree = most costly. That's their metric.

Specious. The service was bought and paid for in the Enlisted account and he presumably did something to earn his pay.

OCS is a cost.

Branch training is an invalid charge as all Officers regardless of commission source attend.

The degree is a cost (though I'd argue the real necessity in some cases) but is probably cheaper then some ROTC scholarships and I'll also point out that's another regulatory requirement...

I understand their point and I understand much opposition to OCS and direct commissions in the Army. I acknowledge the hidden cost which they cite but would argue that they're skewing the metric to make a point...

People do that with metrics quite often...

Thanks for the info -- the above BTW is an attack on their justification process, not you.

[Schmedlap]

If the degree completion and time necessary to do it are considered too costly for an officer who will not likely progress beyond MAJ, then it seems we could make the degree completion waiverable if the OCS candidate has 10 years or more prior service. The reason for the degree is that it is considered an educational foundation for a professional officer. If the individual is not going to progress beyond MAJ, then I doubt there is a whole lot of heavy, big-picture stuff that he will need an advanced degree to wrap his brain around. Most staff work can be done by moderately-trained simians and the leadership work is all small unit stuff that stresses creativity, intellect, and interpersonal skills, not education, test-taking, and pontificating.

[Uboat509]

If the degree completion and time necessary to do it are considered too costly for an officer who will not likely progress beyond MAJ, then it seems we could make the degree completion waiverable if the OCS candidate has 10 years or more prior service. The reason for the degree is that it is considered an educational foundation for a professional officer. If the individual is not going to progress beyond MAJ, then I doubt there is a whole lot of heavy, big-picture stuff that he will need an advanced degree to wrap his brain around. Most staff work can be done by moderately-trained simians and the leadership work is all small unit stuff that stresses creativity, intellect, and interpersonal skills, not education, test-taking, and pontificating.

Someone correct me if I am wrong, but isn't this what the Navy Limited Duty Officer program is all about?

SFC W

[Shek]

Years of service + OCS + branch training + degree = most costly. That's their metric.

Pat,

Close. Branch training is a cost for every officer, so that's a wash. The degree will almost always be cheaper for OCS-IS, but chances are that many of those degrees were paid for with tuition assistance, so while it's a cost advantage to OCS-IS, it's not free. I also suspect that the overhead for OCS isn't a factor, as much of that infrastructure has to exist to allow OCS to be a viable source of high throughput expansion in the event of a major war that requires the # of commissions to skyrocket.

Instead, the opportunity cost is that for every OCS-IS commissionee, you have to recruit and bring in the pyramid of guys to get that OCS-IS candidate. Here is the pertinent quote from page 9:

At the same time, the U.S. Army has increasingly drawn senior NCOs into OCS. In 1997, only 15 percent of OCS-IS candidates had more than 10 years of enlisted service. By 2007 that percentage had tripled to 45 percent, and a full quarter of these were Sergeants First Class.

To create these E-6s and E-7s, you had to bring in several privates. Some left after their first term as E-4s (or lower if they were chaptered). Some spent a second term and made E-5 or possibly E-6. Then some of these stuck around for another enlistment and became career, and then the Army accepted them into OCS-IS. Thus, the cost of developing this NCO is the cost of pyramid of folks that we had to enlist and screen and weed out or simply got out. Given the reality that we are drawing nearly half of our OCS-IS candidates from the E-6 and E-7 ranks, this cost is great. Now, I'd agree that you have to discount this some because the Army is getting a service from these other potential future E-6/E-7s, but you simply cannot just dismiss these costs. Also, if you want to use this model, you have to over-acess to allow your E-6/E-7 ranks to be overstrength, or else you would also have to account for the cost of decreasing the quality of your E-6/E-7 ranks by having your better performers go to OCS.

Of course, this cost decreases if you select them earlier in their enlisted careers, but then you would see decreasing continuation rates compared to now by OCS-IS.

[Ken White]

...Now, I'd agree that you have to discount this some because the Army is getting a service from these other potential future E-6/E-7s, but you simply cannot just dismiss these costs. Also, if you want to use this model, you have to over-acess to allow your E-6/E-7 ranks to be overstrength, or else you would also have to account for the cost of decreasing the quality of your E-6/E-7 ranks by having your better performers go to OCS.

Three points:

- I spent over six years as a PSG -- over three of them as a brand new SSG. Rank is not the issue, competence is -- and competence is absolutely and positively not totally experience or time dependent. It is also noteworthy that was during a time (early 60s) of Officer shortages Army - wide when many rifle Companies in the 82d had only two or three Officers. I had one or another of six platoon leaders for a total of less than two of those almost seven years. That includes six months running a Recon Platoon in Viet Nam. That, incidentally, in an Abn Inf Bn that was less than about 60% strength on Officers. At one point, almost half the Platoons in the Bn had NCOs as acting Platoon leaders and not all of them were PSG E7 types. We also had a 105 By in the Bde with an E5 First Sergeant...

- Any overstrength should be avoided as it leads to make work and underemployment (and thus morale destroying) problems.

- In my observation over many years, those NCOs who elected to go to OCS were not the better performers in most cases -- a few certainly were but the majority were only average or even below average performers. Most NCOs were driven to opt for OCS for one of three reasons -- Ambition; Officers live better / increased social status; A true desire to be able to do more and better for the troops (in that order). Obviously there were and are other factors but those were the big three. Many really good and intelligent NCOs did not opt for OCS due to the social issue and the conformity required of officers. Many offered direct commissions turned them down for those reasons and due to the fact they knew they'd most likely get only three years commissioned and that would be it. As an aside, change the rule on 10 years commissioned service and retirement and see what that does.

As I said, IMO the issue is sheer competence, not competiveness. As Schmedlap said, there's a distinct and obvious need for some high intellectual power and education for some (and I'd add definitely for higher rank) but most Officers are significantly over qualified for the jobs they do. Think about it...

That may have a lot to do with departures at eight years...