SECDEF's DoD Budget Proposals

[Schmedlap]

From The Economist, A Daring Punt: Robert Gates Changes the Pentagon's Priorities

MORE men at the expense of machines; more drones rather than top-end fighter jets and future bombers; more helicopters for combat troops rather than a replacement for the presidential chopper; more coastal vessels and fewer aircraft-carriers; better cyberdefences, but scaled-back missile defences and laser weapons. In short, the new American defence budget would spend more on today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and less to stave off future threats from China or Russia.

The proposals have delighted those who think America will fight irregular “small wars” for the foreseeable future, and horrified those who believe it must be ready to fight big conventional ones. (emphasis mine)

I still don't understand the fear over the conventional capability. While I understand, but do not share, the concern that we do not train enough on conventional, BDE/DIV warfighting, I think it takes irrationality to a new level in worrying that this budget, too, will somehow diminish our conventional capability. The real or imagined diminishing of that capability is due to allocation of training time, not material resources.

NOTE: The comment sections of a news outlet's website are generally not the place to find intelligent discussion, but this story in the Economist bucked the trend. Check out the first 10 or so comments (click this link instead of the one at the story, to see the oldest comments first). This is one of those rare instances where reader comments actually add worthwhile commentary to the story.

In particular, see the comment by System Planner (4th comment from the top):

Mr. Gates has started a resource reallocation process without really affecting the top-line. There will be no net jobs impact. He has cleared the deck and seized the moral high ground prior to the QDR and the PR 2011 budget. In POM 2012, expect to see major surgery. His most important change is remanning the DOD civil service to provide competent acquisition oversight and a substantial in-house R&D capability. That move make DOD the master of its own fate. The day of the huge system integration contractor is rapidly passing. It really has failed miserably.

Can anyone vouch for the accuracy of that comment?

[Stevely]

In particular, see the comment by System Planner (4th comment from the top):

Can anyone vouch for the accuracy of that comment?

I have read in several places that the official word now is that the contractor workforce is too large in comparison to the rest of DOD, and that it will be reduced, and the ranks of the civil service will increase. I believe that the acquisition workforce will be entirely civil service.

Where I work (JFCOM), we have started hiring more GS (well, NSPS) and have been slowly cutting down on contractor work force via consolidating contracts, so far. So maybe it is a trend. There is certainly plenty of rumors that this will gear up in a big way.

Also, there is a big push to get anybody having anything to do with acquisition DAWIA certified, including yours truly.

[Boot]

I still don't understand the fear over the conventional capability.

I read a recent memo from JFCOM CCDR to Sec. Gates. He specifically points out that in making IW a core compentency we will not sacrifice conventional capability or nuclear forces. I believe the last sentence of the intro paragraph reads (paraphrased):
"avoid giving the impression that, if implemented, the Department was going overboard vice achieving balance with IW as a (not "the") core compontency of the Department."

Hope this sheds some light.

Boot

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

remember, Gates had no control over the adoption of the C-17, which does seem to be a more versatile replacement for the 141. The Bush/Rumsfeld days of profligate spending are perhaps over. CSAR is a very important capability that perhaps should be a more joint effort since all the services benefit from it. Plus there were other issues with the proposed CSAR-X.