Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success

[Shek]

If the difference is that great, according to the size of the scholarship, then that is probably a good indicator that they were never all that motivated about being Army Officers in the first place. Why did we offer up that much money as an incentive to people who were so uninterested? It makes me wonder if the cash and resources involved were a high-payoff - or even worthwhile - investment.

On the other hand, I'm hesitant to give undue weight to motivation, rather than disappointment, disillusionment, boredom, frustration, et cetera. Lots of Officers come into the Army with high hopes of accomplishing things, improving the organization, and challenging themselves. Many of them find themselves in a branch that they did not want, or doing work that is not intellectually stimulating, often intellectually insulting, or find themselves encumbered by a lousy chain of command, or otherwise just having their time and talents wasted and the opportunity to do anything worthwhile quashed. I've seen some very good Officers beaten into submission by the bureaucracy and stupidity. You can only take so much abuse from a crappy CO, see yourself surrounded by far less capable Officers who often outrank you, and do so many mind-numbing staff jobs until you throw up your hands and say screw it. I am not speaking of myself in that regard. I've seen some Captains whom I thought had far more potential than I did, who stuck it out for longer than I did, and they eventually just threw in the towel, wondering why they spend 18 out of every 24 months away from the families and wondering why they voluntarily suppress their earning power just to have their time, talent, and motivation squandered.

With some of that in mind, I'd like to see the breakdown for the following...
- Retention by branch
- Retention among those who got their branch of choice versus those who got their 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc.
- Retention among ECP versus non-ECP, including a breakdown by scholarship type
- Retention according to first duty station and last duty station

Schmedlap,

A decent number of cadets at USMA right now turned down an opportunity to go to an Ivy League school, and I don't believe money was a factor in their decision to come to USMA. Additionally, almost all of the cadets I know are excited to be platoon leaders and looking forward to it (maybe some of that is simply the exciting of finishing and leaving West Point, but I don't run into any that are dreading their time in the Army - the four and five year commitments that following from USMA and ROTC scholarship is simply too steep for those that aren't genuinely interested in giving the Army a shot IMO). I think your second half of your post is where the answer is.

A person who's frustrated at their first duty station because of a lackluster chain of command often won't do the career course and PCS to another unit where the odds are that they'll have a more positive experience. Add into that options that dangle in front of them for higher paying jobs and spouses that more than not today also want to have a chance at their own career, I think it's hard to question the motivation of those who have chosen to serve, even if only for their initial commitment.

[Schmedlap]

... almost all of the cadets I know are excited to be platoon leaders and looking forward to it (maybe some of that is simply the exciting of finishing and leaving West Point, but I don't run into any that are dreading their time in the Army - the four and five year commitments that following from USMA and ROTC scholarship is simply too steep for those that aren't genuinely interested in giving the Army a shot IMO). I think your second half of your post is where the answer is.

I, too, think the second half of my previous post has more validity than the first. But, in regard to the money factor, I was speaking more to the differences in scholarships, not so much to USMA. The decision to spend one's college years in a military school, rather than a binge-drinking fraternity house, suggests a high level of commitment. I would add in other military schools as well, like VMI, Citadel, etc. Recognizing that those folks get scholarships, as well, I'd be curious to see the retention breakdown according to commissioning source for the scholarship awardees. My suspicion is that it will be higher for the military schools - not because they produce Officers of any significant difference in quality, but because they recruit individuals with a higher level of commitment to make a career out of the Army.

What I was curious about with the 4-year scholarships (specifically, cadets attending regular universities who have 4-year scholarships) is whether the people who accept them put a lot of thought into the commitment afterwards. This is, after all, the United States. People are not conditioned to think about the future. They run up their credit cards, live beyond their means, indulge in the moment and then complain about the costs later on. It wouldn't surprise me if a lot of university students realize that they need to choose between school expenses and beer money, discover that they're eligible for a scholarship because of their grades (why do we base it on grades?), and then take it, not fully considering the commitment that they are obligating themselves to.

Alternatively, I also wonder if it is difficult stay excited about the military when you are immersed in a civilian world that is devoid of personal responsibility or any ethic of service to others. I lived in DC and attended a large university there last year. I am now roommates with two guys who are fresh out of college (one who went to college in DC, the other in NYC). The world that they were just in - no job, no responsibility, no focus on anything but themselves, growing ever more confident by the day that they've got things figured out - it doesn't seem conducive to fostering any kind of desire to serve. If there ever was a desire, it seems likely that it was significantly eroded.

[Ken White]

will not work -- in both Korea and Viet Nam, what he suggests was effectively the case. Officer priority went to command, staff jobs frequently were filled by NCOs. Operations sergeants (mostly SFCs, MSGs by design but they were not always available -- too many on large, high level staffs. Today you have SGMs...) and their assistants routinely ran Bn and even Bde TOCs constantly and by design. Staff ranks were all one or two grades lower than today I know one Bde in Viet Nam that had a MSG as the S4 for several months and a couple of Companies led by their 1SG for more than a day or two. LTs were often staff Os at Bn, CPTs at Bde. I also knew an Artillery Battery that had a SGT (E5) First Sergeant for several months. Probably not surprisingly, Division staffs were almost always overstrength...

His ideas will work. Whether anyone has the audacity or sense to apply them is another story...

I realize we're a Superpower and a big Army and all but someone should take a look at Swedish military ranks. Before you laugh, consider the fact that they spent many years prepared to face off the USSR, that they buy and use some pretty innovative, very sensible and capable equipment (much of it better than ours) and that their admittedly small bodies of troops recently deployed here and there -- to include Bosnia / Kosovo and Afghanistan -- get good comments on their competence. We do not have all the right answers. Indeed, I often think we don't even ask the right questions...